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This thesis provides empirical evidence on the relation between concentrated ownership and 
the long term operating performance of acquiring firms. Large shareholders are generally 
viewed as beneficial monitors of corporate performance but high levels of concentration can 
lead to potential expropriation from minority shareholders via managerial entrenchment, 
tunneling, or sub-optimal investment decisions. This problem is potentially greater in firms 
with separation of voting and ownership rights. This thesis investigates the performance 
around takeovers in English origin countries other than the US by following the 
classification of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). While generally 
considered similar to the US, these countries vary with respect to ownership concentration 
and investor protection. 
 
This thesis controls a broad set of corporate governance mechanisms including first 
generation governance measures like CEO positions, board characteristics, and other 
blockholders. Furthermore, this thesis also examines whether different degrees of second 
generation governance mechanisms such as anti-director rights, accounting standards, legal 
enforcement, and extra-legal institutions lead to different levels of M&A performance. In 
addition, this thesis includes the new legal indexes recently developed by Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006); these measures have yet to be examined through 
empirical research. 
 
By using an accounting based methodology, this thesis presents Healy, Palepu and Ruback 
(1992) abnormal post cash flow return regression-based results and results of a change model 
(Ghosh 2001). Moreover, this thesis refers to the sample matching techniques in Barber and 
Lyon (1996) and develops the industry, size, and pre performance benchmark.  
 
The principal finding of this thesis is that M&A transactions should improve the long-term 
financial and operating performance of merging firms to reflect that accounting performance 
can capture real economic creations. After controlling for well documented governance 
mechanisms and deal characteristics, the relationship between concentrated ownership and 
the level and change in operating cash flow returns after takeovers is non-linear. Value 
creating deals are associated with higher levels of concentration consistent with decreasing 
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agency costs as the large shareholder’s wealth invested in the acquiring firm increases. 
Further, separation of ownership and voting rights leads to greater value destruction; 
acquiring firms with controlling CEO make significant improvements in post acquisition 
performance after controlling pre-performance; and the presence of CEO-Chairman duality 
and board size are both significantly negatively associated with acquisition operating 
performance.  
 
This thesis also finds, although all acquiring firms are from English origin countries, that the 
greater investor protection, as measured by the initial anti-director right index in La Porta et 
al. (1998) and revised anti-director rights index in Djankov et al. (2006) has a positive 
impact on operating cash flow returns from acquisitions. However, this thesis does not 
document any differential performance with respect to the extra- legal systems of Dyck and 





1.1 Background and Motivations 
 
This thesis adds to the ongoing debate about the agency nature of concentrated 
ownership and provides empirical evidence concerning the relationship between this type of 
ownership structure and the long-term operating performance of acquiring firms. This thesis 
also examines the effects of differing levels of country-specific legal protections on value 
creation following mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in English origin countries.   
 
Why concentrated ownership structure? Stemming mostly from the agency model of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), corporate governance research generally emphasizes the role of 
control mechanisms in ownership structures. Jensen and Meckling (1976) first used the term 
“ownership structure” instead of “capital structure” to highlight the fact that the fraction of 
equity held by the insider and outsider is a key variable in determining corporate value. 
Following this ownership structure theory, a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical 
study has continuously been devoted to investigating the relationship between corporate 
performance and the allocation of equity ownership. However, most research is generally set 
in the US and explains only the typical dispersed ownership structure initially described by 
Berle and Means (1932) (Fama and Jensen 1983a.,b, Hunt 1986, Shleifer and Vishny 1986, 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988b, Ang and Cole 2000).   
 
More recent work challenges the generalization of dispersed ownership. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of 20 
large firms and 10 median firms in each of the 27 wealthy countries, providing important 
evidence to indicate that the dispersed ownership pattern is only common to large firms in 
countries with good shareholder protection. According to their study, many public 
corporations are controlled by one or two shareholders who own a large percentage of the 




Several subsequent studies following La Porta et al. (1999) focus on specific regions. 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), for example, examine 2,980 corporations in nine East 
Asian countries. Their results prove quite conclusively that individual shareholders control 
over two-thirds of firms and that corporate wealth is largely concentrated in the hands of a 
small number of families. Similarly, Faccio and Lang (2002) analyze the ultimate ownership 
and control of 5,232 corporations in 13 western European countries. They find that 36.93 
percent of firms are widely held, while 44.29 percent of firms are family controlled; widely 
held firms are more common in the UK and Ireland, while family control is the norm in 
continental Europe. Barontini and Caprio (2005) investigate the ownership structure using 
data from 675 publicly listed firms in eleven Continental European countries. Their findings 
reveal that half of the sample companies have a majority of shareholders who hold more than 
37 percent of the ultimate voting rights. Concentrated ownership structures are important but 
have clearly been overlooked. 
 
Since concentrated ownership has its own specific costs and benefits, a growing body 
of empirical work has begun to investigate the unique characteristics of concentrated 
ownership firms. Some earlier studies suggest that larger shareholders, i.e. blockholders, 
provide a good internal mechanism for reducing agency costs: these shareholders have 
greater incentive to efficiently monitor decisions and to ensure that such decisions maximize 
firm value (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983a.,b, Shleifer and Vishny 1986, 
Morck et al. 1988b). However, recent researchers such as La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Claessens et al. (2000) report that there exists an agency problem between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders in concentrated ownership structures. Furthermore, 
they suggest that controlling shareholders often have greater control rights than cash flow 
rights. This is due in large part to pyramidal structures, cross-holdings, dual class shares and 
various other control devices (La Porta et al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000). Such a separation 
of rights provides an opportunity for controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders. 
 
Tunneling is one commonly cited problem (Johnson, Lopez-de-Silanes, La Porta and 
Shleifer 2000b). Dominant shareholders who don’t bear the full cost of their decisions often 
have incentive to act according to their own interests rather than in the interests of firm 
performance. There are many ways to achieve tunneling such as by special dividends, 
excessive perks, excess compensation, advantageous transfer prices, inter-company loans at 
non-market rates, guaranties of other entities borrowing, or enhancing the value of other 
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firms in the group by sub-optimal investment decisions such as merger transactions. 
Sub-optimal decision is the other potential agency problem. Zhang (1998) provides 
empirical evidence that controlling shareholders may make sub-optimal decisions because 
they are more risk averse than other shareholders whose portfolios are better diversified. 
Managerial entrenchment is another cost associated with concentrated ownership. Schulze, 
Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz (2001) argue that concentrated ownership structures, 
especially family structures, may reserve top management positions for affiliated members 
instead of hiring more qualified (external) professional managers. Furthermore, high 
ownership stakes by those that are also top managers, as in family firms, can limit the 
effectiveness of outside monitoring because the probability of managerial turnover or 
successful takeover bids when the firm is performing poorly is reduced (Stulz 1988, Morck 
et al. 1988b, Davies, Hillier and McColgan 2005). 
 
The impact of concentrated ownership on corporate performance is a question still 
open for discussion. Some studies show that firm value increases with the cash flow 
ownership of the largest shareholders (McConaughy, Walker, Henderson and Mishra 1998, 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 2002, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
2002, Anderson and Reeb 2003). In contrast, other studies suggest that without effective 
monitoring, controlling shareholders are likely to exploit minority shareholders and make 
sub-optimal decisions, especially when control rights exceed cash flow rights (Faccio, Lang 
and Young 2001, Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003). Also, many studies suggest that the 
relationship may not be linear (Anderson and Reeb 2003, Morck et al. 1988b, McConnell 
and Servaes 1990). A major study concerning this issue appears in work by Morck et al. 
(1988b). The investigation documents an important non-linear relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance. It seems clear that incentive effects impact 
the entire range of ownership while entrenchment effects more significantly influence the 
middle levels (5 to 25 percent).  
 
The following question arises from such situations: how to mitigate these agency 
costs? In general, the solution for these agency concerns is to enhance the monitoring 
mechanisms in corporate systems. In recent years, numerous studies have provided some 
understanding regarding the scope of these mechanisms (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Hermalin 
and Weisbach 2003, Murphy 1999, Core, Guay and Verrecchia 2003, Holderness 2003, 
Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001, Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling 1996). Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), among others, suggest seven alternative mechanisms that are commonly used to 
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control the agency problem: insider ownership, institution shareholding, large shareholders, 
independent directors, debt monitoring, managerial labor market, and the takeover market. 
Denis and McConnell (2003) termed this stream of study as first generation international 
corporate governance research, pointing out that this group of research generally focuses on 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and that it pays little attention to the 
importance of the legal system. Some literature investigates the legal system as an essential 
outside governance mechanism but provides little evidence detailing the concentrated 
ownership structures in single country (Yurtoglu 2003 for Turkey, Bae, Kang and Kim 2002 
for Korea, Holmen and Knopf 2004 for Sweden, Bigelli and Mengoli 2004 for Italy, Lee and 
Yeh 2004 for Taiwan). 
 
Why English origin? Following the investor protection classification scheme of La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), second generation research as defined 
by Denis and McConnell (2003) focuses on comparing corporate performance among 
countries with different legal characteristics (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny 2000 and 2002, Fauver, Houston and Naranjo 2003, Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu 
2004). These subsequent cross-country studies mostly document that common law countries 
have the strongest legal protection; the corporate performance of concentrated ownership is 
positively related to the legal protection of minority shareholders. Companies that operate in 
counties with English origin legal systems exhibit higher levels of corporate performance.   
  
 In addition to comparing the divergence among different legal origin families, 
second generation research also examines individual measures of legal protection including 
anti-director rights, accounting standards, and legal enforcement (La Porta et al. 1998, 
Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman 2000a, Nenova 2003, Esty and Megginson 2003). 
Some articles also consider extra-legal institutions such as market competition, labor 
pressure, moral norms (Zingales 2000, Coffee 2001, Stulz and Williamson 2003), public 
opinion and corporate tax enforcement (Dyck and Zingales 2004). Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006) also introduce two important legal measures: anti-self 
dealing index (i e. private enforcement) and public enforcement. Furthermore they detail a 
revised anti-director right index.   
 
From these measures this thesis observes that while English origin countries are often 
lumped together and viewed as examples of dispersed ownership and heightened investor 
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protection, concentrated ownership is still prevalent in many of these countries; levels of 
investor protection vary within the group, as measured by legal protection (La Porta et al. 
1998), by extra-legal systems (Dyck and Zingales 2004), or by the risks of self-dealing 
(Djankov et al. 2006). Thus, this thesis intends to compare the impact of different levels of 
legal/extra-legal protections on corporate performances in countries that share the same legal 
origins. At present, little research has been conducted in this framework; the new legal 
measures identified by Djankov et al (2006) have yet to be tested in empirical published 
papers.  
 
Why M&As? One of the most important drivers of corporate performance over the last 
decade is mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The most recent fifth merger wave emerged in 
the mid 1990s and reached its peak around the year 2000 (Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu and 
Zulehner 2003, Sudarsanam 2003). One significant feature of the recent M&A wave is that 
corporate takeovers are larger than ever. The value of M&A deals in the US at the height of 
the year 2000 merger boom was nearly $1.8 trillion; this was 5.5 times the value of the 
previous peak in 1989 (Sudarsanam 2003). This steep increase was not confined to US and 
UK markets, but also occurred throughout major industrial countries worldwide (Gugler et al. 
2003). Although companies clearly invest billions of dollars in making acquisitions, most 
empirical studies demonstrate that shareholders associated with acquiring firms experience 
wealth destruction on average or at best break even (Jensen and Ruback 1983, Agrawal, Jaffe 
and Mandelker 1992, Franks and Harris 1989, Goergen and Renneboog 2004).   
 
Due to the high costs and risks associated with M&A investment, merger activity has 
produced great interest among academics. What leads to the value reduction? What 
determines M&A success? Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) point out the importance of 
transaction characteristics such as target attitudes (either hostile or friendly), particular 
defense strategies (white knight, golden parachutes, etc), relative firm size, payment methods 
(cash, stock or combined), type of deal (merger, tender offer, or proxy contest), industry 
relatedness (horizontal/ vertical/ conglomerate), bid premiums, multi-bidders, toehold 
interests, and cross-border topics (Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami 1996, Loughran and Vijh 
1997, André, Kooli and L'Her 2004). Carline, Linn and Yadav (2002) add in the agency 
characteristics such as insider ownership, outside large shareholders, CEO turnover/ 
compensation, board composition, CEO compensation, and capital structures etc. (Kaplan 
and Weisbach 1992, Cyert, Sok-Hyon and Kumar 2002, Gugler et al. 2003).  
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Most studies in this field emphasize United States markets with widespread dispersed 
ownership structures (Jensen and Ruback 1983, Franks, Harris and Mayer 1988, Agrawal et 
al. 1992, Loughran and Vijh 1997). Recent developments in the field of concentrated 
ownership structures, however, introduce a new dimension to M&A considerations. A 
number of governance researchers now explore the relationship between concentrated 
shareholdings, corporate governance and the value creation/reduction of this specific 
corporate decision (Bae et al. 2002, Bigelli and Mengoli 2004, Holmen and Knopf 2004, 
Ben-Amar and André 2006, Faccio and Stolin 2006). One line of study argues that in 
countries with low investor protection, minority shareholders of acquiring firms experience 
overall wealth reduction because M&As are tools used by controlling shareholders to 
facilitate the potential entrenchment that benefits themselves at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Bae et al. 2002, Bigelli and Mengoli 2004). Another line of study declares that 
in countries with better corporate governance controlling shareholders may not be in a 
position to benefit themselves from acquisition transactions but they may choose instead to 
reduce personal risks by making sub-optimal investment decisions (Holmen and Knopf 2004, 
Ben-Amar and André 2006, Faccio and Stolin 2006). This thesis basically extends the 
research of Ben-Amar and André (2006) by doing a cross-country analysis over English 
origin countries. 
 
Why operating performance? To date, most research adopts traditional market based 
event study methodology to examine the relationship between acquisition performance and 
ownership structures. Such an investigation is based on the assumption that stock prices will 
immediately reflect any benefits resulting from the deals (Agrawal et al. 1992, Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford 2001, Franks and Harris 1989, Limmack 1991, Sudarsanam et al. 1996, 
Goergen and Renneboog 2004). However, Healy et al. (1992) argue that the nature of short 
term market performance methodology may not fully capture anticipated benefits from an 
acquisition. They suggest that long-term operating cash flow returns could prove better 
measures for understanding M&A value creation and its drivers. Following the work of 
Healy et al. (1992), financial researchers take a longer term perspective and examine 
acquisition improvements by operating performance (Hitt, Harrison, Ireland and Best 1998, 
Ghosh 2001, Powell and Stark 2005).   
 
Motivated by Healy et al. (1992), Ghosh (2001), Sharma and Ho (2002), and Powell 
and Stark (2005), this thesis intends to expand the discussion concerning long-term operating 
performance for the post acquisition period. It examines levels of post-operating 
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performance (ACFRpost) (Healy et al. 1992, Loughran and Ritter 1997, Linn and Switzer 
2001, Rahman and Limmack 2004, Powell and Stark 2005) and changes in operating cash 
flow return (∆ACFR) (Ghosh 2001, Carline et al. 2002, Rahman and Limmack 2004). 
Performance measurements (ACFRpost and ∆ACFR) are adjusted by the matched companies 
based upon size, industry, and pre-performance. To compare with earlier works, this thesis 
basically constructs matching procedure using various approaches introduced by Barber and 
Lyon (1996); Loughran and Ritter (1997); and Ghosh (1997). 
 
In summary, this thesis intends the following: to investigate the impact of ownership 
structures on acquiring firm performance; to explore the effective monitoring mechanisms 
including corporate governance system and legal/extra-legal protection for alleviating the 
possible expropriating problems; to complete the debate about deal characters; and to 
examine the improvement of acquisition performance by the measurement of long term 
accounting based performance. A sample of 282 deals is obtained from the Thomson 
Financial Securities Data’s SDC Platinum TM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database 
over 1997 to 2001. Following the classification of La Porta et al. (1998), this thesis covers 
eleven English origin countries other than the US: Australia, Canada, India, Republic of 
Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and the United 
Kingdom. The financial and accounting data for the seven-year window (transaction year 
plus three years before and after transactions) was collected from Thomson Financial or 
DataStream database. Ownership data was gathered by recording information taken from 
proxies or annual reports of each company, as well as from the Mergent database, the 




1.2 Research Contributions 
 
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the current academic literature. First 
of all, this thesis examines the potential consequences of concentrated ownership. Ownership 
concentrated in the hands of small groups is the norm around the world. This concept is the 
cornerstone of corporate governance research. A growing body of research devoted to firms 
with concentration ownership generally focuses on emerging economies outside the 
Anglo-American world. This thesis joins the cross-country research by investigating eleven 
English origin nations those comprise both developed and developing economies. 
 
By examining this interesting sample of English origin countries (often assumed to be 
homogeneous in law and finance literature) this thesis highlights important differences in the 
impact of firm-level ownership concentrations and governance mechanisms across countries, 
as well as in country-level legal protections surrounding firm values. In addition, this thesis 
provides evidence for various level of ownership concentration. It examines low- level 
controlled (10%-20%), middle-level controlled (20%-50%), and high-level controlled (over 
50%) firms. It also attempts to identify the non-linear relationship between ownership and 
firm performance. Along with levels of ownership, types of owners are also investigated. 
This thesis traces the ultimate owners of controlling shareholders and classifies these owners 
into four groups: family firms, financial institutions, widely held corporations, and states. 
Looking at particular types of ultimate owners might provide better understanding for the 
identity of concentrated firms.  
 
Second, corporate governance research generally examines the effects of ownership 
structures on overall corporate performance. There are relatively few articles that consider 
the impact of ownership structures on M&A activities and these activities are usually 
regarded as the most important and substantial investment decisions. This thesis focuses on 
acquisition performance rather than on overall firm performance. It therefore provides 
remarkable evidence in those areas where controlling shareholders either create real 
synergies by M&A transactions or indeed expropriate minority shareholders through M&A 
activities. In addition, most previous M&A research observes M&A activities in the early 
part of the 1990s. This thesis goes beyond earlier work to consider the period between 1997 
and 2001. The empirical evidence contained herein contributes to the most recent merger 
wave. 
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Third, this thesis controls for a broad set of corporate governance mechanisms since 
corporate governance can be viewed as an optimal set of choices. First generation 
governance measures like CEO positions, board characteristics, and other blockholders are 
examined mostly with regard to general corporate performance but without much regard to 
specific M&A performance as it appears in the existing governance research. Furthermore, in 
addition to investigating the impact of individual governance mechanisms, this thesis also 
examines relevant cross effects between type I agency problems (separation between 
ownership and control rights) and type II agency problems (separation between ownership 
and management).   
 
Second generation governance mechanisms such as anti-director rights, accounting 
standards, legal enforcement, and extra-legal institutions are essential to corporate 
performance but have been overlooked until recently. There is little evidence regarding these 
institutional measures and general firm values, and even less concerning the M&A value 
creations in existing published articles. This thesis provides empirical evidence for 
determining whether different degrees of legal/extra-legal protection lead to different levels 
of M&A performance. In addition, this thesis includes the new legal indexes recently 
developed by Djankov et al. (2006); these measures have yet to be examined through 
empirical research. 
 
Fourth, considering that short-term market performance can only reflect investor 
expectations and may not capture the real long-term economics, this thesis examines the 
operating abnormal returns created by M&A transactions using an accounting based 
methodology rather than a standard event study approach. Thus, it adds to methodological 
debates about certain performance measures and various estimates for improvement. 
Furthermore, this thesis refers to the sample matching techniques in Barber and Lyon (1996) 
and develops the industry, size, and pre performance benchmark. This approach provides an 
important contribution in controlling the under or over pre-performance problems that are 
inherent in some of the earlier studies of operating performance concerning M&As. 
Moreover, this thesis analyzes the drivers of operating cash flow returns by decomposing 
cash flow returns into cash flow margins and asset turnovers. Sales growth rates are also 




1.3 Structure of Thesis 
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two summarizes the literature 
that concerns the nature of concentrated ownership such as tunneling, sub-optimal decisions, 
and managerial entrenchment problems. It also considers the impact of concentrated 
ownership on general firm performance, including the positive incentive effects, negative 
agency costs, and non-linear relationship; any accentuating factors such as separation 
problems in ownership concentration; and mitigating factors like CEO positioning, board 
characteristics, and the existence of other large shareholders. The end of chapter two offers a 
discussion into various institution mechanisms and focuses on anti-director rights, 
accounting standards, legal enforcement (La Porta et al. 1998), extra-legal systems (Dyck 
and Zingales 2004), anti-self dealing, pubic enforcement, and revised anti-director rights 
(Djankov et al. 2006).   
 
Chapter three studies the rationale for merger and acquisition and introduces the 
background for measuring merger and acquisition performance as related to the empirical 
evidence, discussions and limitations of both short-term/long-term market performance and 
accounting based performance. This chapter also summarizes several transaction 
characteristics that are well documented as determinants of M&A success. These include 
target origin, transaction attitude, payment type, multiple bidders’ competition, industry 
relatedness, toehold interests, deal premiums, size deviation between bidders and targets, and 
levels of acquirer leverage. The final section of chapter three is devoted to describing the 
impact of concentrated ownership and generation governance mechanisms on acquisition 
performance.  
 
Chapter four begins by laying out the research framework for this thesis and then 
postulates major and secondary research hypotheses. Chapter five then illustrates the process 
of sample selection, the description of sample characteristics, the configuration of 
independent variables, the definition and calculation of operating performance measures, and 
the development of benchmark construction. The conclusion of chapter five includes a 
presentation of the empirical models of this thesis. Chapter six then reports various empirical 
results including statistics descriptions, univariate analyses, and multiple regression results 
for seven basic models, two full models, and two modified models. Specific discussions 
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concerning the research hypotheses presented in chapter four are included in the last section 
of chapter six.  
 
Chapter seven provides additional analysis by investigating the elements of the 
improved operating performance, the impact of the type of ultimate owners, and the cross 
effects of the type I agency problem (separation between control and cash flow rights) and 
the type II agency problem (separation between ownership and management). The final part 
of this chapter further presents the results associated with using different definitions for 
independent variables such as cross border rather than cross origin, industry relatedness (2 or 
3- digit SIC codes), and a pre-bidding period for premium measures (1 week or 4 weeks). 
Results with year dummy variables as control variables are also included. 
 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted and reported in chapter eight. This includes the 
following: robustness testing on the methods of detecting outliers (Wilcox 2003), the 
estimation of clustered standard errors including both robust (Woolridge 2003) and bootstrap 
approaches (Efron and Tibshirani 1986), and the argument for setting the year prior to the 
event as the base year for change performance (Denis and Denis 1995). Chapter nine 
provides a summary of all the results included in this thesis, pointing out research limitations 
and suggesting areas for further research. 
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Chapter Two 





In 1976, Jensen and Meckling formally developed an agency theory based on Berle 
and Means’s (1932) concept of widely held corporations. This type of agency problem 
emphasizes the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders; it portrays the 
manager as having only an attenuated interest in profits generated by the firm. One of the 
most significant considerations for reducing this type of agency cost is to increase the 
proportion of shares held by managers in the firm. However, more recent scholars suggest 
that an owner-manager has more tendency and power to enact undesirable agency behavior if 
private benefits exceed private costs (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999, 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000). Increasing ownership concentration may, encourage yet 
another type of agency problem between large and small shareholders. As the first type of 
agency problem between owners and managers has been well studied in past years, this 
thesis will focus more on the second type of agency problem between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review current research defining the nature of the 
problem as it relates to concentrated ownership. It also intends to consider how such 
problems impact corporate performance, what major factor accentuates agency problems of 
ownership concentration, and what governance mechanisms might mitigate agency costs. 
Section 2.2 acknowledges the incentive effects of ownership concentration but focuses more 
on problems with concentrated ownership, specifically with managerial entrenchment, 
tunneling, and sub-optimal decisions. Section 2.3 summarizes the impact of concentrated 
ownership structures on general corporate performance. Section 2.4 then discusses the 
separation problem of control and cash flow rights as the major accentuating factor 
impacting agency costs in a concentrated ownership structure. Section 2.5 finally reviews 
governance mechanisms for concentrated ownership structures. These include first 
generation governance characteristics such as CEO position, board composition, and other 
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large shareholders. This section also introduces second generation governance mechanisms 
which are so-called legal and extra-legal institutions. The most up to date concept of legal 
protection, termed the anti-self-dealing index by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer (DLLS, 2006), will also be included in this section.  
 
 
2.2 The Nature of the Problems with Concentrated Ownership 
 
A relatively large number of empirical studies have focused on the agency problems 
experienced by owners and managers in widely held companies (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Fama and Jensen 1983a,b, Shleifer and Vishny 1986, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988b). 
They propose that ownership concentration is one of the sound internal mechanisms for 
reducing agency costs because the owner-managers have stronger incentive to perform 
efficient monitoring, to solve free-rider problems, and to make beneficial investment 
decisions to maximize the firm’s value. While concentrated firms have their own potential 
agency problems between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, one line of 
concentrated ownership studies emphasizes positive incentive effects. This line still believes 
that in order to gain pecuniary benefits the controlling shareholders will devote themselves to 
increasing the share price in order to benefit themselves and, therefore, the minority 
shareholders. From this point of view, the incentive effects of concentration ownership 
parallel those suggested by dispersed ownership research (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1986).  
 
However, the other line of concentrated ownership studies argues that controlling 
shareholders employ corporate resources to benefit themselves not only in pecuniary but also 
in non-pecuniary ways (Morck 2000). To attain non-economic benefits, controlling 
shareholders might act in their own interest at the expense of the minority shareholders’ 
wealth. This line of study emphasizes how expropriation effects have a stronger influence on 
firm value, especially when the company has a policy of controlling shareholders in order to 
separate their control rights from their cash flow rights.  
 
Expropriation is a broad term used in governance literature. In La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000), expropriation means that “the insiders use the 
profits of the firm to benefit themselves rather than return the money to the outside 
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investors” (La Porta et al. 2000: p4). Expropriation can take a variety of forms such as 
managerial entrenchment (Fama and Jensen 1983b, Stulz 1988, Claessens et al. 2000, 
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz 2001), tunneling (Johnson, Lopez-de-Silanes, La 
Porta and Shleifer 2000b, Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan 2002, Friedman, Johnson and 
Mitton 2003), and sub-optimal investment decision (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Sudarsanam 
and Huang 2006, Faccio and Stolin 2006). Such actions may not technically be illegal, but 
they lower the competitiveness and performance of firms. The following sub-sections will 
focus specifically on the costs of agency problems in concentrated ownership structures. 
 
2.2.1 Managerial Entrenchment 
This thesis confines managerial entrenchment to issues concerning the resistance to 
outside monitoring, incompetent managers, and the misplacement of top managers. Topics 
regarding resource transfer or sub-optimal decision-making will be discussed as the other 
major agency problems. Both Fama and Jensen (1983a) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) point 
out that managers holding a substantial proportion of a firm’s equity may have too strong a 
voting power to ensure their position inside company. This decreases the probability of a 
successful bid by other agents and results in the failure of outside effective monitoring. The 
managerial entrenchment becomes the offsetting cost for heightened managerial incentives. 
Stulz (1988) proposes a model which shows that the more a company’s stakes are held by top 
managers, the lower the probability of turnover among those top managers; this model 
agrees with the entrenchment hypothesis.  
 
Beyond insulating from external discipline, concentrated firms may also suffer a 
drawback arising from the selection of company executives within a restricted labor pool, i.e. 
from among the members of controlling or family shareholders. Schulze et al. (2001) argue 
that the concentrated ownership structure, especially the family structure, may limit the top 
management positions to affiliated members instead of hiring more qualified outside 
professional managers. Empirical research provides evidence that the market performance of 
family firms is strongly and positively related to the announcement of the departure of a 
family CEO. Investors expect that a non-family member appointed to succeed the departing 
top executive can effectively reduce managerial entrenchment costs (Hillier and McColgan 
2005, Villalonga and Amit 2006).  
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2.2.2 Tunneling 
Along with entrenchment effects, tunneling is the other type of expropriation usually 
present in concentrated ownership with pyramid structure. In Johnson et al.’s study (2000b: 
p22) tunneling is narrowly termed as “the transfer of resources out of a company to its 
controlling shareholder” and “does not cover other agency problems, such as incompetent 
management, placement of relatives in executive positions, excessive or insufficient 
investment or resistant to value increasing takeovers”. This definition of tunneling is used 
throughout this thesis. 
  
Clearly, the most visible way of controlling shareholders to allocate corporate 
resources to their own parties is through outright theft. But, corporate governance research 
focuses more on the unfair transfer: “corporate resource is not shared among all the 
shareholders in proportion of the shares, but it is enjoyed exclusively by the party in control” 
(Dyck and Zingales 2004: p541). The common form that controlling shareholders use for 
tunneling comes through self-dealing transactions which include special dividend payouts, 
luxury expenses, excess compensation, asset transfers at above or below market price, 
lending at non-market rates, guarantees of other entities borrowing using firm’s assets as 
collateral, or enhancing the value of other group companies through the use of merger 
transactions. Several attempts have been made to prove that in countries with a poor legal 
system, controlling shareholders, especially in firms with a pyramid ownership structure, 
have a tendency to move the company’s profit from firms where they have low cash flow 
rights to firms where they have high ones (Johnson et al. 2000b, Bertrand et al. 2002, 
Friedman et al. 2003, Riyanto and Toolsema 2004).  
 
Johnson et al. (2000b) point out several well-known tunneling cases in Western 
European countries and propose that tunneling between firms in the same groups is 
sometimes allowed not only in emerging countries but also in developed countries. 
Following the discussion on the legal tunneling, Friedman et al. (2003) and Riyanto and 
Toolsema (2004) further analyze the reasons why minority shareholders (assuming that they 
are rational investors) are willing to be expropriated under the controlling minority 
shareholder (CMS) structure with a separation problem. According to their conclusion, under 
some circumstances controlling shareholders may use private funds to save the new firms 
and in order to preserve the opportunity to expropriate or obtain legitimate profit in the 
future. That is called propping effects or negative tunneling. If propping is possible, minority 
shareholders are willing to endure the tunneling to some extent in the hopes of future 
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positive returns. To date, however, propping remains an initiative that requires further 
examination.  
 
2.2.3 Sub-Optimal Investment Decisions 
Under the perception of dispersed ownership, top managerial compensation is closely 
linked to firm size, growth opportunity, and the probability of survival. These concerns 
motivate managers to invest their internal funds in negative NPV projects rather than in the 
paying out of dividends, especially when they are in firms with a substantial free cash flow 
(Jensen 1986). This kind of investment decision is one type of sub-optimal decision called 
overinvestment. Many studies typically assume that overinvestment decisions are made by 
independent and professional managers who hold either very few or no stakes at all in the 
firms. To reduce the cost of overinvestment decisions, one strand of articles provides 
theoretical and empirical evidence to show that managers with a large percent of company 
shareholdings might mitigate this type of agency cost (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1986, Huddart 1993, Admati and Pfleiderer 1994). 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), if a manager owns 100 percent of the 
residual claims of a firm, he or she will make optimal investment decisions to maximize the 
firm’s value. This argument brings the discussion into the structure of concentrated 
ownership where the agency cost is not between managers and public shareholders, but 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. There are two considerations 
associated with whether or not the owner-managers can reduce the overinvestment. One is 
that if the owner-managers control the company under the CMS structure, then the 
overinvestment problems may be similar to those in dispersed ownership structure. Several 
attempts have been made to prove that managers have a tendency to over-expand the firm 
size, promote their status, and/or raise their compensation through a value-reducing 
investment (Jensen and Ruback 1983, Roll 1986, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Faccio and 
Stolin 2006).  
 
The other is that even without separation, when the private capital of the 
owner-managers is more concentrated in the firm, they clearly bear a more unsystematic risk 
than minority shareholders whose portfolios are fully diversified. Consequently, the risk 
preference of owner-managers will become more risk-averse. A risk-averse owner-manager 
without effective monitoring mechanisms may give up a high-risk but value-enhancing 
investment, or he may undertake a so-so project in order to stabilize the firm’s risks – this 
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may either limit or fail to benefit the minority shareholders (Amihud and Lev 1981, 
Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld 1985, Hubbard and Palia 1995, Sudarsanam and Huang 
2006). This type of sub-optimal decision is called underinvestment.  
 
If increasing ownership concentration cannot reduce the cost of sub-optimal decisions, 
what might be other mitigating factors? One view emphasizes the debt monitoring 
mechanism (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Stulz 1990, Harris and Raviv 1991). This 
perspective relies on an optimal capital structure in which top managers may be forced to 
pay out cash because of a debit commitment and then reduce the waste of cash flow. A more 
detailed review about the debt monitoring mechanism is discussed in chapter three, section 
3.4.9. In addition, governance mechanisms such as an independent CEO, an effective board, 
or an external large shareholder are also expected to encourage or monitor decision makers 
that might help to mitigate this type of agency cost under the concentrated ownership 





2.3 Concentrated Ownership and Firm Performance 
 
2.3.1 The Level of Ownership 
■ Incentive Effect  
The effects of ownership concentration on firm performance remain mixed. Some 
research shows that if large shareholders who hold a sizeable fraction of company’s shares 
are also top managers then they should have the motivation to act in their own interests and 
to benefit the investors as well. Moreover, if large shareholders are not in the position of 
decision makers, then they should have the power to reduce asymmetrical information, solve 
free-rider problems, diminish moral hazards, and perform efficiency monitoring. Zeckhauser 
and Pound (1990) outline a model that illustrates the increasing curve between the large 
shareholder’s average per share and the company’s current market price (measured by E/P 
ratio). They test this relationship empirically by sampling 286 US firms across 22 industries. 
They show that “the market recognized the expected effects of large shareholders on 
fundamental corporate performance, and incorporates that effect into security prices” 
(Zeckhauser and Pound 1990: p171). The evidence basically supports the positive incentive 
effect and suggests that corporate performance increases with the ownership of the large 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 2002).  
 
■ Expropriation Problems 
On the contrary, another group of academics that defends expropriation problems 
declares that without effective monitoring, controlling shareholders are likely to exploit 
minority shareholders by managerial entrenchment, by tunneling, or by making sub-optimal 
decisions. Such expropriation problems are even worse when control rights might exceed 
cash flow rights (Faccio, Lang and Young 2001, Claessens et al. 2002, Cronqvist and 
Nilsson 2003).  
 
From a dividends perspective, Faccio et al. (2001) investigate expropriation in 5,897 
financial and non-financial corporations in nine East Asian and five Western European 
countries. They find that corporations with large shareholders who control 10 to 20 percent 
of the control rights fail to pay higher dividends; the greater the deviation between 
ownership and control, the lower the dividend rates. They provide empirical evidence on 
tunneling suggesting that large inside shareholders may construct a low or negative deal so 
as to consume corporate resources and thereby to expropriate minority shareholders through 
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these transactions. Furthermore, they specifically identify the Asian financial crisis as caused 
by “crony capitalism” where powerful political families developing related-party contracts 
within business groups.  
 
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) use a dataset of 309 Swedish firms from 1991-1997 in 
order to analyze the agency cost of CMS structure. They find a significant negative 
relationship between the voting rights of CMS and firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q). 
They explain that the source of this discount is from lower return on assets (ROA) and that 
lower operating performance is more likely to stem from suboptimal decisions than from 
tunneling behavior in the developed Swedish market. Moreover, they show that about 50 
percent of family firms are less likely to face the threat of takeover. The cost of managerial 
entrenchment exists in the CMS firms, particularly in family firms.    
 
By comparison, Claessens et al. (2002) examine 1,301 listed companies in 8 East 
Asian countries and conclude that ownership concentration is positively associated with the 
increase in firm value (measured by the market to book ratio) but that increases in terms of 
control rights over cash flow rights dramatically decrease the firm value. They confirm that 
both the incentive and entrenchment hypotheses of large shareholdings have impacts on 
corporate performance.  
 
■ Nonlinear Relationship 
Morck et al. (1988b) are the first to highlight a nonlinear relationship between 
managerial ownership and corporate performance. They examine 371 Fortune 500 firms for 
the year 1980 and find a positive relationship between ownership and Tobin Q in the 0 to 5 
percent of ownership ranges, a negative relation in the 5 to 25 percent ranges, and perhaps a 
further positive relation beyond 25 percent. They believe that the convergence of interests 
between managers and shareholders may be one explanation for this but that it may not be 
the only one. Another good reason for interpreting the increase from 0 to 5 percent is likely 
to be the remuneration of the top management, which is generally rewarded in firms with 
already good performance (high Tobin’s Q ratio). Compared to the incentive effects that 
function over the whole range of ownership, expropriation costs are far more likely to be 
significant beyond 5 percent without being greater than 25 percent.  
 
Subsequently, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) have studied 142 NYSE firms and 
report a consistent result that at low levels of ownership (less than one percent), corporate 
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performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) improves with increases in ownership. At moderate 
levels of ownership (between one percent and 20 percent), the Q ratio seems first to be 
negative and then positive but with no significance. At high levels of ownership greater than 
20 percent, the Q ratio decreases significantly with ownership. They explain this result by 
concluding that the cost of increasing insulation from disciplinary devices offsets the benefit 
of increasing an alignment of interests. Another US study by McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
investigates two separate US samples: 113 firms for 1976 and 281 firms for 1986. The study 
finds that for both 1976 and 1986 Tobin’s Q increases with concentration until ownership 
exceeds 40 to 50 percent.  
 
Two important UK empirical studies (conducted by Lasfer and Faccio (1999) and 
Davies, Hillier and McColgan (2005) respectively) also report a nonlinear specification 
between the corporate value and managerial holdings. Lasfer and Faccio (1999) report two 
turning points at 19.68 percent and at 54.12percent. Davies et al. (2005) study a much higher 
level of managerial ownership. Their investigation shows that Tobin’s Q increases in firms 
for managerial ownership levels at 7% and then declines to ownership levels of 26%. This is 
almost identical to the earlier articles stating turning points of around 5 to 25 percents. 
Importantly, they further prove that market discipline has an influence up to the 51 percent 
where the board takes complete control. Tobin’s Q then decreases again until ownership 
levels reach 76 percent after high level Q increases. 
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) specifically focus on family firms and confirm that firm 
performance (measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA; ROA measured by EBITA/Book value of 
asset and Net Income/Book value of asset) increases when family ownership rises from 0 to 
30 percent, tapers off between 30 and 60 percent, and declines after 60 percent. In sum, this 
stream of literature generally agrees that at the lower levels of ownership, internal incentives 
have an impact on managerial behavior; at the median levels of ownership, agency costs are 
not high enough to behave the large shareholder. As controlling shareholdings rise to high 
levels of concentration, severe financial penalties will lead them to act towards 
value-maximization. However, when concentration reaches top levels, expropriation 
problems then arise, including averse-selection, managerial entrenchment, or the failure of 





■ Weak or Insignificant Relationship  
Other studies indicate that the relationship between ownership concentration and 
corporate performance is either weak or insignificant. By sampling 511 US corporations, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) assess the impact of ownership structures on several accounting 
ratios, including the ratio of capital expenditure, the ratio of advertising expenditures, the 
ratio of research and development expenditure, and the value of total assets. They fail, 
however, to discover any significant relationship between ownership concentration and the 
accounting ratios. Based on the arguments of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Palia (1999) add that ownership structure is endogenously determined by the 
contracting environment. Their findings support the view that since other firm characteristics 
are significantly correlated to ownership structure and firm performance, it is not meaningful 
to identify the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q or accounting ratios). Holderness and Sheehan (1988) compare 114 
majority shareholder firms with 101 matched dispersed firms. They find that the difference 
between concentrated and dispersed ownership is small and slightly significant in both the 
accounting rates of returns and in Tobin’s Q.  
 
2.3.2 The Type of Ownership 
The type of the controlling shareholder is also likely to affect a firm’s governance and 
performance. Previous research generally identifies the ultimate owners and classifies those 
owners into the following four1 types: family, widely held financial institution, widely held 
institution, and state (La Porta et al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000, Faccio and Lang 2002). In 
other words, each country mostly has five types of firms: dispersed firms, family controlled 
firms, firms controlled by widely held financial institutions, firms controlled by widely held 
corporations, and state-controlled firms. The most critical point regarding the classification is 
that when the ultimate owner of a corporation is an unlisted private firm and fails to trace its 
owners using all available data sources, most research regards it as a family firm (La Porta et 
al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000, Faccio and Lang 2002). However, in the Maury and Pajuste 
(2005) study, ultimate owners are specially classified into family, corporation, financial 
institution, state, and others. The ones who fail to trace are reported as corporations.  
 
 
                                                 
1  In La Porta et al (1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002), there is another type defined as 
‘miscellaneous’ which includes voting trusts, a cooperatives, or a group with no single controlling 
investors, charities, employees, or minority foreign investors. 
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■ Family Controlled Firms 
A great deal of literature on concentration ownership has addressed the benefits and 
cost of family firms. One stream of previous research supporting the benefits of family firms 
advocates that, first of all, family firms have relatively lower agency costs since there is a 
modest separation problem between management and ownership in family firms. Family 
members have more incentive to maximize the firm value because their welfare is closely 
linked to the firm performance (Demsetz and Lehn 1985, Anderson and Reeb 2003). Second, 
because of the long-term presence family tenure can extend the firm’s learning curve to 
cover longer investment horizons (Stein 1989). Third, family firms have a greater tendency 
to invest in positive projects to pass on to their descendants (James 1999). Fourth, the 
long-term nature may encourage external bodies or third parties to deal with the family firms, 
thereby creating longer-lasting economic benefits or lowering the capital costs of companies 
(Anderson, Mansi and Reeb 2003). Finally, some literature focuses on the trust that might 
mitigate the moral hazard problem between parents (principals) and children (agents). Such 
mitigation will increase the firm performance (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985, Lee 2004) 
 
The other stream of existing research suggests the cost of family firms. First, this 
stream argues that managerial entrenchment problems are even more serious in family 
structures since the top executives of family firms are usually limited by their kinship. Hiring 
inferior or inadequate employees from a relatively smaller labor pool with similar 
characteristics or perhaps lower quality may reduce the competition and company efficiency 
in such a way as deters the growth of firm (Schulze et al. 2001). Second, when family 
members cannot separate their own financial preferences from those of minority 
shareholders, they have more power to act on their own interests at the expense of firm 
performance (Claessens et al. 2002). Third, family has more influence on reducing the 
probability of bidding by other agents. The value of the firm will thereby be reduced due to 
the failure of external monitoring (Barclay and Holderness 1989). Fourth, some research 
states that in order to avoid the dilution of ownership and to secure their control rights, 
family firms may be unwilling to raise loans or to issue new stocks so as to make new 
positive investments. The inadequate investment in R&D or new technology may impede the 
development of the firm (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Fifth, family firms may be more averse 
to risky projects unlike the dispersed shareholders whose portfolios are fully diversified 




■ Institutions Controlled Firms 
Regarding to the effects of institutional large shareholders on corporate performance, 
Duggal and Millar (1999) propose two competing hypotheses. The efficiency-augmentation 
hypothesis supposes that the size of institutional holdings may provide more sufficient 
incentive for institutional investors to intervene in the governance of firms that might result 
in corporate efficiency enhancement due to better professional investment decisions and 
effective monitoring mechanisms. In contrast, the efficiency-abatement hypothesis assumes 
that institutional investors are unable to effectively perform their monitoring roles because of 
their passivity, their myopic goals, their conflicts of interests, or their legal constraints. 
Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) clearly classify institutional investors in terms of the 
extent to business relationships with their invested companies. The institutional investors are 
classified into three categories: pressure-sensitive, pressure-resistant, and 
pressure-indeterminate. Pressure-sensitive institutions, including banks, insurance 
companies, and non-bank trusts have business relationships with firms in which they own 
equities. Pressure-resistant institutions, including public pension funds, mutual funds, and 
endowments and foundations do not have business relationships with firms in which they 
hold equities. Pressure-indeterminate institutions include those institutions whose 
relationships with the firms they invest in cannot be so clearly defined.  
 
David, Kochhar and Levitas (1998) show that pressure-resistant institutions are more 
effective in influencing managers than pressure-sensitive institutions are. Cornett, Marcus, 
Saunders and Tehranian (2003) specifically examine the impact of the type of institutional 
investors on firm performance using cash flow return on assets as measures. They investigate 
S&P 100 firms from the 1990s and confirm a significant positive relationship only between 
pressure-insensitive (resistant) institutional investors in a firm and in its operating cash flow. 
Cornett et al. (2003) suggest that pressure-sensitive institutional investors might compromise 
their role as monitors because of a heightened interest in protecting business relationships 
with the firm. 
 
As major creditors, financial institutions have their own specific characteristics as 
institutional shareholders in public companies. This type of large shareholder is more 
common in Europe and Japan (Gugler 2001) than in the US. Gorton and Schmid (2000) 
study German corporations and discover that firm performance is positively related to bank 
equity holding. Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) attempt to identify the importance of types 
of shareholders in Japan. They find a significantly positive relationship between ownership 
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shares of a financial institution and company productivity. Both studies agree with the view 
that bank involvement in the governance of the firm might expect to provide superior 
monitoring capabilities, a lower cost of capital, fewer financial constraints, or better support 
in financial distresses. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), however, suggest that when banks are 
the main large shareholders there is actually a negative effect on a firm’s profit and growth 
rate. They investigate the performance of 700 listed manufacturing firms in Japan during the 
period 1977 to 1986. They find that firms closely related to banks are less likely to be 
involved in risky though potentially profitable investments. Besides, banks are likely to use 
their monopoly power to expropriate minority shareholders through either credit channel or 
other types of ways when they are a firm’s main large shareholder.  
 
■ State Controlled Firms 
The State large shareholders have hardly been emphasized. In general, state 
ownership has been challenged on the idea that the public owns state firms while control 
rights belong to government departments. This means that these departments can be thought 
of as having extremely concentrated control rights without any significant cash flow rights; 
this is because the cash flow ownership is dispersed among the taxpayers of the country. 
Therefore, the state ownership is broadly considered as an inefficient structure because State 
firms do not attempt to serve the public interest better than private firms (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) compare pre- and post- 
privatization operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries during the period 
1961 to 1990. They find that profitability, real sales, operating efficiency, and capital 
investment spending increase significantly after privatization.   
 
After broadly summarizing earlier research, how the level of ownership concentration 
and the type of owners impacts firm value remains unclear. However, it is relatively clear 
that the separation of control and cash flow rights is the predominant, accentuating factor for 
determining the specific agency costs of concentrated ownership structures. However, recent 
governance research has been devoted to discovering the efficient mitigating factors for 
reducing the agency costs of this structure. Denis and McConnell (2003) divide the existing 
governance research into two generations. The first generation research generally focuses on 
the organizational mechanisms, such as CEO positions, board composition, and outside 
block shareholders, specifically in individual countries. The second generation research pays 
more attention to the importance of the legal and extra-legal institutions from country to 
country.  
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2.4 Accentuating Factor to the Agency Problem with Concentrated 
Ownership 
■ Separation 
Based on the concept that corporate ownership is measured by cash flow rights and 
that the control right is measured by voting rights, recent researchers, such as La Porta et al. 
(1999) and Claessens et al. (2000), report that the controlling shareholders often separate 
their control rights from their cash flow rights using various control devices. Bebchuk, 
Kraakman and Triantis (2000) term this pattern of ownership a controlling minority 
shareholder (CMS) structure because it allows the majority of shareholders to control a firm 
while holding only a small fraction of the firm’s cash flow. When the dominant shareholders 
fail to bear the full costs of their decisions, they may have incentive to expropriate their 
minority shareholders.  
 
There are three typical control devices used by controlling shareholders in producing 
the separation of their control from their cash flow rights: dual class share, pyramids, and 
cross-holdings. The dual-class share structure involves the creation of two or more classes of 
common stocks with differential voting shares. For example, a company has two types of 
ordinary shares. ‘A’ type shares have one vote per share but ‘B’ type shares are nonvoting 
shares or have multiple votes (perhaps 5 or 10 votes per share). It is a simple CMS form that 
the controlling shareholders can separate their control rights from their cash flow rights, 
without establishing multiple firms. La Porta et al. (1999) investigate the ownership structure 
of the largest corporation in 27 wealthy countries. They find the average deviation from 
differential voting rights is very rare. One reasonable explanation for this evidence is that 
most countries either forbid a dual class shares policy or set a high-low vote shares limitation. 
Nevertheless, Bebchuk et al. (2000) point out that dual class share structures are particularly 
common in Sweden and South Africa. Ben-Amar and André (2006) indicate that dual class 
share structures are widespread in Canada. Furthermore, listed corporations cannot issue 
ordinary shares with differential voting rights in Australia but they could have voting shares 
policies (Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rule 6.9) that allow one voting right per share 
on a poll, as opposed to one voting right per person on a show of hands. This mechanism 
provides separation, even though it is not necessary to create different classes of ordinary 




A pyramid structure can be framed in firms with only a single class of share but with 
more than one entity. In this structure the controlling shareholders own a substantial amount 
of the stock of holding corporations which, in turn, hold a majority fraction of the stakes of 
operating companies (Claessens et al. 2000, Bebchuk et al. 2000). The process can be 
repeated several times to establish a multiple level pyramid structure. For example, in a three 
level pyramid, a controlling minority shareholder could hold 60 percent of shares of 
company A, which, in turn, could hold 20 percent of the stocks of company B. The 
controlling minority shareholder controls 20 percent of the voting rights of the operating firm 
(company B) via the holding company (company A), but only has 12 percent (60%*20%) of 
the cash flow rights of the operating firm (company B). Figure 2.1 illustrates this control 
chain. This structure has been generally regarded as a common device for controlling 
minority shareholders to make ownership disproportionate in both Asian and European 
countries.  
 
Figure 2.1 Control Chain of a Pyramid Structure. This figure describes a simple case of pyramid 
structures. Controlling minority shareholders hold 20 percent control rights but only bear 12 percent 
cash flow risk of company B through their holding company A. Ownership shares (cash flow right) are 
denoted by “O” and voting shares (control right) are denoted by “C”. 
 
 
Cross holding structure happens when the voting shares used to control the operating 
firm are horizontally distributed over the entire group rather than concentrated in the hands 
of a single company or an ultimate controlling shareholder (Bebchuk et al. 2000). Affiliates 
in the conglomerate have cross investment by directly or indirectly owning the shares of one 
another. For a simple example for this complex structure, assume that a parent company 
holds 50 percent of the stocks of company A, which in turn holds 20 percent of company B. 
One of the sister companies owns 20 percent of company C, which in turns has 10 percent of 
company B. Consequently, the parent company controls 30 percent (20%+10%) of the voting 
rights of company B through the sum of the weakest links. However, their group only holds 
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12 percent (20%*50%+10%*20%) of the cash flow risk of company B. Obviously, cross 
holding patterns are often adopted in combination with pyramid structures. Cross-holding 
ownership structures are increasing complex; they reduce the efficiency of a defense as well 
as the transparency of a company. Figure 2.2 illustrates this control chain. Cross holding 
structures are relatively popular in Asian countries such as Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore, 
where family conglomerates are more widespread (La Porta et al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000, 
Bebchuk et al. 2000). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Control Chain of a Cross Holding Structure. This figure describes a simple case of cross 
holding structures. The controlling group including parent and sister companies controls 30 percent of 
company B through their holding company A and C but only needs to take 12 percent of cash flow risk. 
Ownership shares (cash flow right) are denoted by “O” and voting shares (control right) are denoted by 
“C”. 
 
Below is a real sample with more complex ownership structure in this thesis. Teck 
Corporation, a Canadian acquiring firm on March 2001 (the last report date before M&A 
transaction) was authorized to issue an unlimited number of Class A Common shares and 
Class B Subordinate Voting shares. On March 5, 2001 the corporation had an outstanding 
4,682,078 Class A Common shares, each carrying the right to 100 votes per share, and 
100,627,557 Class B Subordinate Voting shares, each carrying the right to one vote per share. 
This company obviously had separation via a dual class structure.  
 
This company also had three large shareholders holding more than 10 percent of the 
voting shares at that time. Temagami Mining Company Limited was the largest shareholder 
(37.8%) and was a private company based in Canada and controlled by Keevil Holding 
Corporation (51%) and SMM Resources Incorporated (49%). Therefore, this company had 
another form of separation through a pyramid structure. Tracing its ultimate owner, Keevil 
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Holding Corporation was found to be controlled by Norman B. Keevil (Keevil Family) with 
98% of the voting shares. SMM Resources Incorporated was a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Sumitomo Metal Mining Company Ltd which was a Japanese company widely held by 
financial institutions and public investors. SMM Resources Incorporated also owned 13.2% 
of voting shares of Teck Corporation leading to another type of separation through 
cross-holding ownership structures. The other large shareholder was Caisse de dépôt et 
placement du Québec holding 13.2 percent of voting shares and 15.83 percent of common 
shares. In the case of the Teck Corporation, it is clear that control rested primarily with the 
Keevil Family (with a 23.42% ownership and a 37.8% control rights). The family dominated 
the Temagami Mining Co. (the largest shareholder of Teck Corp) by 51 percent. Sumitomo 
Metal Mining Company Ltd was a beneficial blockholders it had almost equal power (49%) 
in Temagami Mining Co. as the Keevil Family did. This case is indicative of the 
complexities of identifying separation structures through various control devices. Figure 2.3 
displays the chart and the calculating of Teck’s ownership and voting rights structure. 
 
Panel B Calculating of ownership and voting rights of Teck Corp.
Type Number ofshares Voting rights
Number of
Voting shares Percent of ownership
Percent of voting
rights
A-Cmmon shares 4,682,078     100                468,207,800  100% 82.31%
B-Voting shares 100,627,557 1                    100,627,557  0% 17.69%





shares Percent of ownership
Percent of voting
rights





2,150,000     49% -                22.50% -
(2,150,000*0.49/4,682,078)
734,500        - -                15.69% 12.91%
(734,500/4,682,078) (734,500*100/568,835,357)











Figure 2.3 Chart and Calculating of Ownership and Voting Shares of Teck Corporation (Mar. 2001). 
Ownership (cash flow right) are denoted by “O” and voting shares (control right) are denoted by “C”. 
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2.5 Mitigating Factors to the Agency Problem with Concentrated 
Ownership 
 
2.5.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms: 1st generation 
The corporate governance mechanisms have been broadly characterized as being 
either internal or external to the firm (Hirshleifer and Thakor 1994, John and Senbet 1998, 
O'Sullivan and Wong 1998, Weir, Laing and McKnight 2002, Denis and McConnell 2003). 
The internal mechanisms usually focus on CEO compensation, board composition, and 
ownership itself. Denis and McConnell (2003) call these internal mechanisms the first 
generation of international governance mechanisms. The external mechanisms are generally 
discussed as takeover markets and as legal/extra-legal systems. When internal mechanisms 
fail in their function, the market for corporate control is regarded as a potential disciplining 
mechanism. The consequences of takeovers are debatable and will be thoughtfully reviewed 
in chapter three. Legal institutions have been hypothesized as a fundamental governance 
mechanism ever since La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1998); they 
are categorized as the second generation of international governance mechanisms by Denis 
and McConnell (2003). This subject will be covered in more detail in the following section, 
2.5.2. Since first generation governance mechanisms have been widely examined over the 
last ten years, this thesis reviews only the relevant and frequently cited works.  
 
2.5.1.1 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Position  
■ CEO compensation 
Based on the view of dispersed ownership structure, one strand of empirical studies 
concerning CEO mechanisms emphasizes the setting of an optimal CEO compensation 
contract to align the interests of managers and shareholders (Ciscel and Carroll 1980, Core, 
Guay and Verrecchia 2003). Mehran (1995) finds that the form rather than the level of 
compensation is what motivates the managers to increase the firm value. Firm performance 
is positively related to the percentage of a manager’s compensation that is equity-based. 
Murphy (1999) provides an in-depth analysis of executive compensation, showing that 
“pay-performance sensitivities in the US have increased substantially over the past decade, 
driven primarily by an explosion in stock-option compensation” (Murphy 1999: p53). 
Executive compensation has tended to become increasingly complex as firms have formed 
various executive compensation packages. Some firms pay CEOs only salaries and cash 
bonuses while others also include contingent and deferred compensation. Furthermore, 
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compensation data on executive bonuses and stock options are not consistently measured or 
reported across firms, countries, and periods. While Murphy (1999) sampling from the US 
large companies described that “detailed biographic and compensation data for individual 
executives in publicly owned corporations are widely available and easily matched to 
company performance data” (Murphy 1999: p3), most cross-country research recognizes the 
difficulty of obtaining compensation data and of identifying a broadly accepted 
compensation (Joskow, Rose, Shepard, Meyer and Peltzman 1993, Goldberg and Idson 1995, 
Rose and Shepard 1997, Randøy and Nielsen 2002). Due to data constraints and time 
limitations, this thesis is unable to examine CEO compensation as in most of the 
cross-countries studies.  
 
■ Degree of Managerial Ownership 
The second strand of studies claims that the rising degree of managerial ownership 
increases managerial incentive and thus diminishes the conflict of interest between managers 
and dispersed shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Stulz 1988). One of the leading 
discussions in this field is raised by Morck et al. (1988b). As discussed in section 2.3.1, 
Morck et al (1988b) suggest a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and 
corporate performance. Their conclusion points out that the convergence of interests between 
managers and shareholders may exist at lower ownership levels (0 to 5 percent), but 
entrenchment costs have a more important effect on firm performance associated with the 
increase of managerial ownership, and then incentive effects have functions back at high 
level of ownership concentration (beyond 25 percent). After Morck et al (1988b), researchers 
such as McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Davies et al. 
(2005) basically support the nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance; the optimal degree of managerial ownership concentration, however, is still far 
from resolved. 
 
■ Type of CEO 
The third strand of CEO research in the context of concentrated ownership firms is 
related to the type of CEO. An important debate in this field now considers whether 
concentrated firms should hire a professional independent CEO or should designate a 
member of the controlling shareholders to occupy the seat of the CEO. Does a controlling 
CEO help to diminish the agency costs between ownership and management? Or does such 
control actually worsen the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders due to the cost of managerial entrenchment?   
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Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) use stock market and operating proxies (measured by 
ROA) to examine the performance of 124 management successions within Canadian family 
firms. They find that the stock market response is negatively related to the appointment of 
family members. The operating performance of firms with independent successors is 
significantly poorer than the industry in the beginning -- though it improves in the long run. 
By contrast, firms with family successors under-perform after succession. Hillier and 
McColgan (2005) investigate 683 UK firms over the period 1992 to 1998 and find that a 
family CEO is less likely to be replaced even if he/she performs very badly; the departure of 
a family CEO is positively related to corporate performance.  
 
Barth, Gulbrandsen and Schonea (2005) specifically use the Cobb-Douglas 
production function to analyze the effects of family-managers on the company’s productivity. 
By examining 438 Norwegian firms in 1996, they provide evidence that family controlled 
firms with family management are significantly less productive than non-family controlled 
firms. This conclusion is still valid when comparing family managers and professional 
managers within a sample of family firms only. The authors explain these results as owing to 
skills difference or the age of the family firm.  
 
By contrast, Anderson and Reeb (2003) focus on individual/family US controlled 
firms and find that family firms with family members serving as CEOs outperform the firms 
with external CEOs. Recent research by Villalonga and Amit (2006) investigates two types 
of agency problems by conducting a panel survey of US family firms. The first type of 
agency problem is the separation of ownership and management (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). The second type of agency problem is the separation of cash flow rights and 
control rights (La Porta et al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000). They suggest that, if the large 
shareholder is an individual or family, he or she will have a higher incentive to reduce the 
first type of agency problems and, thereby, will cause the second type of agency problem to 
dominate the corporate performance. On the other hand, if the large shareholder is an 
institution, such as a financial institution, a widely held firm, or the government, the private 
benefits of control may need to be divided up. As a result, large shareholders may lose the 
incentive for expropriation and the interest to perform efficient monitoring. The second type 
of agency problem could be lessened but may revert to the first type of agency problem.  
 
Their empirical results sustain the idea that “family firms create value only when the 
founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO” (Villalonga and 
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Amit 2006: p385). Moreover, they confirm the concept that separation problems between 
control and cash flow rights reduce the performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) of founding 
family firms. Basically, Villalonga and Amit (2006) recognize the contributions of 
controlling CEOs in mitigating the first type of agency problem (conflicts between 
ownership and management) but still recognize the expropriation costs caused by the second 
type of agency problem (separation between ownership and control rights). Their latter 
conclusion is generally consistent with the earlier research which state that controlling CEOs 
could easily entrench themselves and thus deviate from firm value maximization (Smith and 
Amoako-Adu 1999, Hillier and McColgan 2005, Barth et al. 2005).  
 
2.5.1.2 Board Characteristics 
■ Independent Directors 
The structure of the board composition is central to the corporate governance system. 
Directors are assumed to provide professional advice for hiring, compensating, or even 
replacing the CEO (Jensen1993). The board is usually composed of inside and outside 
directors, sometimes classified as executive and non-executive directors. Since most inside 
directors are full-time employees of the company, their interests are tied to the top 
management. Therefore they are generally unwilling to challenge their boss. Outside 
directors could be further divided into two groups: related (grey) directors who are not inside 
employees but have a certain level of business relatedness with current management; and 
independent directors. Recently, academics, regulators and shareholder activists have placed 
greater expectations on the role of independent directors. They think that director 
independence can fulfil their monitoring function because independent directors may possess 
important individual characteristics such as independence, professional knowledge or 
experience, and a good reputation (Fama and Jensen 1983b). A great deal of empirical 
research proves a positive association between board composition and the measurements of 
corporate financial performance because outside directors could enhance the firm value.  
 
Weisbach (1988) examines the function of independent directors by testing the market 
performance (stock returns) and accounting performance (measured by earnings before 
interest and tax) towards any decisions concerning the removal of top management. Based 
on the sample of 495 US public firms between 1977 and 1980, they find that both 
performance measures are more closely related to the CEO resignation in firms with outsider 
dominated boards than to those where insiders predominate, indicating that CEO turnover is 
likely to signal the effective composition board and, thereby, to boost the firm’s value.  
 44
Instead of testing the board efficiency on CEO turnover, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), 
observe the effects of board independence by testing the abnormal stock returns 
accompanying the appointment of independent directors. The full sample includes 1,251 
WSJ announcements for outside directors from 1981 to 1985. Their empirical evidence 
implies that pubic investors may anticipate company gains from a more effective board 
following the appointment of an independent director, and may respond to the abnormal 
market returns.   
 
One line of research directly examines the association between performance and the 
proportion of independent directors, failing, however, to find a significant positive 
relationship (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996, Vefeas and Theodorou 1998, Weir et al. 2002). 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) test board independence using the percentages of non- 
employment directors on the board of around 400 large US firms. They find a significantly 
negative relationship between outside directors and firm performance (measured by Tobin’s 
Q). Their results send the important message that independent directors themselves may be 
insufficient to perform supervision; inside participation is still needed to improve the 
decision making. Vefeas and Theodorou (1998) employ 250 UK public firms in 1994 to 
investigate the relationship between board structure and firm performance (measured by 
market to book ratio). Their results are consistent with the findings in Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) study regarding the US firms. 
 
Weir et al. (2002) extend the board composition to the board quality by including the 
proportion of independent directors on the audit committee; the measure of director quality, 
however, is insignificant. They discover a weak but positive association between director 
independence and corporation performance (measured by Tobin’s Q), suggesting that 
independent directors still have monitoring effects and “may therefore be regarded as a 
substitute for other governance mechanisms” (Weir et al. 2002: p604).  
 
■ Board Size 
Compared to the supervisory function of outside directors, far too little attention has 
been paid to the effects of board size. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) propose 
that a small board can improve board performance. They both agree that seven to nine 
directors on the board is the optimal board size because this will allow directors to function 
effectively and will also meet the diversity required. However, it is hard, theoretically 
speaking, to determine an ideal board size. A recent researcher, Raheja (2005) develops a 
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model to prove that “the most effective optimal boards are boards in terms with low project 
verification costs to outsiders and fewer private benefits from inferior projects to insiders” 
(Raheja 2005: p300). He shows that board size and composition vary with different firm 
types, life cycles, and the character of directorship. 
 
Empirical work on board size is relatively scarce. Yermack (1996) examines the effect 
of board size through a sample of 452 large US industrial companies in the period from 1984 
to 1991. They present consistent evidence on the negative relation between board size and 
firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q). Conyon and Peck (1998) point out another perspective 
of board structure. In practice, there are two types of board structure: unitary structure and 
two-tier board structure. Five European countries are included in their sample. The UK and 
Italy have a unitary structure; the Netherlands and Denmark have a two-tier board structure; 
France is classified as a mixed system, with both a unitary and two-tier board structure. They 
compare these five economies on the size of company board and on two corporate 
performance measures (estimated by Return on Equity (ROE), and Tobin’s Q). Consistent 
with the earlier US results of Yermack (1996), their findings also support the negative 
association existing between measures of corporate performance and board size across these 
five major European countries.  
 
■ CEO-Chairman Duality 
An increasing concern regarding board composition is focused on whether the same 
individual should act as both CEO and chairman of the board. The dual leadership structure, 
with a split between the CEO and chairman, is relatively common in the UK but not so 
popular in the US (Vefeas and Theodorou 1998). From a common view of corporate 
leadership structure, a separation of the role of CEO from that of chairman should enhance 
the independence of a non-CEO chairman, allowing the board to exercise its monitoring 
function efficiently and improving corporate performance. Rechner and Dalton (1991) test 
the difference between CEO-chairman firms and non-CEO chairman firms in various 
corporate performance measures: returns on investment (ROI), returns on equity (ROE), and 
profit margins. They observe 250 US firms from 1978 to 1983 and conclude that firms with a 
non-CEO chairman have a significantly higher performance than CEO duality firms.  
 
Focusing on the financial industry, Pi and Timme (1993) select 112 banks in the 
period from 1987 to 1989 and confirm that separating the firm’s management should create a 
better leadership structure, and that banks with a CEO-chairman have lower accounting 
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returns on assets than those without. Carline, Linn and Yadav (2002) examine UK merging 
firms and find a negative but insignificant relationship between CEO duality and the change 
in industry-adjusted operating performance.  
 
On the contrary, advocates of the CEO-chairman duality, such as Brickley, Coles and 
Jarrell (1997), argue that a non-CEO chairman generally has enormous power but small 
capital risk regarding the firm’s future performance. The agency costs may outweigh the 
benefits of independent supervision. Furthermore, a CEO is assumed to be the one with 
specialized information regarding the strategic challenges and opportunities, firm-specific 
experience, or any other variable knowledge since “separating the CEO and chairman title 
necessitates the costly and generally incomplete transfer of critical information between the 
CEO and the chairman” (Brickley et al. 1997: p194). By analyzing the CEOs of 737 large 
US firms in 1988, Brickley et al. (1997) point out that combining the CEO and chairman is 
not definitely associated with inferior market returns and accounting ratio (measured by 
return on capital).  
 
Vefeas and Theodorou (1998) set a hypothesis to test the positive association between 
dual leadership structure and firm value. They find that firms with a non-CEO Chairman do 
not outperform firms with one. The results are contrary to their expectations but remain 
consistent with the arguments of Brickley et al. (1997). However, their findings may be 
limited by the Codes of Best Practice which have been issued in a number of European 
countries, starting with the UK in 1992. These codes specify that different individuals should 
hold Chair and CEO positions. Despite the codes being voluntary, their effects on empirical 
evidence should not be ignored.  
 
2.5.1.3 Other Blockholders 
Faccio and Lang (2002) analyze 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries. 
They report that 46.01 percent of concentrated firms (at the 20 percent level) have more than 
one large shareholder who holds at least 10 percent of the voting shares. Maury and Pajuste 
(2005) sample 136 non-financial Finnish listed firms (612 observations) during 1993-2000 
and find that 52 percent of concentrated companies at the 10 percent threshold are dominated 
by single controlling shareholders, 31.7 percent of cases have the second large shareholders, 
and 16.3 percent of cases have at least three large shareholders. The existence of 
blockholders has been viewed as another corporate governance mechanism because the 




As a governance mechanism, blockholders are often questioned as to whether they 
really do monitor the largest shareholder or whether they form a controlling coalition with 
other large shareholders and thus expropriate the minority shareholders. Theoretical articles 
provide some models for the optimal ownership structure (Pagano and Roell 1998, Gomes 
and Novaes 2001, Bolton and Von Thadden 1998). They suggest several ideas for 
considering the effect of blockholders. 
 
First of all, blockholders may perform effective monitoring to solve free-rider 
problems and to prevent overinvestment, but this bargaining power may also block the 
efficient decisions and lead to underinvestment. Second, large shareholders outside the 
control group may force the controlling shareholder to maintain enough stakes, otherwise 
control may be lost. The controlling shareholder with more company shares may have less 
incentive towards expropriation. Third, when large shareholders hold an equal proportion of 
equity as the controlling shareholder, they may be more likely to act as decision makers 
instead of supervisors. Fourth, under a poor legal system the controlling shareholders may 
tend to bribe the large shareholders. The coalition games will worsen existing agency 
problems between the controlling and minority shareholders. 
 
Since the effect of blockholders remains an open issue, there are two groups of 
empirical research bringing blockholder questions into discussion. One group focuses on the 
existence of blockholders and the other considers the voting shares of blockholders. Faccio 
et al. (2001) examine effect of blockholders on dividend payout ratio. Their findings show 
that the presence of other blockholders has a significant positive impact on dividends in 
European countries due to the monitoring mechanism; whereas in Asian countries, other 
blockholders are significantly negatively related to the dividends ratio. They think that 
collusion under the “crony capitalism2” is the most important reason for this negative effect 
in Asian countries. 
                                                 
2 Claessens et al. (2000) consider that “crony capitalism” arising from the concentration of corporate 
control in the hands of a few families can lead to a vicious circle where family groups lobby 
government agencies and public officials for preferential treatment, government grants, special tax 
breaks, favoritism in the distribution of legal permits, and so forth. The ability of lobby in turn leads 
to increasing family control and an increasing interdependence of politicians and tycoons. The 
success in related-party transactions depends on an extremely close relationship between the 
businessman and the state institutions of politics and government, rather than on the free market 
competition, and economic liberalism.  
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Becht and Mayer (2001) find that in most European countries voting shares of the 
second and third large shareholders decrease rapidly beyond the largest shareholder. They 
shed light on the importance of control allocation among multiple large shareholders. In the 
Maury and Pajuste (2005) study, not only the presence but also the voting shares of other 
blockholders is investigated. They conclude that an equal distribution of voting shares 
among large shareholders has a positive relationship with firm performance (measured by 
Tobin’s Q). They further suggest that family controlled firms significantly under-perform if 
they have large shareholders coming from another family while non-family large 
shareholders, especially financial institutions, offer efficient monitoring for family controlled 
firms.  
 
2.5.2 Corporate Governance Mechanism: 2nd generation 
As stated earlier, the second generation governance research is more international and 
is focused on the importance of legal systems, accounting standards and the extent to which 
these laws are enforced (LLSV 1998, Denis and McConnell 2003). Zingales (2000) sheds 
light on the extra-legal systems. He argues that product competitiveness, public opinion, and 
internal moral norms etc. play no secondary role. This branch of studies basically agrees that 
more complete legal and extra-legal rights attributed to minority shareholders will curb the 
effects of private benefits. 
 
2.5.2.1 Legal Institutions  
■ Legal Origin,  Anti-Director Right,  Revised Anti-Director Right 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1997/1998) examine 49 
countries around the world and assign each company to four legal families3: English 
common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law. Subsequently, 
they measure the level of the legal environment of each country by considering two rights: 
shareholder rights and creditor rights. The shareholder rights have two proxies: the 
one-share-one-vote rule and the anti-director right. The former is set if a country has a 
company law or commercial code which prohibits any type of dual shares; this country offers 
better legal protection to investors and gets one score. According to this rule, only 11 
                                                 
3 English origin countries include Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Kenya, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United 
Kingdom, United States and Zimbabwe. French origin countries include Argentina, Belgium, 
Brazil, Chie, Colombia. Ecuador, Egypt, France, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela. German origin 
countries include Austria, Germany, South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan. Scandinavian origin 
countries include Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.  
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countries are qualified4 in the LLSV sample.  
 
The anti-director right index ranges from 0 to 6, formed by six rights: proxy by mail 
allowed, share not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting/proportional representation, 
oppressed minority, preemptive right to new issues, and the percentage of shareholding to 
call an extraordinary meeting (which is under 10%). If countries provide one of these six 
rights to their minority shareholders then they achieve one score. According to the LLSV 
data, the English origin countries have the highest average score of anti-director rights (4.0). 
Similarly, the creditor rights index measures four rights: the no automatic stay on assets, 
secured creditors first paid, restrictions for going into reorganization and management does 
not stay in reorganization. The English origin countries still get the highest average score of 
creditor rights (3.11). Since different kinds of creditors have different interests, most studies 
concerning legal protection put more emphasis on the anti-director right index. This thesis 
consistently uses the anti-director rights index instead of the creditor right index as the chief 
measure of legal institutions because of its focus on shareholder value. 
  
Stemming from the classification of legal families, an increasing amount of research 
has attempted to compare the difference between legal families. Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000), 
for example, investigate the effect of the institutional environment on corporate performance. 
They sample 38 countries and compare the differences in their legal systems, as LLSV 
defined. Their results prove that significant differences in investment performance (measured 
by internal cash flow, new debt issues, and new equity issues) are related to the legal 
institutions of the countries. The English origin legal system has better investment 
performance than the civil legal system.  
 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) use more than 11,000 companies from 45 
countries to prove that firms in countries with stronger legal protection are less likely to hold 
more free cash flow. Furthermore, Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004) analyze the impacts 
of three different institutions on the company’s investment performance (measured by 
returns on investment to its cost of capital): country legal system, ownership structures and 
capital market. Their data covers 46 countries for the period 1996-2001, grouped by LLSV. 
They conclude that agency problems exist in all countries but can be mitigated by all three 
types of institutions. Among them, legal institutions have the strongest impact on improving 
                                                 
4 These countries are Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Brazil, Chile, Greece, Jordan, Peru, Uruguay, 
Japan and South Korea.  
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investment performance. In practice, more empirical research provides evidence to prove 
that companies in countries with English Origin common law legal systems perform 
significantly better than those in countries with other legal origins (La Porta et al. 2000/ 2002, 
Fauver, Houston and Naranjo 2003).  
 
Beyond comparing the difference among four legal original countries, one line of 
legal research now provides a more detailed investigation for particular aspects of corporate 
governance by measuring the level of anti-director rights in individual countries (Johnson, 
Boone, Breach and Friedman 2000a, Nenova 2003, Esty and Megginson 2003). Their 
general conclusion is that companies in countries with a higher score of anti-director right 
and indicating a stronger protection of investors, can curb private benefits and lead to better 
performance. However, the anti-director right index has been criticized for its ad-hoc nature, 
for mistakes in its coding, and for conceptual ambiguity in its definition (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006). For example, Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003) 
analyze the determinants of effective legal institutions using data from 49 countries. They 
find that “transplant5 effect is a more important predictor of legality than the supply of a 
particular legal family” (Berkowitz et al. 2003: p167). Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (DLLS, 2006) revised their initial anti-director right index which was reported 
in LLSV (1997/1998). They present 72 countries in their revised anti-director right, based on 
laws and regulations that were applicable to public trade firms in May 2003. A similar but 
more precise definition of the six proxies is applied to form the revised index. This reports 
that the key difference between the initial and revised index is the treatment of enabling 
provisions. Most results are consistent with their earlier work. The revised anti-director right 
index still shows a significantly higher score for English origin countries than for French 
legal origin ones.   
 
■ Legal Enforcement 
Laws protecting investors come from different sources such as company laws, stock 
                                                 
5 Berkowitz et al. (2000: p165-166) describe that “there have been three major transplantations of 
legal codes during the past two hundred years. First, during the period of imperialism (1890–1914) 
French law was transplanted throughout Europe and western law (especially French and English 
law) was exported throughout Latin America, Asia and Africa”. “Second, post-World War II, 
United States law played an increasingly important role and many newly independent states 
borrowed legal code from those western countries which they had originally received their law”. 
“Third, following the collapse of socialist system in the late 1980s, countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union rebuilt their legal systems drawing heavily on the European 
and the United States models.” 
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exchange regulations and accounting standards. The enforcement of laws is as crucial as the 
content of laws. LLSV (1998) propose that a strong quality of legal enforcement could be a 
substitute in countries with weak formal rules. Five measures, including efficiency of the 
judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation and risk of contract repudiation 
are employed to judge the enforcement quality. 
 
According to the variable definitions in LLSV (1998: p1140), the first measure 
represents “the efficiency and integrity of legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms”. A country with a higher score has a higher efficiency level. The 
second measure, rule of law, is the assessment of the law and order tradition. A low score 
here means less tradition for law and order. The third measure, corruption, implies the degree 
of corruption in government. A country with a lower score indicates that government 
officials are more likely there to ask for special bribes. The fourth measure assesses the level 
of risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization”. Lower scores represent higher 
risks. The final measure evaluates the level of the “risk of modification in contract taking the 
form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down” due to “budget cutbacks, 
indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in government economic and 
social priorities.” Similarly, lower scores reflect higher risks. 
 
Unfortunately, the results do not support their expectation that the quality of legal 
enforcement can substitute or compensate for the quality of law. Moreover, they find that 
enforcement measures are affected by per capita income. By a single measure, richer 
countries are likely to have higher enforcement scores. The quality of enforcement is higher 
in richer countries. Once income is controlled, countries with French civil law still score 
significantly lower, on each measure, than do countries with common law.  
 
Based on the sample of 661 dual-class firms in 18 countries for 1997, Nenova (2003) 
measured the private benefits of controlling shareholders by examining the value of 
controlling blocks of votes. She finds that the value of controlling blocks of votes varies 
from 0 percent in Denmark to 48 percent in South Korea and that the legal environment, 
including the law enforcement6, investor protection, takeover regulations and corporate 
                                                 
6 Nenova (2003) mainly use the measure for rule of law from LLSV (1998) but also test the 
alternative measures of law enforcement in LLSV (1998) such as efficiency of the judiciary, 
accounting standards, and corruption. She states that the results are stable.  
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charter provisions7 can explain 68 percent of the cross country differences. Among these 
legal measures, she shows that the effects of investor protection law and takeover regulations 
are equally important, but that law enforcement is more powerful.  
 
Johnson et al. (2000a) collected data from 25 emerging markets from the end of 1996 
to April 1999 and tried to link the weakness of the legal institutions regarding corporate 
governance to stock market declines in the Asian crisis. Referring to the data from LLSV 
(1998), they evaluated four types of legal institution: anti-director rights, creditor rights, 
accounting standards and the enforceability of contracts. Their results are closely linked to 
the findings of LLSV (1997/1998) which indicate that weak corporate governance results in 
more expropriation and hence a larger fall in asset prices. But Johnson et al. (2000a) show 
that enforcement of shareholder rights plays a more important role than investor rights in 
their research.  
 
Optimal legal enforcement 
Compared to the considerable amount of literature that has been published to prove 
the positive effect of legal mechanisms, there is relatively little work that investigates the 
interrelationships between them. In the final part of the Denis and McConnell (2003: p43) 
survey a new question is presented: “Would greater protection in the US improve corporate 
governance, and with it firm value?” They highlight the limits to the value of protection. 
“For example, a system in which shareholders have the right to approve or disapprove every 
decision made by managers would be neither practical nor valuable”. “What are these 
limits?” They leave this question open for future researchers. Indeed, one branch of 
governance research focuses on how to reform optimal law enforcement and on the optimal 
quality of legal enforcement (Garoupa and Stephen 2004, Polinsky and Shavell 2000, Posner 
1998, Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer 2003). Basically, their major concern is the enforcement 
cost.  
 
Posner (1998) questions why there has been economic success in East Asian nations 
such as China and Vietnam in which the rule of law is weak, while in India (having a legal 
system modelled on that of England) there is significant underperformance – especially 
                                                 
7 Six charter provisions aggregated in Nenova (2003) including golden shares, coattails, poison pills, 
voting caps, the right of the board of directors to limit transfer of shares, and the right of 
limited-voting shares to attain full voting power in case of dividend nonpayment, sale of assets, or 
excessive concentration of voting power to cash-flow rights.  
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when compared to China? He provided three possible explanations. First of all, the legal 
reform is too expensive and is usually ignored by wealthy nations because of the relatively 
low costs. Secondly, the legal system may enforce not only contract and property rights but 
might also reduce economic efficiency. Thirdly, too high a degree of legal enforcement will 
lead the decision makers to seek other informal substitutes, such as arbitration, reputation or 
retaliation, merger, bilateral monopoly, strong-arm tactics, and altruism. Posner (1998: p2) 
points out that “even in the highly litigious culture of the US, the vast majority of contract 
and property disputes are resolved informally because of the expense of legal proceedings.”  
When decision makers choose these substitutes, the hidden legal enforcement cost still exists. 
Poor countries cannot afford the high cost of good legal enforcement and so turn to 
substitutes; enforcement costs make this even worse.  
 
Burkart et al. (2003) present a theoretical model to test how legal rules affect the 
trade-off between the benefits and costs of separating ownership and management. They 
investigate family firms and discover that when the founders give up their private benefits to 
hire a professional manager, they also transfer the opportunity for managers to divert 
company revenue rather than to pay out dividends to the shareholders. To limit this 
extraction, the founders can still control the monitoring but it is usually over-monitoring: 
“High levels of monitoring and strict legal rules reduce the professional manager’s private 
benefits and may thus discourage him from running the firm.” Offering a high wage may 
make it easy to induce mangers to agree to run the firm. However, “higher ownership 
concentration and better legal protection make it more difficult to satisfy the professional 
manager’s participation constraint.” 
 
When legal protection is strong even in the absence of monitoring, the professional 
manager is offered a wage at the highest possible level because private benefits are 
insufficient to induce the professional manager to run the firm (Burkart et al. 2003). On the 
contrary, when legal protection is poor, the founders have to retain all shares to implement 
an appropriate monitoring level. This is the trade-off between monitoring cost and 
managerial rent. In Burkart et al. (2003) model, a legal system with strong protection of 
outside shareholders is socially desirable: “The best manager is hired to run the firm, and no 
resources are wasted on monitoring. This conclusion is driven by the assumption that law 
enforcement is free.” This is not actually true. For example, the costs of complying with 
better accounting and disclosure standards might be very high. If better legal protection 
imposes higher enforcement costs on the society, Burkart et al. (2003) suggest to compare 
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these legal enforcement costs with the social costs of private monitoring.  
 
There is extremely little empirical research focusing on this field. Lerner and Schoar 
(2005) analyze 210 developing private equity investments and document that investments in 
countries with a common law or with better legal enforcement are far less likely to employ 
common stock or straight debt but are more likely to use convertible preferred stock. 
Transactions in these nations are generally associated with greater contractual protection for 
the private equity groups and these contracts are generally the second best solution, as 
suggested by extensive theoretical literature, to contracting in private equity. Their 
conclusions seem to point out the existence of sub-optimal decision costs a lot in a too strong 
legal system. However, the casual link has not been further proved.   
 
■ Accounting Standards 
The quality of accounting standards is another proxy applied in LLSV (1998) to 
evaluate the legal environment. The quality of an accounting standard is measured using an 
index developed by the Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). 
The CIFAR index employed in LLSV (1998) was published in 1991 and therefore suffered 
from the future convergence of accounting standard in European countries. Their results 
show that countries with Scandinavian origin averagely have the highest quality of 
accounting standards (74.00); English origin countries score second (69.62) and the French 
family has the weakest quality of accounting disclosure.   
 
Based on examining and rating the inclusion or omission of ninety accounting items 
in annual reports of companies, the country-level CIFAR index represents the average scores 
across a sample of domestic companies. While the CIFAR index has been challenged 
because it is highly correlated with other country characteristics, this index is commonly 
used as a measure for examining the relationship between the quality of a country’s 
corporate disclosure regime and economic performance in cross-country analyses (Rajan and 
Zingales 1998, Levine, Loayza and Beck 2000, Lombardo and Pagano 2000).  
 
Levine et al. (2000) examine whether cross-countries differences in legal and 
accounting systems explain differences in levels of financial development. They find that to 
strengthen creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices (measured by the 
CIFAR index) can boost financial development and accelerate economic growth. Lombardo 
and Pagano (2000) document that total stock market returns are negatively related to overall 
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measures of the quality of institutions, such as judicial efficiency and rule of law, controlling 
for risk, and accounting standards. Using a sample from 22 countries, Hope (2003) 
conducted an interesting international investigation on the relations between the accuracy of 
analysts' earning forecasts and the level of annual report disclosure (measured by the CIFAR 
index), and between forecast accuracy and the degree of enforcement of accounting 
standards. They not only provide evidence consistent with the positive effects of accounting 
disclosure but also suggest that the enforcement of accounting standards is also and even 
more important.  
 
2.5.2.2 Extra-legal Institutions 
While the existing second generation governance research focuses mostly on the 
proper functioning of legal institutions, such as legal origin, minority shareholder protection, 
legal enforcement, accounting standard, etc, a recent study by Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
draws attention to the features of extra-legal institutions. In their earlier paper (Zingales 
2000), they first identify that a broader definition of corporate governance should take 
market competition and the pressure of public opinion into consideration. By following the 
arguments in their 2000 study, Dyck and Zingales (2004) study the role of extra-legal 
institutions, including market competition, public opinion pressures, moral norms, labour as 
monitors and corporate tax enforcement.  
 
Take a further look at these five extra-legal institutions. First of all, a more 
competitive structure of input and output market can make the prices more objective, and 
thereby the controlling shareholders will find it more difficult to extract private benefits 
through manipulated transfer price. Second, with a strong and reliable formation of public 
opinion pressures, controlling shareholders may curb their incentive to try tunneling because 
they fear for losing their reputation. Third, beyond the consideration of legal penalties and 
reputation costs, controlling shareholders may be unwilling to promote their self-interests 
simply due to their norm moral. Fourth, labour is regarded as another efficient mechanism 
because it has a direct interest in the firm’s performance and holds private and secret inside 
information about the company. Fifth, the government can play the role of monitoring 
through tax enforcement. If tax authorities enforce their rules on transferring prices by, for 
example, charging two parties for intra-corporate transactions, the private benefit of 
controlling shareholders may be limited and may thereby reduce their motivation to do so. 
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In practice, it is hard to test the effects of the extra-legal institutions. For instance, the 
existence of a truly independent media is doubtful in most countries. Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) use an indicator of newspaper diffusion which is measured as the circulation of daily 
newspapers normalized by population. Nevertheless, the question of independence still 
remains unsolved. Coffee (2001) uses the violent crime rate as the proxy for moral norms. 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) take religion to be an indicator of norms. Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) measure both. Similarly, the causal link between crime rate, religion and the moral 
norms of top-management is open to discussion. Moreover, the interest related to labour is 
not the same as for minority shareholders. In some cases, the labour may align itself with the 
controlling shareholders or fight for their own interests at the expense of the minority 
shareholders.  
 
Given the difficulties of measuring the effects, this line of research still provides 
evidence that extra-legal mechanisms can effectively prevent some transactions that might be 
used to expropriate minority shareholders. Dyck and Zingales (2004) estimates the private 
benefits of control using the differences between the premiums for voting and non-voting 
shares for 393 controlling block sales in 39 countries. They examine both the legal and 
extra-legal institutions and conclude that each single variable is related to the lower level of 
private benefits. Tax enforcement has the best performance in reducing private benefits and 
in indirectly enhancing financial development. Public opinion pressures also help to curb 
private benefits, but not to increase share value. They explain that “strong media also induce 
corporate managers to bow to environmental pressures, which are not necessarily in the 
shareholders’ interest”.  
 
Sampling firm-level control from nine East Asian and 13 Western European countries, 
Haw and Hu (2004) investigate the impact of legal and extra-legal institutions on limiting 
income management. Their legal institutions are proxied by legal origin, anti-director rights, 
the efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law and accounting standards (all sourced form 
LLSV 1998). Extra-legal institutions are measured by market competition, public opinion 
pressure and tax compliance (all sourced from Dyck and Zingales 2004). The univariate test 
results show that the incentive of income management is significantly associated with the 
deviation between control and cash flow right, but legal tradition, minority rights protection, 
the efficiency of the judicial system, disclosure standards competition laws, diffusion of the 
press, and tax compliance can provide avenues for limiting the use of earnings management. 
Furthermore, their multiple regression results suggest that common law tradition and an 
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efficient judicial system cover the effects of the other legal institutions, and the high rate of 
tax-compliance is a more dominant factor among the extra-legal mechanisms. Their findings 
are partially consistent with the results of Dyck and Zingales (2004).  
 
2.5.2.3 Anti- Self-Dealing Index (Private Enforcement) and Public Enforcement  
In Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer’s (DLLS, 2006) recent work, 
they not only revise the initial anti-director right index but more importantly present a new 
measure of legal protection: the anti-self-dealing index. To complete this work, they 
collected 72 valid samples from questionnaires completed by attorneys working in 
international law firms with members across 108 countries; these samples were based on the 
legal rules prevailing in 2003. They designed questions starting with a fixed self-dealing 
transaction and then measured the hurdles that the controlling shareholders needed to tackle 
in order to extract private benefit from this transaction: the higher the hurdles, the higher the 
anti-self-dealing index. Finally, they constructed two up-to-date legal measures: the private 
enforcement and the public enforcement indexes.  
 
A private enforcement index, that is also called anti-self-dealing index, is the average 
score of the ex-ante and ex-post control of self-dealing. The ex-ante private control of 
self-dealing is the average of the approval of disinterested shareholders and ex-ante 
disclosure (reviewer required). Ex-post private control is the average of disclosure in 
periodic filings and the ease of proving wrongdoing. All the above indexes range from zero 
to one after calculation. 
 
In summary, for the anti-self dealing index, they show that common law countries 
have a higher average ex-ante index (0.58). This means that they typically require extensive 
disclosure and the approval of the transaction by disinterested shareholders. Scandinavian 
civil law countries in turn have the lowest average ex-ante index (0.22). For ex-post private 
control, common law countries still obtain the highest score (0.76), which indicates that 
countries with common law origins require more severe information disclosure and that 
plaintiffs will find it easier to prove a wrongdoing in court. The final average 
anti-self-dealing index in common law countries (0.67) is significantly higher than in civil 
law ones (0.36).  
 
Specifically, DLLS point out that the US and France have unexpectedly low scores. 
The US relies more on the ex-post legal protection against self-dealing than on the ex-ante 
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approval by disinterested shareholders. France even allows related party transactions to be 
approved without shareholder approval once they believe that the transaction is on “normal” 
terms. Besides, DLLS prove no evidence for the relationship between income level and the 
anti-self-dealing index. And in the end, they do horse races between the anti-self-dealing 
index and the revised anti-director right index as outlined above. They suggest that 
self-dealing could provide a better index because it is, to a certain extent, the central problem 
of corporate governance in most countries. 
 
Turning to the index of public enforcement, this index is a sum-up score that is 
produced by assigning one quarter point when each of the following sanctions is available: 
fines for the approving body, jail sentences for the approving body, fines for the controlling 
shareholder and jail for the controlling shareholder. Evidence here shows a significant but 
unexpected sign. They suggests that the government’s power to impose fines and prison 
terms for self-dealing transactions that meet disclosure and approval requirements does not 
benefit stock market development (DLLS 2006: p38). However, they stress that this 
conclusion may be too narrow because the importance of public enforcement has not been 
addressed in situations where the criminal sanctions are actually imposed and self-dealing 




In summary, this chapter reviews the nature of the agency problem in concentrated 
ownership structures, as well as the effects of ownership concentration on general corporate 
performance, and the accentuating and mitigating factors of agency costs with concentrated 
ownership. Section 2.2 contends that increasing ownership may have incentive effects on 
reducing the agency costs between owners and managers, but that it also causes other 
conflicts between large shareholders and small shareholders, including managerial 
entrenchment, tunneling, and sub-optimal decision. Section 2.3 reviews these incentive 
effects and the agency costs associated with general corporate performance in the existing 
empirical research. This thesis considers both the level and the type of concentrated 
ownership structures; conclusions are still mixed. Generally, it seems that incentive effects 
impact the upper and lower levels of ownership concentration, but that controlling 
shareholders holding moderate levels of company’s shares are likely to act on their own 
private benefits. The arguments concerning the effect of different types of concentrated firms 
are even more inconsistent. The nature of each type of concentrated firm is the fundamental 
consideration. For example, it is important to consider whether the family firm is managed 
by the founders or by their descendants? Is the institutional large shareholder active or 
inactive in the governance of the firm? There is still large room for debate on the typology of 
ownership.   
 
Section 2.4 highlights how expropriation problems may be exacerbated when large 
shareholders separate the control rights from cash flow rights through various control 
devices. Section 2.5 of the thesis introduces several well known governance mechanisms and 
organizes them into two generation international governance studies as discussed by Denis 
and McConnell (2003). The first generation governance generally focuses on internal 
mechanisms such as CEO position, board composition, and ownership itself. Since this thesis 
examines the concentrated ownership structures for ownership itself, the emphasis is on the 
role of other blockholders. The external mechanism, such as takeover markets as extensively 
outlined by first generation research, will be discussed in-depth in chapter three.  
 
Referring to LLSV (1998), Dyck and Zinglales (2004), and DLLS (2006), this thesis, 
in the final part of section 2.5, explains the effects of the second generation governance 
mechanisms: legal and extra-legal institutions. The legal institutions include the initial 
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anti-director right, enforcement and accounting standards in LLSV (1998) and also the 
revised anti-director right in DLLS (2006). These measures are identified as major factors 
for investigating the degree of a country’s legal protection. A strong legal protection system 
generally results in better corporate performance. The field of extra-legal systems is 
relatively under-developed. To date, existing research provides little evidence that 
extra-legal characters can help to restrain controlling shareholders extracting their own 
benefits from specific events such as block share sales or income management. Through the 
compliance of well-functioning legal institutions, the optimal legal system also comes into 
consideration. 
 
The recent anti-self dealing index and public enforcement proxy formed by the DLLS 
(2006) paper are brought into this thesis at last. The formation processes of these two 
indexes are obviously different from those of the previous legal and extra-legal measures. 
Besides, these new legal indexes (DLLS) have similar characteristics with and are highly 
correlated to the previous legal (LLSV) and extra-legal (Dyck and Zinglales) measures. Thus, 
it may not be proper to test these new DLLS indexes in combination with the initial LLSV 
and the Dyck and Zinglales measures.  
 
After discussing the nature of the agency problem in concentrated ownership 
structures and the accentuating and mitigating factors of agency costs with concentrated 
ownership, next chapter would review the fundamental theories of M&A activities; introduce 
the measuring of M&A performance and the outcomes of the major empirical studies; 
present the deal characteristics of M&A that have been well documented by most studies as 
important factors of M&A success; and consider the possible effects of the concentrated 
ownership structure on M&A performance. 
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Chapter Three 
Merger and Acquisition, Performance Measures, and 




This thesis adds to the discussion about the relationship between merger and 
acquisition8 (M&A) activities, ownership concentration, and acquiring firm performance. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as a literature review of previous theoretical and 
empirical M&A research. Section 3.2 organizes the fundamental theories of M&A activities. 
Section 3.3 gives a brief overview concerning the measuring of M&A performance and the 
outcomes of the major empirical studies. There are two parts in this section. The first part 
(3.3.1) outlines the short-term and long-term market-based approaches. The second part 
(3.3.2) focuses on the accounting- based methods. Section 3.4 introduces the deal 
characteristics of M&A that have been well documented by most studies as important factors 
of M&A success. The final section (3.5) discusses the effects of the concentrated ownership 
structure on M&A performance.  
 
 
3.2 Rationale for Merger and Acquisition  
 
Although M&A issues have been extensively explored by both academic and practical 
studies over the past decade, most discussions are devoted to merger consequences. Strategic 
research suggests that merger motives ultimately decide whether or not a merger is attempted 
(Trautwein 1990). The rest of this section will review the rationale for M&A.  
 
 
                                                 
8 The terms ‘merger’, ‘acquisition’ and ‘takeover’ are used frequently in the group of ‘Merger and 
Acquisition (M&A)’, but the distinctions are not precise. Generally, these terms are used 
interchangeably and can have different legal meaning under particular business and tax laws 
(Sudarsanam 2003). 
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3.2.1 Macroeconomic Drivers (Macro Level) 
In Gort’s (1969) disturbance theory, mergers are driven by macroeconomic 
phenomenon. Specifically, the economic disturbance makes information about the past 
become less effective in predicting the future and thereby discrepancies in valuation arise 
from differences in expectation. When such discrepancies lead to an estimated higher value 
on the assets of a firm by non-owners (potential purchasers) than by owners, acquisitions 
become possible. Merger waves are one indication of the effect of macroeconomic drivers 
and mergers clustered by industry is another. The most common economic shocks come 
from rapid changes in technological improvements, financial innovations, supply shocks, 
foreign competition, or changes in legal regulations. Although this theory tries to explain the 
general phenomenon of fluctuations in merger frequencies over time and across industries, it 
is limited because it focuses much too heavily on a macro-level explanation but the fact is 
that most disturbances are of a more sectional nature on a firm-level (Trautwein 1990).  
 
3.2.2 Rational Choice (Firm Level) 
3.2.2.1 Managers Benefits 
A group of studies focusing on the private interests of managers argues that M&As are 
conducted by managers who intend to pursue their own interests instead of their 
shareholders’ welfare. Firth’s (1980) UK empirical study shows an abnormal increase in the 
remuneration level of the directors but negative market performance of the acquiring firms. 
He interprets this result as self-interest managers use takeovers to benefit themselves at the 
expense of shareholders.  
 
One of the underlying ideas for this argument is the agency-related problem discussed 
in chapter two, section 2.2. Rhoades’s (1983) empire-building theory contends that acquirers 
are willing to pay for growth potential rather than for profitability as their private benefits 
tend to grow with firm size. Conyon and Murphy (2002) document that firm size rather than 
firm performance is the main source of managerial wealth in the UK. Therefore, managers 
with size-related interests may be tempted to use free cash flow to expand their firm size, 
increase their own wealth, or enhance their position through M&A transactions (Jensen 
1986). Moreover, Amihud and Lev (1981) find that without monitoring, managers are likely 
to reduce their employment risks through unrelated mergers which are generally regarded as 
having no interest for shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) describe that when the firm 
is underperforming or lacking in growth opportunities, managers may make acquisitions in 
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order to decrease their chances of replacement. This leads managers to overpay and results in 
poor acquisition performance.  
 
Another idea is managers make mistakes in evaluating potential targets. In Roll’s 
(1986) hubris hypothesis, he declares that decision makers in the acquiring firms easily 
overestimate acquisition synergy because of hubris or exaggerated confidence and that they 
then pay far too much for their targets. This results in wealth transferring from the acquiring 
shareholders to the acquired stakeholders. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) further support 
this hypothesis by providing evidence for the relationship between CEO hubris and the size 
of premiums paid. 
 
3.2.2.2 Acquirers’ Shareholders Benefits 
In fact, most research shows that mergers are carried out under the rational choice that 
managers will make a value-enhancing M&A investment to maximize firm value and to 
benefit shareholders instead of the managers themselves. These studies can be further 
distinguished according to the potential sources of merger success. In general, the postulated 
sources come mainly from net gains through synergies or wealth transfers from other 
stakeholders (debt holders, government, customers/ suppliers).  
 
■ Synergies 
Any merger to be considered a success should generate positive net present value 
(NPV) from the investment. The net present value, or the so-called synergy, is created when 
the economic value of targets (VB) plus the net economic value added (NEVA) are higher 
than the price paid (P). The price paid comprises the premium and the targets’ economic 
value. This thesis will now look more closely at the drivers of synergies. In general, there are 
three perspectives that identify synergy; these are broadly comprised in the efficiency or 
synergy theory. First, from the financial perspective, synergies can be created from the lower 
cost of capital because of a less systematic risk due to portfolio diversification, a stronger 
bargaining power from size advantage, and a superior internal capital market (Mueller 1969, 
Chatterjee 1986, Montgomery 1994, Fluck and Lynch 1999). The main argument against the 
financial synergy hypothesis is that financial synergies are difficult to achieve in an efficient 
capital market (Montgomery and Singh 1984).  
 
Second, from the operational perspective, synergies can be created from a stronger 
market power by combining the operations of two separate units (Ghosh 2004); from a larger 
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economic scale by expanding activities across a variety of the firm; or from knowledge or 
skills transfer that is especially meaningful in high technology industry (Porter 1987). The 
potential concern for operational synergies is the cost of entry and the relocation of 
resources.  
 
Third, from the managerial perspective, a group of governance research assumes that 
M&As can create synergies ascribed to superior management capability and efficient 
monitoring mechanisms (Manne 1965). Specifically, shareholders, especially target 
shareholders, can gain from takeovers by expecting a more capable management to ensure a 
better-quality corporate governance system and the maximization of firm value. Numerous 
articles complete this argument. For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983) first define 
corporate control as the right to determine the management of corporate resources and then 
point out that the takeover market is often described as an efficient method of corporate 
control in which alternative managerial teams compete for the right to manage corporate 
resources. Jensen (1988) further indicates that the market for corporate control is benefiting 
shareholders, society, and corporate forms of organization. Kennedy and Limmack (1996) 
examine the performance of UK quoted companies involved in takeover bids during the 
period from 1980 to 1989. They specifically prove that the potential source of wealth gain 
from takeover is the replacement of inefficient target management. 
 
■ Wealth Transfers 
(i) Through Bondholders 
There is one line of study dealing with shareholder benefits that emphasises wealth 
transfer from bondholders (Kim and McConnell 1977, Asquith and Kim 1982, Eger 1983, 
Dennis and McConnell 1986, Maquieira, Megginson and Nail 1998, Billett, King and Mauer 
2004). Under the conception of stockholder-bondholder conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 
1976), stockholders of leveraged firms may have incentives to earn positive abnormal returns 
by undertaking an M&A deal at the expense of bondholders. This is because there is an 
increase in the variability of firm cash flow. “The bondholders lose because of the increase in 
the default risk of the existing bonds. The positive abnormal returns present the wealth 
transfer from bondholders”(Asquith and Kim 1982: p1209-1210).  
 
The evidence is still mixed. Kim and McConnell (1977) and Asquith and Kim (1982) 
test co-insurance effects by examining US conglomerate mergers. According to the 
co-insurance hypothesis, combining two leveraged firms will lead to a reduction in the 
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default risk of the target firms and will thereby increase the debt-capacity or 
borrowing-ability of combined firms. They find that bondholders of merging firms do not 
suffer abnormal negative returns around the time of merger; this confirms those co-insurance 
effects that signify the lack of any significant wealth transfer. Dennis and McConnell (1986) 
examine senior securities in merging firms (securities are actively traded around the initial 
announcement date of the merger) and find results that are compatible with the predictions of 
the co-insurance hypothesis. They find a small negative announcement effect for acquirer 
bonds, though this is not significantly different from zero. In a more recent study, Billett et al. 
(2004), analyzes the correlation between stockholder and bondholder excess returns. 
Consistent with the findings of earlier studies, their results fail to show any direct evidence 
to prove the presence of merger-induced wealth transfers among security holder classes. In 
particular, they tend to find that stockholder and bondholder excess returns tend to be 
positively correlated. 
 
Focusing on pure stock exchange transactions (where no cash was paid for any 
securities, and no debt was issued in the transaction), Eger (1983) presents some exclusive 
evidence to support the wealth redistribution theory which suggests that in a non synergistic 
merger, bondholders gain and stockholders lose. This redistribution of wealth from 
stockholders to bondholders results from a decrease in the return variance of the combined 
firms. Maquieira et al. (1998) also study pure stock-for-stock deals. They find that 
conglomerate stock-for-stock mergers fail to create synergies and that wealth redistribution 
has no effect on such non-synergistic mergers because bondholders do not gain statistically. 
Instead, they document significant net synergistic gains in non-conglomerate mergers and 
demonstrate that all stakeholders including biding shareholders share these synergies.  
 
In sum, the main challenge is that this line of analyses has to be discussed under the 
assumption of non-synergistic merger where the value of the combined firm equals the sum 
of the value of targets and acquirers. In a synergistic merger, the bondholder effects may be 
masked by the synergy gain that will generally benefit both stockholders and bondholders. 
Since it is hard to know what factors produce synergy, it is consequently difficult to control 
for synergy (Dennis and McConnell 1986, Billett et al. 2004).  
 
(ii) Through customers/ suppliers 
The other line of study explains shareholder benefits on the wealth transfers from 
customers or suppliers. This explanation generally relies on monopoly theory or collusion 
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hypothesis (Edwards 1955) and occurs mostly in horizontal acquisitions. A collusion-driven 
horizontal merger will result in limiting competition, deterring potential entrants, rising up 
the monopoly rent and ultimately transferring wealth from suppliers and customers to the 
takeover industry. By contrast, an efficiency-driven horizontal takeover can lead to a more 
competitive takeover industry, thus benefiting customers and increasing total welfare. In 
addition, Galbraith's (1954) countervailing power theory proposes that a horizontal 
takeover between two rivals will massively increase buyer power for the combined firms. 
Since large buyers usually enjoy lower input prices the result is often a wealth transfer 
from suppliers. 
 
However, the existing empirical studies investigating the wealth effects of mergers on 
rivals, customers and suppliers consistently suggest that efficiency gains rather than market 
power is the main source of shareholder wealth created through horizontal takeovers (Eckbo 
1983/ 1985/ 1992, Baker and Bresnahan 1985, Banerjee and Eckard 1998). There is almost 
no direct practical evidence to support the monopoly or countervailing power theory. 
 
(iii) Through Governments (taxes) 
Another line of study states that a further possible source of wealth transfer is the 
government. More precisely, it is society that pays the cost. Lewellen (1971) provides a 
latent-debt-capacity argument which states that one firm may acquire another if the potential 
target firm is taking only modest interest-tax advantage in its capital structure prior to the 
merger. Thus any valuation gains can be carved out of a consolidation of a combined firm 
merely by utilizing these advantages more efficiently. This could be accomplished as part of 
the merger transaction itself by issuing debt securities for some portion of the purchase price. 
However, to contradict Lewellen’s (1971) perspective, Gilson, Scholes and Wolfson (1988) 
posit that taxation gains can be obtained with techniques other than mergers. Leland (2007) 
presents additional theoretical research, advocating that “combining activities into a single 
firm offers the advantage of risk-reduction from diversification. But keeping activities 
separate offers the advantage of optimizing the separate capital structures” (Leland 2007: 
p801).  
 
Empirical articles studying wealth transfer from tax savings are generally confined to 
a fraction of the premium paid. For example, using a sample of 3,135 takeovers, Fuller, 
Netter and Stegemoller (2002) find that bidders have significantly negative returns when 
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buying public targets and significantly positive returns when buying private or subsidiary 
targets. Furthermore, in buying private and subsidiary targets deals, acquirer returns are 
greater for stock bids than for cash bids. Their findings show that the private-firm owners 
generally prefer stock exchange deals because the tax implications can be deferred. If this tax 
deferral option is valuable to target owners, they may accept a discounted price and the 
lower premium will be reflected in the higher bidder returns. Ayers, Lefanowicz and 
Robinson (2003) present similar evidence to support tax benefits as a source of merger 
premiums. They test the relationship between premiums and the capital gains of target 
shareholders. Their results confirm the positive association between shareholder capital gains 
taxes for individual investors and acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions. 
 
In conclusion, since targets always gain abnormal returns on average because of high 
premium, this thesis emphasizes the value creation for acquiring firms. In addition, the value 
of synergy is difficult to ascertain because of conflicting motives. Therefore, the rest of this 
chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature with respect to measuring success in 
M&A, main results and major determinants, as well as the impact of concentrated ownership 
structures on the acquiring firm performance  
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3.3 The Measuring of Merger and Acquisition Performance 
 
To date, two major approaches are employed to assess M&A performance. One is 
abnormal stock market returns using event study methodology and the other is accounting 
performance as generally measured by some return metrics. As the focus of this thesis is on 
the later and as market based event studies is a well-established research methodology, this 
section will only briefly discuss the methodology and its main findings in the context of 
M&A.  
 
3.3.1 Market Based Approach 
Stock return is a good indicator of M&A performance because it reflects the 
expectations of the shareholders regarding M&A activities and benefits. Short-term event 
study methodology is a straight-forward and relatively easy approach for measuring 
abnormal returns. Initial event studies since Ball and Brown (1968), Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll (1969), consider abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of major 
corporate events, including M&A. From a relatively short window, more recent work has 
extended the period of interest over several years. The following section will look at the 
short-term and long-term market-based approach, respectively.  
 
3.3.1.1 Short-term Event Studies 
(i) Basic Methodology 
Event study methodology has been widely applied and well-documented in the 
academic fields of accounting and finance. To briefly and clearly review the structure of this 
methodology, the procedures for conducting an event study as it appears in Campbell, Lo 
and MacKinlay’s (1997: p150-152) book are presented. They outline the event study 
according to seven steps: 
1. Event definition. This initial task of conducting an event study is to define the event of interest 
and identify the period over which the security prices of the firms involved in this event will be 
examined- the event window […]. In practice, the event window is often expanded to two days, 
the day of the announcement and the day after the announcement. This is done to capture the 
price effects of announcements which occur after the stock market closes on the announcement 
day.  
2. Selection criteria. After identifying the event of interest, it is necessary to determine the 
selection criteria for the inclusion of a given firm in the study. The criteria may involve 
restrictions imposed by data available, such as a listing on the NYSE or AMEX, or may 
involve restrictions such as membership in a specific industry. At this stage it is useful to 
summarize some characteristics of the data sample […] and note any potential biases which 
may have been introduced through the sample selection.  
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3. Normal and abnormal returns. To appraise the event’s impact we require a measure of the 
abnormal return. The abnormal return is the actual ex post return of the security over the event 
window minus the normal return of the firm over the event window. The normal return is 
defined as the return that would be expected of the event did not take place. For each firm i and 
event data τ we have 
[ ]*є = - E |it it tit R R X , 
where *єit , Rit and E(Rit) are the abnormal, actual, and normal returns, respectively, for time 
period t. Xt  is the conditioning information for the normal performance model. There are two 
common choices for modeling the normal return－the constant-mean-return model where Xt is 
a constant, and the market model where Xt is the market return. The constant-mean-return 
model, as the name implies, assumes that the mean return of a given security is constant 
through time. The market model assumes a stable linear relation between the market return and 
the security return.  
4. Estimation procedure. Once a normal performance model has been selected, the parameters of 
the model must be estimated using a subset of the data known as the estimation window. The 
most common choice, when feasible, is to use the period prior to the event window for the 
estimation window […]. Generally, the event period itself is not included in the estimation 
period to prevent the event from influencing the normal performance model parameter 
estimates.  
5. Testing procedure. With the parameter estimates for the normal performance model, the 
abnormal returns can be calculated. Next, we need to design the testing framework for the 
abnormal returns of individual firms.  
6. Empirical results. The presentation of the empirical results follows the formulation of the 
econometric design […]. Occasionally, especially in studies with a limited number of event 
observations, the empirical results can be heavily influenced by one or two firms. Knowledge 
of this is important […]. 
7. Interpretation and conclusions. Ideally the empirical results will lead to insights about the 
mechanisms by which the effect affects security prices. Additional analysis may be included to 
distinguish between competing explanations.  
 
(ii) Main Empirical Findings 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) review seven leading US acquisition articles for the 
sample period from 1962 to 1979, with an event window of around a month and a market 
model as the benchmark. They show that the abnormal returns for bidding firms in 
successful mergers range from +0.25 percent to +0.53 percent, and the weighted average 
abnormal return is +1.37 percent. Instead, abnormal returns for target firms in successful 
mergers range from +13.3 percent to +21.78 percent, and the weighted average abnormal 
return is +15.9 percent.  
 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) conduct another US acquisition study that 
provides evidence for the 1980s and 1990s. They use a three day event window and a longer 
window beginning twenty days prior to the announcement and ending at the close of the 
merger. The average three-day abnormal return for acquirers is -0.7 percent and for targets is 
+16 percent; a longer day abnormal return for acquirers is -3.8 percent and for targets is 23.8 
percent. Both abnormal returns for targets are significantly different from zero at the 5 
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percent level. Their results are consistent with the summary presented in Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) and in other US acquisition articles (Schwert 1996, Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker 
1992). 
 
While the UK has different takeover regulations, most UK empirical studies provide 
results that are similar to the US research, especially with regard to short-term market 
performance. Based on the adjusted market model, Franks and Harris (1989) examine over 
1,800 UK deals during the period 1955-1985. They show that in month 0 bidders earn a 
positive but insignificant abnormal return of about 1.0 percent but targets gain statistically 
positive returns of (on average) about 23.3 percent.  
 
Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) conduct other UK study by sampling 429 
acquisitions during the period 1980-1990. They use the market model with a Dimson thin 
trading adjustment so as to calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of an over -40 
days to +40 days event window. They find that the period day -20 to day +40 captures all the 
value changes. Within this period, the CAR for bidders is -4.04 percent; for targets it is 
+29.18 percent. Both measures are significant from zero at the 1 percent level. These results 
imply the incidence of wealth transferring from bidder to target and echo the conclusions of 
most US and UK acquisitions research (Firth 1980, Limmack 1991).  
 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) particularly provide a cross-country survey of large 
intra-European (including 18 European countries) M&A deals for the period 1993-2000. 
Short-term performance is also calculated by CAR under the CAPM benchmark. The event 
window starts from 2 months (-60 days to +60 days) prior to the event date. Their figures 
display similar results: for the 5 day event window, bidders have a significant abnormal 
return of 3.18 percent and targets have extremely high returns at 26.88 percent.  
 
In sum, the results of these empirical studies mostly show significantly positive 




Under the assumption of stock market efficiency, short-term event study usually uses 
estimators such as the market adjusted model (α=0, β=1), the market and risk adjusted (or 
market) model (ARit =Rit-αi-βiRmt), and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to assess 
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abnormal returns (Jensen and Ruback 1983, Andrade et al. 2001, Franks and Harris 1989, 
Goergen and Renneboog 2004). However, this method estimates the abnormal returns by 
controlling for the risk of the stock and the movement of the market during the event period. 
On some occasions, there are problems with parameter estimation (Blume 1971, Binder 
1985/ 1998). For example, the nontrading or nonsynchronous trading effect induces bias for 
the market model beta (Scholes and Williams 1977). Brown and Warner (1985) examine 
mean-adjusted returns, market-adjusted returns and market- and risk-adjusted returns. They 
find that using daily returns on thinly traded securities the different abnormal return 
measures perform similarly.  
 
In addition, under the unrealistic statistical assumption, abnormal returns are given by 
the market model with stationary parameters. Therefore, the potential statistical bias may be 
caused by the fact that the abnormal return estimators are often correlated or have different 
variances (Mikkleson and Partch 1988, Mais, Moore and Rogers 1989). Jaffe (1974) and 
Mandelker (1974) suggest that combining securities with the event in the same calendar 
month into a portfolio can solve the cross sectional dependence problems in the dependent 
variable. Also, weighting both the portfolio abnormal return estimates and the average 
portfolio values relating to independent variables can effectively eliminate the 
heteroskedasticity problem. Moreover, Chandra and Rorhbach (1990) and Karafiath (1994) 
contend that these biases can be successfully tackled through statistical tests in 
cross-sectional regressions. Brown and Warner (1980) use one factor model (with the market 
portfolio return as the factor) as a simple solution to adjust standard errors when the sample 
firms are from unrelated industries 
 
Overall, since the short-term expected returns are virtually close to zero around event 
days, selecting an estimator as benchmark is not a fatal problem (Andrade et al. 2001) in 
short-term event study. While event study methodology may suffer from statistical problems 
in certain cases, it is still a powerful alternative (with some adjustments) for measuring 
abnormal return.  
 
3.3.1.2 Long-term Studies 
(i) Basic Methodology 
Recent research has heightened the need for analyzing the long-run abnormal stock 
returns following major corporate events. Nevertheless, unlike short-term performance, 
long-term performance is assessed under the assumption that markets take time to assess the 
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value implications of acquisitions and to await fresh information (Sudarsanam 2003). 
Therefore, there is considerable variation in the measures and the statistical tests which are 
normally used to detect long-run abnormal stock returns. Beginning with Ritter (1991), the 
buy-and-hold return (BHAR) methodology becomes a popular approach for examining 
long-term stock price performance. However, Fama (1998) argues against the BHAR 
because of the inadequate abnormal return parameters compounded with long-horizon 
returns. He strongly advocates a monthly calendar-time portfolio approach for measuring 
long-term abnormal returns.  
 
To date, there are two major families of long-term market based methodology: event 
study approach including cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and BHAR, and calendar time 
approach. Since long-term market performance is not the focus of this thesis, the following 
section introduces the basic methodology behind these two families by reviewing their 
implications and discussion through six important articles in the field: Ritter (1991), 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), Barber and Lyon (1997), and Kothari and 
Warner (1997) for long-term event study methodology; Fama (1998) for time calendar 
methodology; and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) for comparison. Moreover, as CAR is a 
more straightforward method and as it is generally employed for comparison with BHAR, 
this thesis emphasizes the BHAR scheme for long-term event study methodology.  
 
(a) Long-term Event Study Methodology 
In an initial event study approach cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated 
as follows:  
CARit=ΣARit,  ARit=Rit ﹣E(Rit) 
Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are defined as  
[ ] [ ]
=1 =1




BHAR R R  
Reference portfolios, control firms, market models and Fama-French (1992/1993) three 
factor models are broadly used as benchmarks to calculate the expected returns E(Rit). Three 
to five years event windows are used to measure the long-term horizon. Four influential 
published academic papers discuss this methodology.  
 
Ritter (1991) evaluates the long-run performance of initial public offerings (IPO) 
using two measures: (1) CAR calculated with monthly portfolio rebalancing and (2) 
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three-year buy and hold return (BHAR). According to Ritter’s definition (Ritter 1991: p6-8), 
“Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a stock 
minus the monthly benchmark return for the corresponding 21-trading-day period”. To avoid 
measurement bias, they used four types of indexes as benchmarks (1) the CRSP 
value-weighted NASDAQ index, (2) the CRSP value-weighted Amex-NYSE index, (3) 
listed firms matched by industry and size, and (4) an index of the smallest size.  
 
To reduce the new listing or delisting bias, they calculate an equally-weighted CAR 
monthly for both the IPO firm portfolio and the benchmark index. This implies a rebalancing 
process. Three-year BHARs are also used for dealing with this issue. According to their 
definition, three-year holding period returns are defined as: 
36
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where rit is the raw return on firm i in event month t:  “This measures the total return from a 
buy-and-hold strategy where a stock is purchased at the first closing market price after going 
public and held until the earlier of (1) its 3-year anniversary, or (2) its delisting.” They find 
evidence of timing ability by using BHAR as measures. IPO managers tend to issue shares 
that result in long-run underperformance when stock prices are high.  
 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) develop a compatible research 
approach by examining the long-run performance of open market share repurchases. They 
also present CAR and BHAR approaches. For both of these methods, abnormal returns are 
calculated relative to four benchmarks: (1) the CRSP equal- weighted NYSE and ASE index, 
(2) the value-weighted NYSE and ASE index, (3) a ten size-based portfolio benchmark, and 
(4) a size- and book-to-market-based benchmark. They regard the CAR approach as 
descriptive in nature and focus more on the correction of BHAR measures which are defined 
as an equal-weighted return “from buy-and-hold investment in all repurchase firms 
beginning in the month following the announcement and continuing for 12 months” 
(Ikenberry et al. 1995: p188). Furthermore, they calculate a rebalancing multi-year total 
return by compounding average annual returns over a four-year observation period; 
consequently, they reduce the possibility that a small set of firms will ever dominate the 
return calculations.  
 
Most importantly, considering that estimating standard errors using an event study 
approach requires a reasonable number of annual observations but that most firms either do 
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not have a long history of returns or have an unstable return distribution over a long period 
of time, Ikenberry et al. (1995) run statistical inference of annual buy-and-hold and 
compounded multi-year returns via bootstrapping. This is to correct the skewness problems 
of individual-firm long horizon abnormal returns and the clustering problems of 
observations. They describe the bootstrapping sampling process as follows (Ikenberry et al. 
1995: p189): 
[…] for each repurchase announcement in our sample, we randomly select with replacement a 
firm listed on the NYSE or ASE that has the same size and book-to-market ranking at that 
point in time. We treat this randomly chosen company as if it had announced a repurchase on 
the same day as the corresponding repurchase firm. This matching process continues until each 
firm in our repurchase sample is represented in this pseudo-portfolio. This portfolio will have 
one randomly drawn firm for each actual repurchase firm, matched in time with similar size 
and book-to-market characteristics. After forming a single pseudo-portfolio, we estimate 
long-run performance in the same manner as we did for the repurchase sample. This yields one 
observation of the abnormal performance obtained from randomly forming a portfolio with the 
same characteristics as our repurchase sample. This entire process is repeated until we have 
1,000 pseudo-portfolios, and thus 1,000 abnormal return observations. This provides us with 
an empirical approximation of the distribution of abnormal returns drawn under the null model 
specific to our sample.  
 
Using a four-year BHAR via bootstrapping, Ikenberry et al. (1995) find a long-term 
abnormal stock price performance responding to the repurchase announcements. Their 
findings, consistent with Ritter’s (1991), reject the market efficiency hypothesis and take 
undervaluation as a motivation for managers to conduct share repurchases. In Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) academic paper, they suggest that the typical approach in the second wave of 
long-term event studies is to focus on BHARs with carefully constructed benchmarks and to 
assess the statistical significance of the mean BHAR via a bootstrapping procedure.  
 
Barber and Lyon (1997), observe biases in test statistics arising from new listings, 
rebalancing of benchmark portfolio, and skewness of long horizon abnormal returns, thus 
arguing that long-term abnormal returns should be measured as a simple BHAR on a sample 
firm less an appropriate expected BHAR on a reference portfolio or control firm. They 
calculate annual, three-year, and five-year BHARs by developing three approaches for 
benchmarks: (1) employing the return on a reference portfolio, (2) matching sample firms to 
control firms on specified firm characteristics, and (3) applying the three-factor model of 
Fama and French (1993). In the first approach, four sets of reference portfolios are 
considered: ten size-based, ten book-to-market, 50 size/book-to-market, and the CRSP 
equally weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market index. As an alternative, the second 
approach is to construct a set of matched firms as control firms on the basis of closest size 
(measured by market value of equity), similar book-to-market ratio, and similar size and 
 75
book-to-market ratio. The final approach for benchmark is the use of the three-factor model 
that regresses post-event excess returns on a market factor, a size factor, and the ratio of 
market to book equity (M/B) (Fama and French 1993).  
 
They finally document that using a reference portfolio (such as a market index) to 
calculate long-term abnormal returns may in fact cause significant biases as they argued. 
CARs are generally affected by the new listing bias, but BHARs are usually biased by 
rebalancing and skewness problems. However, they find that using control firm as a 
benchmark for calculating abnormal returns has statistical robustness results for virtually all 
sample situations. Kothari and Warner (1997) also analyze the security-specific long-run 
abnormal returns by using four different types of benchmark: (1) market-adjusted model, (2) 
market model, (3) capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and (4) Fama and French three-factor 
model. The major difference between their work and that of Barber and Lyon (1997) is that 
they put more concern into the application of the asset pricing model instead of a reference 
portfolio approach. However, the results in both articles highlight the presence of biases 
when calculating long-run abnormal returns using either a reference portfolio or an asset 
pricing model.  
 
Fama (1998) put forward strong arguments against the market inefficiency assumption 
associated with BHAR methodology. He emphasizes that systematic errors caused by the 
imperfect estimators of abnormal returns may not be the problem in short-term event study 
but that they may grow along with the long-term return horizon in event study. And this bad 
model problem is even worse in the BHAR method because it compounds (multiplies) an 
imperfect estimator. Besides, Fama (1998) points out that the expected return estimator used 
in event study is generally firm-specific and doesn’t constrain the cross-sectional expected 
returns. These approaches may explain the reaction of stock prices to firm-specific events 
such as IPOs and mergers, but they cannot identify anomalies in the cross-section of average 
returns such as size effect. The failure to adjust for the cross-sectional dependence of event 
firm abnormal returns may lead to overstatement in statistics results. Instead, Fama (1998) 




(b) Calendar Time Approach 
Based on the Fama-French three-factor model, the calendar time abnormal returns 
(CTARs) are defined as: 
R  -R = (R - R )+ SMB + HML+ii f i M f iαi +b s h εi  
where SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return 
on a portfolio of large stocks, and HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio of 
high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks. bi, si, 
and hi are the slopes in the time series regression (Fama and French 1996). Next, two 
important articles are studied for calendar time methodology. 
 
In Fama (1998), CTARs are calculated as the following process. “The first step is to 
calculate abnormal return for each calendar month on each stock (ARit) that had an event in 
the post-event years. Abnormal returns can be estimated in any reasonable way as previously 
discussed. The second step is then to average those abnormal returns (ARit) for the calendar 
month across stocks in order to get the abnormal return (AARt) for the month on the portfolio 
of stocks with an event in the post-event years. The third step is then to re-form the portfolio 
every month” (Fama 1998: p295) and to re-do step 1 and 2.  
 
While recognizing that the calendar time approach using average monthly return does 
not accurately capture the long-term investor experience captured by the BHAR approach, 
Fama (1998) still contends that average monthly returns have fewer inference problems in 
tests concerning long-term abnormal returns. The reason for this is that average monthly 
returns avoid the skewness problems produced by compounding monthly returns to get 
long-term BHARs. Furthermore, Fama defends market efficiency by regarding anomalies 
(overreaction or underreaction) as chance results that can be fairly eliminated with 
reasonable adjustments in the way they are measured. However, Loughran and Ritter (2000) 
focus on the class of anomalies related to managerial actions involving cash flows (such as 
equity issues, stock-financed acquisitions, and share repurchases) and provide a 
contradictory view showing that if there are significant misevaluations in the stock market 
then there should be some methods which have the power to detect subsequent abnormal 
returns. They argue that monthly portfolio returns using the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model in time-series regressions have less power for identifying abnormal 
returns because time is weighted equally. 
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Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) conduct a comprehensive comparison between these 
two long-term market based families. A traditional event study approach relies on the 
BHARs using a carefully constructed reference portfolio such as the population mean 
abnormal return. Inference is based on either a bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic or 
the empirically generated distribution of mean long run abnormal stock returns from pseudo 
portfolios. A calendar-time portfolio approach counts on an equally weighted or 
value-weighted time series abnormal returns. Lyon et al. (1999) point out that the event 
study approach yields an appropriate estimator which accurately represents “investor 
experience”; this method only suffers because there is such sensitivity in the cross-sectional 
dependence problem. By contrast, a calendar-time portfolio approach controls statistical 
problems quite well but captures investor experiences quite poorly.  
 
(ii) Main Empirical Findings 
Based on 947 acquisition transactions, Loughran and Vijh (1997) use the abnormal 
returns of control firms as a benchmark for calculating the five year BHARs over an 
identical time interval starting on the effective date plus one day. The control firms are 
matched on a basis of size (measured by market value of equity) and book-to-market effect. 
They find that the overall sample has an average five-year BHARs of 88.2 percent compared 
to 94.7 percent for their matching firms. The difference equals -6.5 percent but is not 
significant. Furthermore, they examine the relationship between the post-acquisition returns 
and the mode of acquisition and form of payment. They find, on average, that stock deals 
have significantly negative long-term effects on acquirers’ long-term stock price 
performance, but that cash tender offers earn significantly positive excess returns. 
 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) use a sample of 3,169 mergers and 348 tender offers to 
examine three-year cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). They specially construct reference 
portfolios with dynamic size (ten size deciles at the end of every month) and book-to-market 
ratios. Portfolio returns are used as expected returns by calculating equal-weighted abnormal 
returns every month for 36 months after the merger completion date and then summing those 
averages over time. The significance level is also tested via a bootstrapping approach. They 
find that acquiring firms have significantly negative bias-adjusted CARs (-4%) in the three 
years after the transaction but that long-term underperformance is not homogeneous across 
firms. The glamour acquirers with low book-to-market account for the poor post 
performance (-17%).  
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Mitchell and Stafford (2000) also examine three-year buy-and hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) and calendar-time abnormal returns (CTARs). They do this using three large 
samples of major managerial decisions; these samples include 4,911 SEOs, 2,421 
repurchases, and 2,193 mergers completed from 1958 to 1993. Multiple events by the same 
firm within any 3-year period are excluded. Moreover, similar to most prior research (for 
example, Loughran and Vijh 1997), they focus more on long-term stock price performance 
rather than on cross sectional characteristics. For BHARs, they calculate both equal-weight 
(EW) and value-weight (VW) three-year BHARs using 25 value-weight, nonrebalanced, 
size/ book-to-market equity (BE/ME) portfolios as expected return benchmark. Statistical 
inference is based on a bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic. For CTARs, portfolio 
excess returns are regressed on the Fama and French (FF, 1993) three-factor and the 
intercepts are decomposed into the expected abnormal returns (based on size-BE/ME 
portfolio and FF three-factor) and the amount of abnormal returns attributed to other sources.  
 
Focusing on the results of the mergers, the three-year EW BHAR for the full sample is 
negative with no significance (-1%). This result is robust compared to the CTAR 
methodology on both EW and VW based measures (three year EW CATRs are -1.44% 
(-0.04%*36) percent based on 25 size-BE/ME and -5.05% based on FF three-factor, 
respectively; three year VW CATRs are -1.08 percent based on 25 size-BE/ME and -2.52 
percent based on FF three-factor, respectively). Stock mergers significantly underperform on 
both three-year EW (-0.084) and VW (-0.053) BHARs. But this result is limited on both 
three-year EW and VW CATRs either relative to the 25 size-BE/ME portfolio or to FF 
three-factor benchmarks. Their main findings support a calendar time approach because 
“event-firm abnormal returns are positively cross-correlated when overlapping in calendar 
time” (Mitchell and Stafford 2000: p326). They argue that even BHARs with adjustment by 
bootstrapping procedure, long-term event study approach is not appropriate methodology for 
measuring long-term abnormal returns because it assumes cross-sectional independence.  
 
By applying the calendar-time portfolio approach, André, Kooli and L'Her (2004) 
examine the long-term stock price performance for 267 Canadian deals during the period 
between 1980 to 2000. They employ weighted least squares (equal-weighted and 
value-weighted) procedures to calculate the three-year mean calendar-time abnormal returns 
(MCTARs) using reference portfolios as an expected returns benchmark. The portfolios are 
formed on the basis of size and book to market ratio. The monthly excess returns of portfolio 
are regressed based on the Fama-French three-factor model. They find a significant negative 
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three year abnormal returns on equal-weighted MCTAR (-0.523% per month). Furthermore, 
they test cross-sectional dependence problems by examining the sample without overlapping. 
They discover that acquiring firms suffer over the three post-event years either measuring by 
the equal- or value-weight method. Their results are consistent with the evidence of most 
literature that claims bidders significantly underperform in the long run.  
 
(iii) Other Limitations 
According to the discussion above, it is clear that there are several biases in long-term 
event study methodology. These include the measurement bias, new listing/ survivorship 
bias, rebalancing bias, skewness bias, cross-sectional dependence, and bad model problem. 
On the other hand, calendar time methodology suffers from time equally treated and lower 
power problems.  
 
Beyond the above problems, the selection of a proper benchmark for calculating 
abnormal returns is also considered a fundamental limitation when assessing the post-event 
performance. The benchmarks broadly used in measuring short-term performance such as 
CAPM, even represented by the value-weighted or equal-weighted indexes have been 
criticized for failing to control the size effect. Dimson and Marsh (1986) suggest a size decile 
control portfolio where each company is assigned a decile group based on its market capital 
at the beginning of each year. Also, they use a risk and size control model in which to add a 
decile beta into each firm. Referring to Dimson and Marsh (1986), Kennedy and Limmack 
(1996) use size-matched control portfolios as one of their benchmarks. They summarize that 
the one-year abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero but that the 
significantly negative excess returns were identified in the second year following the bid. 
Higson and Elliott (1998) also apply the simple Dimson and Marsh (1986) size-decile 
control method to examine long-term UK acquisition performance. They conclude that UK 
acquirers show zero abnormal returns in the three years following transaction completion.  
 
Expanding from the asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black 
(1972), Fama and French (1992/ 1993) conduct a three-factor asset pricing model. The 
model implies that the expected return on a portfolio can be explained by three factors: “(1) 
the excess return on a broad market portfolio (RM-Rf), (2) the difference between the return 
on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks (SMB, small minus 
big), and (3) the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks 
and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low)” (Fama 
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and French 1996: p55). Specifically:  
[ ]E(R ) -R = E(R )- R  + E(SMB) + E(HML)ii f i M f ib s h  
As this model has so far been recognized as a proper benchmark for capturing much 
of the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns, it has been broadly employed to 
capture the long-term abnormal returns in the existing literature as previously discussed.  
 
In conclusion, the usefulness of event study is that the effect of an event can be 
directly reflected to a firm’s security basically in the short-term event window and can then 
hopefully cross a long-term period. Therefore, the performance of a corporate event can be 
measured by stock return. However, Hitt, Harrison, Ireland and Best (1998) shed light on the 
fact that the nature of market performance methodology may not fully capture the anticipated 
benefits from an acquisition due to information asymmetries. Healy, Palepu and Ruback 
(HPR, 1992) further argue that stock returns only reflect investor expectations of takeover 
benefits but that they do not provide a direct measure of the impact of the acquisition on 
costs, revenues, profits and cash flow. They think that accounting performance measures can 
more efficiently seize actual economic benefits.  
 
3.3.2 Accounting Based Performance 
Rather than focusing on stock price, several empirical studies examine accounting 
based performance. Based on the efficiency hypothesis that increases in shareholder wealth 
in takeover are derived from economic synergies, it is reasonable to expect that if the equity 
price of an acquiring firm increases within the announcement period it is caused by the 
shareholder’s rational expectations and that the subsequent operating performance should 
increase correspondingly in the following years. A milestone seminar paper looking at 
accounting based performance in the context of M&A is presented by HPR (1992). They 
shed important light on the operating cash flow performance. Hence, the rest of this section 
will discuss HPR’s contribution and will review other related papers before and after HPR 
(1992). 
   
3.3.2.1 Pre HPR ( ~1992) 
(i) Empirical Evidences before HPR 
Pre HPR papers use mostly accrual measures to examine the acquisitions performance. 
For example, Lorie and Halpern (1970) analyze 117 US mergers in the manufacturing and 
mining industry between the year 1955 and 1967. They compute rate of returns (market 
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prices for the stock originally held by the shareholders and for the assets received by the 
shareholders) to the selling shareholders from the date six months prior to the deal 
completion to the time of the merger and over two years after. They compare the measures 
with the general market index and conclude that the investment return performance for 
initial target stockholders who stay in combined firms for one or two years is largely 
superior to the market performance of broad market indexes.  
 
Weston and Mansinghka (1971) present a parallel but identical research by focusing 
on a sample of 63 conglomerate firms covering the year 1958 to 1968. They examine the 
post earnings performance by calculating several accounting-based measures such as 
EBITA/Total asset, EBIT/Total asset, net income/ net worth, net profit/ equity, earnings per 
share, etc; they compare these measures with two kinds of control firms (industrial 
companies only and all companies). They provide contradictory results that the earnings 
performance of the control groups is significantly higher than the earnings rates of the 
conglomerate acquirers.  
 
A study by Lev and Mandelker (1972) develops another accounting based research 
with 13 various measures9. It uses 69 large acquisitions during the period between 1952 and 
1963 to calculate five-year average annual ratios for 13 measures. These measures indicate 
different synergy sources from M&A such as profitability, efficiency of operation, capital 
structure, and tax savings. The performance of control firms is again used as a benchmark. 
Control firms are matched based on industry (4-digit SIC) and firm size (measured by total 
asset).  
 
Instead of comparing the performance of two groups, they investigate excess returns 
for each measure by calculating the difference between the five year average of post-merger 
and the five year average of pre-merger – as adjusted by returns of matched firms. They 
document that the profitability of mergers created in favor of the acquiring firms is reflected 
on both of two market based measures (market annual rate of return and price relative) but 
only on one accounting based index, i.e. ROA. Moreover, the merger effect seems not to 
contribute to the acquiring firm's operating efficiency in subsequent years since the relative 
                                                 
9 These measures include (1) market annual rate of return ((pt+dt)/pt-1), (2) price relative (pt /pt-1), (3) 
ROA, (4) income available for common stockt /book value of common stock, (5) earnings-price 
ratio, (6) profitability of sales, (7) earnings per share, (8) annual growth rate in total asset, (9) 
annual growth rate in sales, (10) annual growth rate in operating income, (11) working capital ratiot, 
(12) Income taxest /operating incomet , and (13) stockholders' equityt /total assetst 
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measures are almost negative. While their results support the idea that merging firms 
perform better than non-merging firms, their evidence is strengthened by testing market 
based indexes rather than by testing accounting based measures. Indeed, most pre HPR 
studies tend to stand on the idea that acquisitions fail to improve corporate performance 
(Mason and Goudzwaard 1976, Melicher and Neilson 1978, Meeks and Meeks 1981, 
Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987) 
 
(ii) Limitations of pre-HPR studies 
Summarizing these pre HPR studies that generally use accounting based performance 
measures to evaluate the economic benefits of corporate mergers leads to many questions 
concerning the long-term mergers effects. If the evidence behind these empirical tests is 
correct, do mergers really create economic synergies for shareholders of acquiring firms? If 
mergers do provide benefits, why do most empirical studies fail to detect the benefits? 
Lubatkin (1983) point out a possible explanation for this is owing to the inappropriate 
methodology. Pre HPR studies that mostly apply accrual accounting data such as ROA/ ROE 
in the context of corporate events like M&As suffer from a number of limitations.  
 
First, financing choice impacts ratios. Several empirical evidences have documented 
that the choice of different payment methods for acquisitions is relevant for the acquirer’s 
liquidity, for the recent stock price of the acquirer, for the pre-acquisition leverage of 
acquirer and target, and for the nature of acquirer itself, etc. (Franks, Harris and Mayer 1988, 
Amihud, Lev and Travlos 1990, Goergen and Renneboog 2004, Faccio and Masulis 2005). 
When debt financing or surplus cash are used as the primary payment mode, the financial 
leverage of acquirers increases. Such increases may be part of acquisition strategies to gain 
interest-tax sheds or other benefits but they cause several side effects in post-merger years. 
For example, a higher leverage level may result in lower post-acquisition profits because of 
interest expense increase. Moreover, if stock equity is issued to pay for the transactions, then 
the shareholder base will be enlarged. This also could be a part of M&A strategy especially 
when the stock markets are too high. The dilution of earnings may lead to a lower EPS for 
several years after the transactions. Unfortunately, most accounting measures used in the 
studies prior to HPR have difficulty reflecting the viewpoint of the common stock without 
having those effects embedded (Lubatkin 1983).  
 
Second, tax arbitrage impacts ratios. Tax arbitrage is the transaction that takes 
advantage of a difference in tax rates or tax systems as the basis for profit. In the M&A field, 
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a target with accumulated income losses (called tax losses) that could be offset against the 
acquirer’s profits would be an attractive target. The acquirer could reduce tax liability for the 
group after acquisition (Sudarsanam 2003). Obviously, traditional accounting indicators are 
unable to detect this hidden information. However, this problem may be confined to some 
degree by enacting an effective tax law or qualified accounting standards.  
 
Third, accounting method for M&A impacts ratios. There were two accounting 
methods for M&A transactions10: Pooling (merging) accounting and Purchase (acquisition) 
accounting. The major difference between these two accounting methods is the way in which 
goodwill is accounted for. Pooling does not recognize goodwill but purchase accounting does. 
Therefore, accounting measures such as ROA or ROE will be higher by using a pooling 
method than by a purchase method because purchase accounting inflates the asset base with 
goodwill and reduces the profit through the expenses of amortization. Beyond that, 
accounting method for M&A still leaves some avenues for acquirers to do manipulation. For 
example, since goodwill may not have to be amortized in the following years, the acquirer 
may have incentive to raise the value of goodwill and to devalue other tangible assets that 
need to be depreciated in post-merger years.     
 
3.3.2.2 HPR Methodology (1992) 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (HPR, 1992), like the earlier accounting based researchers, 
argue that market performance may not be able to fully explain the increases in real 
economics that result from M&A events because of the market inefficiency. HPR attempts to 
eliminate such limitations in pre HPR studies. Therefore, they establish an operating cash 
flow model that employs operating cash flow returns as performance measures, benchmark 
measures against industry, and also control measures for momentum. 
(i) Measure of Performance 
By studying the 50 largest US mergers between 1979 and 1984, HPR (1992) uses 
pretax operating cash flow returns on assets as measures. They define operating cash flow as 
sales, minus cost of goods sold and selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation 
and goodwill expenses. In other words, it is so called earning before interest, tax, 
depreciation and goodwill amortization (EBITDA). This measure is deflated by the market 
                                                 
10 The international accounting standards board (IASB) modified rules in 2004 to eliminate the use of 
pooling and make goodwill and certain intangible assets no longer amortized but needing a 
periodic impairment test. Similar rules exist since early 2000s in the US, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand (Sudarsanam 2003).  
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value of assets so as to offer a compatible return rate across long-term periods and across 
firm specifics. The market value of the asset is the sum of the market value of equity and the 





This operating performance measure improves the weakness of the earnings-based 
performance measures because it is unaffected by depreciation and goodwill and excludes 
the impact of interests and taxes. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the sensitivities of 
financing choice, tax arbitrage issues, and accounting methods for M&A are effectively 
mitigated.  
 
(ii) Benchmark  
HPR (1992) provides a measure of the changes in cash flow returns. This measure is 
calculated by (1) aggregating the pre-merger weighted-operating cash flow returns of the 
bidders and targets as a pro forma premerger performance, where the weights are the relative 
market values of equity of the two firms at one year before the merger announcement, and (2) 
computing the differences between post-merger performance of combined (sample) firms 
and this pro forma premerger performance to get the measure of the change in cash flow 
returns.  
 
However, considering that abnormal returns measured by the change in performance 
are likely contributed to by industry factors or by continuous outperformance from the 
acquiring firm itself, HPR (1992) further constructs an industry benchmark on the basis of 
the Value Line industry definitions at one year before acquisitions. The benchmark 
performance is measured by the median cash flow returns of industry, excluding target and 
acquirer’s performance. Finally, the industry-adjusted cash flow returns (IACRs) for each 
combined firm in each year are computed by subtracting the industry-median benchmark 
returns from the sample firm value. HPR (1992) take IACR as a primary performance 
measure to examine five years post-acquisition performance.  
 
(iii) The Intercept Model 
Moreover, HPR (1992) extend the IACR measure to test the relationship between pre 
and post performance. They measure the abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow returns by 
running a cross-sectional regression model, called the intercept model by Ghosh (2001):  
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IACRpost, i = α+ β IACRpre,i +εi 
“where IACRpost, i is the median annual industry-adjusted cash flow return for company i 
from the postmerger years and IACRpre,i is the premerger median for the same company”. α is 
the measure of the abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow returns. β estimates the effects of 
pre performance on post performance. They basically believe that after controlling the pre  
performance, the intercept (α) is independent from premerger returns and should be 
appropriate for measuring abnormal returns created by M&A.  
 
(iv) Main Findings 
Challenging the previous literature that mostly suggests a negative or insignificant 
post performance based either on stock prices or on accounting data, HPR’s (1992) results 
show that the annual median IACR for the combined firms in five post-merger years is 2.8 
percent significantly higher than their industries’ annual median returns. The annual median 
IACR for the combined firms in five pre-merger years is a positive (0.3%) but with no 
significance. Furthermore, the estimators α is 2.8 percent significantly different from zero 
which indicates that operating performance for acquiring firms increases at 2.8 percent each 
year after transactions. The other indicator β (0.37 with significance) also presents a positive 
and persistent relationship between post and pre performance. In sum, they importantly 
document how acquiring firms have made significant improvements on operating cash flow 
returns in the post-merger period.  
 
(v) Further Tests 
To control the momentum, HPR (1992) attempt to identify the sources for 
improvement in an acquirer’s cash flow returns. These variables include cash flow margins, 
asset turnover, employee growth rate, pension expense/employee, capital expenditure rate, 
asset sale rate-cash value, asst sale rate-book value, and R&D rate. Here, this thesis focuses 
more on two major components: cash flow margins and asset turnovers. Cash flow margin 
on sales measures the pretax operating cash flows generated per sales dollar. Asset turnover 




= ×  
Similar testing processes are run in order to examine these two measures. The results 
show that the combined firms have significantly higher postmerger cash flow margins (1.1%) 
owing to their significant higher cash flow margins (1.4%) in premerger years. The median 
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asset turnover of combined firms in pre-merger years is insignificant negative (-0.2%) 
meaning that combined firms generate 20 cent less in sales than their industrial competitors 
for each dollar of assets. After acquisition, combined firms significantly improve on the 
abnormal returns measured by the intercept α. Overall, the significant increase in cash flow 
returns is attributed to the greater asset productivity (0.2%) after combination rather than the 
improvements of operating efficiency because the pre-merger operating cash flow margins of 
combined firms are already higher than their industry-median performance.  
 
Beyond testing for the momentum, HPR (1992) have another important analysis 
regarding to the relationship between announcement returns and postmerger cash flow 
improvements. They prove a strong relationship between stock performance and operating 
performance, indicating that operating cash flow measures are reasonable for investigating 
whether the expected gains from mergers at announcement are actually realized in the 
following years. However, HPR emphasize that this argument should stand under the 
assumption of market efficiency.  
 
3.3.2.3 Post HPR (1992~) 
(i) Evidence on HPR  
Andrade et al. (2001) replicate the HPR model by examining roughly 2,000 US 
mergers from 1973 to 1998. They use industry-median adjusted operating cash flow margins 
(cash flow to sales) as measures for examining the improvements in post operating 
performance. This measure is calculated by the difference between the combined firm’s 
operating cash flow margin and the corresponding industry median operating margin. 
Abnormal returns are also measured using the intercept model. They consistently find that 
the acquiring firms improve post operating performance relative to their industry peers. Also, 
they compare this result with their market performance analysis and conclude a consistent 
pattern with the positive announcement-period stock market returns. 
 
(ii) Limitation on HPR  
Nevertheless, HPR model has not escaped criticism from the post studies for the 
following major limitations:   
 Benchmark 
Selecting an appropriate benchmark has always been a critical issue not only for 
market based performance but also for accounting based performance. Barber and Lyon 
(1996) present a crucial study regarding operating performance benchmarks. They test four 
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major matching approaches that are often used to measure accounting performance: 2-digit 
SIC code, 4-digit SIC code, 2-digit SIC code and similar size, 2-digit SIC code and similar 
pre-event performance. The SIC code is based on the Compustat classification, whereby size 
is measured as the book value of assets within 70-130 percent, and the performance is 
assessed as the return on assets within 90-110 percent in the prior year of events. The size 
band (70%-130%) and the performance filter (90%-110%) are selected because they yield 
test statistics that are well in-specified in these sampling situations. To avoid dropping firms 
that have no firms matched, they empirically set several alternative rules for each approach. 
For example, expanding the two-digit SIC code to one-digit or even no regarding to SIC 
code; if there is still no firm matched, the final step is to select the firm with the closest 
performance without industry limit. Their results finally suggest that performance-matched 
methods are generally well specified in most sampling situations. 
 
Following Barber and Lyon (1996), most research adopts pre performance based 
matching. Loughran and Ritter (1997) choose their matched firms using the following 
steps. In the first step, they select firms with the same 2-digit SIC code, with a similar assets 
size at the end of year 0 within 25-200 percent, and with the closest ratio of operating 
income before depreciation and amortization to the book value of assets (OIBD/assets). 
Secondly, if no firms meet the first criteria, the alternative is to pick the firms without regard 
to industry but with similar assets within 90-110 percent and with closest but higher 
OIBD/assets. 
 
Under the notion of performance-matched, Ghosh (2001) argues that the empirical 
results of the HPR model may be biased due to the use of an industry-based benchmark. 
Since acquiring firms are generally larger than industry-median firms, the results for 
acquiring firm performance adjusted by an industry-median benchmark are probably too 
optimistic. A detailed discussion regarding Ghosh’s (2001) critics is presented in the latter 
part about estimate for improvements. To avoid the bias caused by comparing the pre- and 
post-acquisition performance of merging firms relative to control firms matched on 
industry-median, Ghosh (2001) sets a benchmark as the size and median performance of the 
matched firms. Matched firms are collected on the basis of (1) the same 2-digit SIC code, (2) 
total assets between 25 and 200 percent, and (3) the closest ratio of operating cash flow to 
market value of assets. Using 315 pairs of acquired and acquiring firms during the period 
from 1981 to 1995, he determines whether acquisitions improve operating performance by 
comparing the difference between pre and post operating cash flow performance of acquiring 
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firms relative to that of matched firms. He finds no evidence to conclude that acquiring firms 
outperform their benchmark firms with industry, size and pre performance adjusted. . 
 
For a comparison of Ghosh (2001) to HPR (1992), Powell and Stark (2005) construct 
two benchmarks. One is based on the industry-median operating performance in HPR (1992). 
Following the definition in Datastream’s level 4 (Financial Times All Share Index), all firms 
in the same industry groupings, excluding delisted firms, are used to calculate industry 
median. The other benchmark, consistent with Ghosh (2001), is based on industry, size and 
pre performance adjusted operating performance of matched firms. The criteria they used to 
select the matched firms are: (1) same industry groups as defined in Datastream’s level 4 
(Financial Times All Share Index), (2) similar firm size based on the size filter between 25 
percent and 200 percent at one year before takeover; if there is no firm matched, the size 
filter will be extended to 0 percent and 300 percent, (3) the closet operating performance at 
one year before acquisitions; similar processes to examine abnormal operating performance 
measures are run for 91 UK deals from 1985 to 1993. Surprisingly, their results suggest that 
takeovers create real improvements in operating performance for acquiring firms but that 
these are not related to which benchmark is employed. As a general rule, however, the 
magnitude of the estimates of performance improvements is higher by using adjusted 
industry, size, and pre performance benchmarks than by using industry adjusted alone. 
  
 Performance Measures  
Along with benchmark problems, the definition of the operating performance used in 
HPR (1992) raises another major concern. Powell and Stark (2005) argue that operating 
performance (EBITDA) used in HPR “tends to be an accruals definition of operating cash 
flow, defined simply as pre depreciation profit” so that it is still likely to be distorted by the 
accounting policies. Therefore, they use two measures to examine the improvements of 
operating performance in postmerger years. One is the initial HPR operating cash flow, 
defined as EBITDA. The other operating performance measure called ‘pure’ cash flow is 
defined as “pre depreciation profit adjusted for changes in working capital. That is the 
changes in inventories, receivables and (non-tax) prepayments less changes in payables and 
(non-tax, non-interest) accruals”. They examine both performance measures and conclude 
that using ‘pure’ cash flows leads to an insignificant but stable result in both benchmarks. 
Using ‘accrual’ operating performance measure (EBITDA) provides mixed results, 
depending on the benchmark used. Hence, the increase of operating cash flow returns is 
supported more by the use of ‘accrual’ operating cash flow returns than by the use of ‘pure’ 
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cash flow returns.  
 
Sharma and Ho (2002) argue that the operating cash flow measure adopted in HPR 
(1992) was not properly operationalised. They suggest that working capital from operation 
could be a better proxy to measure merger benefits. Therefore, unlike HPR (1992), they 
apply a different formula (Ditna and Largay 1985) to calculate four cash flow performance 
indicators with different definitions:  
(1) cash flow return on assets (CFFO11/Total asset), (2) cash flow return from sales 
(CFFO/Sales), (3) cash flow return on average ordinary shareholder’s equity (CFFO/AOSE), 
and (4) (cash flow from operations minus preference dividends) on a number of ordinary 
shares. They also select four accrual performance measures including ROA, ROE, profit 
margin and EPS for comparison 
 
Using an industry adjusted benchmark for 36 Australian deals occurring between 1986 
and 1991, Sharma and Ho (2002) have regression results showing that median performance 
indicators ROA, PM, EPS and CFFO/SALES are all significantly negative and only 
CFFO/NOS is weakly positive. The overall results indicate that on the basis of four accrual 
and four cash flow performance measures, acquiring firms have no improvements in 
operating performance thought M&A. Accrual performance indicators are likely to reveal 
negative returns following an acquisition whereas cash flow measures tend to show positive 
but statistically insignificant gains. 
 
 Deflators  
Moreover, the deflator used in HPR (1992) to scale the operating performance is 
another key point. Rahman and Limmack (2004) argue that to capture the real gains from 
acquisition itself, the use of book value is relatively efficient to exclude any share price 
changes reflecting the shareholders expectation. Thus, unlike HPR (1992) they use the book 
value of assets rather than the market value to scale operating cash flow. The book value of 
asset is calculated as a book value of shareholders funds and total debt less cash and 
marketable securities at the beginning of the relevant year. Besides, by sampling from 
Malaysian companies involved in takeovers between 1988 and 1992 and by using industry 
                                                 
11 CFFO= WCFO± ∆(Trade receivables+ prepayments+ inventories+ other receivables)± ∆(Trade 
creditors+ Interest accrued+ Provision for employee entitlements+ other creditors);  
WCFR= (Operating profit before tax+ Interest expense+/- extraordinary items+ depreciation+ Loss 
on sale of assets and investment+ other write off)– (Profit on sale of assets and investment)  
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adjusted benchmarks, their outcomes suggest that the operating cash flow performance of 
acquiring firms has been significantly improved after combination. Their findings are 
consistent with the results in HPR (1992) which scaled by the market value of assets. 
 
Powell and Stark (2005) have similar concerns as Rahman and Limmack (2004) 
toward to the deflator problem. They cast doubt on HPR (1992) that operating performance 
measures scaled on market value of assets may be biased by the market overreaction to the 
takeover announcement because this would imply that actual operating improvements should 
be greater than those capitalized by the market around the takeover announcement period. 
Therefore, they adopt four different alternatives to test the sensitivity of deflators: (1) Total 
market value of assets (TMV) as defined in HPR (1992) and Ghosh (2001), (2) TMV 
adjusted for market reaction to the takeover, (3) book value of total assets, and (4) total sales. 
TMV adjusted for market reaction to the takeover, as compared to TMV, is designed to test 
the magnitude of any overreaction by the market to takeovers. The regression results are 
truly sensitive to the deflator used. A clearer sign is that none of the control variables has 
power enough to explain operating performance scaled by adjusted TMV. But some of the 
control variables are significantly related to operating performance using either book value 
of assets or sales as deflator. 
 
 Estimate for Improvements (Abnormal Returns) 
Recall that, HPR (1992) use the cross sectional regression model to estimate the 
abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow returns (IACR). They take the intercept (α) as a 
measure to examine the improvement (increase) in the operating cash flow after acquisitions. 
However, Ghosh (2001) suggests that the change in adjusted cash flow return (∆Cash Flow) 
should be a better estimate to examine the abnormal cash flow returns. The change in 
adjusted cash flow return (∆Cash Flow) is defined as the median postmerger adjusted cash 
flow return minus the median adjusted cash flow return in pre-merger years. Ghosh (2001) 
named it the change model. Specifically:  
adi adi
i ipost pre∆Cash Flow = (Cash Flow  -Cash Flow ) = + jα χ ε  
where iχ  are denoted to any explanatory variables and iα  measure the improvement in 
cash flow for iχ  variables.  
 
The main reason why Ghosh (2001) designed this measure was to tackle benchmark 
problems with industry-median firms in the HPR (1992) model. He criticizes the fact that 
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conclusions about improvements in operating performance based on the intercept model as 
in HPR (1992) are likely to be biased. Furthermore, he presents three cases to illustrate that 
the bias may arise from permanent E(CFpre) and/ or temporary E(εpre) difference in operating 
performance between merging and industry-median firms’ in the pre-acquisitions period. 
Simply to say: 
Case 1, when there are no permanent (E(CFpre)=0) and temporary difference (E(εpre)=0) in 
operating performance between merging and industry-median firms’ prior to acquisitions, the 
intercept model and the change model will yield identical unbiased estimates (Ghosh 2001, 
p157).  
Case 2, when there is no temporary difference (E(εpre)=0) but the pre-acquisition 
performance of merging firms is different from that of industry-median firms because of 
permanent factors (E(CFpre)>0), the estimates from the change model (∆Cash flow) is 
unbiased but the intercept model will lead to biased conclusion (E(α)=(1-β)[ E(CFpre)]) 
(Ghosh 2001, p158).  
Case 3, when the difference of pre-acquisition performance between merging and 
industry-median firms results form both permanent and temporary factors, not only the 
intercept but also the change model yields biased estimators because the temporary 
differences should not be assumed to persist into post-acquisition years (Ghosh 2001, p159). 
 
In summary, Ghosh (2001)’s argument suggests that if merging firms outperform their 
peers because of permanent differences in the pre-acquisition period such as sustained 
competitive advantage or economies of scales, then the superior pre performance will be 
incorporated into the post performance. This kind of bias, however, (too optimistic a 
performance) cannot be detected by simply controlling pre performance in the intercept 
model. The change model may reduce the degree of bias because the measure of change in 
cash flow return deducts the permanent factors that persist into the future at the beginning. 
However, if merging firms outperform their peers because of temporary differences in the 
pre-acquisition period such as windfall profits from a short-term demand surge, a simple 
comparison of post- and pre-acquisition industry-adjusted cash flows as in the change model 
are not merely unable to eliminate the bias problems but can even cause the under/ over 
evaluation of abnormal cash flow returns.  
 
Powell and Stark (2005) evaluate these arguments by addressing the fact that it is 
unreasonable to assume that after controlling for pre performance, the average of post 
operating performance left unexplained (i.e. α, at β=0) is all attribute to the improvement of 
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acquisitions. It is also unreasonable, however, to assume that the superior (or inferior) pre 
performance will 100 percent (i.e. β=1) continue into the post performance. As it is hard to 
identify the difference of pre-acquisition performance between merging and industry-median 
firms due to permanent or temporary factors, one possible solution is to construct control 
firms matched on pre-acquisition performance and size as discussed above. The other way is 
to examine both performance metrics as in most recent studies (Linn and Switzer 2001, 
Ghosh 2001, Carline, Linn and Yadav 2002, Powell and Stark 2005).  
 
 Others 
There are still some other limitations relying on HPR (1992) accounting-based 
performance approach. For example, separating the impact of acquisitions from that of other 
corporate events is difficult; measuring the time lag in performance improvement is not clear; 
and examining accounting numbers is backward-looking on historical performance 
(Sudarsanam 2003). Despite the above concerns, operating performance is still identified as 
a useful measure for exploring whether or not the acquisitions increase economic wealth in 




3.4 Determinants of M&A Success 
 
A number of studies provide background for assessing the determinants of M&A 
success. The following sections will briefly review a variety of transaction characteristics 
that have been well documented as having potential impact on acquisition performance.  
 
3.4.1 Cross Border/Origin 
■ Cross Border 
Cross border acquisitions have become popular corporate activities even though they 
have presented some controversial issues over the past few decades. Extant studies 
suggesting that cross border M&As are usually based on the assumption that this type of 
mergers provides diversification, reduces risk, and integrates the synergy of 
internationalization (Markides and Ittner 1994, Morck and Yeung 1991, Seth, Song and Pettit 
2002). However, several competing explanations consider the fact that the expected value of 
the proposed cross border transactions should be low because acquirers may face obstacles 
of a different nature that offset any possible advantages when entering new markets.  
 
Campa and Hernando (2004) support this point by analyzing 262 European M&As 
during the period 1998-2000. They find that the shareholders of the acquiring firms obtain 
lower abnormal returns in cross-border deals than in domestic deals,. This is probably due to 
the legal, culture, and transaction barriers. André et al. (2004) examine long-term market 
performance for Canadian M&As and also prove that cross border deals perform poorly in 
the long run. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) consistently provide empirical evidence that 
compared to domestic acquirers, US cross-border acquirers suffer in terms of both stock 
return and operating performance.  
 
Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1996) conduct an US research to investigate shareholder 
wealth transfer. They find that foreign (not US) acquirers with US targets have significantly 
high returns. In turn, US acquirers with foreign targets have no gains from such cross-border 
mergers. This result has been interpreted by some scholars under the undervaluation 
hypothesis (Gonzalez and Vasconcellos 1998). The hypothesis indicates that foreign (non US) 
acquiring firms merging an undervalued US target may minimize the acquisition costs and 
then efficiently expand their markets to the US marketplace.  
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■ Cross Origin 
Following the different lines of reasoning, some scholars believe that cross-border 
mergers may be responsible for any change in corporate governance. For example, Bris and 
Cabolis (2002) evaluate the industry value (measured by the industry Tobin’s Q) of cross 
border mergers by controlling the variables of legal origin and legal institutions including the 
anti-director right, creditor right, accounting standard, and corruption indexes. Their central 
findings are as follows: first, the adoption of targets with better legal institutions 
(anti-director right and corruption) than those in the domestic market creates merger values. 
Second, target firms in countries with French, German, and Scandinavian legal origins would 
benefit from acquisition by acquirers in English origin countries. Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005) provide consistent evidence for the positive relationship between bidder returns and 
the level of investor protection in the target country.  
 
3.4.2 Transaction Attitude 
There is extensive debate over the association between the acquirer type and the 
acquisition performance. On the surface, a hostile takeover is not welcome because of 
potentially high restructuring costs. Hostile acquirers usually have to pay a higher premium 
to control the target firms. However, when friendly bidders have to pay exceedingly high 
costs in order to make agreements with inefficient and greedy target managers, friendly 
takeover is not recommended. In one sense, hostile bids can act as governance mechanisms 
for corporate control. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a) defend hostile takeovers by 
arguing that this type of bid is driven by the urge to replace the inadequate incumbent 
management of the target firms and thereby to create a merger synergy to benefit the 
acquirer shareholders. This argument is further been challenged by empirical evidence 
showing that hostile targets do not necessarily have poor pre-bid performance (Franks and 
Mayer 1996).  
 
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) examine 339 American deals during the period 
from 1975 to 1987. They use different benchmarks to test post-merger abnormal returns. 
Their results suggest that adjusted cumulative abnormal returns are overall positive for 
opposed bids, but that there is no significant difference between the performance of opposed 
and uncontested bids. In recent research by Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006), 519 UK 
acquisitions from 1983 to 1995 are used in order to test the three year post-acquisition gains 
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of acquirer shareholders. Their conclusions are consistent with the earlier works of Morck et 
al. (1988a) which suggest that hostility leads to better value creation.  
 
3.4.3 Method of Payment 
There are two fundamental methods of payment for the acquiring firms: cash and 
stock shares. Usually, the method of payment signals the acquirer assessment of its own or 
the target firm’s value. The managers of the acquiring firms prefer to pay for their 
acquisitions by cash when they judge that their stock price is undervalued around the 
announcement date. If the stock market underreacts in the short-term event window, then the 
abnormal returns are likely to show up in the post-acquisition performance. These lines of 
study imply that cash offers might produce better post performance than equity bids (Myers 
and Majluf 1984, Franks et al. 1991, Loughran and Vijh 1997, André et al. 2004, Faccio and 
Masulis 2005) 
 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) examine 228 large (deal value at least USD 100 
million) European cross border deals for the period 1993-2000. They find that cash offers 
triggering larger share price reactions is only for targets and not for bidders. The reason for 
this is that the market may realize that the choice to make all-cash bids is not possible for 
such large cross border deals. An all-equity offer does not suggest to the market that the 
bidder’s equity is overvalued. 
 
Except for a few inconsistent evidences against the signal of payment method, most 
significant current discussions support the positive effect of cash offers. Loughran and Vijh 
(1997) calculate 5-year BHARs by the form of payment for acquirers and matched firms. 
They prove that the post-acquisition performance of cash acquirers is better than that of 
stock acquirers. André et al. (2004) also show that entirely equity-financed M&As 
significantly under-perform in the long run.  
 
3.4.4 Competition/Multiple Bidders 
Numerous studies attempt to use competition in order to explain why targets gain 
higher wealth but bidders earn smaller returns (Ruback 1983, Franks and Harris 1989). A 
perfect competition in the acquisition market is assumed to imply that potential bidders will 
increase their bid premium until the net present value (NPV) for the winner bidder is close to 
zero. Successful acquirers may create acquisition value but will find it hard to capture the 
 96
abnormal return unless the acquisition market is imperfect. This stream of analysis is 
strongly supported by the succeeding empirical research (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1990, 
Duggal and Millar 1999). Morck et al. (1990) investigate 326 US deals between 1975 and 
1987 and find that multiple bidders reduce the takeover gains for acquirers. Duggal and 
Millar (1999) observe 108 to 120 US transactions in the 1985-1990 periods and provide 
consistent evidence that the acquirers suffer when there is competition in the bids.  
 
Capron and Pistre (2002) provide a different view by showing that the value captured 
by the acquirer depends on which resources create synergies. Their survey combines with 
event study so as to enable them to conduct an empirical analysis on 101 horizontal 
acquisitions across a wide range of industries, countries, and firms. Their results support the 
idea that there is no abnormal return in acquisition with competition if acquirers only receive 
resources from the targets. However, if the acquirers control unique resources then they can 
still expect to earn abnormal returns. Their study offers a valuable direction for further 
research that might explain the positive effects of competition on acquiring performance.  
 
3.4.5 Industry Relatedness 
There remains some debate regarding the type of transactions. Some previous 
research accepts that related (non-conglomerate) mergers are more likely to create synergy 
through the transfer of core skills, economies of scale, and effects of market power (Lubatkin 
1983, Porter 1987). Other research claims that unrelated (conglomerate) mergers can raise 
entry barriers, reduce systematic risk and default probability, improve income stability, and 
lower capital costs (Lewellen 1971, Scott 1989). Recent empirical studies compare the 
merging performance among these types of acquisitions. Lahey and Conn (1990) provide the 
first evidences of related mergers outperforming unrelated mergers in the long run. Datta and 
Pinches (1992) conduct a meta-analysis and similarly suggest that bidders should prefer 
related mergers rather than conglomerate acquisitions.  
 
On the contrary, Limmack and McGregor (1995) explore the relationship between 
industry structure and acquiring performance by testing UK acquisitions during the period 
1977 to 1986. They report that bidders obtain insignificantly negative abnormal returns in 
unrelated acquisitions but receive statistically negative abnormal returns from related 
acquisitions. Their striking findings are further supported by André et al. (2004) who show 
that non-conglomerate mergers significantly underperform in the long run, but that there is 
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no significant difference in the returns between conglomerate and non-conglomerate 
mergers.  
 
Specifically, Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu and Zulehner (2003) carry out an international 
comparison for the effects of merger. They separate deals into three categories: horizontal, 
vertical and conglomerate. According to their definition, horizontal mergers are mergers 
between two companies with sales in the same primary four-digit SIC industry; vertical 
mergers are mergers where at least 10% of the sales or purchases of the primary four-digit 
industry to which one of the companies belongs must go to or come from the industry to 
which the other belongs; and conglomerate mergers consist of all mergers which are neither 
horizontal nor vertical. Gugler et al (2003) also divide the samples into the manufacturing or 
service sector. The interesting conclusion here is that mergers in the service sector show 
better performance than those in the manufacturing sector. Horizontal mergers are more 
successful in the service sector while vertical mergers generate larger profits in the 
manufacturing sector.  
 
3.4.6 Toehold Interests 
Toehold interests are target shares that are held by potential acquirers before the 
acquirers initiate the bid. Theoretically, when companies (potential acquirers) own enough 
shares in other companies (targets), they easily obtain special information about target 
resource allocation that will give the potential acquirers a stronger incentive to launch the bid. 
From this point of view, toehold interests solve the free-rider problems, increase the 
probability of successful bids, reduce the average bid premium, and then create more 
profitable deals for bidders (Grossman and Hart 1981). Unlike the model of Grossman and 
Hart (1981) under dispersed ownership, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) propose a model under 
the assumption that a firm is owned by large shareholders (the potential bidders) prior to the 
offer. Their model confirms that under the asymmetric information, toehold interests are a 
signal for the target’s post-acquisition value. The more toehold interest held by the large 
shareholders indicates the lower the current target price. Consequently, the target’s share 
price will increase and the actual bid premium paid to the target will be lower.  
 
Both theoretical models support the positive relationship between toehold interest and 
acquiring firm performance. However, the results of empirical research are ambiguous. The 
empirical evidence shows that the majority of bidders do not hold the target’s shares prior to 
the offer (Chowdhry and Jegadeesh 1994, Bris 2002). Franks and Harris (1989) set toeholds 
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at a 30% threshold for over 1,800 UK takeovers in the period 1955-1985. They find no 
strong evidence to prove that pre-merger equity interests affect bidder gains around the 
merger date. Consistent with Franks and Harris (1989), Sudarsanam et al. (1996) examine 
429 UK bids during the years 1980 to 1990. They report that toehold interests do not help 
shareholders of acquiring firms to retain the benefits of acquisition. 
 
3.4.7 Bid Premium  
It is widely agreed that there is a negative effect of bid premiums on the subsequent 
rate of return among acquiring firms. However, setting too low a price runs the risk of losing 
a bargaining chance or resulting in a failed profitable offer. Walkling and Edmister (1985) 
analyze the determinants of bid premiums and set a model for estimating the optimal 
premium size. Most transaction characteristics are considered by their model such as inside 
ownership, target attitude, toehold interest, transaction type, payment method and so on. The 
target’s market and financial performance are also included. By focusing on the bid 
characteristics, their estimations suggest that bid premiums are positively but insignificantly 
influenced by non-conglomerate and hostile attitudes; bids with multiple bidders have 
significantly higher premiums while toehold interests are statistically more negative.  
 
After Walkling and Edmister (1985), empirical research has started to focus on an 
assessment of the relationship between bid premium and other deal characteristics rather 
than on a direct discussion concerning the impact of bid premium on acquisition. Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) investigate 228 European deals in the period 1993-2000. They point 
out that the higher the target’s market to book, the larger the bid premium that then triggers a 
negative acquiring performance. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1997) adopt a cash flow 
measure for examining 382 US samples from 1979 to 1984. They show that strategic 
acquirers who run friendly transactions with stock payments in related industries pay a lower 
premium and that leads to a better acquiring performance.  
 
3.4.8 Relative Size 
Another large body of literature considers size effect to be an influential determinant 
of post-acquisition performance. Several hypotheses attempt to explain the size effect. First 
of all, the managers of large firms easily pay more money (hubris hypothesis, Roll 1986). 
Secondly, large firms are more likely to overestimate their market value and then to offer an 
equity transaction (over-extrapolation hypothesis by Rau and Vermaelen 1998, signaling 
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hypothesis by Myers and Majluf 1984). Thirdly, top managers in large firms with excess free 
cash flow tend to initiate acquisition instead of increasing payouts to their shareholders (Free 
cash flow hypothesis by Jensen 1986).  
 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) conduct an empirical study to test size effect. 
They examine 12,023 acquisitions from 1980 to 2001 and provide evidence that the hubris 
hypothesis is related to large firms, while extrapolation, signaling, and cash flow hypotheses 
have comparatively weak associations. They also suggest that larger firms offer higher 
premiums that bring about negative returns. This size effect is similar to the conclusion that 
smaller firms outperform larger firms (Franks et al. 1991).  
 
Another stream of empirical papers extends the discussion of the size of acquirers to 
the relative size between two parties. Arguments for the merging of two similar sized firms 
focuse on the economies of scale (Asquith, Bruner and Jr Mullins 1983, Becher and 
Campbell II 2003b). On the contrary, suggestions for the size deviation emphasize the 
difficulties of melding culture, bargaining profitable deal, or obtaining entry advantage 
(Pettway and Yamada 1986, Scanlon, Trifts and Pettway 1989). Loughran and Vijh (1997) 
use one year buy-and-hold returns as measures and find that merger of equals eventually 
leads to value destruction. Most other research may find size effect to be either positive or 
negative but may have difficulty proving any significant relationship between relative size 
and the acquirer’s post performance (Franks and Harris 1989, Franks et al. 1991, Agrawal et 
al. 1992, Gugler et al. 2003).  
 
3.4.9 Acquirer’s Leverage  
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), a considerable debate about capital structure 
now centres on the benefit of debt rather the cost. Jensen (1986) argues that debt can act as a 
substitute for dividends and can force managers to pay out future cash flows. Companies 
with a higher leverage ratio will not have the extra cash flow to waste on sub-optimal 
investment; the threat of bankruptcy caused by large debts will motivate managers to run the 
corporation more efficiently. Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993) also examine the 
debt monitoring hypothesis by investigating 428 US mergers from 1958 to 1982. They 
empirically suggest a significant and positive relationship between the level of leverage and 




Stulz (1990) partially agrees with the debt mechanism but argues that issuing debt 
may require the management to pay out cash. This would reduce the overinvestment cost but 
might also prevent the management from undertaking value-enhancing projects. Such a case 
would exacerbate the underinvestment cost. Harris and Raviv (1991) further support the 
underinvestment hypothesis. In 1998, however, Zhang established several models to examine 
the investment decision under the concentration ownership with risk-averse controlling 
shareholders. These models suggest a view contrary to Stulz (1990). They state that issuing 
risky debt prior to taking an investment decision could create a risk-shifting effect that might 
compensate for the risk-averse incentives of large shareholders and mitigate the 
underinvestment problem.  
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) provide another contradictory view regarding the benefit of 
debt monitoring. They argue that internal resources are vastly preferred over external 
financing. Under the asymmetric information assumption, managers learn more about the 
firm’s values than outside investors. Since issuing equity is assumed to transmit bad signals, 
management may refuse to do so, even when they are forced to miss a positive NPV project. 
Therefore, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that holding a large amount of financial slack 
e.g. cash or marketable securities, actually benefits firms. Virtually, even under the debt 
monitoring hypothesis, the optimal debt-equity ratio remains controversial. Linn and Switzer 
(2001) examine operating cash flow for 413 US transactions. They conclude that the bidder’s 




3.5 Concentrated Ownership, Governance Mechanisms, Legal/ 
Extra-Legal Institutions and Acquisition Performance 
 
3.5.1 Concentrated Ownership Structure 
3.5.1.1 The Level of Ownership Concentration 
■ Evidence on Incentive Effects 
One stream of governance research studying the relationship between ownership 
concentration and acquiring firms performance has proven that increasing insider ownership 
has a positive impact on acquirers’ returns (Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld 1985, Carline 
et al. 2002). The core concern in this group is the incentive effect as discussed in chapter two, 
section 2.2. Lewellen et al. (1985) examined 266 US deals from 1963 to 1981. Their results 
support the idea that the abnormal stock returns of bidders firms are positive when related to 
the percentage of company shares held by the senior management. Carline et al. (2002) 
undertook an empirical analysis on the change in industry-adjusted operating performance 
around transactions for UK firms merging between 1985 and 1994. Their results suggest that 
the performance of combined firms significantly improves after acquisitions and the increase 
in operating performance is positively related to the acquirers’ managerial ownership.  
 
■ Evidence on Managerial Entrenchment 
The other stream of governance research that studies the impact of ownership 
concentration on acquiring firm performance argues that the ultimate majority shareholders, 
especially when they can separate their control rights from their cash flow rights, have a 
stronger ability to expropriate minority shareholders via M&A events. One of the 
expropriation costs is caused by managerial entrenchment. A number of studies are devoted 
to how or why managers entrench themselves by making M&A transactions. Their studies 
have already provided rather completed evidence for the impact of managerial entrenchment 
on acquisition performance (Firth 1980, Rhoades 1983, Jensen 1986, Roll 1986, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1989, Conyon and Murphy 2002). Most of these issues are covered in the earlier 
section 3.2.2.1 of this chapter on the subject of managerial benefits as major motivating 
factors for making transactions. Here, under the heading of ownership concentration, this 
thesis places some emphasis on the probability of a takeover in concentrated firms and on 




Stulz (1988) argues that an increase in the proportion of voting rights controlled by 
management decreases the probability of a successful tender offer. Morck et al. (1988a) 
further prove that a firm controlled by the founder is less likely to be taken over than the 
average firm. When owner-managers entrench themselves by adopting various types of 
control devices so as to avoid the pressures from takeover threats, the firm value decrease. 
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) study the controlling minority shareholder (CMS) structure of 
309 Swedish firms from 1991 to 1997. They find that the estimated takeover probability for 
family controlled firms to be taken over is only 4.8 percent -- significantly less than the 8.5% 
for other firms. And the estimated takeover probability of ending up in financial distress is as 
high as 4.1 percent for family controlled firms. This is significantly higher than the 1.6% for 
other firms. They conclude that firms with CMS structure will only relinquish control when 
the controlling shareholders get compensated for their private benefits, resulting in a lower 
takeover probability -- a lower takeover probability will materialize as a lower q. These 
arguments are further supported by Holmen and Nivorozhkin (2005). 
 
■ Evidence on Tunneling 
The other expropriation cost is caused by tunneling (specifically, in the way of wealth 
transferring) among the controlling shareholders. Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) investigate 107 
mergers by Korean business groups called chaebols. They argue that the owner-managers of 
chaebols have substantial discretionary powers and that legal protection against the 
expropriation of minority shareholders is quite weak in Korea. They believe that when 
chaebol affiliated firms make acquisitions their share price drops so that the minority 
shareholders of these firms lose out while controlling shareholders gain because of the 
increase in the value of other firms in the group. Furthermore, they argue that the implicit 
guarantee of a bailout for chaebols members still makes investments interesting for minority 
shareholders. This notion of negative tunneling or propping is also discussed in La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000), Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) and 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002).  
 
Bigelli and Mengoli (2004) examine 280 acquisition announcements made by 
companies in Italy where the ownership is highly concentrated and the separation of 
ownership and control is widespread. They find a non-monotonic relationship between the 
participation of the dominant shareholder and the abnormal returns for bidder shareholders. 
They also show that separation problems, especially within pyramidal groups, may lead the 
controlling shareholders to set the price so as to transfer corporate wealth to the ultimate 
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level where the controlling shareholders own a greater proportion of the cash flow rights.  
 
Holmen and Knopf (2004) examine Swedish firms which have tunneling problems 
through pyramid structures and dual-class shares. They show that the existence of 
shareholders with dual ownership decreases bidder returns, increases target returns, and turns 
out without any positive synergies. However, they do not find the direct transfer of wealth 
from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders through takeover.  
 
Ben-Amar and André (2006) study 232 Canadian deals for the period from 1998 to 
2002. They suggest a square relationship between ownership level and acquiring firm 
abnormal market returns, indicating that large shareholders may take less risky projects when 
their wealth is too much concentrated in the firm. Besides, they find that the separation of 
ownership and control does not lead to value destruction as expected. These findings confirm 
“the existence of entrenchment problems but resist the tunneling hypothesis through M&A.” 
This is attributed to the well investor protection environment in Canada making the 
expropriation costs too high to achieve private benefits via M&A investments.  
 
■ Evidence on Sub-Optimal Decisions 
However, the other concerns argue that controlling shareholders may not be in a 
position to do tunneling through acquisitions but may make sub-optimal M&A decisions so 
as to reduce their own human capital risk. Amihud and Lev (1981) provide a landmark study 
for discussing this issue. They propose that managerial income is closely related to the 
survival and performance of their corporation and that it is less diversified than that of the 
shareholders. Therefore, risk-averse managers are expected to make sub-optimal decisions 
that might diversify their employment risks or minimize the company’s earnings variance 
rather than benefiting the shareholders. They examine US deals during the period 1961 to 
1970 and document that acquisition, specifically conglomerate mergers, may not be so 
obvious a profit investment but may generally be used to stabilize the firm income and to 
reduce managerial employment risks.  
 
Wright, Kroll, Lado and Van Ness (2002) conduct an empirical study which basically 
confirms the diversification hypothesis of Amihud and Lev (1981). They examine the 
influence of CEO ownership incentives on the takeover valuation for 163 US firms from 
1993 to 1997. They set their hypotheses by assuming that the CEO’s personal wealth 
concentration will induce them to undertake risk-reducing strategies because of the 
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preference for portfolio diversification; the value of the acquisition will therefore be 
decreased. Their results support their hypothesis by stating that the relationship between the 
value of ownership and abnormal returns is significantly positive at moderate values of CEO 
equity ownership but significantly negative at substantial values of equity. Consistently, 
Bigelli and Mengoli (2004), an Italian study, further provide a significant U-shaped 
relationship to confirm the presence of sub-optimal acquisition decisions under the 
controlling shareholding structure with separation problems.  
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) particularly connect corporate governance with the 
bidders’ payment choice. They examine European deals for the period 1997-2000 and focus 
on the trade-off between bidder corporate control threats and financing constraints. They find 
that both corporate control concerns and debt conditions have a significant influence on 
bidder payment decisions. They also find that cash offers are relatively preferred for a 
bidder’s large shareholder holding in the middle level of voting shares in the range of twenty 
to sixty percents. They define this range as the margin percentage of votes whereby the 
majority shareholders easily lose control under their equity acquisition. In their sub-sample, 
the consistent evidence further confirms the cube relationship between voting shares and 
payment decisions in countries with a common law system. Their implication is insufficient 
to prove the relationship among voting shares, payment decisions, and acquisition 
performance under the notion of legal origin, but it could prove an interesting area for further 
research. 
 
3.5.1.2 The Type of Ownership Concentration 
Under the assumption of the agency problem with concentrated ownership, family 
firms are generally viewed as making M&A to benefit family interests at the expense of 
small shareholders. However, James (1999) suggests that family firms may have more 
incentive to initiate a beneficial M&A transaction that improves viability of their companies 
over time and passes the interests to the next generations. In the Ben-Amar and André (2006) 
study, they provide evidence to support James’s (1999) argument. They find that family 
ownership has a significantly positive relationship with M&A value creation.  
 
Faccio and Stolin (2006) perform a cross-countriy research through information taken 
from the dataset in Faccio and Lang (2002) (13 western European countries, from 1997 to 
2000, at 20 percent level of ownership) and obtain 184 family-controlled bidders where the 
bidder belongs to a specifically identified business group. Expropriation is here defined as 
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the disproportional sharing of gains among different investors. They compare the 
announcement period change in the stock market wealth of the bidder’s controlling 
shareholder with the wealth change implied by their holdings in the bidder. They find a 
non-proportional sharing of market value changes when they split the sample on the basis of 
group characteristics like separation or pyramid structures, but there is no significant result 
when these variables regressed on the measure of expropriation. They conclude, therefore, 
that the expropriation of minority shareholders does take place in Europe but that 
acquisitions are unlikely to be the preferred instrument for family acquirers to achieve 
expropriation purpose.  
 
Institutional large shareholders are expected to have an influence on acquisition bids 
for enhancing shareholder interests or to force acquirer managers to be more objective in 
their acquisition strategies. Duggal and Millar (1999) investigate the impact of institutional 
ownership on corporate performance of 143 US acquiring firms in the 1985 to 1990 period. 
They do find the positive relationship between institutional ownership and bidder returns, but 
the ownership concentration is determined by firm-specific factors such as size, insider 
ownership and the presence in the S&P 500 index. Moreover, although they identify the 
firms targeted for monitoring by some active institutions such as CALPERS, the results fail 
to expose any significant role played by active institutional large shareholders in M&A 
market.  
 
In Wright et al. (2002) study, active institutions are defined as institutions (mutual 
funds, public pension funds, endowment funds, and foundations) have more than one percent 
ownership in the company. They find a significant positive relationship between active 
institutional ownership and the value of acquiring firms. 
 
3.5.2 Governance Mechanisms 
Compared to the wider discussion about corporate governance mechanisms on general 
firm performance (discussed in 2.5.1), there is relatively scarce theoretical or empirical 
research to provide evidence concerning the relationship between governance mechanisms 
and specific acquisition performance. O'Sullivan and Wong (1999) provide an important 
standpoint for addressing the relationship between internal and external control mechanisms 
in the context of hostile takeover. However, their study is undertaken from the view of target 
firms. Here, this thesis summarizes some articles focusing on the mechanisms of corporate 
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governance regarding to CEO type, board characteristics and other blockholders-- 
specifically on the acquisition performance of acquiring firms. 
 
CEO positions 
Ben-Amar and André (2006) argue that the decisions made by different types of CEOs 
can have a varying impact on market expectations. Their results show that family controlled 
firms with a family member as CEO have a positive impact on abnormal market returns at 
the announcement date. Basically, their results suggest that family CEOs are more efficient 
in their investment decisions and that they are trying to maximize firm value in order to 
transfer this asset to future generations. With well-developed market and effective outside 
monitoring systems, a family CEO may provide essential firm-specific know-how and hence 
benefit the firm value. 
 
Board Characteristics 
Researching 225 US banking mergers, Subrahmanyam, Rangan and Rosenstein (1997) 
find that the effect of the proportion of independent outside directors on the board of 
acquiring firms is negative when related to the abnormal returns. Similar results are provided 
by Becher and Campbell II (2003a). Using a sample of US bank mergers from 1990 to 1999, 
they find that corporate governance mechanisms that are related to the acquirer board 
(including board size, the ratio of independent directors and the board ownership) have no 
impact on the target premium so as to the negotiation advantages. However, these studies 
focus on bank acquisitions; bank boards are, on average, larger than those of nonfinancial 
firms (Subrahmanyam et al. 1997). Ben-Amar and André (2006) show that the ratio of 
non-related directors is positive related to the abnormal returns of acquiring firms around the 
announcement date. This positive effect has been supported by Sudarsanam and Mahate’s 
(2006) recent work which reports acquiring firm performance for more than three years after 
transactions.  
 
Additionally, Ben-Amar and André (2006) document a negative relationship between 
board size and the announcement date returns of acquiring firms. However, similar to the 
study on the effect of the CEO position, it is essential to consider that the negative effect of 
board size may be endogenously affected by other variables such as company size, 
ownership structure, past performance or other intangible factors. 
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For a sample of 386 UK domestic acquisitions of high-tech targets during the period 
1990 to 1999, Sudarsanam and Gao (2003) document that there is no significant difference 
when it comes to the abnormal returns (three year BHARs) between acquiring firms with 
dominant, dual-role CEOs and acquiring firms with no duality. Nevertheless, in another 
study based on a sample of 519 UK acquisitions during the time 1983 to 1995, Sudarsanam 
and Mahate (2006) find that acquiring firms with COE-COB duality problems have weakly 
negative three-year post-acquisition value creation. 
 
Other Blockholders 
Sudarsanam and Gao’s (2003) also examine the effect of the percentage of shares hold 
by institutional blockholders. They argue that institutional blockholders can provide quality 
suggestions those should efficiently monitor acquirer managers to avoid the overpayment 
problems. Their results, however, do not provide any significant evidence to support 
argument. The expected positive relationship between blockholder ownership and the 
announcement date abnormal returns of acquiring firms is further proved by Ben-Amar and 
André’s (2006) study. 
 
3.5.3 Legal/ Extra-legal Institutions 
Even less attention has been paid to the effects of legal and extra-legal mechanisms on 
the acquisition performance. Some articles touch upon the function of legal origin and 
shareholder protection rights, but no research has yet been discovered that explain the impact 
of extra-legal institutions and DLLS’s new index on M&A value creations. 
 
For a large sample of international M&A across 49 countries between 1990 and 1999, 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) attempt to examine the determinants of M&A by focusing on 
differences in legal institutions. They proxy legal institutions by legal origin, anti-director 
rights, rule of law and accounting standards. Their main findings are: first, the volume of 
M&A activity is significantly larger in countries with stronger investor protection; second, 
acquirers from countries with better investor protections tend to adopt hostile takeovers; 
third, takeover premiums in countries with stronger investor protection are higher since the 
lower cost of capital in markets with better investor protection will increase potential 
competition and will result in higher premiums; fourth, acquirers in countries with better 
investor protection do not pay higher premiums than those from countries with weaker 
investor protection, providing evidence showing that the higher premium in countries with 
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better protection is not a proxy of private benefits; and fifth, shareholder protection is 
negatively related to the all-cash bids which is possibly explained by the higher risk of 
expropriation to issuing stock mergers. Rossi and Volpin (2004) provide a valuable direction 
for M&A activity when it converges with legal protection, but they offer no further direct 
evidence concerning the M&A value creation.   
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) test the effects of legal origin on the choice of payment 
methods of acquirers. Based upon a large sample of European transactions over the period 
from 1997 to 2000, they find, in continental Europe (non-common law), that there is a linear 
relationship between the concentrated control and the likelihood of cash payments. In 
UK-Irish (common law), a cube relationship exists. That means bidders are reluctant to pay 
stock over intermediate levels of voting control. This evidence is still too weak, however, to 






In conclusion, the major purpose of this chapter is to understand a broad scope of 
research on mergers and acquisitions and to know the impact of ownership structure and 
governance mechanisms on M&A performance. In section 3.2, this thesis enhances current 
knowledge by summarizing the rationale of M&A. M&A can be driven by macroeconomic 
factors that result in merger wave, or by firm-specific rational choices. Focusing on the 
firm-specific factors, it seems clear that M&A can be adopted for the private benefits of 
managers that mostly suffer acquisition value from agency problems like empire-building or 
hubris, or for acquirers’ shareholders benefits. Assuming that managers will make decisions 
to maximize firm value, this thesis emphasizes how M&A synergies are created for acquiring 
shareholders. The sources of M&A success that may come form M&A synergies include 
wealth transfer from bondholders, customers/suppliers, or the society. Certainly, it seems that 
M&A might create real synergies from financial benefits, operational advantages, or 
managerial improvements. Since it is difficult to assess M&A synergies because of so many 
different motives, there are many debates surrounding both the measurement and M&A.  
 
Section 3.3 introduces two primary methodologies for measuring M&A success. One 
school of thought is the event study methodology for short and long-term market 
performance. Under the assumption of market efficiency, short-term event study has 
relatively few problems such as nontrading or nonsynchronous trading effect, cross sectional 
dependence or heteroskedasticity problem. However, short-term event study methodology is 
criticized because it only reflects shareholder expectations around the announcement date 
without capturing the long-term economic values. Long-term event study methodology is 
mainly questioned for its measurement bias such as new listing or delisting bias, rebalancing, 
skewness, and clustering problems, etc. So far this approach remains very controversial.  
 
The other school of thought is accounting-based methodology. This approach is based 
on an influential seminar paper provided by HPR (1992). Before HPR, most projects used 
accrual measures such as ROA, ROE that are more direct and simple. These investigations 
suffer from the impact of financing choices, tax arbitrage, and accounting methods for M&A. 
After HPR, most accounting-based studies follow the operating cash flow measures with a 
different benchmark adjusted. However, this method still has some limitations regarding the 
benchmark, performance measures, deflators, and estimates for improvement. In order to 
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capture the real economic values of M&A, this thesis adopts the operating cash flow return 
as one measure and uses size, industry, and pre performance benchmarks to estimate the 
long-term acquisition performance. 
 
In section 3.4, this thesis reviews several transaction characteristics which have been 
identified as the possible determinants of M&A success. These characteristics include 
cross-border/cross-origin, transaction attitude, payment method, competition, industry 
relatedness, toehold interest, bid premium, size relatedness and bidder’s leverage. Even after 
summarizing this review, it remains clear that there is still great opportunity for clarifying the 
effects of these proxy measures. Therefore, these characteristics are considered as control 
valuables in the following empirical work.  
 
 In the final section 3.5 of this chapter, this thesis questions the impact of 
concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms on M&A 
performance. Do M&As create firm value or provide a channel for controlling the 
shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders? The answers are still far from certain. So 
far, the most general apprehension is that majority shareholders may have different attitudes 
under the different circumstances of legal or extra-legal institutions. Considering that there is 
still an insufficient discussion on the issue of legal institutions, this thesis adds to the 
examination of the relationship between concentrated ownership and acquiring firm 
performance under the effects of investor protection.  
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Chapter Four 




The purpose of this chapter is to present the research framework and testable 
hypotheses. Beginning with a description of fundamental ideas and core issues, this thesis 
adopts a two-stage research framework. Within this structure, several testable hypotheses are 
developed and are divided into major and secondary hypotheses. The rest of this chapter 
comprises three parts. Section 4.2 describes the research framework; section 4.3 displays the 




4.2 Research Framework 
 The First Stage 
This thesis develops a two-stage research structure to address two main issues. The 
first stage attempts to explain the impact of ownership concentration on acquisition operating 
performance. As discussed in chapter three, this thesis examines the long term acquisition 
performance using the Healy, Palepu and Ruback (HPR, 1992) model, defined as operating 
cash flow returns as performance measures and uses size, industry, and pre-performance 
benchmarks to capture the abnormal returns created by M&A investments in the long run 
horizon. Further, following Ghosh’s (2001) critic of HPR, two measures are used: the 
adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost, similar definition as IACR in HPR (1992) 
but adjusted by industry, size and pre performance) and the change in adjusted operating 
cash flow returns (∆ACFR, same definition as ∆Cash Flow in Ghosh (2001)). Full definitions 
of these variables are presented in chapter five. 
 
This thesis adopts various metrics to ownership. First, the percentage of voting shares 
held by the largest shareholders at 10 percent threshold is used in order to divide the sample 
companies into dispersed (voting shares <10 percent) and concentrated (voting shares 10 ≧
percent) firms. Second, as the 20 percent threshold is also widely used as breakpoint for 
defining large shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1999, 
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Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000, Faccio and Lang 2002), it is introduced for comparison. 
Third, to look more in depth at the level of ownership concentration, this thesis designs three 
more detailed levels for the concentrated firms: low level controlled firms (10 percent 
voting shares < 20 percent), middle level controlled firms (20 percent  voting shares < ≦ ≦
50 percent), and high level controlled firms (voting shares 50 percent)≧ . Fourth, in 
reviewing the literature, a quadratic and cubic function relationship between ownership 
structure and general firm performance is suggested by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988b), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Anderson and Reeb (2003) to capture non-linearities in 
the relationship. This thesis also tests for a non-linear relationship between the voting shares 
of the largest shareholders and acquisition performance. Details on the measurement of these 
ownership metrics are presented in chapter five, section 5.4.1. Fifth, the type of concentrated 
ownership is another interesting issue (considered in more detail in chapter seven as an 
additional analysis). A threshold at 10 percent level is used to identify the ultimate owners of 
a sample company’s largest shareholders. According to the type of ultimate owners, sample 
firms are classified into five types: (1) dispersed firms, (2) family controlled firms, (3) firms 
controlled by widely held financial institution, (4) firms controlled by widely held 
corporation and (5) state-controlled firms. 
 
Moreover, as discussed in section 2.5 of chapter two, a variety of internal and external 
governance mechanisms are assessed; limited evidence exists relative to the impact of these 
governance mechanisms on the performance of significant corporate events such as M&A. 
The separation of cash flow and control rights must be added in as an accentuating factor, 
along with several firm-specific mitigating factors including CEO as the member or 
representative of large shareholders; CEO and chairman duality; the efficiency of board size; 
the ratio of independent active directors on the board; and the existence of other 
blockholders. From this framework is revealed the degree to which concentrated ownership 
affects the M&A values after controlling for these governance variables. 
 
In order to clearly identify the effects of ownership structure and corporate 
governance on M&A value creation, it is necessary to control the other factors which might 
be the determinants of the acquisitions performance. As discussed in section 3.4 of chapter 
three, several determinants of M&A success are broadly identified in prior literatures. These 
deal-specific transaction characteristics are also carefully controlled in this thesis. These 
include cross origin, transaction attitude, payment method, competition, industry related, 
toehold, premium, size-related, and acquirers’ leverage.  
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 The Second Stage 
Evidence regarding acquisition operating performance, ownership structure, 
governance mechanisms, and transaction characteristics is expected to generate a benchmark 
model. The first stage benchmark model will be used to explore the second main issue: the 
impact of legal and extra-legal institutions on M&A value creation. Recent studies 
investigating the effects of legal system are carried out mostly with regard to legal origins 
after La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1998) and far too little 
attention is paid to differing levels of investor protection within the same legal origin. This is 
the other core concern in this thesis.  
 
At the second stage, country-specific legal and extra-legal institutions are investigated 
by using indexes developed in LLSV (1998), Dyck and Zingales (2004) and Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (DLLS, 2006). As discussed in section 2.5.2.3, the 
DLLS (2006) methodology that is used to develop their new indexes (anti-self dealing and 
public enforcement) is obviously different from the previous research that considered legal 
and extra-legal measures. The anti-self dealing index has been viewed as a private 
enforcement index with characteristics close to those in the legal and extra-legal system. 
Given the correlation between these various metrics, institutional variables are separated into 
two groups. The first group is comprised of three legal measures (anti-director right, 
enforcement, and accounting standards) in LLSV (1998) and one extra-legal proxy from 
Dyck and Zingales (2004). The second group includes all three new indexes in DLLS (2006), 
i.e. the two legal measures presented by revised anti-director right and public enforcement, 
and one private enforcement index proxied by anti-self dealing. The research framework is 




Figure 4.1 Research Framework 
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4.3 Research Hypotheses 
 
4.3.1 Hypotheses regarding Acquisition Operating Performance  
According to the extant literature presented in chapter 3, the target company’s 
shareholders seem to be the big winners with significant abnormal returns on share prices 
around the announcement. The acquiring company’s shareholders have mostly negative or 
‘break even’ abnormal returns around the announcement. However, if the acquiring firms 
will suffer from M&A transactions in the end, why are M&A deals still so? One stream of 
M&A studies declares that acquisition deals are motivated by expected synergy but that short 
term stock price performance around the announcement is unable to identify whether 
takeovers create real economic gains in the long run (HPR 1992, Sharma and Ho 2002, 
Goergen and Renneboog 2004). This synergy hypothesis indicates that if a market is efficient 
and if the stock price reflects the anticipation of acquisitions synergy, merger events should 
lead to the improved financial and operating performance of combined firms. Therefore, the 
fundamental hypothesis of this thesis is constructed by testing whether the corporate 
acquisitions generate a significant positive improvement in operating performance (measured 
by abnormal adjusted cash flow returns and the change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR) in the post-acquisition period). Accordingly, the thesis posits several null 
hypotheses:  
 
H 1.1: Ceteris paribus, the average abnormal adjusted cash flow returns (α) from 
cross-sectional regression on the average adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) of 
three post acquisitions years is equal to zero.  
 
H 1.2: Ceteris paribus, the average change in adjusted cash flow returns (∆ACFR) is equal to 
zero. 
 
4.3.2 Hypotheses regarding Ownership Structure 
Assumptions concerning ownership structure, governance mechanism, and legal 
institutions are major hypotheses in this thesis. The structure of ownership has been 
extensively discussed ever since Berle and Means (1932) introduced the separation theory of 
ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling (1976) further propose the agency theory that 
defines the relationship between owners and top mangers as a contract; managers may not 
attempt to maximize firm value, especially in the absence of sufficient monitoring. In this 
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context, they suggest a convergence-of-interest hypothesis that increasing managerial 
ownership will provide a higher incentive for top managers to mitigate the costs associated 
with the conflict.  
 
While ownership concentration is proposed as a solution for the divergence-of-interest 
problems, it in turn induces expropriation problems between large and small shareholders as 
discussed in the literature review of chapter two. A curvilinear relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance has been captured in some prior literature (Morck 
et al. 1988b, McConnell and Servaes 1990). They employ the turning points in order to 
explain that a convergence-of-interests exists in the whole range of ownership but that 
expropriation, including tunneling and sub-optima decisions, does dominate when ownership 
is concentrated over a certain level. This thesis extends the convergence-of-interests and 
expropriation hypothesis to acquisition performance.  
 
In addition, legal origin is now a core concern in governance research after LLSV 
(1998). These articles document that agency problems between the controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders can be effectively mitigated in English legal origin countries 
which are regarded as having better corporate governance systems (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 2002, Gugler 2003, Mueller and Yurtoglu 2000). 
They shed light on the importance of legal protection but attenuate the influence of 
ownership concentration in countries with a good corporate governance system. Does this 
mean, however, that the convergence-of-interests and the expropriation hypotheses become 
invalid in English origin countries? Anderson and Reeb (2003) first examine the relationship 
between the founding family holdings and performance in large US firms. They find that 
family ownership produces better firm performance than non-family firms. Ben-Amar and 
André (2006) measure the market reflection of Canadian acquisitions and suggest that the 
dominant shareholders may not attempt tunneling via acquisitions in countries with better 
legal systems, but that they might have a tendency to reduce risks by making sub-optimal 
investment decisions when they have more interest in the firms. Basically, this thesis follows 
the classification of LLSV (1998) and extends Ben-Amar and André’s (2006) research to a 
cross-country analysis by sampling all countries other than the US in the English origin legal 
system. The thesis starts by testing the relationship between acquisition operating 




H 2.1: Ceteris paribus, concentrated ownership has no impact on the average adjusted 
operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR). 
 
H 2.2: Ceteris paribus, the level of ownership concentration has no impact on the average 
adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash 
flow returns (∆ACFR).  
 
4.3.3 Hypotheses regarding Governance Mechanisms  
Upon examining the effects of ownership structure on M&A performance, subsequent 
consideration is given to influential mitigating or accentuating factors. Firm-specific 
governance mechanisms are therefore among the first to be contemplated in this thesis. In the 
literature, the separation problem that exists between control and cash flow rights (called 
type I agency problem in this thesis) is regarded as the very essence of agency problem and 
is linked to concentrated ownership structures (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, La Porta et al. 
1999). On the one hand, separation may increase the incentive to expropriate small 
shareholders since the large shareholder does not bear the full costs of his decisions. On the 
other hand, separating mechanisms like dual class voting shares can ensure control by the 
dominant shareholder in making good corporate decisions while opening up the capital of the 
firm to investors.  
  
H 3.1: Ceteris paribus, separation of voting rights and cash flow rights has no impact on the 
average adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted 
cash flow returns (∆ACFR). 
 
Furthermore, this thesis extends the central agency problem between owners and 
managers in dispersed ownership (here called type II agency problem) to that in concentrated 
ownership. On the one hand, it is possible that companies with a CEO who is the member or 
representative of the large shareholders make M&A decisions in best interest of the large 
shareholder also benefiting small shareholders. On the other hand, dominant shareholders 






H 3.2: Ceteris paribus, dominant shareholder involvement in the CEO position has no 
impact on the average adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average 
change in adjusted cash flow returns (∆ACFR). 
 
Some literature provides a monitoring hypothesis as reviewed in chapter two. This 
thesis basically contends that a separation of the CEO and chairman position leads to better 
governance; that smaller board size will permit directors to function more effectively; that 
outside directors should enhance firm value through effective monitoring; and that other 
blockholders who hold a sizable fraction of voting shares might reduce the cost of obtaining 
information and solve the free-rider problem for minority shareholders (Rosenstein and 
Wyatt 1990, Weisbach 1988, Lipton and Lorsch 1992, Conyon and Peck 1998, Demsetz and 
Lehn 1985, McConnell and Servaes 1990, Agrawal and Knoeber 1996).  
 
While the effects of corporate governance provision on corporate performance are 
now relatively well documented, the extent to which they impact M&A decisions under the 
notion of ownership concentration remains unclear. This thesis intends to contribute to the 
literature by testing the following hypotheses (in null form):  
 
H 3.3: Ceteris paribus, CEO-Chairman duality has no impact on the average adjusted 
operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR) 
 
H3.4: Ceteris paribus, the number of board members has no impact on the average adjusted 
operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR). 
 
H 3.5: Ceteris paribus, the ratio of independent directors has no impact on the average 
adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash 
flow returns (∆ACFR). 
 
H 3.6: Ceteris paribus, the existence of other blockholders has no impact on the average 
adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash 




4.3.4 Hypotheses regarding Legal and Extra-legal Institutions  
Following the investor protection classification scheme of LLSV (1998), cross 
-country research has focused on comparing corporate performance in countries with 
different legal origins (Fauver, Houston and Naranjo 2003, Friedman, Johnson and Mitton 2003, 
Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu 2004). While English origin countries are often lumped together 
and viewed as examples of more dispersed ownership and greater investor protection, 
concentrated ownership is quite prevalent in many of these countries and the level of 
investor protection does vary from group to group.  
 
This thesis intends to examine the discrepancy in acquisition operating performance 
among countries with the same legal origin but with different levels of legal and extra-legal 
systems. Do higher levels of investor protection lead to the better acquisition performance? 
Seven proxies of legal and extra-legal institutions are employed to test hypothesis: the initial 
anti-director right; the enforcement index and accounting standard in LLSV (1998); the 
integrated extra-legal index in Dyck and Zingales (2004); the anti-self dealing indexes; the 
public enforcement measure; and the revised anti-director right in DLLS (2006). The 
hypotheses in null form are displayed in the following. 
 
H 4.1: Ceteris paribus, a higher ‘original’ anti-director rights index has no impact on the 
average adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted 
cash flow returns (∆ACFR). 
 
H 4.2: Ceteris paribus, the degree of enforcement has no impact on the average adjusted 
operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR). 
 
H 4.3: Ceteris paribus, the rating of accounting standards has no impact on the average 
adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash 
flow returns (∆ACFR). 
 
H 4.4: Ceteris paribus, a higher integrated extra-legal index has no impact on the average 
adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash 




H 4.5: Ceteris paribus, the degree of anti-self dealing has no impact on the average adjusted 
operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR). 
 
H 4.6: Ceteris paribus, a higher public enforcement index has no impact on the average 
adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash 
flow returns (∆ACFR). 
 
H 4.7: Ceteris paribus, a higher ‘revised’ anti-director right index has no impact on the 
average adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted 
cash flow returns (∆ACFR). 
 
4.3.5 Hypotheses regarding Transaction Characteristics  
This thesis considers transaction characteristic hypotheses as secondary. Several deal 
features, as reviewed in chapter three, have been well studied in the prior literature; however, 
there are still open issues. By referring to previous research, this thesis develops the 
following null hypotheses for the transaction characteristics: 
 
H 5.1: Ceteris paribus, cross origin in takeovers has no impact on the average adjusted 
operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR). 
 
H 5.2: Ceteris paribus, hostility in takeovers has no impact on the average adjusted 
operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR). 
 
H 5.3: Ceteris paribus, payment method has no impact on the average adjusted operating 
cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR). 
 
H 5.4: Ceteris paribus, the existence of other bidders (competition) has no impact on the 
average adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted 
cash flow returns (∆ACFR). 
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H 5.5: Ceteris paribus, industry relatedness in takeovers has no impact on the average 
adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash 
flow returns (∆ACFR). 
 
H 5.6: Ceteris paribus, toehold interests has no impact on the average adjusted operating 
cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR). 
 
H 5.7: Ceteris paribus, the level of premium paid has no impact on the average adjusted 
operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR). 
 
H 5.8: Ceteris paribus, size differences between the bidders and targets have no impact on 
the average adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) and the average change in 
adjusted cash flow returns (∆ACFR). 
 
H 5.9: Ceteris paribus, the level of acquirer’s leverage has no impact on the average adjusted 






The core issue of this thesis is how concentrated ownership structures impact the 
long-term acquisition operating performance of English origin countries, after controlling for 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms (first stage) and legal and extra-legal 




Table 4.1 Research Hypotheses 
H 1.1 Ceteris paribus, the average abnormal adjusted cash flow returns (α) from cross-sectional regression on theaverage adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRpost) of three post acquisitions years is equal to zero.
H 1.2 Ceteris paribus, the average change in adjusted cash flow returns (∆ACFR) is equal to zero.
H 2.1 Ceteris paribus, concentrated ownership has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 2.2 Ceteris paribus, the level of ownership concentration has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 3.1 Ceteris paribus, separation of voting rights and cash flow rights has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 3.2 Ceteris paribus, Ceteris paribus, dominant shareholder involvement in the CEO position has no impact onACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 3.3 Ceteris paribus,  CEO-Chairman duality has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR
H 3.4 Ceteris paribus, the number of board member has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 3.5 Ceteris paribus, the ratio of independent directors has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 3.6 Ceteris paribus, the existence of other blockholders has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 4.1 Ceteris paribus, a higher 'original' anti-director rights index has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 4.2 Ceteris paribus, the degree of enforcement has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 4.3 Ceteris paribus, the rating of accounting standard has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 4.4 Ceteris paribus, a higher integrated extra-legal index has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 4.5 Ceteris paribus, the degree of anti-self dealing has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 4.6 Ceteris paribus, a higher public enforcement index has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 4.7 Ceteris paribus, a higher 'revised' anti-director right index has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 5.1 Ceteris paribus, cross origin in takeovers has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 5.2 Ceteris paribus, hostility in takeovers has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 5.3 Ceteris paribus, payment method has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 5.4 Ceteris paribus, the existence of other bidders (competition) has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 5.5 Ceteris paribus, industry relatedness in takeovers has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 5.6 Ceteris paribus, toehold interests has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 5.7 Ceteris paribus,  the level of premium paid has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 5.8 Ceteris paribus, size differences between the bidders and targets have no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H 5.9 Ceteris paribus, the level of acquirer’s leverage has no impact on ACFRpost and ∆ACFR.
H1: Hypotheses for testing Acquisition Operating Performance
H2: Hypotheses for testing the effects of Ownership Structures
H3: Hypotheses for testing the effects of Governance Mechanisms
Panel A   Major Hypotheses at the first stage
Panel B   Major Hypotheses at the second stage
H4: Hypotheses for testing the effects of Legal and Extra-Legal Systems
Panel C   Secondary Hypotheses








The objective of this chapter is to provide a detailed description of data and the 
methodology that is used to test the hypotheses developed in chapter four. The rest of the 
chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the process of sample selection and 
sample characteristics. Section 5.3 illustrates the measure of operating performance and the 
criteria of benchmark construction. Section 5.4 defines the independent variables. Section 
5.5 displays the empirical models upon which that testing is based. The main empirical 
results will be reported in chapter six. 
 
 
5.2 Sample Selection and Data Characteristics 
 
5.2.1 Sample Selection 
In order to cover the recent mergers boom at its peak around 2000 and to have access 
to necessary information12, this thesis selects completed deals from the beginning of 1997 
until the end of 2001. To observe firm performance three years before and after acquisition, 
the accounting data can start as early as 1994 and as late as 2004. To investigate the more 
influential M&A transactions, the deal value is set to at least USD10million. To ensure 
accounting and financial data is available, this thesis, like most of the operational 
performance literature, focuses on deals between publicly listed firms. Adopting the 
classification of legal families by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 
1998), all English origin countries13 are set as the sample nations of acquiring firms. Since 
the United States market has already been extensively studied and since most American 
                                                 
12 Information for earlier periods is often difficult to find. 
13 LLSV (1998) include the following countries in the English-origin category: Australia, Canada, 
Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States and Zimbabwe. 
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firms are widely held, American deals are excluded from this study14. Moreover, the 
acquiring firms must have less than 50 percent of the target’s ownership before and more 
than 50 percent after, i.e. a takeover. Government, financial, and investment companies are 
excluded because of their specific accounting and regulatory requirements.  
 
In sum, the sample in this thesis meets the following criteria: 1) Observations are for 
1997-2001; 2) Only transactions greater than US$10 million are included; 3) Acquiring and 
targets firms are listed companies; 4) Adopting the LLSV (1998) classification, acquiring 
nation is an English origin country except for the US; 5) Deals are completed as mergers, 
exchange offers, or acquisitions of majority interest; 6) Government, financial, and 
investment companies are excluded; 7) Companies with several M&A during the period are 
included. According to the above restrictions, 715 initial deals in 11 countries were obtained 
from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC Platinum TM Worldwide Mergers & 
Acquisitions Database. From this initial sample, 52 deals were deleted because no record 
existed to identify the target firms and 197 deals were dropped because acquirers have either 
been acquired themselves or gone under and, hence, have no data available whatsoever. At 
this stage, 466 deals in 11 countries were identified to collect financial and accounting data. 
 
The financial and accounting data for the seven-year window are obtained from the 
Thomson Financial or DataStream database. In this step, 77 deals were dropped because 
their financial data is no longer available. Data is needed at least one year before and one 
year after transactions, therefore another 56 deals were consequently dropped because their 
missing data is spread over all seven years of observation window (transaction year plus 
three years before and after transactions) for either acquiring or target firms. At this stage, 
333 deals were left to collect ownership data. Ownership data is collected by recording 
information from the proxies or annual reports of each company, from the Mergent database, 
from the SEDAR filing system, from SEC fillings, or from the company website. Finally, 43 
deals were excluded because profiles are unavailable. After these adjustments, the final 
                                                 
14 Anderson and Reeb (2004) argue that around 35% of their sample firms are classified as family 
firms with the average holding 17.9 percent of the firm’s equity. Anderson, Durub and Reeb (2006) 
further report that family ownership in 48 percent of the 2,000 largest industrial firms with the 
average family holding about 20 percent of the companies’ shares. However, According to their 
classification and following by the criteria used here, this thesis got roughly 3% (273/7154, i.e. 273 
deals within 7154 US deals are made by the US family firms) of US deals classified as family 
deals and most of those family deals are made by multiple family acquirers (81/273, i.e. 81 US 
family firms launched these 273 US family deals). This thesis understands that the percentage of 
US concentrated firms (not only US family firms) may be higher, but the costs and benefits are 
definitely not proportionate. 
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sample includes 282 deals (222 acquiring firms15 and 282 target firms) in 11 countries. The 
process of sample selection and number of firms is shown in Table 5.1. A complete list of 
sample firms is supplied in appendix A. 
 
Brown and da Silva Rosa (1998) point out that selecting a sample from a set of 
criteria may overestimate abnormal performance. They take newly listed firms as an example 
and explain that newly listed firms generally report systematically negative abnormal returns. 
If newly listed firms are systematically excluded from any selection, then the abnormal 
performance will be positively biased. While this sample does suffer from survivorship bias, 
like most of the finance literature, the matching of acquiring firms with non-acquiring firms 
also required to have data over the (-3, +3) year-period actually limits the survivorship bias. 
Using a Heckman (1979) requires a selection equation with available explanatory variables 
for all selected and non selected firms; these are not available since excluded firms have 
either been acquired themselves or have gone under (not highly probable in the case of 
acquiring firms) and have no data available. So far, there are no papers on long-term 
operational performance that provide a solution to this issue. 
 
Table 5.1 Sample Selection Criteria and Number of Deals 
Description No. of deals
Deal Status (Code) Include 01/01/1997 to 12/31/2001        358,154
Date Effective/Unconditional Between Completed        129,194
Acquirer Nation (Code) Include English Origin countries          33,658
Acquirer Public Status (Code) Include Public          16,976
Target Public Status (Code) Include Public            2,678
Percent of Shares Owned after Transaction Between 50 to 100            1,458
Percent of Shares Held by Acquirer at
Announcement
Between 0 to 50            1,286
Target Macro Industry (Code) Exclude Real Estate, Government and
Agencies Financials
           1,043
Acquirer Macro Industry (Code) Exclude Real Estate, Government and
Agencies Financials
 962
Deal Value ($ Mil) Between 10 to HI  715
Initial Deals  715
Exclude Acquirers: 197 518
Exclude Targets: 52 466
Preliminary Deals 466
With identification number but no financial
data provided Exclude 77 389
With financial data but incomplete in all
seven years (year -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3) Exclude 56 333
Acquirers without Profiles for ownership Exclude 51 282
Final Deals 282




                                                 
15 Acknowledging that multiple acquirers may cause clustering problem, to control for this, this thesis 
has rerun regression while estimating the cluster robust (Wooldridge 2003) and the bootstrap 
(Efron and Tibshirani 1986) standard errors. Regression results are qualitatively similar. A more 
detailed discussion is added as sensitivity analysis in chapter eight.  
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5.2.2 Data Characteristics 
In panel A of table 5.2, a complete report of the annual numbers, aggregate values, 
and mean values of acquisitions is presented. The sample comprises 282 acquisitions with a 
total market value of over US$553 billion. Consistent with the trend of the fifth merger wave, 
the transaction amount increased yearly and reached the top in year 2000. In this sample, the 
deal value of year 2000 occupied 61.2 percent of the total value of the observation years. 
Acquiring firms paid, on average (median), US$1,964.5 (238.1) million for the targets. The 
breakdown of the sample by one digit primary SIC code is presented in panel B of table 5.2. 
A large percentage (46.8 %) of deals occurs in the manufacturing sector. The smallest 
proportion (8.9%) of deals is in the consumer and wholesale industry. The rest of the deals 
are distributed equally among the agriculture (15.2 %), the transportation (14.5 %) and the 
services (14.5 %) industry.  
 
Panel C lists firms and deal values by the acquirer’s country. Most deals are initiated 
in the UK (141 deals out of the 282 or 50 percent) followed by Canada (75 deals or 26.6 %), 
and Australia (24 deals or 8.5 %). The other 42 deals (14.9 %) are spread across the 
following countries: South Africa (14), Ireland (11), India (6), Singapore (5), New Zealand 
(3), Israel (1), Malaysia (1), and Thailand (1). There are 55 percent (155 out of 282) of deals 
classified as domestic transactions, that is, 45 percent cross border deals. If this thesis set the 
breakdown of sample by targets’ origin instead of by targets’ country, the proportion of target 
firms coming from the English origin countries dramatically increases to 92.2 percent (260 
deals); only 7.8 percent (22 deals) belongs to cross origin transactions.    
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Table 5.2 Description of Sample Characteristics 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. 










1997 10 276.1                 132.1 2,761.1         0.50%
1998 43 703.9                 173.5 30,266.5       5.46%
1999 74 1,909.2              211.4 141,283.1     25.50%
2000 88 3,852.7              297.5 339,039.5     61.20%
2001 67 606.6                 205.5 40,643.8       7.34%
Total 282 1,964.5              238.1 553,994.0     100.00%
By SIC code 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997-2001 %
Agriculture and
Natural Resources
0000-1999 3 6 8 14 12 43 15.2%
Manufacturing:
2000-3999 1 23 35 45 28 132 46.8%
Transportation:
4000-4999 3 5 10 12 11 41 14.5%
Consumer and
Wholesale:
5000-5999 1 6 7 6 5 25 8.9%
Services:
7000-8999 2 3 14 11 11 41 14.5%
Total 10 43 74 88 67 282 100%














Australia 24 19 899.4              160.1            21,585.4         17 24
Canada 75 55 912.7              300.1            68,449.0         39 69
India 6 6 155.1              155.1            930.6              5 6
Ireland-Rep 11 8 420.9              207.8            4,629.7           1 10
Israel 1 1 53.4                53.4              53.4                0 1
Malaysia 1 1 49.5                49.5              49.5                1 1
New Zealand 3 3 295.4              64.0              886.2              0 2
Singapore 5 5 223.9              193.9            1,119.4           5 5
South Africa 14 11 210.5              164.5            2,947.4           11 14
Thailand 1 1 124.1              124.1            124.1              1 1
United Kingdom 141 112 3,214.3           250.1            453,219.1       75 127
Total 282 222 1,964.5           239.3            553,994.0       155 260






5.3 Operating Performance Measures 
 
5.3.1 Operating Cash Flow Returns 
Based on Healy, Palepu and Ruback (HPR, 1992), this thesis uses pre-tax operating 
cash flow (OCF) to measure acquisition performance. Operating cash flow is defined as 
operating income after depreciation plus depreciation and goodwill amortization (in other 
words, EBITDA). This definition ensures that the performance measure is unaffected by 
different merger accounting methods, by tax policy, or by the type of financing used to fund 
the acquisition. Operating cash flow return (OCFR) 16 is calculated as operating cash flow 
divided by market value of assets17. The market value of assets is computed at the beginning 
of each year to control for changes in the size of the firm over time (HPR, 1992: 142). 
Formally,  
 
Operating Cash Flow (OCF) = Operating income after depreciation  
  +Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization Expense 
Market Value of Asset = Market Value of Equity at the beginning of each year 
                   +Book Value of Net Debt 
Book Value of Net Debt = Total Debt - Cash, Marketable securities, and cash equivalents  
     + Preferred Stock  
Operating Cash Flow Return (OCFR) = Operating Cash Flow / Market Value of Asset. 
 
Operating cash flow returns (OCFRB, OCFRT) are computed for each company up to 
three years before and after the acquisition event. Post acquisition performance is measured 
by the operating cash flow return of the merging firms after transaction (MEGi, post). Pre 
acquisition performance is calculated as a weighted-average of the operating cash flow 
return for the bidder and the target (MEGi, pre). The weights are based on the market values 
of assets of both companies at the year before acquisition. This measurement is consistent 
with that of HPR (1992) and Ghosh (2001).  
                                                 
16  To identify the source of the improvement in operating cash flow return, this thesis also 
decomposed OCFR into operating cash flow margin (CFM) and asset turnover (AT). The operating 
cash flow margin is measured by EBITDA per dollar of sales. The sales margin ratio is measured 
by the dollar sales generated for each dollar invested in market value of assets (Ghosh 2001, 
Rahman and Limmack 2004). Tests and results are reported in chapter seven as further analysis. 
17 The limitations of EBITDA performance and the market value of assets deflator have been noted 
and discussed in chapter three, section 3.3.2. 
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The data on the year of the acquisition (t=0) is excluded from this analysis. One major 
concern is that the accounting method for acquisition and the transaction costs will be 
reflected on the operating results of the transaction year. This makes any comparison with 
other years inappropriate. The other concern is about the potential partial results of mid-year 
acquisitions for target firms at the year of transaction. For example, if the completion date is 
in December, one-month partial data will be included to account for the financial 
performance of acquiring firms at the year of the acquisitions; results may then be 
misrepresented. This approach that excludes the data on the year of the acquisition is parallel 
to the method in the other operating performance research such as HPR (1992) and Linn and 
Swizer (2001). 
 
Following Ghosh’s (2001) critique of the industry-median benchmark in HPR (1992), 
a list of matched firms18 is selected based on size, industry and pre-performance. After the 
list of matched firms is set, the steps for calculating operating cash flows are repeated and 
then operating cash flow returns (OCFRMB; OCFRMT) for the pair of matched firms are 
determined. Since the pair of matched firms forms the benchmark, both post and 
pre-acquisition performances are also measured as the weighted-average of the operating 
cash flow returns (MATi, pre and MATi, post). 
 
The industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted operating cash flow return (ACFR) is 
the operating cash flow return of the merging firm minus that of the matched firm. After this, 
a decision is made concerning how best to measure the post operating performance. Similar 
to HPR (1992) and Linn and Switzer (2001), the median of ACFR three years19 before and 
after acquisition is used as a measure of pre (ACFRpre) and post (ACFRpost) operating 
performance. The median performance measures are employed in order to avoid the 
influence of extreme values (HPR 1992, Linn and Switzer 2001, Loughran and Ritter 1997) 
while Linn and Switzer (2001) execute a sensitivity check and report that the results are 
robust to the use of mean versus median measures.  
 
                                                 
18 The list of matched firms is shown in appendix A. 
19 This thesis noticed that HPR (1992/1997), Linn and Switzer (2001) and Rahman and Limmack 
(2004) look at median measures over 5 years pre and post. Ghosh (2001) and Powell and Stark 
(2005) examine the change between year t-1 and the median post performance over t+1 to t+3. 
Denis and Denis (1995) examine changes in performance based on the last year (t-1) prior to the 
event to each of the three years following the event. Therefore, this thesis further carried out the 
robustness test based on Denis and Denis (1995) approach to examine whether the results are still 
hold. The robustness results are reported in chapter eight: sensitivity analysis. 
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Furthermore, as discussed regarding the estimates for improvements in section 3.3.2.3 
of chapter three, HPR (1992) use a cross sectional regression model (called the intercept 
model by Ghosh (2001)), to estimate the abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow returns. They 
use the intercept (α) as a measure for examining the improvement (increase) in the 
operating cash flow after acquisitions. They basically believe that after controlling pre 
-performance, the intercept (α) is an independent measure that could properly reflect M&A 
improvements. Ghosh (2001) argues that if merging firms outperform their peers because of 
permanent factors, then the superior pre-performance will be incorporated into the post 
performance; the bias cannot be detected by simply controlling pre-performance in the 
intercept model. Therefore, Ghosh (2001) suggests that the change in cash flow return 
(∆ACFR) is a better estimate for examining the abnormal cash flow returns. The change in 
cash flow return (∆ACFR) is defined as ACFRpost minus ACFRpre.  
 
As it is hard to confirm that the pre-performance relative to the post performance is 
caused by permanent or temporary difference, most studies investigate both performance 
measures (Linn and Switzer 2001, Ghosh 2001, Carline, Linn and Yadav 2002, Powell and 
Stark 2005). While this thesis does attempt to avoid the related problems by developing 
benchmark firms based on pre-acquisition performance and firm size, these two performance 
measures (ACFRpost and ∆ACFR) are calculated for comparisons. The calculation process 
of these two operating performance measures is shown in figure 5.1, and the benchmark 
construction is discussed in the next section.  
 
Figure 5.1 Calculation Process of Operating Performance Measures 
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5.3.2 Construction of Performance Benchmark 
As discussed in chapter four, despite that the drawbacks of the accounting data are 
improved by adopting pre tax operating cash flow, the acquisition performance can still be 
misled due to the special economy or industry factors of merging firms. HPR (1992) use 
industry matched as a benchmark to mitigate the impact of firm-specific and industry factors. 
However, acquiring firms usually possess superior performance before acquisition and are 
generally larger than their benchmark sample firms (Ghosh 2001). Therefore, the 
pre-performance matching approach is employed in this thesis. To make these results 
comparable with previous studies, the matching procedure here remain consistent with the 
recommendations of Barber and Lyon (1996) and are similar to the techniques applied by 
Ghosh (2001) and Loughran and Ritter (1997). Benchmarks are constructed using the 
following initial criteria. Data sources are either from Thomson Financial Securities Data’s 
SDC Platinum TM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions database or from DataStream database. 
 
1. Same 2-digit primary SIC code. 
2. Similar size, measured as book value of assets within 70 and 130 percent one year 
before takeover.  
3. Similar pre-performance, measured as return on asset (ROA) within 90 and 110 
percent one year before takeover.  
4. Same nation code for the bidder and the target. 
 
From the list of potential matched firms, the firms with the closest ROA are selected. 
If there is no match, then the pre-performance restriction is extended by choosing a matched 
firm with ROA between 50 percent and 150 percent. If still no firm meets these restrictions 
then the limit of the same country is replaced by the requirement of the same legal origin and 
the pre-performance limit goes back to 90 to 110 percent, at least staying within 50 and 150 
percent. If the first run criteria are too strict to give a matched firm, then a second run is 
attempted with larger bands. That is, same 2-digit primary SIC code, book value of assets 
within 25 and 200 percent, ROA between 90 and 110 percent, and the same country. After 
the second run, there still a few cases cannot be matched at this point. This thesis therefore 
select the firm with the closest ROA within size band (25 and 200 percent), industry (2 digit 
SIC code) and same English origin countries. The construction processes of matched firms 




Figure 5.2 Construction Processes of Matched Firms 
 
In the end, 82.27 percent of matched bidders and matched targets are within the size 
band between 70 percent and 130 percent of book value assets one year before transaction. 
After extending the size criteria to 25 percent and 200 percent, all the matched firms meet 
the necessary requirements. Obviously, it is too strict to set the limit of pre-performance 
between 90 percent and 110 percent of return on assets (ROA) at the year before takeover. 
Only 36.52 percent of matched bidders and 43.97 percent of matched targets are obtained to 
meet this performance limit. Fortunately, when performance restrictions are extended to 50 
percent and 150 percent, around 87.52 percent matching for acquiring firms and 90.43 




A more detailed matrix is reported in panel C and D; this includes the additional 
country requirement. From this matrix it is clear that 33.30 percent of matched bidders and 
58.16 percent of matched targets have the same country code with their own matching firms, 
respectively. The other matched firms are selected with the same legal origins according to 
the classification of LLSV (1998). Finally, results are summarized in panel E based on figure 
5.2 as it depicts best to worst choice. It is obvious that while there are only 7.80 percent of 
marched bidders and 24.11 percent of matched targets classified as first choice matched 
firms, 74.11 percent matched bidders and 77.66 percent matched targets appear after the first 
run of the construction process. Moreover, after the second run process there is 87.52 percent 
matching for acquirers and 90.43 percent matching for targets.  
 
In addition, statistical analysis shows that the original operating cash flow data of both 
merging and matched firms have heavy tailed distributions. This thesis uses Huber’s 
M-estimator with k=1.28 to estimate the measure of location to detect outliers. In order to 
maintain sample size, this project applies the winsorizing approach which eliminates outliers 
by replacing (rather than discarding) them with the observed values. For merging firms, the 
average level of winsorizing is 15.7 percent for right tail and 9.9 for left tail. For matched 
firms, 17.9 percent for right tail and 10.1 for left tail were winsorized, on average. A 
robustness test is employed for the other estimators like 2σ-winsorized, 20 percent- 
winsorized, 2σ-trimmed, M-estimator with K=1.28- trimmed and 20 percent-trimmed. The 
process and results are reported as sensitivity analysis in chapter eight.  
 
 134
Table 5.3 Comparison of Merging Firms and Matched Firms 
This table presents summary results of comparison of matched firms to merging firms for bidders and targets, respectively. Size 
is measured by book value of assets one year before takeover. Pre-performance is measured by return on asset (ROA) one year 
before takeover. The relatedness is calculated as matched firms (MB, MT) divided by merging firms (B, T). Data sources are 
from Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions database or from DataStream 
database. 
0.5~0.9 0.9~1.1 1.1~1.5 closest Total %
0.25~0.7 6 11 9 10 36 12.77%
0.7~1.3 72 89 48 23 232 82.27%
1.3~2.0 3 3 3 5 14 4.96%
Total 81 103 60 38 282 100.00%
% 28.72% 36.52% 21.28% 13.48% 100.00%
0.5~0.9 0.9~1.1 1.1~1.5 closest Total %
0.25~0.7 12 8 8 9 37 13.12%
0.7~1.3 54 111 54 13 232 82.27%
1.3~2.0 2 5 1 5 13 4.61%
Total 68 124 63 27 282 100.00%
% 24.11% 43.97% 22.34% 9.57% 100.00%
0.5~0.9 0.9~1.1 1.1~1.5 closest Total %
Yes 0.25~0.7 3 3 2 4
(Same Country) 0.7~1.3 27 22 27 6
1.3~2.0 0 0 0 0 94 33.33%
No 0.25~0.7 3 8 7 6
(Same Origin) 0.7~1.3 45 67 21 17
1.3~2.0 3 3 3 5 188 66.67%
Total 81 103 60 38 282 100.00%
0.5~0.9 0.9~1.1 1.1~1.5 closest Total %
Yes 0.25~0.7 5 5 5 6
(Same Country) 0.7~1.3 32 68 31 7
1.3~2.0 2 0 1 2 164 58.16%
No 0.25~0.7 7 3 3 3
(Same Origin) 0.7~1.3 22 43 23 6
1.3~2.0 0 5 0 3 118 41.84%
Total 68 124 63 27 282 100.00%
Panel C  Metrix of Related size, pre-performance and country code for Bidders (B) and
Matched Bidders(MB)
Panel A   Metrix of Related size and pre-performance for Bidders (B) and Matched
Bidders (MB)
















Panel D   Metrix of Related size, pre-performance and country code for Targets (T)
and Matched Targets (MT)
 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
sub-total
(1st Run) 5th 6th 7th 8th
sub-total
(2ndRun) 9th Total
22 54 67 66 209 3 5 11 16 35 38 282
7.80% 19.15% 23.76% 23.40% 74.11% 1.06% 1.77% 3.90% 5.67% 12.41% 13.48% 100.00%
68 63 43 45 219 5 13 8 10 36 27 282
24.11% 22.34% 15.25% 15.96% 77.66% 1.77% 4.61% 2.84% 3.55% 12.77% 9.57% 100.00%
Matched
Targets (MT)






5.4 Independent Variables Description 
 
Independent variables are grouped into five categories: ownership variables as major 
independent variables; governance variables for individual corporate governance 
mechanisms; institutional variables for legal and extra-legal systems; typical transaction 
variables found in event studies; and country control variables.  
 
5.4.1 Ownership Variables (OWNi) 
This thesis focuses on the relationship between ownership of the controlling 
shareholders and acquiring performance. Because controlling shareholders are likely to 
separate their control rights from ownership by various control devices, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) suggest that a measure of control power should be 
based on voting rights instead of cash flow rights. Therefore, concentrated ownership is 
defined relying on the voting shares held by the large shareholders. Ownership variables 
include five dummy variables reflecting different thresholds of voting shares of the largest 
shareholder. There is also a continuous variable for the actual percent of voting shares held 
by the largest shareholder. The information is obtained from the description of substantial/ 
principal shareholders in each company’s proxy circular or annual report at the year prior to 
the deal. 
 
■ Concentrated Ownership at 10 percent threshold (CONCEN10) 
This dummy variable CONCEN10 is for companies having a large shareholder 
holding more than 10 percent of voting shares. The 10 percent level has been broadly used as 
a cut point for testing the difference between dispersed and concentrated ownership structure 
because it provides a significant threshold of votes (La Porta et al. 1998/99, Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang 2000, Faccio, Lang and Young 2001); most countries mandate disclosure 
at this level or lower.20 
 
■ Concentrated Ownership at 20 percent threshold (CONCEN20) 
The 20 percent level is another cutoff generally employed to define ownership 
concentration in extant research. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that 20 percent is generally 
                                                 
20 Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand require the disclosure of top 20 large and 
substantial shareholders. Canada requires the disclosure of information with respect to the large 
shareholders who beneficially own 10% or more of outstanding common shares whereas the UK 
and South African thresholds are 3% and 5%, respectively.  
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sufficient to effect control over a firm (Faccio et al. 2001). Claessens et al. (2000) examine 
the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 companies in nine East Asian countries. 
They find large differences across countries in the distribution of ultimate control at the 10 
percent level, but the differences across countries are much more widened at 20 percent. 
Moreover, most Anglo-Saxon GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) recognize 
this threshold as reflecting significant influence and requiring the use of the equity method to 
account for such stakes. Based on the above ideas, this thesis sets the second dummy 
variable CONCEN20 for companies having a large shareholder with more than 20 percent of 
voting shares.  
 
■ Concentrated Ownership at 50 percent threshold (CONCEN50) 
There is no theoretical research providing strong evidence regarding which cutoff 
points should be determined to define the ownership concentration. 50 percent cutoff levels 
are generally regarded as a legal threshold reflecting the stage that the large shareholder not 
only dominates but effectively controls the company (Davies, Hillier and McColgan 2005). 
Faccio and Lang (2002) define the controlling owner as the one who controls more than 50 
percent of voting shares. To investigate the influence of this specific group of controlling 
shareholders, this thesis introduces the third dummy variable CONCEN50 for companies 
having a large shareholder with more than 50 percent of voting shares.  
 
■ Voting shares between 10-20 & 20-50 percent (CONCEN1020 & CONCEN2050) 
In addition to setting cut points at 10, 20, and 50 percent of company shares, some 
particular ownership studies represent different thresholds for blocks. For example, 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) examine US companies and define a large shareholder as a 
single entity holding more than 15 percent of the outstanding shares of the corporation. Barth, 
Gulbrandsen and Schonea (2005) investigate the performance of Norwegian family firms 
basis on thresholds at 33 percents of the shares owned by one person or by one family. 
Faccio et al. (2001) find that investors are less likely to be alert to expropriation within 
corporations that are loosely affiliated to the groups whose control-links are between 10 to 
20 percent. In order to explore the effects of different levels of ownership, two dummy 
variables are used, COCEN1020 and CONCEN2050, in order to allow the creation of three 
ownership categories: between 10 and 20 percent, between 20 and 50 percent, and more than 




■ Voting shares of the largest shareholder (LSH1P, LSH1PSQ, LSH1PCUBE)  
A continuous variable LSH1P is used for acquiring the actual percent of voting shares 
held by the largest shareholder (from 10% or more). This variable is squared and cubed to 
capture the potential non-linear relationship between controlling ownership and acquiring 
performance. The introduction of a quadratic and cubic function simply allows the 
possibility of capturing one or two turning points. Authors attempting to capture such non 
linearity include Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988b), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and 
Anderson and Reeb (2003). 
 
5.4.2 Governance Variables (GOVi) 
Information concerning the following variables is obtained by recording the financial 
statements and notes in each company’s proxy or annual report. 
 
■ Separation from cash flow right to voting right (SEP) 
The separation problem can be measured in three ways: (1) a dummy variable equals 
to one when there is separation between ownership and control rights, zero otherwise 
(Ben-Amar and André 2006, Villalonga and Amit 2006); (2) the ratio of the degree of the 
deviation between ownership and control rights (O/C) (Faccio et al. 2001, Bigelli and 
Mengoli 2004, Ben-Amar and André 2006); and (3) the difference between the level of 
control rights with respect to ownership (C-O) (Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 2002, 
Ben-Amar and André 2006). In this thesis, Canadian firms usually have multiple voting 
shares carrying more than one vote per share; Australian and New Zealand companies 
separate the two rights by setting one vote for one person on a show of hands, one vote for 
one share upon a poll. In addition, a few companies in Canada, UK and South Africa 
separate ownership from control by constructing pyramid structures. Notice that different 
countries use different types of separation. This thesis does not provide evidence concerning 
the effects of individual control devices but does emphasize whether the existence of such 
control devices actually causes value reduction. Therefore, a dummy variable, SEP, is used: 
this is equal to one if an acquiring firm has a capital policy that enables its voting right to 
deviate from its cash flow right. 
 
■ Dominant shareholder involvement in CEO position (CEOLSH) 
Previous research discussing CEO positioning in concentrated firms puts a great deal 
of emphasis on the family CEO. Many studies define an actively managed family firm as one 
in which the CEO is a member of family (Smith and Amoako-Adu 1999, Anderson and Reeb 
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2003, Villalonga and Amit 2006). This study extends their arguments and sets a dummy 
variable CEOLSH equal to one when the CEO is the member or representative of any large 
shareholders, including family and non-family institutions that hold over 10 percent of the 
voting shares in certain acquiring firms.  
 
■ CEO is also the Chairman of the board (CEOdual) 
A third governance variable is set in order to test the effectiveness of separating the 
role of management and supervision. A dummy variable CEOdual is equal to one when the 
same individual holds the position of CEO and Chairman simultaneously. This dummy 
variable is also used, though quite broadly, in earlier research by individuals such as Rechner 
and Dalton (1991), Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997), and Vefeas and Theodorou (1998). 
 
■ Numbers of directors on the board (BSIZE)  
The board size is another issue relating to the board composition of a supervision 
mechanism. Conyon and Peck (1998) use the log of board size as a measure. This thesis, 
following the measure of Yermack (1996), applies the number of directors on the board as a 
continuous variable in order to explore the relationship between board size and acquisition 
performance.  
 
■ Ratio of Independent Directors (INDDIR) 
The definition of the independent director is inconsistent in earlier research. Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996) simply examine the percentage of non-employee directors on the board. 
Weisbach (1988) denotes outside directors by excluding the ‘grey’ directors who are not 
inside directors but who may still not be independent of the current management. However, 
there is no clear explanation concerning how to determine a ‘grey’ director in his study. 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) jointly refer to ‘grey’ directors as non-executive directors having a 
fiduciary relationship with the firm -- individuals such as management consultants, 
executives in financial institutions, and firm legal counsel. They view independent directors 
as those who have no relationship to the company, either as management or as substantial 
customers or supplier of goods or services. These definitions are followed by Vefeas and 
Theodorou (1998).  
 
Ben-Amar and André (2006) follow the Toronto Stock exchange (TSE) definition 
stating that the unrelated board member is a director who is not the manager of the firm or its 
subsidiaries, and who is not related to the controlling shareholder and does not have business 
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dealing with the firm. 
 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) exclusively categorize non-executive directors by the 
director’s primary occupation as (1) financial outsiders who are officers of any potential 
supplier of capital; (2) corporate outsiders who are officers or employees of other 
corporations; (3) and neutral outsiders who are outside directors including academics, 
lawyers in private practice, retired officers of other corporations or financial institutions, 
consultants, professional directors, retired or active government officials including military 
officers, employees of trade or non-profit organizations, religious leaders, representatives of 
ethnic or minority groups, public figures, and others (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990: p179).  
 
Referring to these prior empirical works, this thesis uses the fractions of independent 
directors on the board and defines the independent directors as non- executive directors 
excluding those having associations with the inside or outside large shareholders, company 
customers or suppliers, partners, and legal or management consultants. 
 
■ Other large shareholders (OTHLSH) 
With respect to the information advantage of other large shareholders, this thesis uses 
a dummy variable OTHLSH that is equal to one if the company has another owner who 
holds more than 10 percent of voting shares of firm. This variable is the same as those 
measures regressed in other papers (Faccio et al. 2001, Maury 2005). The large shareholders 
can be internal investors such as directors, executive and managers, or external stakeholders 
such as the other families, institutions or the government. 
 
5.4.3 Deal Variables (DEALi) 
To clearly identify the effects of ownership, governance, and institutional variables on 
acquisition performance in those multiple regressions of this thesis, it is necessary to control 
the other variables that have been well defined as deal characteristics having an impact on 
acquisition performance. Information on the following variables is either defined by or 
collected from Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC Platinum TM Worldwide Mergers & 
Acquisitions database. 
 
■ Target firms’ legal origin (TGORI_English) 
Recent developments in the field of cross border M&A transactions have led to a 
renewed interest in the quality of corporate governance in target countries (Bris and Cabolis 
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2002, Moeller and Schlingemann 2005). The variable usually used as a proxy is the legal 
origin classified by LLSV (1998): English, German, Scandinavian, and France. Confined by 
small observations, this thesis simply extends the concept of cross border21 to cross origin 
and sets a dummy variable TGORI_English which is equal to one if the target firm from 
English origin countries, otherwise zero (Rossi and Volpin 2004). 
 
■ Transaction Attitude (ATTI _Hostile) 
Cernat (2004) points out that there are relatively few deals in Europe belonging either 
to hostile takeovers or using defensive strategies. The statistics of this thesis confirm this 
(3.5% hostile in this thesis) but still retain transaction attitude as an important deal 
characteristic worthy of control. This control variable is measured with a dummy variable 
ATTI _Hostile which is equal to one when the management or boards of target firms are 
initially opposed to amalgamating the acquiring firm and the deals are classified as hostile 
transactions in Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC Platinum TM Worldwide Mergers & 
Acquisitions database. 
 
■ Types of Payment (PAY _Stock) 
In order to control the signaling effects of payment method, another dummy variable 
PAY_Stock is used for deal characteristics; this is equal to one if the payment methods is 
classified as ‘stock only’ in Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC Platinum TM 
Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions database. 
 
■ Transaction with Multiple Bidders (COMPETE) 
Whereas Franks and Harris (1989) partition multiple bids into revised or contested 
bids, most empirical work generally takes the presence of multiple bidders as proxy to 
measure whether acquirers do worse when they are involved in an open contest (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1990, Duggal and Millar 1999). This thesis also sets a dummy variable 
COMPETE which is equal to one if the bidders are more than one party.  
 
■ Relatedness of Business Industry (IND_rel) 
Existing research usually defines the relatedness of business according to the standard 
industrial classification (SIC) codes (Powell and Stark 2005). However, it is difficult to 
determine how strictly to define industry relatedness. Some studies define mergers between 
                                                 
21 The effects of cross border are further tested in chapter seven as additional analysis.  
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firms with a common activity at the two- digit or higher as related deals (Limmack and 
McGregor 1995, Moeller and Schlingemann 2005). Other studies term the acquisition related 
if the pair of firms share the same top three digits of their SIC code (Morck et al. 1990, 
Wright, Kroll, Lado and Van Ness 2002). Still others identify horizontal (related) mergers as 
those taking place between two companies in the same primary four-digit SIC industry (Linn 
and Switzer 2001, Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu and Zulehner 2003). A dummy variable for this 
characteristic is equal to one if the acquiring firms had an equivalent four-digit primary SIC 
code at the time of acquisition.22 
 
■ Shareholdings before Acquisition (TOEHOLD) 
With respect to 30 percent of toehold interests conveyed at purchasing advantage, 
Franks and Harris (1989) use this cut point to split deals into three categories: without 
threshold, with toehold below 30 percent, and with toehold above or equal to 30 percent. 
Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) use the real percentage of target shares held by the 
bidder as a testing variable. Considering that there are still many disagreements on the point 
of threshold to define toeholds, this thesis simply focuses on the presence of toehold and, 
thereby, sets another dummy variable, TOEHOLD, which is equal to one if an acquiring firm 
owns any shares of target before the actual bids.  
 
■ Bid Premium (PREM_1day)  
Previous research strongly proves that a higher bid premium brings about a negative 
acquiring performance (Healy, Palepu and Ruback 1997, Goergen and Renneboog 2004). 
This continuous variable presents the premium offer price to the target trading price one day 
prior to the original announcement date.23 
 
■ Relative Size of Deal (SIZE_rel) 
In most existing research, the relative size of target and bidder is measured by the 
relative market values of target and acquirer respectively (MVt/MVa). Asquith, Bruner and Jr 
Mullins (1983) calculate the ratio of market value of equity of the two pairs of merging firms. 
These market values were taken one day after the announcement in their research. Agrawal, 
Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) also use the market value of equity from both sides of the 
                                                 
22 This thesis also conducted the analysis using two and three-digit SIC codes to measure industry 
relatedness. Test and results are reported in chapter seven as additional analysis. 
23 This thesis also conducted the analysis using the premium of offer price to target trading price one 
week and four weeks prior to the original announcement date. Test and results are reported in 
chapter seven as additional analysis. 
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companies but their work is based on the six months before the public announcement day. 
Scanlon, Trifts and Pettway (1989) measure the same ratio at the year end before 
announcement day. Except for using the ratio of market value of equity, Becher and 
Campbell II (2003b) investigate the merger of equals based on the asset ratio where the ratio 
is defined as a target’s assets divided by the sum of the target and bidder firm assets.  
 
This thesis examines the effects of size relatedness by calculating a continuous 
variable which is the natural logarithm of MVa/MVt, where MVa and MVt are the market 
value of assets of acquiring and target firms, respectively. The market value of assets is the 
sum of the market value of equity and book value of net debt at the fiscal year end before the 
acquisition year. This market value of asset is also used to compute the operating cash flow 
return as a performance measure in HPR (1992).  
 
■ Acquirer’s Leverage (LEV)  
To test the debt monitoring hypothesis, prior research generally uses the debt equity 
ratio of acquiring firms as a form of measurement (Myers and Majluf 1984, Stulz, Walkling 
and Song 1990, Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell 1993). Linn and Switzer (2001) create a 
dummy variable which equals to one if the leverage of the bidders is greater than the median 
leverage for firms in the sample at the fiscal year end prior to the bid. They compute the 
leverage as the company’s book value of short and long-term debt divided (BVdebt) by the 
pseudo-asset value. The value of asset (MVasset) is calculated as a sum of the book value of 
debt, book value of preferred stock, and the market value of equity. The leverage variable is 
comparable with that in Linn and Switzer (2001) but is measured as a continuous variable. 
The bidder’s leverage is assessed as the natural logarithm of BVdebt/MVasset in this thesis. 
BVdebt and MVasset are the acquirer’s book value of debt and the market value of assets, 
respectively. Both of them are defined as in Linn and Switzer (2001).  
 
5.4.4 Institutional Variables (INSTIi) 
Data used to represent or compute the following variables is basically collected from 
LLSV (1998), Dyck and Zingales (2004), and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (DLLS, 2006). The summary statistics are shown in Table 5.4. 
 
■ Anti-director Right (ANTIDIR_high)  
Except for legal origin, the most widely recognized legal measure in recent studies is 
the score of the anti-director right provided by LLSV (1998) (Johnson, Boone, Breach and 
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Friedman 2000a, Nenova 2003, Esty and Megginson 2003). In particular, Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) use a dummy for high versus low shareholder rights, based on whether 
the anti-director rights variable in LLSV for that country is more than three which is the 
sample mean score of all sample countries. Similarly, a dummy variable ANTIDIR_high is 
established in this thesis to examine the difference among countries having the same legal 
origin. One if the acquiring firms is in countries having more than the median score of 
anti-director rights, otherwise it is zero. Based on the scores of anti-director right in LLSV 
(1998), the median score of the 11 countries is 4.0. Countries ranking above the median 
score are Canada, India, South Africa, and the UK.  
 
■ Enforcement (ENFORCE)  
After LLSV (1998), which proposes five individual measures for enforcement 
variables,24 several follow up practical studies now research the efficiency of these estimates. 
As yet, there is little agreement among them. Stulz and Williamson (2003) examine each of 
these five variables, Johnson et al. (2000a) adopt three of them to measure the enforceability 
of contracts: judicial efficiency, rule of law, and corruption. Following Johnson et al. (2000a), 
Shen and Chih (2005) use the mean score of these three legal variables. Nenova (2003) and 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) simply pick up the rule of law as a single measure for legal 
enforcement.  
 
Exclusively, Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (BRP, 2003) aggregate these five 
individual enforcement proxies into a single legality index, called the BRP index25. The 
validity of this simplification is formally tested in Berkowitz et al.’s (2003) study and the 
results are robust compared to several alternatives (e.g. Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton 1999). The BRP composite legality index is adopted for measuring legal 
enforcement by subsequent authors such as Esty and Megginson (2003). Considering that the 
high correlation will create a multicollinearity problem if the five LLSV enforcement 
variables are all regressed on performance, this thesis consistently uses the BRP single 
legality index as an enforcement continuous variable (ENFORCE) 26 which ranges from the 
                                                 
24 Five enforcement measures in LLSV (1998): efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, corruption, 
risk of expropriation, and risk of contract repudiation. Descriptions are shown in chapter two, 
section 2.5.2.1. 
25 Legality index= 0.381*efficiency of judicial + 0.578* rule of law + 0.503*corruption + 0.347* risk 
of expropriation + 0.384*risk of contract repudiation.  
26 This thesis also tests the average of three LLSV legal variables as an alternative enforcement 
measure, like Shen and Chih (2005) did. The correlation between this proxy and BRP index is 
0.951 and the regression results are robust. Test and Results are reported in appendix B. 
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lowest score of 12.94 for Thailand to the highest score of 21.55 for New Zealand.  
 
■ Accounting Standard (ACCTSTD)  
Consistent with the previous research (e.g. Johnson et al. 2000a, Stulz and Williamson 
2003, Haw and Hu 2004, and Dyck and Zingales 2004), this thesis uses the rating of 
accounting standards reported in LLSV (1998) as an estimate of the quality of accounting 
standards. This continuous variable ACCTSTD ranges from the lowest level of 57 for India 
to the highest level of 78 for Singapore and the UK. However, the results may be restricted 
by information that fails to consider the future convergence in the LLSV (1998) study. 
Besides, the original data from Ireland in LLSV (1998) is not available. Missing values are 
replaced by the mean of sample countries. The processes of dealing missing data are 
explained in chapter six, section 6.3. 
 
■ Extra-legal systems (XLEG_high)  
To discover the function of extra-legal systems, some empirical research has 
attempted to suggest certain estimates (e.g. Coffee 2001 for violent crime rate, Stulz and 
Williamson 2003 for religion). To date, however, there are no controlled studies that prove a 
strong measure for extra-legal characteristics. Dyck and Zinglales (2000/2004) explore six 
proxies27 as extra-legal institutions to restrain the possibility of expropriation. Unfortunately, 
they only provide data for 39 countries. Moreover, too many figures are missing in these five 
proxies, especially when it comes to labor protection and the acceptability of cheating on tax. 
Haw and Hu (2004) apply only three variables in their study: competition law, news 
circulation pop, and tax compliance.  
 
Following the variables of Dyck and Zinglales (2004) but considering that these 
variables are highly correlated, this thesis establishes an extra-legal single variable by three 
steps: (1) ranking each variable (excluding labor protection and the acceptability of cheating 
on taxes due to the seriously incomplete data); (2) adding the rank score to get an aggregate 
extra-legal index28 for each country; (3) using the median of aggregate extra-legal index to 
set a high final dummy variable XLEG. The dummy is equal to one when an acquiring firm 
is in a country with a median ranking above (20) the aggregate extra-legal index derived 
                                                 
27 Dyck and Zingales (2004) present statistics of six extra-legal proxies including competition law, 
news circulation pop, serious crime rate, labor protection measures, tax compliance and 
acceptability of cheating on taxes. Descriptions are shown in chapter two, section 2.5.2.2. 
28 The ranges for the aggregate extra-legal index are from the lowest rank of 6 for South Africa to the 
highest rank of 30 for Singapore. 
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from the sample. Here, countries defined as having high extra-legal institutions are Australia, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK. Similarly, missing value for India and 
Ireland is replaced by the mean of sample countries to follow the above steps. The processes 
of dealing missing data are explained in chapter six, section 6.3.  
 
■ Anti-self Dealing index (ANTISDI)  
DLLS (2006) create a new investor protection metric in their recent paper: the 
anti-self dealing measure which focuses on private enforcement mechanisms. So far, there 
exists no empirical study that uses this new measure to examine the legal protection of 
minority shareholders against expropriation. This thesis uses the anti-self dealing index in 
DLLS (2006) as a continuous variable ANTISDI that ranges from the lowest score of 0.55 
for India to the highest score of 1.0 for Singapore. 
 
■ Public Enforcement (PUBENFORCE_high)  
Another new investor protection metric in DLLS (2006) is the public enforcement 
mechanisms. They give one quarter point when each sanction29 happens and add these four 
dummy variables to form the index of public enforcement, ranging from 0 to 1. Once again, 
a high verses low dummy variable (PUBENFORCE_high) is employed; this equals to one if 
an acquiring firm is in a country scoring above the median point (0.5) of the public 
enforcement index. High public enforcement countries include Canada, Israel, Malaysia and 
Singapore.  
  
■ Revised Anti- Director Right (NANTIDIR_high)  
Along with the above two new measures, DLLS (2006) further revises the initial 
anti-director right index which was reported in LLSV (1998). Adopting these revised 
statistics, this thesis sets another dummy variable NANTIDIR_high for the new measure. 
The dummy is denoted to one when an acquiring firm is in a country scoring above the 
median (4) of a new anti-director right. Countries in the high range include India, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Africa, and the UK.   
 
                                                 
29 Four sanctions is available as described in chapter two: fines for the approving body, jail sentences 
for the approving body, fines for the controlling shareholder, and jail for the controlling 
shareholder. 
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5.4.5 Country Variables (Countryi) 
Beyond controlling for all this ownership as well as for governance and for deal and 
legal characteristics, this thesis attempts to extract country-fixed effects from firm-level 
regressions. The country fixed-effects specification is broadly applied in cross-country 
analysis such as that in Dyck and Zingales (2004), Mitton (2002), and Maury (2005). 
Similarly, this thesis includes three country-specific omitted variables for three major 
countries in order to control for country fixed effects. The first variable is the UK dummy, 
defined as an acquiring firm from the United Kingdom. The second is the CAN dummy, 
defined as an acquiring firm from Canada. The last is the AUS dummy, defined as an 
acquiring firm is an Australian firm. The definition of the variables in this thesis is described 
in the following section and is summarized in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.4 Institutional Variables 















Australia 4 10 10 8.52 9.27 8.71 20.44 75 30 0.79 0.50 4
Canada 5 9.25 10 10 9.67 8.96 21.13 74 16 0.65 1.00 4
India 5 8 4.17 4.58 7.75 6.11 12.80 57 19 0.55 0.50 5
Ireland-Rep 4 8.75 7.8 8.52 9.67 8.96 18.92 71^ 19 0.79 0.00 4
Israel 3 10 4.82 8.33 8.25 7.54 16.54 64 20 0.71 1.00 4
Malaysia 4 9 6.78 7.38 7.95 7.43 16.67 76 21 0.95 1.00 5
New Zealand 4 10 10 10 9.69 9.29 21.55 70 30 0.95 0.00 4
Singapore 4 10 8.57 8.22 9.3 8.86 19.53 78 33 1.00 1.00 5
South Africa 5 6 4.42 8.92 6.88 7.27 14.51 70 6 0.81 0.00 5
Thailand 2 3.25 6.25 5.18 7.42 7.57 12.94 64 10 0.85 0.00 4
United Kingdom 5 10 8.57 9.1 9.71 9.63 20.41 78 30 0.93 0.00 5
mean 4 8.57 7.40 8.07 8.69 8.21 17.77 70.60 21 0.82 0.5 4
median 4 9.25 7.8 8.52 9.27 8.71 18.92 72.00 20 0.81 0.5 4
country missing None None None None None None None Ireland India None None None
Ireland
^ missing value is replaced by the mean of sample countries


























Table 5.4 (Continued) 
Country Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank
Australia 5.52 8 3.00 8 57.5 7 4.58 7 30
Canada 5.37 6 1.60 4 122.3 2 3.77 4 16
India 5.21^ 5 2.08^ 5 85.86^ 4 4.1^ 5 19
Ireland-Rep 5.21^ 5 2.08^ 5 85.86^ 4 4.1^ 5 19
Israel 5.11 4 2.90 7 68.9 6 3.69 3 20
Malaysia 4.84 2 1.60 3 34.5 10 4.34 6 21
New Zealand 5.40 7 2.20 6 52.3 8 5.00 9 30
Singapore 5.21 5 3.20 9 45.2 9 5.05 10 33
South Africa 4.89 3 0.34 1 225.2 1 2.40 1 6
Thailand 4.77 1 0.60 2 70.4 5 3.41 2 10
United Kingdom 5.74 9 3.30 10 96.4 3 4.67 8 30
mean 5.21 2.08 85.86 4.10
median 5.21 2.20 68.90 4.34





















ACCTSTD 0.116* 0.690*** 1.000
XLEG_high -0.075 0.256*** 0.662*** 1.000
ANTISDI -0.006 0.065 0.673*** 0.874*** 1.000
PUBENFORCE_high 0.135** 0.310*** -0.241*** -0.727*** -0.748*** 1.000
NANTIDIR_high 0.415*** -0.289*** 0.338*** 0.645*** 0.794*** -0.676*** 1.000
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 5.4 (Continued)
Panel C   Correlation Matrix
Panel B   Extra Legal Institutions: Aggregate Index
Competition Law Public Opinion Pressure Serious Crime Tax Compliance Aggregate
Rank Index
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Table 5.5 Variable Definitions 
Definition
One if a shareholder owns more than 10% of voting shares of the acquiring firm.
One if a shareholder owns more than 20% of voting shares of the acquiring firm.
One if a shareholder owns more than 50% of voting shares of the acquiring firm.
One if a shareholder owns 10% and 20% of voting shares in the acquiring firm.
One if a shareholder owns 20% and 50% of voting shares in the acquiring firm.
The percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder.
The square of the percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder.
The cube of the percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder.
SEP One if there exists separation of ownership and cash flow rights in the acquiring firm.
CEOLSH One if CEO is related to the largest shareholder.
CEOdual One if CEO and COB positions are held by the same individual.
BSIZE Numbers of directors on the board.
INDDIR The fractions of independent directors on the board.
OTHLSH One if there is another shareholder with at least 10% ofthe voting shares of the acquiringfirms.
TGORI_English One if the legal origin of target firm is English.
ATTI_Hostile One if the management or board of target firm were initially opposed to the deal.
PAY_Stock One if the payment method of transaction was stock only.
COMPETE One if the acquiring firm had to compete with other possible acquirers.
IND_rel One if the acquiring and target firms had equivalent 4-digit primary SIC code.
TOEHOLD One if acquiring firm owns any target shares before transaction.
PREM_1day Premium of offer price to target trading price 1 day prior to the announcement date.
SIZE_rel Natural logarithm of the acquiring firm’s market value of assets divided by target firm’smarket value of asset at the fiscal year end before the acquisition year.
LEV Natural logarithm of the acquiring firm’s leverage (book value of debts divided by marketvalue of assets) at the fiscal year end before the acquisition year.
ANTIDIR_high One if the acquiring firms are in countries with above the median score (4) of anti-directorrights (LLSV 1998).
ENFORCE BRP legality index, a summary statistics from LLSV (1998) analysis on legal enforcements.
ACCTSTD The rating of accounting standards (LLSV 1998).
XLEG_high One if the acquiring firms are in countries with above the median score (19) of aggregateextra legal index (Dyck and Zingales 2004).
ANTISDI Anti-self-dealing Index (DLLS 2006).
PUBENFORCE_high One if the acquiring firms are in countries with above the media points (0.5) of publicenforcement index  (DLLS 2006).
NANTIDIR_high One if the acquiring firm is in a country with above the median score (4) of new anti-directorindex (DLLS 2006).
UK One if  the nation of an acquiring firm is the United Kingdom.
CAN One if the nation of an acquiring firm is Canada.






























































5.5 Empirical Models 
 
5.5.1 Ownership Concentration Models 
In order to test the major hypotheses at the first stage concerning ownership 
concentration, two operating performance measures (ACFRpost and ∆ACFR) are regressed 
against different level and types of ownership concentration variables (CONCEN10, 
CONCEN20, CONCEN1020, CONCEN2050, CONCEN50, LSH1, LSH1SQ, LSH1CUBE, 
and FAM). To explicitly investigate the effects of ownership structure on acquisition 
performance, other variables are also controlled: these include governance and transaction 
variables as introduced in prior chapters. Therefore, at the first stage of the research scheme, 
the eight principal models to be tested are as follows: Model 1 is for dispersed ownership 
versus concentrated ownership at 10% threshold; Model 2 is for dispersed ownership versus 
concentrated ownership at 20% threshold; Model 3 and 4 set middle points to investigate the 
impact of different level of concentrated ownership; Model 5 is for linear relationship; 
Model 6 is for square relationship; model 7 is for cube relationship. Formally: 
 
Model 1a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1 CONCEN10＋β2i GOVi＋β3i DEALi＋β4i ACFRpre＋εj 
Model 1b: ∆ACFR= β0＋β1 CONCEN10＋β2i GOVi＋β3i DEALi＋ε 
 
Model 2a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1 CONCEN20＋β2i GOVi＋β3i DEALi＋ACFRpre＋εj 
Model 2b: ∆ACFR = β0＋β1 CONCEN20＋β2i GOVi＋β3i DEALi＋ε 
 
Model 3a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1 CONCEN1020＋β2 CONCEN20＋β3i GOVi＋β4i DEALi 
                       ＋β5i ACFRpre＋εj 
Model 3b: ∆ACFR = β0＋β1 CONCEN1020＋β2 CONCEN20＋β3i GOVi＋β4i DEALi＋εj 
 
Model 4a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1CONCEN1020＋β2CONCEN2050＋β3CONCEN50 
＋β4i GOVi＋β5i DEALi＋β6i ACFRpre＋εj 
Model 4b: ∆ACFR = β0＋β1CONCEN1020＋β2CONCEN2050＋β3CONCEN50 




Model 5a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1 LSH1P＋β2i GOVi＋β3i DEALi＋β4i ACFRpre＋εj 
Model 5b: ∆ACFR = β0＋β1 LSH1P＋β2i GOVi＋β3i DEALi＋εj 
 
Model 6a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1 LSH1P＋β2 LSH1PSQ＋β3iGOVi＋β4i DEALi 
＋β5i ACFRpre＋εj 
Model 6b: ∆ACFR = β0＋β1 LSH1P＋β2 LSH1PSQ＋β3iGOVi＋β4i DEALi＋εj 
 
Model 7a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1 LSH1P＋β2 LSH1PSQ＋β3LSH1PCUBE＋β4i GOVi 
                   ＋β5i DEALi＋β6i ACFRpre＋εj 
Model 7b: ∆ACFR = β0＋β1 LSH1P＋β2 LSH1PSQ＋β3LSH1PCUBE＋β4i GOVi 
                 ＋β5i DEALi＋εj 
where: εj is denoted as the error term, the exact definition of all variables are described in 
section 5.4 and summarized in table 5.5. 
 
To test the association between operating acquisition performance and the voting 
shares of the largest shareholders, models 6 and 7 are formed into the square and cube 
equations. These two models are parallel to the recognition of the non-linear relationship of 
Morck et al. (1988b), McConnel and Severaes (1990) and Anderson and Reeb (2003), thus 
allowing the coefficients on the ownership variables to estimate one or two optimal 
inflection points. Completing the regression with the control variables as modeled above, the 
expected sign can be obtained as follows. To simplify the notation, let y be the dependent 
variables (ACFRpost / ∆ACFR) and x be the ownership variables (LSH1P). The equation for 
model 6 is quadratic:  
y=β0＋β1 x＋β2 x2         (1) 




∂ =0, and 





=β1＋2β2 x =0         (2) 
1
22
x β β= −
       (3) 
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The equation for model 7 is cubic. Similar concepts are used in model 6 to obtain two 
turning points which then help determine convergence-of-interest and expropriation effects 
at the level of ownership.  
y=β0＋β1 x＋β2 x2 ＋β3 x3             (4) 




∂ =0, and solving for two inflection points x1 





=β1＋2β2 x＋3β3 x2 =0        (5) 
2







β β β β
β
− ± −
=   (6) 
x1 is denoted to be the first turning point where performance starts to 
increase/decrease with the level of concentration and a second turning point at x2 where 
performance reverses.  
 
Additionally, by assuming that the intercept (β0) represents the average performance 
of widely held firms, the intersection points can be estimated to compare the performance of 
concentrated firms and dispersed firms. Take the cubic curve as an example, assuming y=β0, 
     
y= β0＋β1 x＋β2 x2＋β3 x3 =β0      (7) 
β1 x＋β2 x2＋β3 x3 =0    (8) 
β1＋β2 x＋β3 x2 =0    (9) 
Solving for two intersection points x3 and x4 (x3, x4): 
2







β β β β
β
− ± −
=  (10) 
This further analysis can show that the acquisition performance of acquiring firms 
with majority shareholders is below/ above the average performance of the widely-held firms 
(the intercept, β0) until x3 and then remains above/below up to the ownership concentrated at 




5.5.2 Institution Mechanisms Model 
After building the seven empirical models regarding ownership concentration, another 
two empirical models are set for testing major hypotheses as the second stage research 
scheme regarding the effects of legal and extra-legal institutions. One of the seven ownership 
models with more representativeness is selected to be the benchmark model and the second 
generation governance mechanisms are further incorporated into the multiple regressions. 
The second generation governance mechanisms are separated into two groups as described in 
the research design of chapter four, section 4.2. The first group variables include both legal 
and extra-legal measures (ANTIDIR_high, ENFORCE, ACCTSTD and XLEG_high) as 
proposed by LLSV (1998) and Dyck and Zinglales (2004). The second group variables 
comprise newer legal system measures (ANTISDI, PUBENFORCE_high and 
NANTIDIR_high) as suggested by DLLS (2006). Moreover, considering the likelihood of 
the country effect, three dummy variables are set to control three major countries: the UK, 
CAN and AUS. In the end, two complete models are built in the second research scheme. 
Formally: 
 
Model 8a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1i OWNi＋β2i GOVi＋β3i DEALi ＋β4ANTIDIR_hgih 
                           ＋β5ENFORCE＋β6 ACCTSTD＋β7XLEG_high＋β8i Countryi 
            ＋β9i ACFRpre＋εj                     
Model 8b: ∆ACFR = β0＋β1i OWNi＋β2i GOVi＋β3i DEALi＋β4ANTIDIR_hgih    
            ＋β5ENFORCE＋β6 ACCTSTD＋β7XLEG_high＋β8i Countryi＋εj 
                     
Model 9a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1iOWNi＋β2iGOVβ1＋β3iDEALi＋β4ANTISDI 
             ＋β5 PUBENFORCE_high＋β6 NANTIDIR_high＋β7i Countryi 
 ＋β8i ACFRpre＋εj 
Model 9b: ∆ACFR = β0＋β1iOWNi＋β2iGOVβ1＋β3iDEALi＋β4ANTISDI 
           ＋β5 PUBENFORCE_high＋β6 NANTIDIR_high＋β7i Countryi＋εj 
where: εj is denoted as the error term, the definition of all variables are described in section 
5.4 and summarized in table 5.5. 
 
It was detected that, in model 9, the explanatory variables ENFORCE, ACCTSTD and 
XLEG_high are highly correlated with one another (see table 5.4, panel C). To mitigate the 
multi-collinearity problems and to estimate the stability of regression coefficient, a reduced 
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model 8.1 is constructed by excluding ACCOUNT and ENFORCE and by leaving 
ANTIDIR_high and XLEG_high in the model as measures of legal and extra-legal systems, 
respectively.  
 
Model 8.1a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1i OWNi＋β2i GOVi＋β3i DEALi＋β4ANTIDIR_hgih 
               ＋β5XLEG_high＋β6iCountryi＋β7i ACFRpre＋εj 
Model 8.1b: ∆ACFR = β0＋β1i OWNi＋β2i GOVi＋β3i DEALi＋β4ANTIDIR_hgih 
             ＋β5XLEG_high＋β6iCountryi＋εj 
where: εj is denoted as the error term, the definition of all variables are described in section 
5.4 and summarized in table 5.5. 
 
Similarly, there are strong correlations in model 9 among the institutional variables 
ANTISDI, PUBENFORCE_high and NANTIDIR_high (table 5.4 panel C). Also, in the 
DLLS (2006) conclusion, public enforcement has significant negative effects. They explain 
that this unexpected sign is caused by concealed transactions in most cases even under 
countries with criminal sanctions. Considering that this index generates much controversy as 
discussed in section 2.5.2.3 of chapter two, the PUBENFORCE_high variable is eliminated 
to form a reduced model 9.1 as follows. Regression results for all above models are reported 
in the next chapter. 
 
Model 9.1a: ACFRpost = β0＋β1iOWNi＋β2iGOVβ1＋β3iDEALi＋β4ANTISDI 
               ＋β5 NANTIDIR_high＋β6iCountryi＋β7i ACFRpre＋εj  
Model 9.1b: ∆ACFR = β0＋β1iOWNi＋β2iGOVβ1＋β3iDEALi＋β4ANTISDI 
             ＋β5 NANTIDIR_high＋β6iCountryi＋εj  
where: εj is denoted as the error term, the definition of all variables are described in section 
5.4 and summarized in table 5.5. 
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Chapter Six 




This chapter reports the results of the empirical cross-sectional regression models 
which are presented in chapter five. First of all, section 6.2 describes the two measures of 
operating cash flow returns. Secondly, section 6.3 provides the descriptive statistics and 
correlation of the model variables. Third, section 6.4 states the outcomes from univariate 
analysis. Fourth, section 6.5 presents the results of multiple regressions for testing the 




6.2 Operating Cash Flows Returns 
 
■ Pre Performance 
Table 6.1 presents the operating cash flow returns (pre, post, and change) for the 
merging and matched firms and the industry, size, and pre performance adjusted operating 
cash flow return. The results in panel A report a median (mean) operating cash flow return 
for merging firms (MEGi) in the three years before acquisition ranging from 11.22 percent 
(11.35%) for year t-1 to 12.57 percent (13.09%) for year t-3. The median (mean) 
pre-acquisition operating cash flow return for matched firms (MATi) is from 12.85 percent 
(13.46%) for year t-1 to 14.21 percent (14.38%) for year t-3. And then the median and mean 
measure of industry, size, and pre performance adjusted return is calculated and tested 
(ACFRi = MEGi -MATi). The mean measures are tested by One-Sample t test30 and the 
median measures are tested by Wilcoxon Signed Ranks31 test of nonparametric method. The 
median (mean) measure for pre-acquisition year t-3, t-2, and t-1 is -0.91 percent (-1.29%), 
-0.70 percent (-1.57%), and -1.37 percent (-2.11%), respectively. All the above measures are 
                                                 
30 The One-Sample t test tests whether the mean of a single variable differs from a specified constant 
(SPSS). This thesis tests difference from zero. 
31 The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test is designed to test a hypothesis about the median of a population 
distribution. It often involves the use of matched pairs in which case it tests for a median difference 
of zero (Easton and McColl 1997). 
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statistically different from zero. The median adjusted return over three pre-acquisition years 
(ACFRpre) is -0.70 percent and statistically different from zero. Similar conclusions are 
drawn from the measurement of mean operating performance (-1.51%). 
 
■ Post Performance 
Panel A also presents a median (mean) operating cash flow return for merging firms 
(MEGi) in the three years after acquisition ranging from 11.06 percent (11.41%) for year t+1 
to 12.47 percent (12.87%) for year t+3. The median (mean) post-acquisition operating cash 
flow return for matched firms (MATi) is from 10.52 percent (10.88%) for year t+1 to 12.15 
percent (12.71%) for year t+3. The median (mean) measure for post-acquisition year +1, +2, 
and +3 is +0.23 percent (+0.53%), +0.54 percent (+0.20%), and +0.17 percent (+0.16%), 
respectively. As is apparent, the median and mean measures of adjusted returns in each of the 
three post-acquisition years are insignificant. The median adjusted return over 
post-acquisition years (ACFRpost) is 0.59 percent and the mean is 0.31 percent. Both are 
insignificant. Although these results are indistinguishable from zero, all of them are positive. 
Additionally, the mean measures (0.53% to 0.16%) and the percentage of sample firms with 
positive adjusted returns (54.61% to 50.18%) concurrently decrease from t +1 to t +3.  
 
Comparing the results in Linn and Switzer (2001) and Powell and Stark (2005), the 
median adjusted return over post-merger periods is 2.84 percent and 1.55 percent with no 
significance, respectively. While the sample firms have lower post performance, the sign is 
consistent. Ghosh (2001) has particular results. He presents significantly positive mean 
adjusted returns but insignificant median adjusted returns in each and over post-acquisition 
years (2.55% mean and 1.16% median over three years). Using industry performance as a 
benchmark, Healy, Palepu and Ruback (HPR, 1992) reports a significantly positive median 
measure (2.8%) over five years industry adjusted cash flow returns after acquisitions.    
 
■ Performance Improvement (Abnormal Returns) 
(i) The change model 
With respect to the Ghosh (2001) suggestion, the change in operating cash flow 
returns (∆ACFR) is computed in order to measure the abnormal adjusted returns of M&A 
activities. The median and the mean measure of ∆ACFR are 1.73 percent and 1.82 percent, 
respectively. Both are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. On average, acquiring 
firms in the sample have acquisition-related improvements in the post-acquisition periods. 
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These results are comparable to those in Linn and Switzer (2001) who also find significant 
results in median (1.81%) and mean (2.20%) abnormally adjusted cash flow returns 
(∆ACFR).  
 
However, the results differ from Ghosh’s (2001) findings. Based on industry, size, and 
pre performance benchmarks, he determines positive but insignificant median (0.26%) and 
mean (1.25%) abnormal adjusted returns. This result is further supported by Powell and 
Stark (2005). They find 0.92 percent abnormal adjusted returns without significance. Note 
that in these two papers the pre-acquisition performance is used to calculate the ∆ACFR as it 
is specifically represented by the one year before the transaction (year -1); this is because the 
size and performance used to select matched firms is also done as of year t-1. As outliers can 
easily bias the one-year performance, this thesis calculates the ∆ACFR benchmark by the pre 
median of adjusted cash flow returns over year t-3 to t-132 (HPR 1992/ 1997, Linn and 
Switzer 2001). 
 
(ii) The Intercept Model 
The other measure used to determine the performance improvement is by HPR (1992) 
intercept model. Table 6.1 panel B presents the regression results of the three-year 
post-acquisition median adjusted returns (ACFRpost) on the three-year pre-acquisition 
median adjusted returns (ACFRpre). The intercept α (1.1%) is positive and significant at the 
1 percent level, which indicates that average adjusted operating performance has a 
significant improvement of 1.1 percent in the post-acquisition period after controlling for the 
effects of pre performance. The slope coefficient β (53.7%) is also positive and statistically 
different from zero. This captures the correlation in operating cash flow between the pre- and 
post-acquisition years as a 53.7 percent positive effect per year -- average adjusted cash flow 
returns tend to persist over time.  
 
Comparing the numbers to those in prior studies, HPR (1992) finds that average 
post-merger performance reflects significant improvement (α=2.8%). Ghosh (2001) conducts 
a test that is similar to the one conducted by HPR and proves that merging firms may 
                                                 
32 However, this thesis does sensitivity tests for ∆ACFR by various windows ([-1,+1], [-1,+2], 
[-1,+3]) applying similar approach as that used in Denis and Denis (1995). Results are qualitatively 
similar to the change in pre and post three-year median adjusted performance. This thesis also ran 
the regressions for benchmark model (model 7) and reduced models (model 8.1 and 9.1) using 
these alternative measures. Results where again are qualitatively similar. The detailed reports are 
discussed in section 8.3 of chapter eight as sensitivity analysis.  
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outperform industry-median firms over pre- and post-acquisition years. He also proves that 
there are significant abnormal returns created from M&A (α=2.4%) accounting for increase 
in industry-adjusted cash flow. Powell and Stark (2005) support Ghosh’s (2001) point on the 
basis of an industry-median benchmark. But if on the basis of an industry, size, and pre 
performance benchmark, they do find significant improvement for merging firms (α=1.6%) 
as this thesis does.  
 
Summarily, results in table 6.1 demonstrate that merging firms in the sample 
significantly underperform as compared to the benchmark firms before M&A; the post 
adjusted return is not statistically distinguishable from zero but the measures of change in 
adjusted returns are significant at the 1 percent level when combining the significantly poor 
pre performance and positive post performance. The intercept model further proves 
significant improvements surrounding the acquisition. While results in prior literature are 
still mixed and the findings of this thesis is not completely comparable, an agreement 
indicating that operating performance of merging firms improves after M&A events and the 
improvements are not due to a continuation of superior pre performance. 
 
Table 6.1 Operating Cash Flows Returns 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Operating cash flow return (OCFR) is calculated as operating cash flow divided by market 
value of asset. Operating cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation. Post-acquisition performance for each 
deal is measured by the operating cash flow return of the surviving acquirer after transaction. Pre-acquisition performance is 
calculated as a weighted-average of the operating cash flow return for the bidder and the target included (MEGi pre and post). 
The weights are based on the market values of assets of both companies in the year before acquisition. Post- and pre-acquisition 
performances of the matched firms are measured as weighted-average of the operating cash flow rates (MATi pre and post). 
Industry, Size, and Pre performance Adjusted Operating Cash Flow Rates (ACFR) is operating cash flow rates of merged firms 
minus those of matched firms. The change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow rate ( ACFR) is defined as △
3-year median ACFRpost minus 3 year-median ACFRpre. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, * significance at the 10% level. 
Panel A   Operating Cash Flows
N Mean% Median% N Mean% Median% N Mean% Median% Positive
-3 194 13.09 12.57 194 14.38 14.21 194 -1.29 ** -0.91 ** 43.81%
-2 260 12.27 11.91 260 13.84 13.32 260 -1.57 *** -0.70 *** 47.31%
-1 282 11.35 11.22 282 13.46 12.85 282 -2.11 *** -1.37 *** 39.01%
1 282 11.41 11.06 282 10.88 10.52 282 0.53 0.23 54.61%
2 280 11.81 11.72 280 11.61 11.12 280 0.20 0.54 52.14%
3 279 12.87 12.47 279 12.71 12.15 279 0.16 0.17 50.18%
ACFRpre: Median for years (-3 to -1) 282 -1.51 *** -0.70 *** 43.26%
ACFRpost: Median for years (+1 to +3) 282 0.31 0.59 53.19%
△ACFR: change in operating cash flow rate (ACFRpost -ACFRpre) 282 1.82 *** 1.73 *** 60.99%
Panel B   Regression of ACFRpost on ACFRpre





Mergering Firms (MEGi ) Matched Firms (MATi ) Industry, Size, and Pre-performance Adjusted(MEGi -MATi )
 
 159
6.3 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 6.2 displays summary statistics for all variables in the full sample along with a 
breakdown of three major countries (Australia, Canada, and the UK). When comparing 
adjusted operating cash flows returns across countries, it becomes clear that Canadian firms 
have the best mean/median pre performance (-0.24% / 0.42%) and post-performance (0.73% 
/ 1.18%) (i.e., performance was not statistically different from matched firms). Sample firms 
from other English origin countries, however, experience the poorest average mean/ median 
pre-merger adjusted performance (-2.78% / -1.48%) in the post-merger period (1.1% / 
0.14%), thus leading them to experience greater improvements in the change of adjusted 
operating cash flow returns (3.88% / 4.43%). All statistics for ACFRpre and △ACFR for 
AUS, UK and other countries are significantly different from zero and consistent with the 
results of the total sample. 
 
For ownership variables, it is evident that concentrated ownership at the 10 percent 
threshold is dominant in the total sample (71% in Australia, 64% in Canada, 51% in the UK, 
74% for ‘others’ and 60% for total sample). There are only 16 firms out of 141 (11%) with a 
20 percent or more large shareholder in the UK. This is the case in 38 percent of the 
Australian sample, in 53 percent of cases in Canada, in 52 percent of cases in ‘others’ and in 
31 percent of cases in the total sample. Canada has the largest number of controlling large 
shareholders (28% of firms have a shareholder with over 50 percent of voting shares) 
followed by the other English origin countries (21%); there is only one case in the UK and 
there is zero in Australia. The median voting shares of the largest shareholder is 10% in 
the UK (below overall sample median of 11%), 14% in Australia, 27% in Canada, and 24% 
in other English origin countries. By comparison, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(1999), use a 10 percent cut off and when looking at medium-sized firms find concentrated 
ownership in 90% of cases in Australia, 90% in the UK, 60% in Canada, and 82.5% on 
average in ‘others’. At a 20% cut off, they find 70% concentration in Australia, 40% in the 
UK and Canada, and 57% on average for ‘others’.  
 
For governance variables, the separation of voting and cash flow rights is present in 
17% of the sample but is most common in Australia (63%) and Canada (33%) rather than in 
the UK (4%) or in ‘others’ (5%). CEOs are linked to controlling shareholders in 14% of 
cases but are most prevalent in Australia (17%) and Canada (29%). CEO is also Chairman 
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in 26% of cases; Australia (8%) and the UK (22%) are below average whereas Canada (36%) 
and ‘others’ (31%) are above. There exist multiple large shareholders in and around 20 
percent of cases across the total sample. This percentage is lower than that in the Maury 
(2005) study which examines 1672 Western European non-financial firms and reports 36 
percent of the sample firms as having multiple block holders. Median board size ranges 
from seven to ten members across countries and the average is 9.58 which is close to the 
average UK board size (8.56) reported in Conyon and Peck (1998). The average ratio of 
independent directors is 54 percent in the overall samples. AUS (63%) and CAN (67%) are 
above the average whereas the UK (46%) and “others” (50%) are below.  
 
It is clear from deal characteristics that the quasi-totality of deals are with a target an 
English origin country (92%) and that most deals are not hostile (97%). Cernat (2004) 
points out that there are relatively few hostile deals in Europe. Between 16 percent and 19 
percent of deals are entirely paid with stock as compared to the 11.3 percent of pure stock 
European deals in Faccio and Masulis (2005). Overall, 36 percent of deals are classified as 
being in the same industry (both target and acquirer having same 4-digit SIC code). 
Compared to the 13.29 percent level in Goergen and Renneboog (2004) for European 
takeovers, there are relatively fewer deals (7%) involving multiple bidders and only 16 
percent of those deals are initiated by acquirers with a toehold. The median 1-day premium 
is 31.02% overall, the highest in the UK (37.22%) and lowest in Canada (19.73%). The 
average size of acquirers is about 5.63 (exp (1.73)) times larger than that of targets and the 
average level of leverage of acquiring firms is 16 percent (exp (-1.81)) which is relatively 
low if compared to the 21.5 percent in Maury’s (2005) examination of Western European 
firms. 
 
Looking at the institutional variables, 84 percent of the sample firms in four sample 
countries (Canada, India, South Africa, and the UK) are classified as having a high level of 
initial anti-director right index. The mean (median) BRP enforcement index and 
accounting standard rating of all sample companies is 20.04 (20.41) and 75.36 (78.00), 
separately. Acquiring firms in Australia and Canada have higher enforcement index (20.44 
for AUS, 21.13 for CAN) but lower accounting disclosure ratings (75 for AUS, 74 for CAN). 
There are 174 deals (62%) in the high rank of extra-legal systems including acquirers in 
Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK. Turning to the new legal 
measures of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (DLLS, 2006), the average 
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score of anti-self dealing index of all sample firms is 0.82. 59 percent of deals in five 
sample countries including India, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, and the UK are 
cataloged as having the top scores of revised anti-director rights. Canada (0.65) and 
Australia (0.79) have lower than mean anti-self-dealing indexes and Canada is excluded 
from the new list of countries with highly revised anti-director right. The UK has both a 
higher than mean anti-self-dealing index (0.93) and a high anti-director rights index. 
Surprisingly, a relatively low fraction (29%) of deals belong to the acquirers in countries 
with strong public enforcement (all three major countries are not included).  
 
As stated in chapter five, section 5.4.4, the data for accounting standards is missing in 
Ireland (11 deals) and the extra-legal index is missing in India (6 deals) and Ireland (11 
deals). The decision processes to handle these missing data are as follows. First, the missing 
and non-missing cases are compared based on variables where information is complete. For 
example, samples with extra-legal index and samples without extra-legal index are compared 
in terms of acquisition performance measures whose data is complete. The results show that 
there is no significant difference between these two groups (with and without missing values) 
on both two-performance measures (ACFRpost and ∆ACFR). Second, these two variables 
with missing values (accounting standard and extra-legal index) are kept in the analysis 
because this is not a substantial proportion (3.9% for accounting standard and 6.0% for 
extra-legal index) of cases with lacking data. Third, deals in the two countries with missing 
values (India and Ireland) are retained and those missing values are replaced with some other 
values. This is because sample firms in this thesis are selected based on the English origin 
countries. If these two countries were dropped out subjects for these limited data, the 
remaining cases may not be a truly representative of the population. Finally, the mean of 
sample countries is adopted as the replacement value. This is a widely used technique for 
dealing with missing values. The average score applied to replace the missing values for 
accounting standards is 71. The mean of sample countries for each single proxy of the 
extra-legal index is calculated and used to replace the missing value. The detailed figures are 
shown in table 5.4.
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics (By Sample Country) 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand 
and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & 
Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance 
adjusted cash flow return. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. *, **, *** indicate whether ACFR measures are statistically different from zero at 10%, %5 and 1% 




# (1｜0) 17 71% 7 29% 48 64% 27 36% 72 51% 69 49% 31 74% 11 26% 168 60% 114 40%
# (1｜0) 9 38% 15 63% 40 53% 35 47% 16 11% 125 89% 22 52% 20 48% 87 31% 195 69%
# (1｜0) 0 0% 24 100% 21 28% 54 72% 1 1% 140 99% 9 21% 33 79% 31 11% 251 89%
# (1｜0) 8 33% 16 67% 8 11% 67 89% 56 40% 85 60% 9 21% 33 79% 81 29% 201 71%
# (1｜0) 9 38% 15 63% 19 25% 56 75% 15 11% 126 89% 13 31% 29 69% 56 20% 226 80%
(mean｜median)
# (1｜0) 15 63% 9 38% 25 33% 50 67% 5 4% 136 96% 2 5% 40 95% 47 17% 235 83%
# (1｜0) 4 17% 20 83% 22 29% 53 71% 8 6% 133 94% 5 12% 37 88% 39 14% 243 86%
# (1｜0) 2 8% 22 92% 27 36% 48 64% 31 22% 110 78% 13 31% 29 69% 73 26% 209 73%
(mean｜median)
(mean｜median)
# (1｜0) 5 21% 19 79% 16 21% 59 77% 24 17% 117 82% 9 21% 33 77% 54 19% 228 79%
# (1｜0) 24 100% 0 0% 69 92% 6 8% 127 90% 14 10% 40 95% 2 5% 260 92% 22 8%
# (1｜0) 3 13% 21 88% 1 1% 75 100% 4 3% 137 97% 2 5% 40 95% 9 3% 273 97%
# (1｜0) 4 17% 20 83% 14 19% 61 81% 22 16% 119 84% 8 19% 34 81% 48 17% 234 83%
# (1｜0) 3 13% 21 88% 6 8% 69 92% 9 6% 132 94% 1 2% 41 98% 19 7% 263 93%
# (1｜0) 8 33% 16 67% 32 43% 43 57% 51 36% 90 64% 10 24% 32 76% 101 36% 181 64%






# (1｜0) 0 0% 24 100% 75 100% 0 0% 141 100% 0 0% 20 48% 22 52% 236 84% 46 16%
(mean｜median)
(mean｜median)
# (1｜0) 24 100% 0 0% 0 0% 75 100% 141 100% 0 0% 9 21% 33 79% 174 62% 108 38%
(mean｜median)
# (1｜0) 0 0% 24 100% 75 100% 0 0% 0 0% 141 100% 7 17% 35 83% 82 29% 200 71%
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6.4 Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 6.3, panel A examines the relationship between performance and the 
ownership, governance, deals and institutional variables on a univariate basis.33 Looking 
at the ownership variables, the LSH1P voting share (%) of the largest shareholder is 
positively but not significantly correlated with performance (0.018 in ACFRpost, 0.029 in 
∆ACFR). Turning to CONCEN10, the mean (median) post adjusted cash flow return 
(ACFRpost) for the 168 firms with a large shareholder over 10% is 0.26% (0.59%) 
whereas it is 0.38% (0.64%) for the 114 widely-held firms. The mean (median) change in 
adjusted cash flow returns (∆ACFR), is 1.67% (1.35%) for firms with a large shareholder 
and 2.04% (2.44%) for widely-held firms, both differences being insignificant. The 
performance for various sub-groups is also analyzed. The CONCEN1020 group has the 
poorest post performance whereas the CONCEN20 and CONCEN2050 groups perform 
better than other groups. Panel B further investigates and confirms the above results 
suggesting a potential non-linear relationship between performance and ownership. These 
univariate results suggest that firms with lower levels of concentration make poorer M&A 
decisions.  
 
Governance variables are weakly related to the change in adjusted cash flow 
returns (∆ACFR). Firms with controlling CEOs outperform their peers on post adjusted 
performance (ACFRpost) at the 5% level of significance. This is consistent with Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) who suggest that family CEOs view themselves as stewards of the firm. 
Further, board size in this sample has a significantly negative correlation with ACFRpost. 
This evidence is parallel to that in prior studies. For example, Jensen (1993) argues that 
keeping boards small should improve firm performance. Yermack (1996) suggests that 
large boards are associated with problems such as communication and effective 
decision-making. Conyon and Peck (1998) also find empirical evidence of a negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance. Besides, companies with 
chairman in the CEO position have a poor change in operating cash flow returns 
                                                 
33 The Independent-Sample t test procedure is mainly used to compare the means for two groups 
of each dummy variable. Pearson's correlation coefficient is computed to test the bivariate 
correlations between two performance measures and a single continuous variable. Besides, this 
thesis further performs non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test for all dummy variables. Results 
are consistent with T tests and shown in appendix C. 
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(∆ACFR) at the 10 percent of significance. This result weakly supports the arguments of 
Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) and Vefeas and Theodorou (1998).  
 
Among the deal variables, the COMPETE variable has a significantly negative 
relationship with ∆ACFR. This evidence is consistent with Duggal and Millar (1999) and 
shows multiple bidders benefiting targets but not bidders. The correlation between 
premium and both performance measures (ACFRpost & ∆ACFR) is not significant. The 
correlation between the relative size and ACFRpost is -0.238, significant (-0.040 for 
∆ACFR). These results contrast with some studies which suggest that deal size is not 
related to post-merger returns (Frank and Harris 1989, HPR 1992, Agrawal et al. 1992) 
but support the view that larger deviations in firm size leads to poorer acquisition 
performance (Loughran and Vijh 1997, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 2004). The 
findings support the debt-monitoring hypothesis by documenting a significant relation 
between the leverage ratio, LEV, and post adjusted performance (ACFRpost) at the 5% 
level. Except for these three deal variables, the univariate results do not reveal any other 
transaction characteristics that are significant determinants of acquisition performance. 
 
The individual institutional variables have little impact on operating acquisition 
performance when adopting univariate analysis. The companies with better investor 
protection in both initial (ANTIDIR_high) and revised anti-director rights indexes 
(NANTIDIR_high) have positive but not significant mean and median measures of 
post-acquisition performance (ACFRpost). Results are similar to the change in adjusted 
operating performance (∆ACFR). The correlation between the level of the 
anti-self-dealing index (ANTISDI) and ACFRpost is negative (-0.068) while that with 
∆ACFR is positive (0.002). None of the relationships are significant. The most striking 
result emerging from the data is that Enforcement is the only legal variable with 
significant but negative associations with both post-acquisition (ACFRpost) and the 
change in adjusted performance (∆ACFR). This result is apparently counter-intuitive. One 
possible explanation is the argument for optimal legal enforcement as discussed by prior 
research. For example, Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) argue that too strong legal 
enforcement may reduce a professional manager’s private benefits and may force 
company owners to pay higher wages in order to induce managers to run for a company. 
They point out that legal enforcement is not free. If better legal protection imposes higher 
enforcement costs on the society, then it is better to compare those legal costs with the 
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social costs of private monitoring. Besides, Posner (1998) argues that higher legal 
enforcement will encourage the decision makers to seek other informal substitutes that 
will lead to even higher costs. A more detailed literature review is described in chapter 
two, section 2.5.2.1. Due to the data limitation, this thesis can only illustrate the legal 
enforcement costs existing in acquiring firms with common law legal origins. There is no 
further evidence to account for the reason why stronger legal enforcement leads to poorer 
acquisition performance. All results and tests reported so far are based on univariate 
analysis. Additional results should be obtained using cross-sectional regression models to 
test whether those effects continue to hold after controlling for other factors that are 
expected to affect acquiring performance. 
 
Table 6.3 Univariate Statistics of All Independent Variables 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 
for completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM 
Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre 
performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. T tests of differences are presented for dummy 
variables and Pearson correlations for continuous variables *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% 













CONCEN10 Y 168 60% 0.26    0.59     7.68    1.67 1.35 7.24
N 114 40% 0.38    0.64     6.68    2.04 2.44 6.72
CONCEN1020 Y 81 29% 0.24-    0.53     7.23    0.31 -0.36 7.13
N 201 71% 0.53    0.68     7.30    2.43 2.47 6.91
CONCEN20 Y 87 31% 0.73  0.68   8.08  2.94 2.47 7.15
N 195 69% 0.12  0.54   6.90  1.32 1.49 6.93
CONCEN2050 Y 56 20% 0.28    1.40-     7.91    3.49 2.41 7.33
N 226 80% 0.32    1.08     7.13    1.41 1.66 6.90
CONCEN50 Y 31 11% 1.54    2.95     8.46    1.95 2.47 6.83
N 251 89% 0.16    0.34     7.12    1.81 1.56 7.06
LSH1P (%) - 168 60% - - - 0.018 - - - 0.029
SEP Y 47 17% -0.91 -1.83 8.54 0.82 0.75 6.89
N 235 83% 0.55 0.79 6.99 2.02 1.76 7.05
CEOLSH Y 39 14% 2.62 2.96 7.84 1.61 2.47 6.96
N 243 86% -0.06 0.19 7.13 1.86 1.63 7.05
CEOdual Y 73 26% 0.81 1.23 7.68 0.61 1.01 7.53
N 209 74% 0.14 0.54 7.14 2.25 2.06 6.81
BSIZE (#) - 287 100% - - - -0.168 *** - - - -0.052
INDDIR (#) - 287 100% - - - -0.100 - - - -0.075
OTHLSH Y 54 19% 1.02 0.74 8.54 3.22 2.35 7.97






























Table 6.3 (Continued)  
TGORI_English Y 260 92% 0.31 0.59 7.43 1.83 1.73 7.08
N 22 8% 0.25 0.65 5.33 1.71 1.78 6.43
ATTI_Hostile Y 9 3% 0.88 1.69 6.27 3.17 3.86 4.66
N 273 97% 0.29 0.54 7.32 1.78 1.69 7.09
PAY_Stock Y 48 17% -1.05 -0.08 6.79 1.64 1.31 7.75
N 234 83% 0.59 0.76 7.36 1.86 1.94 6.88
COMPETE Y 19 7% -1.50 -1.83 7.35 -2.58 -0.85 6.85
N 263 93% 0.44 0.68 7.27 2.14 2.11 6.94
IND_rel Y 101 36% -0.06 -0.07 7.35 2.11 1.42 7.22
N 181 64% 0.52 0.79 7.25 1.66 2.07 6.93
TOEHOLD Y 46 16% 0.37 0.27 6.32 2.54 2.77 6.19
N 236 84% 0.30 0.62 7.46 1.68 1.57 7.18
PREM_1day (%) - 255 90% - - - -0.016 - - - 0.034
SIZE_rel (#) - 274 97% - - - -0.238 *** - - - -0.040
LEV (#) - 263 93% - - - 0.136 ** - - - -0.067
ANTIDIR_high Y 236 84% 0.50    1.00     7.21    1.86    1.73     7.13    
N 46 16% -0.66 -0.37 7.65    1.63    1.83     6.50    
ENFORCE (#) - 282 100% - - - -0.132 ** - - - -0.182 ***
ACCTSTD (#) - 271 96% - - - -0.078 - - - -0.116
XLEG_high Y 174 62% -0.27 0.54     6.69    1.65    1.70     6.89    
N 108 38% 1.25    1.21     8.08    2.10    2.04     7.26    
ANTISDI (#) - 282 100% - - - -0.068 - - - 0.002
PUBENFORCE_high Y 82 29% 0.54    0.89     7.85    0.96    1.56     7.18    
N 200 71% 0.21    0.54     7.05    2.17    1.79     6.95    
NANTIDIR_high Y 167 59% 0.33    0.73     6.99    2.18    1.82     7.20    





















0.38 0.38 0.38 2.04 2.04 2.04
(52.6%) (50.0%) (50.0%) (61.2%) (61.2%) (61.2%)
0.26 -0.24 -0.24 1.67 0.31 0.31
(50.9%) (50.6%) (50.6%) (54.4%) (48.1%) (48.1%)
0.73 0.28 2.94 3.49
(51.1%) (43.1%) (60.0%) (58.6%)
1.54 1.95
(65.6%) (62.5%)





Panel B   Further look at ownership
Full Sample (N=282)










6.5 Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
 
6.5.1 Regression Results at First Stage 
     -For Ownership and 1st Generation Governance 
Table 6.4 reports the first level regression results for the two operating 
performance measures on ownership structure after controlling for governance 
mechanisms and transaction characteristics. Panel A provides results for the post 
performance measure, ACFRpost. It is clear that all models are significant and that those 
adjusted R squares are between 28.6 and 31.6 percent. Panel B shows results for the 
change in performance, ∆ACFR. All models are also significant and have adjusted R 
squares between 2.4 and 6.2 percent.  
 
 Evidence on Ownership Structure 
Results considering ownership further confirm the non-linear relationship between 
ownership of the largest shareholder and the two operating performance measures. The 
presence of a large shareholder (more than 10%) does not significantly improve either 
measures (Models 1 in panel A and B). However, the presence of a large shareholder 
(more than 20%) suggests over performance in both measures by 0.024 percent for 
ACFRpost and 0.026 percent for ∆ACFR (Models 2 in panel A and B). When firms with 
large shareholders between 10 percent and 20 percent ownership (CONCEN1020) and 
more (CONCEN20) are separated, it is evident that the CONCEN1020 group 
underperforms (-0.025% for ACFRpost and -0.027% for ∆ACFR, both significant) 
whereas the CONCEN20 group outperforms the widely-held group (though not 
significantly).  
 
A continuous variable LSH1P (Models 5 to 7) is used in order to investigate the 
actual level of concentration. Given the indications of a non-linear relationship a 
quadratic and cubic relationship is examined by testing the second order (model 6) and 
the third order terms (model 7) in the regression models. Model 5, the linear model, 
suggests that post performance (change in performance) increases by 0.0235 percent 
(0.021%) for a one percent change in concentration, but that linear relationship is not 
significant. Instead, all ownership variables (LSH1P, LSH1PSQ, LSH1PCUBE) in model 
7 are statistically significant at the 5 percent levels. Thus it can be argued that the cubic 
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model (Model 7) better fits the data and captures the relationship between ownership and 
the acquisition improvements. Since this cube relationship to some degree covers the 
results from prior models (low level controlled underperformance, higher controlled 
improved), model 7 is proposed as a benchmark regression model at the first stage 
research scheme and is brought into the second stage research framework in order to test 
the effects of second generation governance mechanisms: legal and extra-legal systems.  
 
While the correlation matrix is not presented here, there is no serious correlation 
between variables (p ≦ 0.50). A variance inflation factors index (VIF) is used to check 
for evidence of multicollinearity in all eight models; no variable (except the LSH1SQ, 
LSH1CUBE as expected) has a VIF greater than two in the seven models for both 
ACFRpost and ∆ACFR. Furthermore, the relative stability of results across various model 
specifications is another sign that multicollinearity is not a serious issue. 
 
Interception and Inflection Points of Model 7 
Another point of investigation considers the inflection points of the entire 
ownership curve as related to the two performance measures. For the post performance 
(ACFRpost) in Panel A of Model 7, a first inflection point is discovered around 14.25 
percent where performance starts to increase with the level of concentration (ACFRpost at 
the first inflection point is around 0.041) and a second inflection point is discovered 
around 61.30 percent where performance starts to taper off (ACFRpost at the second 
inflection point is around 0.087). Further analysis shows that the curve stays below the 
level of widely-held firms (the intercept, 0.056) up to the 32.37 percent level of 
ownership and remains above the level of widely-held firms up to 80.96 percent. Also, 
performance of ownership dips down below zero around 93 percent of ownership but the 
maximum level of ownership in this sample is 87 percent. Therefore, the entire ownership 
curve for post performance is always above zero.  
 
In panel B, similar results appear for the change in performance (∆ACFR) with 
inflexion points around 14.42 percent (change in ACFR at the first inflexion point is 
around 0.012) and 60.92 percent (∆ACFR at the second inflexion point is around 0.058). 
The ownership curve is below the level of widely-held firms (the intercept, 0.028) up to 
the 32.90 percent of ownership and remains above that level until the 80.12 percent of 
ownership. Performance is below zero around the 86 percent of ownership indicating that 
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the two controlling firms in the sample with 87 percent of ownership have a negative 
estimated ∆ACFR around -0.002. 
 
Figure 6.1 demonstrates a clear trend of the above analysis. Hence, parallel to 
Ben Amar and André (2006) and others, firms with concentrated ownership structures 
make good M&A decisions on average. However, at lower levels of concentration there is 
some evidence that these firms perform more poorly than widely-held firms or more 
concentrated ones. Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that US family firms outperform 
non-family firms over the entire spectrum of ownership levels, tapering off from 30 



































 Evidence on 1st Generation Governance Mechanisms  
Turning to look at governance variables, it can be said that the separation of cash 
flow rights and control rights is negatively related to performance; this conclusion is 
similarly found in a number of other studies (e.g., Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 2002, Faccio and Lang 2002, Cronqvist and 
Nilsson 2003, Bennedsen and Nielsen 2005). Perceived good governance or investor 
protection in English origin countries does not appear sufficient to mitigate the agency 
costs of separation. This thesis also finds that firms with smaller boards do better than 
those with larger boards, capturing the potential inefficiency of larger boards as suggested 
in the prior literature (e.g., Jensen 1993, Yermack 1996, and Conyon and Peck 1998). 
Companies with a CEO holding large shares have significant improvements on model 1 
in post-acquisition performance but not in the change performance (Anderson and Reeb 
2003, Ben-Amar and André 2006). Companies with CEO duality significantly 
underperform in the change in performance but not in the post performance (Rechner and 
Dalton 1991, Pi and Timme 1993). Other block holders have significant improvements on 
model 1 in the change performance but not in the post-acquisition performance.  
 
 Evidence on Deal Characteristics 
Among deal characteristics, the regression results are basically consistent with the 
prior univariate analysis. The presence of multiple bidders has a significant negative 
impact on post adjusted performance and on the change in adjusted performance (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1990, Duggal and Millar 1999). The larger size relative acquirers 
lead to the poorer post-acquisition performance (Asquith, Bruner and Jr Mullins 1983, 
Becher and Campbell II 2003b, Moeller et al. 2004), though not significantly to the 
change in performance (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker 1992, Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu 
and Zulehner 2003).  
 
However, the debt monitoring mechanism loses its effect on post performance 
(ACFRpost) when combing other factors in regression analyses. Even more, the level of 
acquirer leverage has negative association with the change in performance (∆ACFR) at 
the 10 percent significance level in model 7. This result is unexpected since the earlier 
literature (e.g. Stulz 1990, Harris and Raviv 1990 and Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell 
1993) generally supports the debt-monitoring mechanism; this effect is proved through 
the post performance measure (ACFRpost) in the prior univariate test. This evidence 
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sustains the view of Myers and Majluf (1984) that internal resources are more preferred 
than external financing. A company holding a large amount of financial slack may have 
more opportunity to capture the positive deals and to thus benefit firm performance. 
Unfortunately, the effect in these regression models is economically trivial and unsteady 
throughout all examinations. 
 
Table 6.4 Regression of Acquiring Firm Performance on Ownership Structure, Governance 
Mechanisms and Deal Characteristics (Basic Models) 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 
for completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM 
Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre 
performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% 
level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Intercept 0.048 ** 0.050 ** 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.041 * 0.042 * 0.056 **
CONCEN10 -0.012
CONCEN1020 -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
CONCEN20 0.024 ** 0.012
CONCEN2050 0.012
CONCEN50 0.012
LSH1P 0.0235 0.006 -0.234 **
LSH1PSQ 0.025 1.012 ***
LSH1PCUBE -0.893 ***
SEP -0.019 * -0.028 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.026 ** -0.030 **
CEOLSH 0.025 ** 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.015
CEOdual -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 **
INDDIR -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
OTHLSH 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.009
TGORI_English 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
ATTI_Hostile 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.007
PAY_stock -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
COMPETE -0.035 ** -0.032 ** -0.035 ** -0.035 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.035 **
IND_rel 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
TOEHOLD 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 **
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
ACFRpre 0.516 *** 0.518 *** 0.521 *** 0.521 *** 0.514 *** 0.514 *** 0.516 ***
 Adjust R2 (%)
F 7.706*** 7.259*** 7.512***
29.0 30.0 31.6
7.756*** 8.083*** 8.210*** 7.748***
Model 5 Model 6
Model 7
(Benchmark)Model 4
Panel A   Dependent Variable: ACFRpost
28.9 28.6 30.6
(N=282)




Table 6.4 (Continued) 
Panel B   Dependent Variable: △ACFR
(N=282)
Intercept 0.021 0.023 0.045 * 0.048 * 0.013 0.014 0.028
CONCEN10 -0.013
CONCEN1020 -0.027 ** -0.027 **
CONCEN20 0.026 ** 0.013
CONCEN2050 0.017
CONCEN50 0.007
LSH1P 0.021 0.005 -0.243 **
LSH1PSQ 0.023 1.042 ***
LSH1PCUBE -0.922 ***
SEP -0.016 -0.026 ** -0.024 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.026 **
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002
CEOdual -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.022 ** -0.024 ** -0.024 ** -0.022 **
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
INDDIR -0.013 -0.003 -0.013 -0.015 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
OTHLSH 0.023 * 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.020
TGORI_English 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.008
ATTI_Hostile 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.015
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008
COMPETE -0.050 *** -0.046 *** -0.049 *** -0.050 *** -0.048 *** -0.048 *** -0.049 ***
IND_rel 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009
TOEHOLD 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
LEV -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 *




















6.5.2 Regression Results at Second Stage 
     -For 2nd Generation Governance: Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions 
(i) Full Model  
Table 6.5 reports the second level regression results for the two operating 
performance measures on ownership structures after controlling for institutional variables. 
Based on the evidence of regression at the first level, model 7 is selected as a benchmark 
model for further constructing models 8 and model 9 and for testing the effects of legal 
and extra-legal variables. Similar to the results of first level regressions, panel A shows 
that the values of F of both models for post performance measure (ACFRpost) are 
significant beyond 0.01 levels and that those adjusted R square are up to 33.9 (model 8) 
and 32.8 (model 9) percent. Panel B presents consistent evidence for the change in 
performance (∆ACFR). Both models are significant and have adjusted R square 6.0 and 
8.1 percent respectively. Recall that when model 7 without controlling institutional 
variables was used to predict acquisition operating performance, adjusted R square was 
30.6 percent for ACFRpost and 4.6 for ∆ACFR. With adjusted R square increasing, it 
becomes obvious that adding institutional variables improves the predictive power of the 
regression equation.34 
 
 Evidence on Ownership Structure 
Focusing on the ownership variables, there exists a curvilinear relationship 
between ownership of the largest shareholder and the two operating performance 
measures (ACFR and ∆ACFR) in these two models; the measures still remain beyond 
0.10 percent level of significance but the regression coefficients (β) are decreased.35 
Therefore, while the concentrated ownership structure still has statistical impact on M&A 
performance, the explanatory power of ownership variables is diminished after 
controlling for legal and extra-legal mechanisms.  
 
                                                 
34 This thesis also runs regressions to test the R squared and F change. The value of R squared 
change in model 8 for post performance (ACFRpost) is 4.71 with significance (F change=2.856) 
beyond 0.01 levels. More detailed tests and results are provided in appendix D.  
35 It is known that beta coefficients give further than the regression coefficients because each 
gives a change of one standard deviation on that variable produces the number of changes of 
standard deviation on dependent variable. Also, beta coefficients are more comparable across 
independent variables, since they are all in same units (Kinnear and Gray 2004). While this 
thesis does not present the beta coefficients in the table 6.5, the statistics can be found in 
appendix D and those confirm the results of the regression coefficients (β).  
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Interception and Inflection Points of Model 8 and Model 9 
In addition, the last two columns of table 6.5 report the interception and inflection 
points of the level of ownership on both performance measures of models 8 and 9. The 
inflection points are again computed to provide further analysis of the relationship 
between the ownership curve and the operating performance for model 8 (with initial 
legal and extra-legal indexes) and model 9 (with DLLS new legal indexes). For the post 
performance measures ACFRpost (Table 6.5, Panel A, Model 8), a first inflexion point 
appears around 19.12 percent where performance starts to improve with the level of 
concentration and a second inflexion point around 61.98 percent where performance 
starts to deteriorate. Moreover, the ownership curve stays below the level of widely-held 
firms up to the 48.81 percent level of ownership and remains above the level of 
widely-held firms up to the 72.85 percent. Unlike the form of model 7, the average 
performance of widely-held firms (the intercept, -0.158) is negative (but not significant).  
 
Similar results are obtained for the post performance measure of model 9 (panel 
A). The first inflexion point is at the 18.82 percent level of ownership and the second 
inflexion point is around 61.91 percent. The ownership curve stays below the level of 
widely-held firms (the intercept, 0.020) up to the 47.50 percent level of ownership and 
remains above the level of widely-held firms up to the 73.60 percent. The ownership 
curve is below zero after an 84 percent level of ownership.  
 
For the change measure ∆ACFR, the results parallel the post-performance measure 
(ACFRpost). Two inflection points in Model 8 are around 19.52 percent and 64.03 
percent, respectively. The inflection points in Model 9 are very close to those in model 8 
by 19.16 percent and 63.11 percent separately. Model 8 has an ownership curve below 
the level of widely-held firms (the intercept, -0.182) up to the 49.37 percent of ownership 
and remains above the level until the 75.96 percent of ownership. The curve of Model 9 
is below the level of widely-held firms (the intercept, 0.011) up to the 48.28 percent and 
remains above the level until the 75.11 percent. The ownership curve has two intersection 
points with zero: the first is around 36 percent of ownership and the second is around 82 
percent. 
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Table 6.5 Regression of Acquiring Firm Performance on Legal & Extra-Legal Institutions 
(Full Models) 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 
for completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC 
PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and 
pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash 
flow return. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at 
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Intercept 0.056 ** -0.158 0.020 0.028 -0.182 0.011
LSH1P -0.234 ** -0.197 ** -0.222 ** -0.243 ** -0.228 ** -0.231 **
LSH1PSQ 1.012 *** 0.674 * 0.769 ** 1.042 *** 0.762 * 0.786 *
LSH1PCUBE -0.893 *** -0.554 * -0.635 ** -0.922 *** -0.608 * -0.637 *
SEP -0.030 ** -0.032 ** -0.033 *** -0.026 ** -0.029 ** -0.028 *
CEOLSH 0.015 0.025 * 0.022 0.002 0.018 0.012
CEOdual -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.022 ** -0.021 * -0.021 *
BSIZE -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.013 -0.027 -0.031 -0.004 -0.011 -0.010
OTHLSH 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.020 0.016 0.019
TGORI_English 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 0.008 0.004 0.002
ATTI_Hostile 0.007 0.016 0.005 0.015 0.008 0.012
PAY_stock -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009
COMPETE -0.035 ** -0.038 ** -0.037 ** -0.049 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 ***
IND_rel 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.007 0.008
TOEHOLD 0.006 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.021 * 0.018
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.005 ** -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
LEV -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 * -0.006 * -0.007 *





PUBENFORCE_high -0.070 * -0.056
NANTIDIR_high 0.060 *** 0.062 **
UK -0.064 -0.062 ** -0.125 ** -0.061 **
CAN -0.061 0.099 ** -0.141 ** 0.070
AUS 0.055 * 0.035 * 0.027 0.030
ACFRpre 0.516 *** 0.503 *** 0.512 ***




y =intercept (32.37%, 80.96%)(49.37%, 75.96%)(48.28%, 75.11%)























In summary, it is clear that, first of all, the first inflection point of the ownership 
curve moves to around 20 percent (14 percent of model 7) which indicates that when the 
mechanisms of investor protection are controlled, the incentive effects are likely to bring into 
play with the increasing ownership concentration until the level of ownership concentration 
goes beyond 20 percent. This number is confirmed by prior univariate analysis and more 
closely to the arguments of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988b); it reveals agency costs to be 
significantly higher between 5 and 25 percent levels of ownership concentration. 
 
Second, the range of two intersection points with the average performance of 
dispersed firms (the axis of the intercept) is narrowed down to roughly between 50 and 80 
percent levels (compared to approximate 32%-80% in model 7) which illustrates that after 
controlling institutional variables, concentrated firms worsen M&A performance on average 
much more than the dispersed firms do, unless the firms are fully controlled (50 percent 
levels of ownership) by the largest shareholders. This argument is further confirmed by the 
third point: the peaking spot over the entire spectrum of ownership levels is around 60 
percent and is quite stable across various regression models. After holding more than 60 
percent of voting shares, controlling shareholders may choose lower performing acquisition 
projects in order to diversify the risk of wealth concentration. This may cause the average 
M&A performance to decrease although the average performance will still be higher than 
that of widely held firms. The figures in this analysis are rather close to the decreasing point 
of Anderson and Reeb (2003) at 60 percent, but they are relatively high when compared to 
the 40 to 50 percent of McConnell and Servaes (1990). Finally, according to this ownership 
curve, a few high level concentrated firms (holding more than 80%) in this sample may 
underperform the dispersed firms. In fact, there are five companies (1.8%) in this sample 
with the largest shareholders holding more than 80 percent of voting shares (seven 
companies with the largest shareholders holding more than 75 percent of voting share). Since 
these are extremely rare cases, it is difficult and also inappropriate to draw any conclusions 
from this small sample of high-level concentrated firms. 
 
 Evidence on 2nd generation governance: Legal and Extra-legal Institutions 
Upon examining the institutional variables in regression models 8 of Table 6.5, it 
becomes clear that after controlling for other factors that might be expected to affect 
acquiring performance, the coefficients of initial anti-director right (ANTIDIR_high) for 
both performance measures are significant positive (0.083 in panel A for ACFRpost and 
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0.126 in panel B for △ACFR). As expected, acquisitions in countries with better investor 
legal protections (i.e., countries with a high anti-director right index) have higher M&A 
returns. The extra-legal index has a negative coefficient for ACFRpost but a positive one for 
△ACFR. The Accounting standard has a positive relationship with both performances. 
Unfortunately, as the coefficients for these three legal and extra-legal variables (ENFORCE, 
ACCTSTD, and XLEG_high) are not significant, the results are not overly conclusive.  
 
A surprising outcome surfaces in the proxy of enforcement. This has a significant 
negative impact on both performances by the univariate test but shows no sign of coming out 
on multiple regression results. It is obvious that while enforcement individually has a 
significant negative relationship with acquiring performance, its significance is replaced by 
many other variables. This evidence supports the conclusion of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1998) and states that the quality of legal enforcement fails to be 
a substitute/compensate for the quality of law.  
 
However, there is strong relationship existing among those LLSV institutional 
variables, especially in relation to the enforcement index (ENFORCE) and accounting 
standard (ACCTSTD). The pairwise correlation between these two variables is bigger than 
0.5 (0.690, which is shown in Tables 5.4 panel C). The presence of a high degree of 
multicollinearity may result in the unstable regression coefficient estimates. Thus, 
ENFORCE and ACCTSTD variables were removed in order to eliminate this problem and to 
create a modified regression model 8.1. The regression results are present in table 6.6 and 
will be discussed in the following parts of the modified models.  
  
Model 9 of table 6.5 tests the effects of legal mechanisms as based on the updated 
measures by DLLS (2006). The revised anti-director rights (NANTIDIR_high) are positively 
associated with good M&A decisions for both performance measures. Again, this confirms 
that investor protection, even in English origin countries, has an impact on acquisition 
operating performance. The coefficients of public enforcement (PUBENFORCE_high) are 
negative and weakly significant at the 10 percent level. This unexpected sign is consistent 
with the evidence of DLLS (2006). Due to data limitations, however, this thesis still has 
difficulty providing a more detailed explanation as to why the government’s power to impose 
fines and prison terms for self-dealing transactions does not benefit acquiring performance. 
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In addition, there does not seem to be a link between long-term acquisition performance and 
the anti-self dealing index (ANTISDI).  
 
In DLLS (2006) analysis, public enforcement shows significant negative effects. They 
explain that the way they adopt to construct the public enforcement index may be biased 
because concealed transactions happened even under countries with criminal sanctions. 
Besides, considering the existence of multicollinearity problems among the three new legal 
measures, the PUBENFORCE_high variable is removed and a modified regression model 
10.1 is run. The results are also presented in table 6.6 and discussed in the next part of the 
modified models. This evidence confirms the results for public enforcement in DLLS (2006). 
The DLLS argument is depicted in chapter two, section 2.2.1. 
 
 Evidence on 1st Generation Governance Mechanisms and Deal Characteristics 
Turning back to the governance and deal variables in models 8 and 9 for post 
performance (panel A: ACFRpost), ther results are similar and stable when compared with 
the coefficients of variables in model 7. Separation (SEP), board size (BSIZE), multiple 
bidders (COMPETE), and size deviation between bidders and targets (SIZE_rel) continue to 
have a negative effect on post performance after controlling for institutional variables. The 
only exception is when the company with a controlling CEO shows its significant positive 
relationship with post performance (ACFRpost in panel A) after controlling the legal 
variables. This evidence parallels the sign in the existing univariate test and in the analyses 
of both Villalonga and Amit (2005) and Ben-Amar and André (2006).  
 
Consistent results also appear when looking at panel B for changes in operating 
performance ( △ ACFR). Acquiring firms with separation (SEP) capital policy, 
CEO-chairman (CEOdual), multiple competitors (COMPETE), and size relative (SIZE_rel) 
again significantly underperform on the change performance measure. A more significant 
difference is that (even after controlling for the initial legal and extra-legal variables (model 
8)) the toehold interests have a slightly positive effect on the change in performance at the 
10 percent significance level. This result supports the argument in prior theoretical models 
stating that the toehold may help potential buyers obtain special information, may solve the 
free-rider problems, may reduce the average bid premium, and may then create more 
profitable deals for bidders (Grossman and Hart 1981, Shleifer and Vishny 1986). 
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(ii) Modified Models  
All results and tests reported for model 8.1 and 9.1 in table 6.6 are based on the same 
concepts of model 8 and model 9. In order to tackle the multicollinearity problems and to 
still be able to capture the information on the desired variables, model 8.1 is run by 
selecting the anti-director right index (ANTIDIR) as a symbol variable from the other legal 
mechanisms of LLSV (1998) and by including the single aggregate extra-legal dummy 
variable (XLEG_high) of the Dyck and Zingales (2004) study 36 . Except for the 
multicollinearity problems, the public enforcement measure (PUBENFORCE_high) is 
excluded in Model 9 also because of the unexplainable sign that is concerned in DLLS (2004) 
study as well.  
 
Similar patterns are found in model 8.1 and 9.1 when comparing model 8 and model 9 
respectively. The cube relationship between ownership and both performance measures still 
persists; governance and transaction factors in each specification have signs that are stable 
and consistent with the prior full models in general; legal protection, no matter whether 
represented by initial anti-director right measures or by a revised anti-director rights index, 
are positively and significantly associated with good M&A decisions for both performance 
measures. Unfortunately, the other institutional variables (XLEG_high and ANTISDI) in 
their own related specifications are still not strong enough to explain the operating 
performance measures. The results of Dyck and Zingales (2004) and DLLS (2006) for 
anti-self dealing cannot be verified in this sample.  
 
After running the regression model 8.1 and 9.1, there appears a high correlation 
among institutional variables that does not affect the ability to obtain a good fit for the 
regression (R2 are stable). Nor does it affect the quality of predictions from the regression 
(the coefficient of each control variables is stable across various model specifications). 
However, there is a major change when the values of the intercept in model 8.1 for two 
measures turn back to be positive and even have a significant sign at the 10 percent level for 
ACFRpost. Taking all the results into consideration, model 9.1 seems to be relatively stable 
and reliable in terms of the updated legal measures by DLLS (2006)37. Regression model 9.1 
is therefore used as the representative model. Based on the dependent variables in model 9.1, 
                                                 
36 After correcting the multicollinearity, there is no variable (except the LSH1SQ, LSH1CUBE as 
expected) with VIF greater than 15 in model 8.1 and 9.1 for both ACFRpost and ∆ACFR. Results 
are not reported in table 6.6 but shown in appendix E. 
37 An early version of this regression result has been published in Journal of Economics and Business, 
article in press (Yen and André 2007). Available online 4 May 2007. 
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additional tests are conducted to examine whether the findings of the basic regression models 
in the first research scheme (model 1 to model 7) are still ongoing. Fortunately, the results 
are qualitatively similar and stable.  
 
Furthermore, the last two columns of table 6.6 show the interception and inflection 
points of ownership levels on both performance measures in models 8.1 and 9.1. For the 
post-performance (ACFRpost) of model 8.1, a first inflexion point is around 17.85 percent 
and a second inflexion point is around 61.62 percent. The curve stays below the level of 
widely-held firms (the intercept, 0.108) up to the 43.72 percent level and remains above the 
level up to the 75.49 percent. The entire ownership curve for post performance is always 
above zero. For the change measure (△ACFR), a first inflexion point is around 19.41 
percent and a second inflexion point is around 63.30 percent. The curve is below the level of 
widely-held firms (the intercept, 0.015) up to the 49.32 percent of ownership and remains 
above the level until the 74.75 percent of ownership. The curve for the change performance 
is above zero between 30 and 84 percent level of ownership. 
 
For the post-performance (ACFRpost) of model 9.1, the first inflexion point is around 
18.06 percent and the second inflexion point is around 61.33 percent. The curve stays below 
the level of widely-held firms (the intercept, 0.108) until the 44.62 percent of ownership and 
then remains above the level up to the 74.46 percent. The entire ownership curve for post 
performance is always above zero. For the change measure (△ACFR), the first inflexion 
point is around 18.50 percent and the second inflexion point is around 62.69 percent. The 
curve is below the level of widely-held firms (the intercept, 0.083) till the 45.78 percent of 
ownership and then remains above the level up to the 76.01 percent of ownership. The curve 
for the change performance is also above zero for the entire ownership structure in the 
sample.  
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Table 6.6 Regression of Acquiring Firm Performance on Legal & Extra Legal Institutions 
(Modified Models) 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted 
cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. Outliers have been 
winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% 
level, * significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Intercept 0.055 * 0.108 0.015 0.083
LSH1P -0.201 ** -0.202 ** -0.219 * -0.214 *
LSH1PSQ 0.726 ** 0.724 ** 0.737 * 0.749 *
LSH1PCUBE -0.609 * -0.608 * -0.594 * -0.615 *
SEP -0.033 *** -0.033 ** -0.027 * -0.027 *
CEOLSH 0.022 * 0.021 0.014 0.012
CEOdual -0.012 -0.015 -0.021 * -0.023 **
BSIZE -0.003 ** -0.002 * -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.023 -0.028 -0.007 -0.007
OTHLSH 0.007 0.011 0.019 0.022 *
TGORI_English -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.002
ATTI_Hostile 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.017
PAY_stock -0.013 -0.013 -0.009 -0.010
COMPETE -0.037 ** -0.036 ** -0.052 *** -0.051 ***
IND_rel 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.009
TOEHOLD 0.012 0.009 0.019 * 0.017
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.002 -0.002
LEV -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 ** -0.008 **
ANTIDIR_high 0.060 ** 0.076 ***
XLEG_high -0.024 0.005
ANTISDI -0.075 -0.079
NANTIDIR_high 0.045 ** 0.049 **
UK -0.033 -0.029 -0.070 * -0.034
CAN -0.041 ** 0.013 -0.058 *** 0.000
AUS 0.054 ** 0.034 0.032 0.029
ACFRpre 0.512 *** 0.517 ***




y =intercept (49.32%, 74.75%)
Model 9.1
(43.72%, 75.49%) (44.62%, 74.46%)
1.799**6.495***6.963***













6.6 Results Summary and Discussions  
 
This thesis sets out with the aim of assessing the importance of ownership structures 
in the long term operating performance of acquiring firms in English origin countries other 
than the US, following the classification of LLSV (1998). First of all, the results show that 
the measures of change in adjusted returns are significantly improved when combining the 
significantly poor pre performance and the positive post-performance. Such evidence rejects 
hypothesis 1.1. Also, after controlling for the effects of pre-acquisition performance, the 
operating performance of merging firms improves after M&A events. This evidence rejects 
hypothesis 1.2. According to these results, evidence supports the synergy hypothesis as 
declared by prior literature: M&A events should lead to improved financial and operating 
performances among merging firms in order to reflect the market expectation HPR 1992, 
Sharma and Ho 2002, Goergen and Renneboog 2004).  
 
Second, this study finds that concentrated firms with the largest shareholder holding 
more than 20 percent of voting shares make better post-acquisition performance than 
widely-held firms. The group of firms with a large shareholder holding lower levels of 
voting shares (between 10 and 20 percent) significantly underperforms. Moreover, a cubic 
relationship between ownership structures and acquisition operating performance is proven 
to exist in the acquiring firms in countries with English origin. These findings suggest a 
rejection of hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2 and agree with previous work proposing that increasing 
ownership might be a solution for the divergence-of-interests problems but expropriation 
may have effects on performance when the voting shares are concentrated under or over a 
certain level (Morck et al. 1988b, McConnell and Servaes 1990, Anderson and Reeb 2003). 
While the sample firms are all from English origin countries, it is clear that the influence of 
ownership concentration is still valid in acquiring firms with good legal protection. Legal 
origin itself is not enough to speak for a corporate governance system that might mitigate the 
expropriation problems.  
 
Third, among the first generation governance mechanisms, hypothesis 3.1 is rejected; 
separation problems have negative impact on acquisition performance in the post-merger 
period. While this result remains consistent with the position on the cost of separation in 
most prior studies (Claessens et al. 2000, La Porta et al. 2002, Faccio and Lang 2002, 
Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003), it is evident that the so-called good governance mechanism in 
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English origin countries is neither sufficient to mitigate the cost of separation. In addition, 
hypothesis 3.2 is partially rejected for model 1, 8 and 8.1 on post-acquisition performance 
(ACFRpost). Companies with a controlling CEO make significant improvements in 
post-acquisition performance (ACFRpost) when concentrated ownership at the 10 percent 
threshold or legal and extra-legal mechanisms are controlled. Besides, results show that the 
acquisition performance of acquiring firms with a CEO-Chairman is statistically negative. 
This evidence is closer to the conclusion of Rechner and Dalton (1991) and Pi and Timme 
(1993). This thesis can only reject hypothesis 3.3 on the change performance (∆ACFR) 
measure and not on the post performance measure (ACFRpost).  
 
Moreover, this thesis concludes that the board size has a significant negative 
association with acquisition operating performance rejecting hypothesis 3.4 and responds to 
the findings of previous research (Yermack 1996, Conyon and Peck 1998); however, its 
significance only exists on the post performance (ACFRpost) and not on the change 
performance (∆ACFR). In contrast to the findings of earlier literature (Agrawal and Knoeber 
1996, Vefeas and Theodorou 1998, Weir, Laing and McKnight 2002), no evidence on the 
ratio of independent directors is detected in this thesis. There is no significant sign 
concerning the relationship between the fraction of independent directors and the acquisition 
operating performance; hypothesis 3.5 cannot be rejected. A similar situation exists when 
testing the efficiency of multiple large shareholders. The presence of multiple large 
shareholders has no significant effect on the two acquisition performance measures; 
therefore, this thesis cannot reject hypothesis 3.6.  
 
Fourth, when legal and extra-legal mechanisms are added into the regression equation, 
these institutional variables significantly improve the predictive power of the regression 
model. This evidence suggests that there is significant discrepancy in acquisition operating 
performance among countries with the same legal origin but that there are different levels of 
legal and extra-legal systems. Therefore, this thesis proposes an argument disputing the 
manner in which English origin countries are lumped together and collectively viewed as 
examples of great corporate governance (see Fauver, Houston and Naranjo 2003, Friedman, 
Johnson and Mitton 2003, Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu 2004). Additionally, in the first 
group of legal and extra-legal variables of LLSV (1998) and Dyck and Zingales (2004), the 
acquisition operating performance in countries with a higher rank of anti-director right index 
is significantly better than that in countries with a lower rank of anti-director right index 
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(reject hypothesis 4.1). However, no significant differences are found between the 
acquisition operating performance and the other mechanisms such as degree of enforcement, 
the rating of accounting standards, and the rank of aggregate extra-legal index (i.e. cannot 
reject hypothesis 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).  
 
Correspondingly, in the second group of legal variables of DLLS (2006), the revised 
anti-director right index is confirmed as having significant and positive effects on the 
acquisition operating performance (reject hypothesis 4.5). The public enforcement measure 
has weakly negative significance (reject hypothesis 4.6). While this sign is counterintuitive, 
it is consistent with the evidence in the DLLS (2006) working paper. This measure has not 
previously been examined or described in the published paper. Restricted by data availability, 
it is difficult to explain this result except to say that it might be related to legal costs; these 
might deserve further study. In addition, this thesis cannot provide significant evidence to 
state the relationship between the anti-self dealing index and the acquisition operating 
performance (can not reject hypothesis 4.7). Disappointedly, the study fails to support the 
importance of the anti-self dealing measure which is highly recommended by LLSV (2006). 
 
Finally, it is somewhat surprising that there are few deal characteristics that might be 
noted as having an effect on acquisition operating performances in this sample. The 
acquisition operating performance of transactions with more than one bidder is significantly 
worse than that of transactions with a single bidder. This stable evidence suggests a rejection 
of hypothesis 5.4 which assumes that competition has no impact on M&A operating 
performance. The higher deviation in size ratio of the bidders and targets leads to a poorer 
acquisition performance (reject hypothesis 5.8), but this evidence is limited on the post 
operating performance (ACFRpost) and not on the change performance (△ACFR). After 
controlling for the cube relationship of ownership and the change performance (△ACFR), it 
is clear that the degree of acquirer leverage is significant but negatively associated with the 
change performance (△ACFR). Therefore, Hypothesis 5.9 is conditionally rejected. Except 
for these three deal variables, this thesis is unable to demonstrate the importance of the other 
transaction characteristics such as target origin, transaction attitude, payment type, industry 
relatedness, toehold interests, and premium (i.e. cannot reject hypothesis 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 







This chapter intends to conduct further analysis extending from the main results of 
chapter six. Section 7.2 attempts to discover the drivers of improved operating cash flow 
returns. Section 7.3 studies the ultimate owners for the concentrated firms and examines the 
effects of different types of larger shareholders on M&A performance. Section 7.4 offers an 
analysis of the interactive effects between the type I agency problem (separation between 
control and cash flow rights) and the type II agency problem (separation between ownership 
and management). Section 7.5 adopts other alternatives for defining independent variables 
such as cross borders, two or three-digit SIC codes, and one or four week premium measure 
periods. At the end of this section the year dummy is introduced to test the impact of 
acquisition year difference.  
 
 
7.2 Analysis of Source of Operating Performance 
 
In order to identify the source of increases in operating cash flow return this section 
decomposes the operating cash flow return (CFR) into two components: operating cash flow 
margin (CFM) and asset turnover (AT). In addition, it tests another important component of 
cash flow rates, the sales growth rate (SG), to see whether acquisitions lead to sales growth.  
 
7.2.1 Cash Flow Margin (CFM) 
 The cash flow margin (CFM) is defined as the operating cash flow per dollar of sales 
(OCF/S). Operating Cash Flow (OCF) is calculated by operating income after depreciation 
plus back depreciation, depletion and amortization expense. Table 7.1 presents the summary 
data on CFM for merging firms and matched firms. The adjusted operating cash flow margin 
(ACFM) in the years surrounding the acquisition, the 3 year-median ACFM before and after 
acquisition (ACFMpre and ACFMpost) and the changes in adjusted cash flow margin (△
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ACFM) are also summarized. Panel B shows the results of the cross-sectional regression 
model.  
 
The results in panel A of table 7.1 show that the mean (median) adjusted cash flow 
margin in the pre-merger period is from 1.73 (0.00) for year -3 down to 0.44 (-0.20) for year 
-1. The mean and median measure over pre-acquisition years (ACFMpre) is 1.12 and 0.40, 
respectively. While the median measure is only significant in year -3, all the mean measures 
are statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level of significance except year t-1. In 
general, merging firms in the sample are performing better than their matched counterparts in 
the pre-acquisition period. These differences are more substantial in the post-acquisition 
period. Both mean (2.68, 2.52, and 2.87 for year +1, +2, and +3, respectively; 2.82 for 
ACFMpost) and median (2.29, 2.08, and 2.15 for year +1, +2, and +3, respectively; 2.15 for 
ACFMpost) measures are significantly positive at the 1 percent annual level in the annual 
and over the three years after acquisition. Comparing the pre and post adjusted cash flow 
margins (△ACFM) also indicates that the mean and the median change of 1.70 and 1.94 are 
statistically significant.  
 
 The above findings are supported when the improvements are tested by regression. 
Panel B presents the regression results of median adjusted post-acquisition cash flow 
margins (ACFMpost) on median adjusted pre-acquisition measures (ACFMpre). The 
intercept α (0.023) is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, which indicates 
that after controlling for the effects of pre-merger cash flow margins, there is still a 
significant improvement of 2.3 percent in the post-acquisition period. Compared to the 
results of table 6.1, the adjusted cash flow returns in the post-acquisition period seem to be 
insignificantly positive while the cash flow margins are significantly positive. One possible 
reason for this is that the significant increase in adjusted operating cash flow margins is 
offset by the significant decrease in asset turnover. The following test on asset turnover 
confirms this point. Also, from the change in operating performance, both cash flow returns 
(△ACFR) and cash flow margins (△ACFM) prove that merging firms have significant 
improvements after transaction.  
 
 Overall, the merging firms in this sample earn higher adjusted operating cash flow 
margins (ACFM) than their matched counterparts in the post-acquisition period; these 
improvements are not due to a persistence of superior pre-performance. These findings are 
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similar to the conclusion in Healy, Palepu and Ruback (HPR, 1992) and Rahman and 
Limmack (2004). However, HPR (1992) hesitate to attribute the increase to the acquisition 
itself because even when they control for pre-acquisition adjusted operating cash flow 
margins, they are unable to find evidence of a significant change in the margins after 
transaction. In the Ghosh (2001) study, the mean adjusted cash flow margins are significantly 
positive in year t+1, t+2 and over the three-year post-acquisition. Nevertheless, Ghosh 
cannot prove the significant increase in the change of adjusted operating cash flow margins 
(△CFRM) following acquisition transactions. 
 
Table 7.1 Operating Cash Flow Margin 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Operating cash flow margin (CFM) is calculated as operating cash flow divided by Sales. 
Operating cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation. Post-acquisition performance for each deal is measured 
by the operating cash flow margin of the surviving acquirer after transaction. Pre acquisition performance is calculated as a 
weighted-average of the operating cash flow margin for the bidder and the target included (MEGi pre and post). The weights are 
based on the market values of assets of both companies in the year before acquisition. Post- and pre-acquisition performances of 
the matched firms are measured as weighted-average of the operating cash flow margin (MATi pre and post). Industry, Size, 
and Pre performance Adjusted Operating Cash Flow Margin (ACFM) is operating cash flow rates of merging firms minus those 
of matched firms. ACFMpost and ACFMpre are the 3 year-median ACFM before and after acquisition. The change in industry, 
size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow margin (△ACFM) is defined ACFMpost minus ACFMpre. Outliers have been 
winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, * 
significance at the 10% level. 
Panel A Operaitng Cash Flow Margin (CFM)
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Positive
-3 194 14.22 13.14 194 12.49 12.29 194 1.73 ** 0.00 * 47%
-2 260 15.33 14.39 260 14.27 14.16 260 1.06 * 0.34 57%
-1 282 15.75 14.49 282 15.30 15.24 282 0.44 -0.20 45%
1 282 16.09 14.67 282 13.41 13.11 282 2.68 *** 2.29 *** 62%
2 280 15.55 14.25 280 13.03 12.77 280 2.52 *** 2.08 *** 63%
3 279 15.49 13.96 279 12.62 12.05 279 2.87 *** 2.15 *** 64%
ACFMpre: Median for years (-3 to -1) 282 1.12 ** 0.40 53%
ACFMpost: Median for years (+1 to +3) 282 2.82 *** 2.20 *** 63%
△ACFM: change in operating cash flow rate (ACFMpost -ACFMpre) 282 1.70 *** 1.90 *** 64%
Panel B  Regression of ACFMpost on ACFMpre
ACFMpost = 0.023*** + 0.504***ACFMpre
F=75.033***
adj. R2 = 20.9%
Year Relative to
Acquisition
Matched Firms (MATi )Mergering Firms (MEGi )





7.2.2 Asset Turnover (AT) 
 The ratio of asset turnover (AT) is calculated as sales divided by market value of 
assets (S/MVA) (the same definition as offered in HPR 1992). Market value of asset is 
computed by adding market value of equity at the beginning of each year and the book value 
of net debt. Table 7.2 presents the summary statistics on asset turnovers (AT) for merging 
firms, matched firms and adjusted asset turnover (AAT) in the years surrounding the 
acquisition. The 3 year-median AAT before and after acquisition (AATpre and AATpost) and 
the change of adjusted asset turnover (△AAT) are also displayed in panel A. Panel B 
provides the results of the change regression model.  
 
 The results in panel A of table 7.2 give details that both mean and median adjusted 
asset turnovers are significantly negative in all pre-acquisition periods (year t-3 to t-1). The 
median (mean) measure over three pre-acquisition years (AATpre) is -0.130 (-0.179) which 
indicates that merging firms generate 13.0 cent less in sales than benchmark firms for each 
dollar of assets in the pre-acquisition years. The results are close to those reported by HPR 
(1992) who find that median asset (sales) turnover of the merging firms is 0.2 lower than that 
of their competitors. Besides, Rahman and Limmack (2004) also report a -0.05 median 
adjusted asset turnover over the pre-acquisition period.  
 
 Evidence in this thesis shows that merging firms are still and even worse (-0.206 for 
mean and -0.172 for median) after merger while HPR (1992) document that merging firms 
close the gap and achieve a comparable adjusted asset turnover in the post-merger period. 
Merging firms consistently and stably underperform on asset turnover and it is reasonable to 
conjecture that poor post performance might be attributed to the poor pre performance. 
While the intercept regression model (table 7.2 panel B) still shows a significant decrease 
after controlling the pre performance, it might be more interesting to look at a change in 
asset turnover which is negative but non-significant. (median and mean measure is -0.027 
and -0.038, respectively). 
 
 From this analysis, it is clear that the improvement in adjusted operating cash flow 
returns is completely contributed by the increase of cash flow margins and not by using 
operating assets productively in the three years following acquisition. Due to the research 
limits, this thesis can only speculate about possible reasons for the decrease in asset turnover 
rates following the transactions. For instance, the disposal of the pre acquisition unwanted 
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capacity is not as efficient as expected in the first three years after takeovers; the large 
increase in operating assets based in the combined firms actually worsens the idle property; 
or the benefits of sales growth are still not enough to be distributed because of the fast 
increase of market shares.  
 
Table 7.2 Asset Turnovers 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Asset Turnover (AT) is calculated as sales divided by market value of asset. Post-acquisition 
performance for each deal is measured by the asset turnover rates of the surviving acquirer after transaction. Pre acquisition 
performance is calculated as a weighted-average of the asset turnover rates for the bidder and the target included (MEGi pre and 
post). The weights are based on the market values of assets of both companies in the year before acquisition. Post- and pre 
-acquisition performances of the matched firms are measured as weighted-average of the asset turnover rates (MATi pre and 
post). Industry, Size, and Pre performance Adjusted Asset Turnover (AAT) is asset turnover rates of merging firms minus those 
of matched firms. AAT and AATpre are the 3 year-median AAT before and after acquisition. The change in industry, size, and 
pre performance adjusted sales turnover (△AAT) is defined as 3-year median AATpost minus 3 year-median AATpre. Outliers 
have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% 
level, * significance at the 10% level. 
Panel A  Asset Turnovers (AT)
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Positive
-3 194 0.653      0.534      194 0.863 0.709 194 -0.210 *** -0.028 *** 30.30%
-2 260 0.841      0.734      260 0.966 0.870 260 -0.125 *** -0.074 *** 41.51%
-1 282 0.769      0.665      282 0.996 0.925 282 -0.227 *** -0.168 *** 39.02%
1 282 0.750      0.642      282 0.936 0.839 282 -0.186 *** -0.173 *** 35.46%
2 280 0.787      0.680      280 0.996 0.858 280 -0.209 *** -0.166 *** 35.71%
3 279 0.878      0.750      279 1.065 0.919 279 -0.187 *** -0.200 *** 39.43%
AATpre: Median for years (-3 to -1) 282 -0.179 *** -0.130 *** 37.28%
AATpost: Median for years (+1 to +3) 282 -0.206 *** -0.172 *** 36.88%
△AAT: change in operating cash flow rate (AATpost -AATpre) 282 -0.027 -0.038 45.39%
Panel B  Regression of AATpost on AATpre
AATpost = - 0.100*** + 0.591***AATpre
F=174.293***
adj. R2 = 38.1%
Industry, Size, and Pre-performance Adjusted
(MEGi -MATi )Year Relative to
Acquisition
Mergering Firms (MEGi ) Matched Firms (MATi )
 
 
7.2.3 Sales Growth Rate (SG) 
 Sales are examined after realizing that the most important source of improved 
operating cash flow returns comes from the cash flow margins rather than from the efficient 
use of resources available in the post-bid period. The one-year sales growth rates (SG) are 
obtained from the Thomson Financial database and are defined as the current year’s net sales 
divided by the last year’s total net sales (St / St-1). Table 7.3 presents the summary statistics of 
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sales growth rates (SG) for merging firms, matched firms, and adjusted sales growth rates 
(ASG) in the years surrounding the acquisition; the 3 year-median ASG before and after 
acquisition (ASGpre and ASGpost) and the change of adjusted asset turnover rate (△ASG) 
are also presented. Again, panel B provides the results of the change regression model. 
 
 The results reveal information that parallels the cash flow margin results in table 7.3. 
Both mean (4.23, 4.66 and 1.12 for year t-3, t-2, and t-1, respectively; 3.13 for ASGpre) and 
median (1.61, 3.64 and 2.29 for year t-3, t-2, and t-1, respectively; 1.51 for ASGpre) 
measures are significantly positive in all but year t-1 in the pre-acquisition period. Merging 
firms outperform their matched counterparts in sales growth rates during the pre-acquisition 
period. After merger, the mean (median) adjusted sales growth rate jumps to 18.43 (16.06) 
percent in year t+1 and then decline to 3.65 (4.42) percent in year t+2 and 0.00 (0.00) in year 
t+3. This result is similar to earlier findings in Ghosh (2001). According to the explanation 
offered in the Ghosh (2001) paper, the big jump in year t+1 is probably due to accounting. 
Because the sales growth rate of year t+1 is calculated based on the sales of year 0, for 
mid-year acquisition target firms’ yearly sales are not fully reported in the combined 
statement at year 0 under purchase accounting, there is a sudden jump in the growth rate of 
year t+1. The mean (6.06) and median (5.43) ASG post are significantly positive at one 
percent level and both measures of change in adjusted sales growth dates (∆ASG) are 
economically significant (2.93 and 4.69).  
 
 The improvements of adjusted sales growth rates following the acquisition are further 
confirmed by the regression results. Panel B presents the regression results of median 
adjusted post-acquisition sales growth rates (ASGpost) on median adjusted pre-acquisition 
measures (ASGpre). The intercept α (5.678) is significantly different from zero at the one 
percent level, which indicates that even after controlling for the effects of pre-merger sales 
growth rates, there is still a significant improvement of 5.678 percent in the sales growth 
rates of merging firms following acquisition.  
 
 From this test, it is clear that sales make an important contribution to the 
improvements of cash flow. However, it is also clear that the advantage in sales growth rates 
dramatically declines year by year after transaction. The difference between merging firms 
and matched firms in sales growth rates becomes insignificant in year t+3.  
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Table 7.3 Sales Growth Rates 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for 
completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM 
Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Sales Growth rate (SG) is calculated as current year’s net sales divided by last 
year’s total net sales. Post-acquisition performance for each deal is measured by the sales growth of the surviving acquirer after 
transaction. Pre acquisition performance is calculated as a weighted-average of the sales growth for the bidder and the target 
included (MEGi pre and post). The weights are based on the market values of assets of both companies in the year before 
acquisition. Post- and pre- acquisition performances of the matched firms are measured as weighted-average of the sales growth 
(MATi pre and post). Industry, Size, and Pre performance Adjusted Sales Growth (ASG) is sales growth rates of merging firms 
minus those of matched firms. ASGpost and ASGpre are the 3 year-median ASG before and after acquisition. The change in 
industry, size, and pre performance adjusted sales growth (△ASG) is defined as 3-year median ASGpost minus 3 year-median 
ASGpre. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 
significance at the 5% level, * significance at the 10% level. 
Panel A Sales Growth Rates (SG)
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Positive
-3 194 10.72 9.72 194 6.50 5.15 194 4.23 *** 1.61 *** 53%
-2 260 14.82 12.16 260 10.16 9.35 260 4.66 *** 3.64 *** 60%
-1 282 15.28 13.07 282 14.16 12.65 282 1.12 2.29 57%
1 282 25.55 21.85 282 7.11 6.59 282 18.43 *** 16.06 *** 77%
2 280 8.02 6.63 280 4.37 3.84 280 3.65 *** 4.42 *** 59%
3 279 5.70 4.48 279 5.70 5.37 279 0.00 0.00 50%
ASGpre: Median for years (-3 to -1) 282 3.13 *** 1.51 *** 57%
ASGpost: Median for years (+1 to +3) 282 6.06 *** 5.43 *** 66%
△ASG: change in sales growth rate (ASGpost -ASGpre) 282 2.93 ** 4.69 *** 59%
Panel B  Regression of ASGpost on ASGpre
ASGpost = 5.678*** + 0.122*ASGpre
F=2.895*
adj. R2 = 0.7%
Industry, Size, and Pre-performance Adjusted
(MEGi -MATi )Year Relative to
Acquisition






7.3 Analysis of Type of Shareholders 
 
As reviewed in section 2.3.2 of chapter two, different types of shareholders have their 
own specific characteristics in the concentrated ownership structure. For family ownership, a 
line of previous literature suggests that a family’s tenure can extend the firm’s learning curve; 
families tend to have longer investment horizons (Stein 1989) and families often attempt to 
invest in positive projects to pass on to their descendants (James 1999). However, the other 
line of study argues that family may limit the top management positions to family members 
instead of hiring more qualified, external professional managers (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino 
and Buchholtz 2001); the family also has more power to act on its own interests (Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang 2000); and the family may be unwilling to raise loans or to issue new 
stocks so as to make new positive investments (Zhang 1998). For institutional ownership, 
some research suggests that institutional investors may have more power and information for 
solving free-rider problems. But some articles argue that institutional investors are unable to 
effectively play their monitoring role because of their passivity, their myopic goals, or their 
interest conflicts (Duggal and Millar 1999). Financial institutional ownership is a specific 
type of institutional ownership. One stream of study represents the positive effect of bank 
involvement because financial institutions are assumed to provide superior monitoring 
capabilities, lower capital costs, or better financial supports (Lichtenberg and Pushner 1994). 
The other stream suggests negative effects since banks are usually risk-averse and are likely 
to use their monopoly power to expropriate minority shareholders (Weinstein and Yafeh 
1998). State ownership is broadly considered an inefficient structure because this structure 
indicates a significant separation problem between control rights and cash flow rights; state 
firms do not attempt to pursue public interests more than private firms (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997).  
 
While the purpose of this thesis is not to examine various types of shareholders, it is 
still valuable to look at the specific benefits and costs of each type of ownership related to 
long-term acquisition operating performance. Therefore, following the classification of 
controlling shareholders in previous literature (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999, 
Claessens et al. 2000, Faccio and Lang 2002), it is possible to identify four ultimate owners 
of concentrated firms in the sample and to then set four dummy variables for the four groups:  
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LSH_FAM which equals to one if an acquiring firm has the ultimate owner who is individual 
or a member of family holding more than 10 percent of firm’s voting shares;  
LSH_FIN which equals to one if an acquiring firm has the ultimate owner who is widely 
held financial institution holding more than 10 percent of firm’s voting shares; 
LSH_NFIN which equals to one if an acquiring firms has the ultimate owner who is widely 
held corporation holding more than 10 percent of firm’s voting shares;   
LSH_GOV which equals to one if an acquiring firms has the ultimate owner who is the 
department of government holding more than 10 percent of firm’s voting shares 
A detailed explanation for the classification and characteristics of each type of 
concentrated firms is described in section 2.3.2 of chapter two..  
 
7.3.1 Statistics Description and Univariate Analysis 
To do univariate analysis, another variable (LSH_Type) is placed. It includes 
dispersed firms (DISPERSED) and four groups of concentrated firms as described above 
(LSH_FAM, LSH_FIN, LSH_NFIN, and LSH_GOV). Table 7.4 shows that in the sample 
companies, family controlled firms (22.7%) and financial institutions controlled firms 
(23.0%) have equal weight. There are 12.8 percent of acquiring firms controlled by a widely 
held corporation and 40 percent of samples are dispersed firms. Only three acquiring firms in 
the sample are identified as state firms; these are all controlled by the Singapore government.  
 
In panel A for pre-acquisition performance (ACFRpre), the mean and median 
measures are higher in family controlled firms (-0.53% and 0.09%) than in overall sample 
companies (-1.51% and -0.70%). While the median measure of the state controlled firms is 
better than that of family firms, the relatively high standard deviation due to the small 
sample size implies the likelihood of bias. Acquiring firms controlled by a widely held 
corporation have poorer pre-performance in both measures (-2.85% for mean and -3.36% for 
median). Nevertheless, the underperformance or outperformance among these subgroups 
within the whole sample is not significant either by using independent t test to compare 
average performance between each type or by using ANOVA F test to examine the 
differences.  
 
Similar results might be derived from panel B for post-acquisition performance 
(ACFRpost). The state controlled firms have better mean and median performances (2.76% 
and 3.96%) but the results may be over interpreted because of the small sample size of the 
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stated controlled firms. Widely held controlled firms still have the lowest mean (-0.86%) and 
median (-1.31%) measures. Family controlled firms (1.15% for mean and 2.15% for median) 
again outperform the overall sample companies (0.31% for mean and 0.59% for median). 
However, there is no significant evidence to support the outperformance of family firms 
either by independent t test or by ANOVA F test.  
 
From panel C for the change performance (∆ACFR), the dispersed firms, except the 
stated controlled firms, create better abnormal returns through M&A transactions (2.04% for 
mean and 2.44% for median) even they do no possess the same high post-acquisition 
performance as family controlled firms. However, this evidence is still not significant 
enough to form any conclusions. A relatively small sample size for each type of concentrated 
firm may affect the results. This thesis further applies a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U 
test. The non-parametric results are qualitatively the same though they are not reported.  
 
Table 7.4 Statistics description and Univariate test of Type of Shareholders 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash 
flow return. ∆ACFR is the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. LSH_FAM is defined when 
the largest shareholder is individual or member of family. LSH_FIN is defined when the largest shareholder is a financial 
institution. LSH_NFIN is defined when the largest shareholder is a non-financial institution. LSH_GOV is defined when the 
largest shareholder is government. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. T tests of differences are 
presented. *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
FIN NFIN GOV DIS
LSH_FAM 64 22.7% -0.53 0.09 7.11 0.715 1.517 0.183 1.124
LSH_FIN 65 23.0% -1.46 -0.99 7.63 - 0.873 0.072 0.188
LSH_NFIN 36 12.8% -2.85 -3.36 7.75 - - -0.093 -0.838
LSH_GOV 3 1.1% -2.06 5.38 14.44 - - - -0.047
DISPERSED 114 40.4% -1.66 -0.72 6.10 - - - -
Overall 282 100.0% -1.51 -0.70 7.00
FIN NFIN GOV DIS
LSH_FAM 64 22.7% 1.15 2.15 8.67 0.949 1.143 -0.312 0.618
LSH_FIN 65 23.0% -0.11 0.34 6.27 - 0.482 -0.759 -0.485
LSH_NFIN 36 12.8% -0.86 -1.31 8.07 - - -0.737 -0.837
LSH_GOV 3 1.1% 2.76 3.96 9.71 - - - 0.603
DISPERSED 114 40.4% 0.38 0.64 6.68 - - - -
Overall 282 100.0% 0.31 0.59 7.28
FIN NFIN GOV DIS
LSH_FAM 64 22.7% 1.68 1.96 7.49 0.244 -0.246 -0.712 -0.332
LSH_FIN 65 23.0% 1.34 -0.29 8.13 - -0.493 0.727 -0.588
LSH_NFIN 36 12.8% 1.99 2.66 4.98 - - -0.930 -0.046
LSH_GOV 3 1.1% 4.82 4.67 6.31 - - - 0.706
DISPERSED 114 40.4% 2.04 2.44 6.72 - - - -








































7.3.2 Regression Results 
Based on the research structures used in the main analysis, four dummy variables for 
the type of large shareholders are first examined in regression models 10 of table 7.5. After 
controlling for those governance and deal factors that are expected to affect acquiring 
performance, it seems the coefficients of financial institutions controlled firms (LSH_FIN) 
for both performance measures are significantly negative at a 10 percent level (-0.017 in both 
panel A for ACFRpost and panel B for △ACFR). Evidence here supports Weinstein and 
Yafeh’s (1998) point by stating that financial institution large shareholders tend to pursue 
less risky projects that would result in lower profit investment returns. Results for the other 
control variables are consistent with the main findings. From panel A for ACFRpost, it is 
clear that separation problems still lead to value reduction; the existence of multi-bidders and 
the larger deviation between bidders’ and targets’ firm size are related to the poorer 
acquisition performance. Panel B for △ACFR evidences how CEO duality has a stronger 
negative impact on the average change performance; the presence of other blockholders 
plays an efficient monitoring role; and acquiring firms have higher levels of leverage that 
may be forced to miss a positive M&A investment.  
 
In model 11, 12, 11.1, and 12.1 of table 7.5, four dummy variables for the type of 
large shareholders are further examined by controlling for institutional variables. An 
interesting result shows that both financial institutions controlled firms and also family 
controlled firms have significantly poor post-acquisition performance. This means that when 
legal and extra-legal mechanisms are controlled, family controlling shareholders are likely to 
act on their own private benefits at the expense of firm performance through M&A 
transactions. Besides, once institutional variables are controlled, the first generation 
governance mechanisms become significantly important. For example, in panel A for post 
operating performance (ACFRpost) controlling CEOs have higher incentive to make 
profitable M&A decisions and smaller board size may function more efficiently. The other 
results for deal and institutional variables are the same as those held in the main analyses. 
Initial anti-director right and revised anti-director right indexes are stable proxies to 




Table 7.5 Regression Results of Type of Large shareholders 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash 
flow return. ∆ACFR is the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. Outliers have been 
winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. T tests of differences are presented. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. LSH_FAM is defined when the largest shareholder is 
individual or member of family. LSH_FIN is defined when the largest shareholder is a financial institution. LSH_NFIN is 
defined when the largest shareholder is a non-financial institution. LSH_GOV is defined when the largest shareholder is 
government. See table 5.5 for the definitions of other variables. 
Panel A   Regression Results on Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.052 ** -0.196 0.056 0.008 0.102
LSH_FAM -0.014 -0.024 * -0.023 * -0.026 * -0.024 *
LSH_FIN -0.017 * -0.019 * -0.018 * -0.020 ** -0.019 *
LSH_NFIN -0.001 -0.015 -0.013 -0.016 -0.012
LSH_GOV 0.015 0.023 0.021 0.004 -0.023
SEP -0.020 * -0.027 ** -0.028 ** -0.028 ** -0.028 **
CEOLSH 0.024 0.034 ** 0.032 ** 0.032 ** 0.031 **
CEOdual -0.015 -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.017 *
BSIZE -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 *
INDDIR -0.021 -0.034 -0.031 -0.041 -0.039
OTHLSH 0.013 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.012
TGORI_English 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
ATTI_Hostile 0.006 0.017 0.012 0.003 0.009
PAY_stock -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.015
COMPETE -0.037 ** -0.040 *** -0.039 ** -0.040 ** -0.039 **
IND_rel 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002
TOEHOLD 0.007 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.010
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.005 ** -0.004 * -0.005 ** -0.005 * -0.005 **
LEV -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003






NANTIDIR_high 0.071 *** 0.056 ***
UK -0.075 -0.043 -0.075 *** -0.042 **
CAN -0.068 -0.046 *** 0.115 ** 0.020
AUS 0.059 ** 0.055 ** 0.036 * 0.036
ACFRpre 0.520 *** 0.506 *** 0.517 *** 0.515 *** 0.519 ***





Model 12 Model 12.1Model 11.1Model 10 Model 11
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Table 7.5 (Continued) 
Panel B   Dependent Variable:  △ACFR
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.052 ** -0.222 0.017 -0.001 0.080
LSH_FAM -0.014 -0.028 * -0.027 * -0.029 * -0.027 *
LSH_FIN -0.017 * -0.022 * -0.021 * -0.022 * -0.020 *
LSH_NFIN -0.001 -0.015 -0.012 -0.013 -0.009
LSH_GOV 0.015 0.031 0.025 0.016 -0.007
SEP -0.020 -0.023 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021
CEOLSH 0.024 0.028 * 0.024 0.024 0.022
CEOdual -0.015 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.022 ** -0.025 **
BSIZE -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.021 -0.019 -0.014 -0.021 -0.019
OTHLSH 0.013 * 0.017 0.020 * 0.021 * 0.023 *
TGORI_English 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
ATTI_Hostile 0.006 0.008 0.012 0.009 0.014
PAY_stock -0.012 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012
COMPETE -0.037 *** -0.055 *** -0.055 *** -0.054 *** -0.053 ***
IND_rel 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.009
TOEHOLD 0.007 0.024 ** 0.022 * 0.020 * 0.018
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
LEV -0.001 ** -0.007 * -0.008 ** -0.008 ** -0.008 **






NANTIDIR_high 0.071 *** 0.059 **
UK -0.134 ** -0.076 ** -0.074 *** -0.045 **
CAN -0.145 ** -0.061 *** 0.089 0.007
AUS 0.032 0.035 0.031 0.031













7.4 Analysis of Cross Effects of Type I and Type II Agency 
Problem 
 
As defined in section 4.3.3, the type I agency problem exists when a company with 
control devices which separate control rights from cash flow rights. The type II agency 
problem occurs when a company with an independent CEO owning few shares in the 
company; this causes the divergence-of-interest effects between ownership and management. 
Extending the evidence regarding to separation (SEP) and controlling CEO (CEOLSH) in 
the main analyses, this thesis also attempts to examine the interactive effects between these 
two types of agency problems on acquisition operating performance. That is, which type of 
these two agency problems is the more detrimental to acquisition performance? To what 
extent can one type of agency cost be offset by ameliorating the other type of agency cost, 
and vice versa?  The results are presented in table 7.6.  
 
From panel A of table 7.6 for full samples, there are 29 firms with both the type I and 
the type II agency problems, 18 firms with the type I but not the type II agency problem, 214 
firms with the type II but not the type I problem, and 21 firms with neither the type I nor the 
type II agency problem. As expected, it is clear from these findings that the mean measure of 
post-acquisition performance (ACFRpost) in companies with the type I and the type II 
agency costs (-3.64%) is significantly worse than in the other groups. Companies without the 
type II but with the type I (3.50% for ACFRpost), as compared to companies with the type II 
but without the type I (0.42% for ACFRpost), have statistically higher performance measures 
(t=1.814 for ACFRpost). Moreover, in companies without the type II problems there is no 
significant difference (t=0.647 for ACFRpost) between companies with and without the type 
I agency costs. In sum, it is clear that the separation of ownership and management (the type 
II agency problem) has a dominant effect on acquisition performance for this sample. When 
the type II agency cost is curbed, the type I agency costs can be offset to the extent that 
performance in companies with a type I problem (3.50% for ACFRpost) is made even better 
(but not more significant) than in companies without the type I agency costs (1.86% for 
ACFRpost). The similarity of these cross effects is reflected in the change in adjusted 
operating cash flow returns (∆ACFR). While the difference between the average performance 
of companies with the type I but without the type II (3.64% for ∆ACFR) and the performance 
of companies with the type II but without the type I (2.24% for ∆ACFR) is not as significant 
as that in the ACFRpost measure, it is clear in the group without the type II costs that 
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companies even with the type I costs (3.64% for ∆ACFR) still can significantly outperform 
companies without the type I agency costs (-0.14% for ∆ACFR).  
 
Note that the effects of the type II agency problem might be enforced since there are 
114 dispersed firms in full samples and the CEOs in those firms are clearly not related to 
large shareholders. Therefore, in subsequent analyses the independent t tests were carried out 
only for the 168 concentrated firms having large shareholders with more than 10 percent of 
company shares. Table 7.6 panel B reveals the results of these tests. After excluding the 
dispersed firms, there are 24 firms with both the type I and the type II agency problem, 18 
firms with the type I but without the type II agency problem, 105 firms with the type II but 
without the type I problem, and 21 firms with neither the type I nor the type II agency 
problem. Similarity, the existence of both types of agency problem is still associated with the 
lowest average operating performance (-4.22% for ACFRpost and -0.50% for ∆ACFR) 
among the subgroups. Acquiring firms without the type II agency problem even with the type 
I agency costs (3.50% for ACFRpost, 3.64% for ∆ACFR) still outperform the acquiring firms 
with type II agency problems no matter those firms with or without type I agency problems. 
Results again confirm that the type II agency costs have a stronger impact on both 
performance measures in the sample; this conclusion continues to hold even when the 
dispersed firms are excluded from the full sample.  
 
Furthermore, to specifically identify the interactive effects on family firms, focus is 
placed on 64 family controlled firms in the sample. Table 7.6 panel C illustrates that there 
are seven family controlled firms with a separation policy and which are hiring independent 
CEOs; 16 family firms with a separation policy but which are run by family CEOs; 24 
family firms without the type I but with the type II agency costs; and 17 family firms without 
both the type I and the type II agency costs. Neither the type I costs nor the type II costs 
significantly impact the post-acquisition performance (ACFRpost) of family controlled firms. 
Family CEOs do not have as strong a positive impact on the acquisition performance of a 
family firm as does the controlling CEOs of the concentrated firms. For the change in 
adjusted operating cash flow returns (∆ACFR), family acquiring firms with both agency 
costs are related to the significant negative performance. There is no evidence to suggest 
which factor is the most detrimental to acquisition performance. Considering that the sample 
firms in each subgroup are relatively small, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test is also 
conducted. The results are qualitatively similar and are reported in table 7.7. 
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Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine the relative importance of the conflict of interest 
between managers and controlling large shareholders for US family firms. Their answers 
suggest that the interaction between family control and management generates significant 
value differences across firms but that such interaction relies crucially on whether the CEO is 
the family-founder or the family-descendent. A negative impact on the firm value of 
separation reduces the founder premium. Founder-CEO firms with separation, however, are 
more valuable than non-family firms, while minority shareholders in descendant-CEO family 
firms are worse off than they would have been in a non-family firm. These results are 
comparable to the findings of Villalonga and Amit (2006) but only for concentrated firms 
with controlling CEOs. The differences still exist when focusing on family firms but there is 
no statistical significance for making solid conclusions.  
 
Table 7.6 Cross effects of Type I and Type II Agency Problems using Independent t Test 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash 
flow return. ∆ACFR is the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. Outliers have been 
winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. T tests of differences are presented. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Type I agency problem is defined as company with 
separation problem (SEP=1) of ownership and voting shares. Type II agency problem is defined as company with independent 
CEO (CEOLSH=0).  













n 29 18 n 29 18
µ -3.64% 3.50% µ -0.93% 3.64%
n 214 21 n 214 21
µ 0.42% 1.86% µ 2.24% -0.14%
-2.928*** 0.647 -2.351** -2.287** 1.731* -0.404













n 24 18 n 24 18
µ -4.22% 3.50% µ -0.50% 3.64%
n 105 21 n 105 21
µ 0.41% 1.86% µ 2.20% -0.14%
-2.796*** 0.647 -2.471** -1.634 1.731* -0.175













n 7 16 n 7 16
µ -2.08% 3.12% µ -3.33% 2.87%
n 24 17 n 24 17
µ 0.25% 1.92% µ 3.37% 0.23%
-0.589 0.422 1.000 -2.042* 1.067 1.024
2.008*
△ACFR
NO (SEP=0) 0.580 NO (SEP=0)
                             Type II
Type I
                             Type II
Type I
YES (SEP=1) 1.436 YES (SEP=1)
Test of difference (t)
0.830NO (SEP=0)
ACFRpost






Test of difference (t)
YES (SEP=1) YES (SEP=1)
NO (SEP=0) NO (SEP=0)
Test of difference (t)




Test of difference (t)
YES (SEP=1)
NO (SEP=0)
                             Type II
Type I
-1.303










Table 7.7 Cross effects of Type I and Type II Agency Problems using non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney U Test  
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash 
flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. Outliers have been 
winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. The absolute values of Z statistics of Non-Parametric Mann-Whitney U Tests 
are presented. *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Type I 
agency problem is defined as company with separation problem (SEP=1) of ownership and voting shares. Type II agency 
problem is defined as company with independent CEO (CEOLSH=0). 













n 29 18 n 29 18
µ -3.64% 3.50% µ -0.93% 3.64%
n 214 21 n 214 21
µ 0.42% 1.86% µ 2.24% -0.14%
2.859*** 0.704 2.388** 2.248** 1.831* 0.678













n 24 18 n 24 18
µ -4.22% 3.50% µ -0.50% 3.64%
n 105 21 n 105 21
µ 0.41% 1.86% µ 2.20% -0.14%
2.645*** 0.704 2.503** 1.456 1.831* 0.410













n 7 16 n 7 16
µ -2.08% 3.12% µ -3.33% 2.87%
n 24 17 n 24 17
µ 0.25% 1.92% µ 3.37% 0.23%
0.378 0.504 0.984 1.843* 0.937 1.111











                             Type II
Type I





YES (SEP=1) YES (SEP=1)











                             Type II
Type I
                             Type II
Type I
0.794
YES (SEP=1) 1.336 YES (SEP=1) 1.804*
Non-Par Test (|Z|) Non-Par Test (|Z|)




7.5 Analysis of Different Definition of Independent Variables 
 
This section reports the results on acquisition performance using different definitions 
of independent variables. It investigates cross border deals instead of cross origin 
transactions; it uses a definition of industry relatedness by two-digit and three-digit SIC 
codes; it extends the pre-bid period for premium measure from 1-day to 1-week and 4-week; 
and finally it adds in a year dummy to capture year differences. Table 7.8 summarizes the 
univariate statistics of all additional explanatory variables with different definition. Table 
7.9 to table 7.14 displays separate regression results for each variable.  
 
Table 7.8 Univariate Statistics of Additional Independent Variables  
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for 
completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM 
Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance 
adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. CROSSBD is 
defined as the nation of acquiring firm is different from that of target firms. IND_rel_2D is defined as the acquiring and target 
firms had equivalent 2-digit primary SIC code at transaction year. IND_rel_3D is defined as the acquiring and target firms had 
equivalent 3-digit primary SIC code at transaction year. PREM_1W is the premium of offer price to target trading price one 
week prior to the announcement date. PREM_4W is the premium of offer price to target trading price four week prior to the 
announcement date. The year of acquisition completed in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 is defined as YR98, YR99, YR00 and 
YR01, respectively. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. T tests of differences and Pearson 

















Y 127 45% -0.84 -0.65 6.97 1.42 1.31 6.98
N 155 55% 1.25 1.32 7.41 2.15 2.47 7.06
Y 175 62% -0.14 0.30 7.32 1.66 1.02 7.51
N 107 38% 1.05 1.11 7.18 2.09 2.92 6.18
Y 138 49% -0.17 -0.16 7.37 1.99 1.60 7.34
N 144 51% 0.77 1.10 7.19 1.66 2.08 6.73
PREM_1W (%) - 250 89% - - - -0.051 - - - -0.014
PREM_4W (%) - 260 92% - - - -0.008 - - - 0.020
Y 43 15% 2.11 2.37 6.17 3.14 3.12 7.11
N 239 85% -0.01 0.30 7.43 1.59 1.39 7.00
Y 74 26% 0.15 0.56 6.16 2.19 2.09 6.17
N 208 74% 0.37 0.59 7.65 1.69 1.63 7.31
Y 88 31% 0.22 0.09 8.48 0.74 1.07 7.75
N 194 69% 0.35 0.76 6.68 2.31 2.20 6.63
Y 67 24% -0.02 0.54 7.26 1.92 0.28 7.13















7.5.1 Cross Border 
Cross border mergers are generally expected to create synergies from business 
diversification as well as less systematic risks and stronger market power (Seth, Song and 
Pettit 2002). However, this type of deals suffers from different cultural, legal, and 
transactional barriers (Campa and Hernando 2004). In the main analyses, focus is upon cross 
origin deals that have more severe challenges for those different natures. Here, additional 
analysis is presented in order to obtain more information about the expected costs and 
potential advantages of cross border deals. One dummy variable (CROSSBD) is equal to one 
when the nation of the acquiring firm is different from that of target firm. 
 
It is clear from table 7.8 that the average adjusted cash flow returns of cross border 
deals is significantly negative in the post-merger period. The potential advantages of cross 
border transactions are offset by high entry costs. This result supports previous research 
which finds that acquiring firms obtain lower abnormal returns in cross-border deals than  
in domestic deals (André, Kooli and L'Her 2004, Campa and Hernando 2004, Moeller and 
Schlingemann 2005). Regression results in table 7.9, however, indicate that the nature 
problems of cross border deals are not the major factors which destroy acquisition values; 
their significant negative effects can be explained by the other control variables. 
 
7.5.2 Industry Relatedness: two-digit and three- digit SIC codes 
The choice of industry definition to classify industry related versus non-related 
acquisitions is a critical issue. Two-digit codes are defined as firms in different industrial 
groups; three- or four-digit codes are simply defined as being related to firms in different 
product lines. Two-digit SIC codes are employed by Ghosh (2001) and Ben-Amar and André 
(2006). Tighter definitions of three- or four-digit codes are employed by Eckbo (1983, 1985), 
Lang and Stulz (1994) and Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu and Zulehner (2003). Ghosh (2004) 
defines related industry based on a four-digit SIC code but also provides comparisons for a 
three and a two-digit SIC code definition. He argues that “merging firms are likely to benefit 
mostly from economies of scale when the industry definition is based on a four-digit SIC 
code (horizontal acquisitions). The sources of benefits for mergers within a three-digit SIC 
code possibly include economies of technical scope and economies of scale (vertical 
acquisitions). Mergers within a two-digit SIC code are most likely to benefit from economies 
of scope (conglomerate acquisitions) and are less likely to benefit from economies of scale”.  
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Therefore, in this additional analysis two dummy variables are used in order to test the 
effects of the choice of industry definition: (1) IND_rel_2D equals to one when the acquiring 
firms and target firms had equivalent 2-digit primary SIC code at transaction year. (2) 
IND_rel_3D equals to one when the acquiring firms and target firms have an equivalent 
3-digit primary SIC code at the transaction year. In table 7.8, there is no significant 
difference between related and non-related mergers, no matter whether using a two-digit or a 
three-digit SIC code to define business relatedness. Regression results in table 7.10 for 
two-digit SIC codes and in table 7.11 for three-digit SIC codes also confirm the 
non-significant difference as the results in univariate analysis. This finding is consistent with 
the findings of Limmack and McGregor (1995) and André et al. (2004) who document that 
there is no significant difference between conglomerate and non-conglomerate mergers. 
    
7.5.3 Pre- bid Period for Premium Measure: one week and four weeks 
Schwert (1996) shows that any abnormal movement of the target’s stock price in 
pre-bid period (called the pre-bid runup) is an added cost for the bidders. If this argument 
can be sustained, then a longer pre-bid period may be more relevant to premium measure 
since it includes most runup costs. To control this possible pre-bid runup effect, this thesis 
replaces the 1-day premium by a 1-week and 4-week premium, respectively. Thus, two 
explanatory variables are added: (1) PREM_1W is the difference in the bid price and the 
target’s market value one week before announcement. (2) PREM_4W is the difference in the 
bid price and the target’s market value four weeks prior to the announcement. 
 
 From table 7.8, it is clear that neither a 1-week premium nor a 4-week premium has a 
significant relationship with post-acquisition performance (both ACFRpost and ∆ACFR). 
Regression results in table 7.12 for a 1-week premium and in table 7.13 for a 4-week 
premium are in agreement with previously published studies which suggest that focusing on 
an assessment of the relationship between bid premium and other deal characteristics is more 
meaningful than directly discussing the impact of the bid premium on acquisition 
performance (Walkling and Edmister 1985, Goergen and Renneboog 2004)  
 
7.5.4 Year Dummy 
From table 5.2 in the main analysis, it is clear that most deals (61.2%) are completed 
in year 2000; only 0.5 percent of transactions belong to year 1997. As sample deals are not 
proportionally distributed among five event years (1997-2001), this thesis sets another four 
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dummy variables in order to capture similarities or discrepancies among acquisition years 
with respect to acquisition performance. YR98, YR99, YR00 and YR01 are set to equal to 
one when the year of acquisition completed is in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively. 
 
From table 7.8, it is evident that transactions completed in year 1998 have 
significantly higher average adjusted cash flow returns in the post-merger periods 
(ACFRpost). Instead, deals completed in year 2000 have significant underperformance by the 
change performance measure (∆ACFR). However, table 7.14 presents evidence that when 
these four- year dummy variables are considered into regression models as control variables, 
the significant effects of year difference disappear in both performance measures (ACFRpost 
and ∆ACFR). The other variables including ownership variables, governance variables, 
institutions variables, and deal variables have consistent and stable results as those in the 
main analyses. Year difference therefore has no explanation power for the improvements of 
acquisition in the sample. 
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Table 7.9 Regression Results of Cross Border Deals 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. T tests of differences are presented. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 
5% level, * significant at the 10% level. CROSSBD is defined as the nation of acquiring firm is different from that of target firms. See table 5.5 for other variables definitions. 
Panel A  Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.055 ** 0.048 *** 0.071 *** 0.070 *** 0.043 ** 0.045 ** 0.059 *** -0.170 0.055 ** 0.019 0.109
CONCEN10 -0.013
CONCEN1020 -0.027 *** -0.027 ***
CONCEN20 0.023 ** 0.009
CONCEN2050 0.008
CONCEN50 0.010
LSH1P 0.021 -0.005 -0.252 ** -0.212 ** -0.214 ** -0.238 ** -0.215 **
LSH1PSQ 0.038 1.045 *** 0.716 ** 0.760 ** 0.813 ** 0.760 **
LSH1PCUBE -0.910 *** -0.584 * -0.632 ** -0.668 ** -0.635 *
SEP -0.020 * -0.028 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.027 ** -0.030 ** -0.033 ** -0.034 *** -0.034 *** -0.033 **
CEOLSH 0.025 ** 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.026 * 0.023 * 0.022 * 0.021
CEOdual -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012 -0.010 -0.012 -0.010 -0.014
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 *
INDDIR -0.021 -0.012 -0.020 -0.020 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.026 -0.022 -0.030 -0.027
OTHLSH 0.012 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.011
CROSSBD -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006
ATTI_Hostile 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.016 0.013 0.005 0.011
PAY_stock -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013
COMPETE -0.036 ** -0.033 ** -0.036 ** -0.036 ** -0.034 ** -0.034 ** -0.036 ** -0.039 ** -0.038 ** -0.038 ** -0.037 **
IND_rel 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
TOEHOLD 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.009
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.004 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 * -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.005 **
LEV -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003






NANTIDIR_high 0.056 ** 0.041 *
UK -0.065 -0.028 -0.060 ** -0.026
CAN -0.071 -0.039 ** 0.099 ** 0.011
AUS 0.054 ** 0.053 ** 0.031 0.030
ACFRpre 0.511 *** 0.516 *** 0.519 *** 0.518 *** 0.511 *** 0.511 *** 0.513 *** 0.503 *** 0.510 *** 0.510 *** 0.516 ***









Model 9.1Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 8 Model 9Model 8.1
33.9
7.011***7.935*** 8.164*** 8.339*** 7.872***






Table 7.9 (Continued) 
Panel B  Dependent Variable:  △ACFR
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.033 0.027 0.051 ** 0.052 ** 0.022 0.023 0.037 * -0.181 0.018 0.014 0.086
CONCEN10 -0.013
CONCEN1020 -0.028 *** -0.028 **
CONCEN20 0.026 ** 0.012
CONCEN2050 0.015
CONCEN50 0.006
LSH1P 0.021 0.000 -0.253 ** -0.236 ** -0.223 * -0.236 ** -0.218 *
LSH1PSQ 0.030 1.066 *** 0.785 * 0.749 * 0.803 * 0.761 *
LSH1PCUBE -0.936 *** -0.624 * -0.602 * -0.650 * -0.624 *
SEP -0.016 -0.026 ** -0.024 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.026 ** -0.029 ** -0.028 * -0.028 * -0.027 *
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.012
CEOdual -0.023 ** -0.021 ** -0.022 ** -0.021 ** -0.023 ** -0.023 ** -0.021 ** -0.020 * -0.021 * -0.020 * -0.023 **
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.012 -0.002 -0.012 -0.014 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007
OTHLSH 0.023 * 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.021 * 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.022 *
CROSSBD -0.009 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
ATTI_Hostile 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.007 0.014 0.012 0.017
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
COMPETE -0.049 *** -0.046 *** -0.050 *** -0.050 *** -0.047 *** -0.048 *** -0.049 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.052 *** -0.051 ***
IND_rel 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009
TOEHOLD 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.021 * 0.019 * 0.018 0.017
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
LEV -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 * -0.006 * -0.007 ** -0.007 * -0.008 **






NANTIDIR_high 0.060 ** 0.048 *
UK -0.125 ** -0.068 * -0.061 ** -0.033
CAN -0.145 ** -0.057 *** 0.070 -0.001
AUS 0.027 0.032 0.029 0.028





Model 5 Model 6
4.4 7.9
1.586* 1.804** 2.130***










1.831** 1.802**  
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Table 7.10 Regression Results of Industry Relatedness: Two- digit Primary SIC Code 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. T tests of differences are presented. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 
5% level, * significant at the 10% level. IND_rel_2D is defined as the acquiring and target firms had equivalent 2-digit primary SIC code at transaction year. See table 5.5 for other variables definitions. 
Panel A  Dependent Variable: ACFRpost  (2-digit primary SIC code)
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.053 ** 0.054 ** 0.076 *** 0.076 *** 0.045 ** 0.046 ** 0.060 *** -0.165 0.064 ** 0.025 0.118
CONCEN10 -0.013
CONCEN1020 -0.027 *** -0.027 ***
CONCEN20 0.024 ** 0.011
CONCEN2050 0.010
CONCEN50 0.011
LSH1P 0.023 -0.003 -0.244 ** -0.208 ** -0.211 ** -0.235 ** -0.213 **
LSH1PSQ 0.038 1.022 *** 0.675 * 0.728 ** 0.776 ** 0.729 **
LSH1PCUBE -0.889 *** -0.538 * -0.595 * -0.625 * -0.597 *
SEP -0.019 * -0.028 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.027 ** -0.030 ** -0.033 *** -0.035 *** -0.035 *** -0.034 ***
CEOLSH 0.025 * 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.015 0.025 ** 0.022 * 0.022 * 0.021 *
CEOdual -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.015
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 *
INDDIR -0.022 -0.012 -0.021 -0.021 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.028 -0.024 -0.033 -0.029
OTHLSH 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.012
TGORI_English 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
ATTI_Hostile 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.017 0.013 0.005 0.012
PAY_stock -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013
COMPETE -0.034 ** -0.031 ** -0.034 ** -0.034 ** -0.032 ** -0.032 ** -0.034 ** -0.037 ** -0.036 ** -0.036 ** -0.035 **
IND_rel_2D -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008
TOEHOLD 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.007
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 **
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002






NANTIDIR_high 0.061 *** 0.045 **
UK -0.068 -0.034 -0.065 ** -0.029
CAN -0.066 -0.040 ** 0.105 ** 0.014
AUS 0.057 ** 0.056 ** 0.036 * 0.035
ACFRpre 0.512 *** 0.513 *** 0.517 *** 0.517 *** 0.510 *** 0.510 *** 0.512 *** 0.497 *** 0.507 *** 0.506 *** 0.511 ***








Model 8.1Model 8 Model 9Model 5 Model 6 Model 9.1Model 1
29.2
7.825*** 8.105*** 8.291***








Table 7.10 (Continued) 
Panel B   Dependent Variable: △ACFR (2-digit primary SIC code)
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.027 0.028 0.051 * 0.053 ** 0.018 0.019 0.034 -0.191 0.021 0.012 0.090
CONCEN10 -0.014
CONCEN1020 -0.029 *** -0.029 ***
CONCEN20 0.025 ** 0.011
CONCEN2050 0.015
CONCEN50 0.006
LSH1P 0.020 -0.007 -0.255 ** -0.241 ** -0.231 ** -0.245 ** -0.227 **
LSH1PSQ 0.040 1.053 *** 0.769 * 0.741 * 0.798 * 0.758 *
LSH1PCUBE -0.916 *** -0.596 -0.580 -0.629 * -0.606 *
SEP -0.015 -0.025 * -0.024 * -0.022 * -0.022 * -0.023 * -0.026 * -0.029 ** -0.028 * -0.028 * -0.027 *
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.011
CEOdual -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.022 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.020 * -0.023 **
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.013 -0.003 -0.012 -0.014 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.012 -0.007 -0.011 -0.008
OTHLSH 0.023 * 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.023 *
TGORI_English 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
ATTI_Hostile 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.008 0.015 0.013 0.019
PAY_stock -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009
COMPETE -0.049 *** -0.045 *** -0.048 *** -0.049 *** -0.047 *** -0.047 *** -0.048 *** -0.052 *** -0.051 *** -0.051 *** -0.050 ***
IND_rel_2D -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003
TOEHOLD 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.020 * 0.018 0.017 0.016
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
LEV -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 * -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.008 **






NANTIDIR_high 0.063 ** 0.049 **
UK -0.132 ** -0.072 * -0.064 ** -0.034
CAN -0.148 ** -0.057 *** 0.078 0.002
AUS 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.030









Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 7Model 4
1.516* 1.708** 2.067*** 1.959** 1.431 1.354 1.690**
2.9
Model 5 Model 6
3.9 6.0 7.74.2
Model 8 Model 9 Model 9.1Model 8.1
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Table 7.11 Regression Results of Industry Relatedness: Three- digit Primary SIC Code 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. T tests of differences are presented. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 
5% level, * significant at the 10% level. IND_rel_3D is defined as the acquiring and target firms had equivalent 3-digit primary SIC code at transaction year. See table 5.5 for other variables definitions. 
Panel A  Dependent Variable: ACFRpost   (3-digit primary SIC code)
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.051 ** 0.052 ** 0.074 *** 0.074 *** 0.043 * 0.044 * 0.058 ** -0.157 0.057 * 0.021 0.111
CONCEN10 -0.013
CONCEN1020 -0.027 *** -0.027 ***
CONCEN20 0.024 ** 0.011
CONCEN2050 0.011
CONCEN50 0.011
LSH1P 0.023 0.000 -0.239 ** -0.201 ** -0.205 ** -0.228 ** -0.208 **
LSH1PSQ 0.034 1.016 *** 0.676 * 0.728 ** 0.772 ** 0.727 **
LSH1PCUBE -0.889 *** -0.549 * -0.603 * -0.630 * -0.603 *
SEP -0.019 * -0.028 ** -0.026 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.026 ** -0.029 ** -0.032 ** -0.033 *** -0.034 *** -0.033 **
CEOLSH 0.025 * 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.025 * 0.022 * 0.022 0.021
CEOdual -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 -0.014
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 *
INDDIR -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.027 -0.024 -0.032 -0.029
OTHLSH 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011
TGORI_English 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
ATTI_Hostile 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.016 0.012 0.005 0.011
PAY_stock -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013
COMPETE -0.034 ** -0.031 ** -0.034 ** -0.034 ** -0.032 ** -0.033 ** -0.034 ** -0.037 ** -0.037 ** -0.037 ** -0.036 **
IND_rel_3D -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
TOEHOLD 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.008
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 **
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002






NANTIDIR_high 0.061 *** 0.046 **
UK -0.065 -0.034 -0.063 ** -0.029
CAN -0.062 -0.041 ** 0.101 ** 0.014
AUS 0.055 ** 0.054 ** 0.035 0.034
ACFRpre 0.512 *** 0.514 *** 0.516 *** 0.516 *** 0.511 *** 0.511 *** 0.513 *** 0.500 *** 0.509 *** 0.508 *** 0.513 ***
 Adjust R2 (%)
F 
31.4









7.774*** 8.073*** 8.244*** 7.780***
Model 4
28.8 28.6 30.6
Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9.1Model 7
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Table 7.11 (Continued) 
Panel B   Dependent Variable: △ACFR (3-digit primary SIC code)
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.022 0.023 0.046 * 0.049 * 0.013 0.014 0.028 -0.190 0.015 0.009 0.084
CONCEN10 -0.013
CONCEN1020 -0.028 ** -0.028 **
CONCEN20 0.026 ** 0.012
CONCEN2050 0.016
CONCEN50 0.007
LSH1P 0.021 0.004 -0.244 ** -0.229 ** -0.220 * -0.233 ** -0.217 *
LSH1PSQ 0.024 1.044 *** 0.764 * 0.738 * 0.791 * 0.753 *
LSH1PCUBE -0.923 *** -0.609 * -0.594 * -0.641 * -0.618 *
SEP -0.016 -0.025 ** -0.024 * -0.022 * -0.022 * -0.023 * -0.026 * -0.029 ** -0.027 * -0.027 * -0.027 *
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.011
CEOdual -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.022 ** -0.024 ** -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.024 **
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.013 -0.002 -0.012 -0.014 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.011 -0.006 -0.010 -0.007
OTHLSH 0.023 * 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.022 *
TGORI_English 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
ATTI_Hostile 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.009 0.015 0.013 0.019
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
COMPETE -0.049 *** -0.046 *** -0.049 *** -0.049 *** -0.048 *** -0.048 *** -0.049 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.052 *** -0.050 ***
IND_rel_3D 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
TOEHOLD 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.021 * 0.019 * 0.018 0.017
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
LEV -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 * -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.007 **






NANTIDIR_high 0.061 ** 0.048 **
UK -0.127 ** -0.069 * -0.062 ** -0.033
CAN -0.144 ** -0.057 *** 0.074 0.001
AUS 0.028 0.033 0.030 0.029























Table 7.12 Regression Results of Pre Bid Period for Premium Measure: One- Week 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Pearson Correlation test are presented. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 
the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. PREM_1W is the premium of offer price to target trading price one week prior to the announcement date. See table 5.5 for other variables definitions. 
Panel A  Dependent Variable: ACFRpost  (One-week Premium)
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.049 ** 0.050 ** 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.041 * 0.042 * 0.056 ** -0.147 0.055 * 0.023 0.110
CONCEN10 -0.012
CONCEN1020 -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
CONCEN20 0.023 ** 0.011
CONCEN2050 0.010
CONCEN50 0.012
LSH1P 0.022 0.005 -0.240 ** -0.203 ** -0.207 ** -0.229 ** -0.209 **
LSH1PSQ 0.026 1.028 *** 0.710 ** 0.760 ** 0.804 ** 0.759 **
LSH1PCUBE -0.906 *** -0.590 * -0.642 ** -0.670 ** -0.643 *
SEP -0.020 * -0.029 ** -0.027 ** -0.028 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.030 ** -0.032 ** -0.034 *** -0.034 *** -0.033 **
CEOLSH 0.025 * 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.024 * 0.021 0.021 0.020
CEOdual -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.014
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 *
INDDIR -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.026 -0.022 -0.030 -0.027
OTHLSH 0.013 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.012
TGORI_English 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
ATTI_Hostile 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.019 0.015 0.007 0.013
PAY_stock -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014
COMPETE -0.034 ** -0.031 ** -0.034 ** -0.034 ** -0.032 ** -0.032 ** -0.034 ** -0.036 ** -0.036 ** -0.036 ** -0.035 **
IND_rel 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
TOEHOLD 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.008
PREM_1W 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.004 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.004 * -0.005 * -0.005 * -0.005 **
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003






NANTIDIR_high 0.058 ** 0.043 **
UK -0.057 -0.028 -0.059 ** -0.026
CAN -0.057 -0.039 ** 0.097 ** 0.013
AUS 0.055 ** 0.054 ** 0.033 0.032
ACFRpre 0.515 *** 0.517 *** 0.520 *** 0.520 *** 0.514 *** 0.513 *** 0.515 *** 0.501 *** 0.511 *** 0.511 *** 0.516 ***




Model 5 Model 6
33.5
7.651*** 7.207*** 7.482*** 6.440***7.718*** 8.008*** 8.113*** 7.667***
Model 8 Model 9 Model 9.1Model 8.1Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
31.128.9 29.8 31.4 33.4
6.876***
32.5 31.6
6.404*** 6.416***  
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Table 7.12 (Continued) 
Panel B   Dependent Variable: △ACFR (One-week Premium)
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.022 0.023 0.045 * 0.047 * 0.01329 0.014 0.029 -0.17081 0.014 0.014 0.085
CONCEN10 -0.013
CONCEN1020 -0.027 ** -0.027 **
CONCEN20 0.025 ** 0.012
CONCEN2050 0.016
CONCEN50 0.007
LSH1P 0.020 0.004 -0.248 ** -0.235 ** -0.225 ** -0.237 ** -0.221 *
LSH1PSQ 0.024 1.058 ** 0.799 ** 0.773 * 0.821 ** 0.784 *
LSH1PCUBE -0.936 *** -0.645 * -0.629 * -0.672 * -0.650 *
SEP -0.017 -0.026 ** -0.025 ** -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.027 ** -0.029 ** -0.028 * -0.028 * -0.027 *
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.011
CEOdual -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.022 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.020 * -0.020 * -0.020 * -0.023 **
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.014 -0.004 -0.013 -0.015 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006
OTHLSH 0.024 * 0.012 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.021 * 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.023 *
TGORI_English 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005
ATTI_Hostile 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.011 0.016 0.015 0.019
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
COMPETE -0.049 *** -0.046 *** -0.048 *** -0.049 *** -0.047 *** -0.047 *** -0.048 *** -0.052 *** -0.051 *** -0.051 *** -0.050 ***
IND_rel 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.010
TOEHOLD 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.020 * 0.019 0.017 0.016
PREM_1W 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
LEV -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 * -0.006 * -0.007 ** -0.007 * -0.008 **






NANTIDIR_high 0.059 ** 0.047 *
UK -0.118 ** -0.065 ** -0.058 ** -0.031
CAN -0.137 * -0.056 *** 0.068 -0.001
AUS 0.027 0.032 0.028 0.027






7.5 6.12.5 2.2 4.4
Model 9.1Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 7Model 4 Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9
1.519* 1.733** 2.040** 1.938** 1.455 1.368 1.723**
2.9
Model 5 Model 6
4.0 5.9 7.3
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Table 7.13 Regression Results of Pre Bid Period for Premium Measure: Four- Weeks 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Pearson Correlation test are presented. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 
the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. PREM_4W is the premium of offer price to target trading price four week prior to the announcement date. See table 5.5 for other variables definitions.  
Panel A  Dependent Variable: ACFRpost (Four-Weeks Premium)
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.048 ** 0.049 ** 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.041 * 0.041 * 0.055 ** -0.166 0.054 * 0.025 0.109
CONCEN10 -0.012
CONCEN1020 -0.026 *** -0.026 ***
CONCEN20 0.024 ** 0.011
CONCEN2050 0.011
CONCEN50 0.012
LSH1P 0.023 0.005 -0.240 ** -0.208 ** -0.210 ** -0.232 ** -0.212 **
LSH1PSQ 0.026 1.032 *** 0.725 ** 0.770 ** 0.813 ** 0.767 **
LSH1PCUBE -0.910 *** -0.599 * -0.648 ** -0.675 ** -0.647 **
SEP -0.020 * -0.028 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.027 ** -0.030 ** -0.032 ** -0.034 *** -0.034 *** -0.033 **
CEOLSH 0.024 * 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.024 * 0.021 0.021 0.020
CEOdual -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 -0.010 -0.013
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 *
INDDIR -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.026 -0.022 -0.030 -0.026
OTHLSH 0.012 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.012
TGORI_English 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
ATTI_Hostile 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.014 0.007 0.013
PAY_stock -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014
COMPETE -0.034 ** -0.031 ** -0.034 ** -0.034 ** -0.032 ** -0.033 ** -0.034 ** -0.037 ** -0.037 ** -0.037 ** -0.036 **
IND_rel 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
TOEHOLD 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.008
PREM_4W 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.004 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 **
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003






NANTIDIR_high 0.059 *** 0.044 **
UK -0.065 -0.031 -0.059 ** -0.027
CAN -0.067 -0.041 ** 0.095 ** 0.012
AUS 0.054 ** 0.053 ** 0.033 0.033
ACFRpre 0.515 *** 0.517 *** 0.520 *** 0.520 *** 0.513 *** 0.513 *** 0.515 *** 0.503 *** 0.511 *** 0.511 *** 0.516 ***







Model 9.1Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 7 Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9
7.731*** 8.041*** 8.174*** 7.715***
28.9





Table 7.13 (Continued) 
Panel B Dependent Variable: △ACFR (Four-Weeks Premium)
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.021 0.023 0.045 * 0.047 * 0.013 0.014 0.028 -0.195 0.013 0.016 0.084
CONCEN10 -0.013
CONCEN1020 -0.027 ** -0.027 **
CONCEN20 0.026 ** 0.012
CONCEN2050 0.016
CONCEN50 0.007
LSH1P 0.021 0.004 -0.249 ** -0.243 ** -0.230 ** -0.241 ** -0.225 *
LSH1PSQ 0.024 1.065 *** 0.825 ** 0.790 ** 0.835 ** 0.798 *
LSH1PCUBE -0.941 *** -0.663 * -0.641 * -0.682 * -0.659 *
SEP -0.016 -0.026 ** -0.025 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.026 ** -0.029 ** -0.028 * -0.028 * -0.027 *
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.016 0.013 0.011 0.010
CEOdual -0.024 ** -0.021 ** -0.022 ** -0.021 ** -0.023 ** -0.023 ** -0.021 ** -0.019 * -0.020 * -0.019 * -0.022 **
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.014 -0.004 -0.013 -0.015 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006
OTHLSH 0.024 * 0.012 0.016 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.021 * 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.023 *
TGORI_English 0.013 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003
ATTI_Hostile 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.019 0.019 0.016 0.009 0.016 0.015 0.019
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
COMPETE -0.049 *** -0.046 *** -0.049 *** -0.049 *** -0.047 *** -0.047 *** -0.049 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.051 *** -0.050 ***
IND_rel 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.010
TOEHOLD 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.020 * 0.018 0.017 0.016
PREM_4W 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
LEV -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 * -0.006 * -0.007 ** -0.007 * -0.008 **






NANTIDIR_high 0.060 ** 0.048 **
UK -0.128 ** -0.068 * -0.057 ** -0.032
CAN -0.150 ** -0.057 *** 0.065 -0.001
AUS 0.025 0.031 0.029 0.028
 Adjust R2 (%)
F 1.464 1.377 1.737**
2.9














Table 7.14 Regression Results of Acquisition Years 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed takeovers over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Pearson Correlation test are presented. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 
the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. PREM_1W is the premium of offer price to target trading price one week prior to the announcement date. The year of acquisition completed at 1998, 1999, 2000 
and 2001 is defined as YR98, YR99, YR00 and YR0, respectively. See table 5.5 for other variables definitions 
Panel A Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.036 0.039 0.058 * 0.058 * 0.030 0.030 0.045 -0.157 0.046 0.021 0.100
CONCEN10 -0.011
CONCEN1020 -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
CONCEN20 0.026 ** 0.014
CONCEN2050 0.016
CONCEN50 0.012
LSH1P 0.025 0.013 -0.218 ** -0.178 * -0.182 * -0.200 * -0.179 *
LSH1PSQ 0.018 0.962 *** 0.616 * 0.669 * 0.697 * 0.645 *
LSH1PCUBE -0.854 *** -0.508 * -0.563 * -0.576 * -0.543 *
SEP -0.020 * -0.029 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.027 ** -0.030 ** -0.033 ** -0.034 *** -0.034 *** -0.033 **
CEOLSH 0.025 * 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.025 * 0.022 * 0.022 0.021
CEOdual -0.016 * -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 * -0.016 * -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.016 *
BSIZE -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 **
INDDIR -0.019 -0.009 -0.017 -0.018 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.024 -0.021 -0.027 -0.024
OTHLSH 0.013 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.011
TGORI_English 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
ATTI_Hostile 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.016 0.011 0.006 0.011
PAY_stock -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015
COMPETE -0.036 ** -0.033 ** -0.036 ** -0.036 ** -0.034 ** -0.034 ** -0.036 ** -0.040 *** -0.040 *** -0.040 *** -0.039 **
IND_rel 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
TOEHOLD 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.004 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 * -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.005 **
LEV -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003






NANTIDIR_high 0.065 *** 0.053 **
YR98 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.015 0.017 0.018 0.018
YR99 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001
YR00 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005
YR01 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005
UK -0.067 -0.039 -0.059 ** -0.030
CAN -0.056 -0.040 ** 0.094 ** 0.020
AUS 0.057 ** 0.055 ** 0.042 * 0.042 *
ACFRpre 0.517 *** 0.521 *** 0.523 *** 0.524 *** 0.516 *** 0.516 *** 0.518 *** 0.507 *** 0.516 *** 0.514 *** 0.520 ***








Model 9Model 5 Model 6 Model 8.1Model 7
6.441*** 6.810*** 6.966*** 6.644***
30.428.9






Table 7.14 (Continued) 
Panel B  Dependent Variable: △ACFR
Full Sample (N=282)
Intercept 0.028 0.032 0.051 0.053 0.022 0.022 0.037 -0.165 0.023 0.039 0.096
CONCEN10 -0.011
CONCEN1020 -0.026 ** -0.026 **
CONCEN20 0.029 ** 0.016
CONCEN2050 0.022
CONCEN50 0.007
LSH1P 0.023 0.018 -0.221 * -0.203 * -0.194 * -0.200 * -0.184 **
LSH1PSQ 0.007 0.985 ** 0.692 * 0.672 * 0.695 * 0.658 *
LSH1PCUBE -0.884 ** -0.560 -0.549 -0.571 -0.547 *
SEP -0.018 -0.028 ** -0.026 ** -0.024 * -0.025 * -0.025 * -0.028 ** -0.031 ** -0.030 ** -0.029 ** -0.029 **
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.012
CEOdual -0.026 ** -0.024 ** -0.024 ** -0.023 ** -0.025 ** -0.026 ** -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.025 **
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.011 -0.001 -0.010 -0.013 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006
OTHLSH 0.024 * 0.011 0.016 0.013 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.021 *
TGORI_English 0.013 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002
ATTI_Hostile 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.010 0.015 0.016 0.020
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012
COMPETE -0.050 *** -0.047 *** -0.050 *** -0.051 *** -0.049 *** -0.049 *** -0.050 *** -0.055 *** -0.055 *** -0.054 *** -0.053 ***
IND_rel 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009
TOEHOLD 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.020 * 0.018 0.017 0.016
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
LEV -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 * -0.006 * -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.008 **






NANTIDIR_high 0.067 ** 0.058 **
YR98 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000
YR99 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017
YR00 -0.020 -0.021 -0.018 -0.017 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021 -0.024 -0.026 -0.026 -0.028
YR01 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.016 -0.018 -0.020 -0.022
UK -0.123 ** -0.074 * -0.055 * -0.035
CAN -0.130 * -0.056 *** 0.062 0.008
AUS 0.031 0.036 0.039 0.039
 Adjust R2 (%)
F 
4.7
Model 8 Model 9 Model 9.1Model 8.1
1.449* 1.375 1.630**
3.2
Model 5 Model 6
5.0 6.8 8.0
1.465* 1.740** 1.970*** 1.915***














 This chapter presents robustness tests on three aspects. First, as stated in section 5.3.2 
of chapter five, the original operating cash flow data of both merging and matched firms 
have heavy tailed distribution. In the main analyses, Huber’s M-estimator with k=1.28 is 
used to estimate and winsorize outliers. In section 8.2, other estimators are presented 
including µ±2σ and 20 percent breakdown point and the sensitivity of results is tested using 
both trimming and winsorizing approaches. Second, as described in section 5.2.1 of chapter 
five, the sample comprises 282 acquisitions conducted by 222 acquiring firms. To investigate 
whether the clustering problems caused by multiple acquirers have an impact on basic results, 
section 8.3 displays the simulation regressions under the clustered- robust and the bootstrap 
standard errors. Third, with respect to the approaches used in Denis and Denis (1995) and 
Ghosh (2001), section 8.4 examines two operating performance measures (based on the last 
year prior to the transactions, year t-1) to each of the three following years. Since the 
methodology behind such sensitivity analysis is not the focus of this thesis, the following 
sections introduce the theoretical background and test the sensitivity of results in chapter six.  
 
 
8.2 Robustness Analysis on OutlierS 
 
8.2.1 Background Introduction  
 Classical statistical procedures rely heavily on assumptions that data is normally 
distributed, at least approximately. In practice, the real data usually does not satisfy a normal 
distribution. Outliers generally have influential effects on the performance of the classical 
statistical analysis. Barnett and Lewis (1984) define outliers as observations that appear to be 
inconsistent with other observations in the data set. These outliers have a large effect on the 
mean, dragging it towards them and away from the center of the data set. Obviously, the 
mean measure is biased for estimating the location of the center of the data and even badly 
affects the standard deviation because the squares of the deviations from the mean go into 
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the calculation. Earlier statistical journals indicate that slight deviations away from normality 
could have a large negative impact on power whenever means are being compared (Tukey 
1960). A theory of robustness has since been developed by Huber (1964) and Hample, 
Ronchetti, Rousseeuw and Stahel (1986). In recent research, a useful mathematical 
foundation and computer software have been established to detect the outliers and to 
estimate the location and scale of data (Huber 1981, Rousseeuw and Leroy 1987, Wilcox 
2001). 
   
 Once the outliers are identified in the data set, the next step is to decide which 
estimator could prove a better measure instead of the sample mean. It is well known that the 
breakdown point 38  of the sample mean is zero. That means a single contaminated 
observation may have an unbounded influence on the estimator. The higher the breakdown 
point of an estimator, the more robust it is. Numerous studies examine those cases in which a 
50 percent breakdown point can be achieved. The trimmed mean is a simple robust estimator 
of location that deletes a certain percentage of observations in each tail of the data, and then 
computes the mean out of the remainder. Formally, given a sample of ordered n data values, 
X(1)≤...,≤X(n),  the α-trimmed mean is expressed as 
[ ]1 2 11 ....
2
g g n g n gtgX X X X Xn g
+ + − − −= + + + +
−
 
where g=[nα]. Generally, the so called α-trimmed mean39 has the outlier observations 
removed from each end and indicates a breakdown point at α level. Since the α-trimmed 
mean is based on a given level, the choice of a higher breakdown point might be made 
arbitrarily so as to give data more of a chance to avoid the masking problem40. But if the 
level of trimming is too high, power will be low when sampling from a light tailed 
                                                 
38 Breakdown is a measure of the largest percentage of contaminating data which can be present 
before overwhelming the remaining data. The maximum breakdown point is 50% because if more 
than half of the observations are contaminated, it is not possible to distinguish between the 
underlying distribution and the contaminating distribution. 
39 For example, the 20% trimmed mean is computed by removing the 0.2n smallest and 0.2n largest 
of the sample and averaging those that remain (Wilcox 2001/ 2003), and this 20 percent trimmed 
mean estimator has breakdown point at roughly 20% level. However, be cautious that some study 
define α-trimmed mean by trimming α*n/2 level each side and having breakdown point α/2. For 
instance, if the 10% upper and lower of the data are removed, then it creates a 20% trimmed mean 
(Singh 1998).  
40 Masking problem occurs because the trimming level α is too low, outliers have chance to mask 
each other. As a simple example, when a data set includes one modest and one large outlier, the 
procedure of detecting with too low trimming level will make the modest outlier look relatively 
normal and only identify the large outlier. As soon as the large outlier is removed, the estimated 
standard deviation shrinks, and the modest outlier becomes unusual. This masking problem gets 
worse as the complexity of the data increases.  
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distribution or even from a good data set (Wilcox 2003). In fact, the mean and the median 
are extreme values of the trimmed mean with α=0 and α=0.5 respectively.  
 
 According to Tukey (1970), the resistant rule of thumb for identifying extreme values 
is to set the breakdown point at roughly 25 percent (Hoaglin, Iglewicz and Tukey 1986). 
Besides, Thomas (2000) suggests a value in the range between 0.1 and 0.3. While the 
trimmed mean performs well relative to the sample mean in the presence of outliers, the 
method of trimmed means is criticized when sampling from a heavy one-tail skewed 
distribution since the proportion of observations is pre-determined and the trimming is 
applied in both tails. The other alternative, M-estimators, has been highly recommended to 
improve this deficiency. 
 
 M-estimators are a generalization of the maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) as 









=∑       (1) 
where ψ is some odd function. A complete theoretical description regarding this approach is 
not the major issue in this thesis and it can be found in related statistics literature (Huber 
1981, Rousseeuw and Leroy 1987, Wilcox 2001/ 2003, Pitselis 2005). In practical situations, 
the choice of the ψ function is not critical for gaining a good robust estimate and many 
choices give similar results that offer great improvements (in terms of efficiency and bias) 
over classical estimates in the presence of outliers (Huber 1981).   
 
Among the many choices for ψ, Huber’s ψ - called a one-step M-estimator41 - has 
been broadly applied in a practical and theoretical field by using the constant K=1.28 
(Staudte and Sheather 1990, Wilcox 2003). 
( )( ) , ,x max K min K xψ = −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦    (2) 
Considering that the median (M) and the median absolute deviation42 (MAD) are more suited 
                                                 
41 That is using a single iteration in the Newton-Raphson method to solve equation (1). 
42  The median absolute deviation (MAD) is computed by subtracting the median from each 
observation and then taking absolute values. The median of the n values just computed is MAD 
(Wilcox 2001: p35). The constant 0.6745 is needed because for a large sample from normal 
distribution curve N(0, σ2), E(MAD/0.6745)= σ. While MAD is a less accurate estimator than the 
sample standard deviation (σ), it is much less sensitive to outliers because of its high breakdown 
point. 
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for detecting outliers because of the higher breakdown point (approximately 0.5), they are 
widely accepted as the efficient robust estimators of the location (θ ) and scale (σ̂ ) of data 
with outliers. After a slight modification performed on the Huber’s one-step M-estimator, a 
more practical equation (3) has been proposed. Here, any observed value, X, is regarded as an 






> =      (3) 
  
The idea of flexibility for the trimming ratio leads to the interest in the M-estimator. 
This estimator is appealing due to its higher breakdown point than that of sample mean and 
its more accurate variance than that of median from a normal distribution or that of trimmed 
means from a heavy tailed probability curve (Wilcox 2001). However, M-estimate is not 
necessarily unique; K virtually determines the degree of trimming. Arguments for choosing 
K have been made in several quantitative studies (Staudte and Sheather 1990, Singh 1998, 
Wilcox 2003). In Wilcox’s (2001) book, he develops an experiment to compare a 20 percent 
trimmed mean and Huber’s one-step M-estimator (K=1.28). His conclusions suggest that 
there is little separating the two, especially when the samples are not too small (more than 
20). The trimmed means might be better for small sample sizes and individual tests, but 
M-estimators play a more dominant role when dealing with regression. 
 
A winsorized mean, a development of the trimming approach, is another measure of 
the central tendency which is proposed by Dixon and Tukey (1968). Unlike the trimmed 
mean, a β-winsorized mean does not need to remove the end points completely but shrinks 
the most extreme g=[nβ] data values at each end to the smallest g by X(g+1) and the largest g 
by X(n-g). Assume that X(1)≤...,≤X(n) are the usual order statistics. Let     
( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( )
( ) ( )
,              
,                    
,             
g i g
i i g i n g
n g i n g
X if X X
W X if X X X









Then the β-winsorized mean is defined as  
1 2 1
1 ( 1) .... ( 1)wg g g n g n gX g X X X g Xn + + − − −
⎡ ⎤= + + + + + +⎣ ⎦ , 
and the winsorized sample variance is given by 
2 2 2 2
1 2 1( 1)( ) ( ) ... ( ) ( 1)( )wg wg wg wgwg g g n g n gSSD g X X X X X X g X X+ + − − −= + − + − + + − + + −
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 Yuen (1975) conducts a power comparison of winsorized t, trimmed t, and student’s t. 
The evidence proves that when the parent population is long-tailed, trimmed t and 
winsorized t are proposed as better robust estimators of location. However, based on a 
long-tailed underling distribution, this study further compares the performance of winsorized 
t and trimmed t; the results show small difference between these two estimators. Winsorized 
mean has been regarded as an attractive alternative to the skewed populations not only 
because it is a nearly unbiased estimator of the population mean, but also because it 
improves the sample mean even in small samples (Rivest 1994).  
 
8.2.2 Application to Data  
 Turning to the sample in this thesis, the statistics in table 8.1 show that the original 
data of operating cash flow returns for both merging (MEG_CFRi) and matched firms 
(MAT_CFRi) comes from heavy tailed distributions. For example, the standard deviation of 
MEG_CFRt+3 (135.15%), MEG_CFRt-2 (70.25%), MEG_CFRt-3 (193.74%), MAT_CFRt-1 
(115.01%), MAT_CFRt-2 (73.33%) and MAT_CFRt-3 (948.62%) is incredibly large and 
indicates that data points are far from the mean. In addition, from figure 8.1 many extreme 
values are spotted in all data sets. While in sets MEG_CFRt+3, MEG_CFRt-2, MAT_CFRt+2 
and MAT_CFRt-3 distribution appears to be contaminated by extreme values in both tails, 
most data sets have outliers falling on the right tail. Obviously, the sample mean is strongly 
altered by the large values and the standard deviation tends to overstate the variation. 
 
 When outliers are encountered, special checks are conducted to ensure that the values 
are genuine and not subject to computing or other errors. Outliers are not always bad data but 
the major interest of this thesis is not to track the behavior of these unusual signs. This thesis 
simply hopes to assess which approach, provided by the earlier literature, is more suited for 
testing the relationship between the response and explanatory variables in the sample, and 
for deciding which will provide more reliable results. A sensitive analysis is applied at 
several estimators including 2σ-winsorized, 20 percent- winsorized, 2σ-trimmed, 
M-estimator with K=1.28- trimmed and 20 percent-trimmed. 
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Table 8.1 Outlier Robustness Test: Original Data 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Operating cash flow return (OCFR) is calculated as operating cash flow divided by market 
value of asset. Operating cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation. Post acquisition performance for each 
deal is measured by the operating cash flow return of the surviving acquirer after transaction. Pre acquisition performance is 
calculated as a weighted-average of the operating cash flow return for the bidder and the target included (MEGi pre and post). 
The weights are based on the market values of assets of both companies in the year before acquisition. Post and pre acquisition 
performances of the matched firms are measured as weighted-average of the operating cash flow rates (MATi pre and post). 
ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the 
change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
Summary statistics for the Original data set











MEG_CFR t+3 282 3 279 4.20% 12.47% 135.15% -6.15% 8.67% 17.62% 29.37% 77.84%
MEG_CFR t+2 282 2 280 13.45% 11.72% 31.24% -3.49% 7.35% 16.19% 29.39% 41.58%
MEG_CFR t+1 282 0 282 12.75% 11.05% 14.15% -3.20% 6.47% 16.53% 29.77% 65.71%
MEG_CFR t-1 282 0 282 12.50% 11.22% 21.78% 0.00% 7.14% 15.34% 34.41% 74.36%
MEG_CFR t-2 282 22 260 14.32% 11.91% 70.25% -1.32% 8.33% 16.78% 34.52% 303.72%
MEG_CFR t-3 282 88 194 32.13% 12.56% 193.74% 2.38% 8.54% 17.50% 38.53% 406.03%
MAT_CFR t+3 282 3 279 14.54% 12.15% 23.82% -6.62% 7.22% 18.98% 37.76% 122.26%
MAT_CFR t+2 282 2 280 13.41% 11.12% 28.09% -2.73% 6.24% 17.49% 42.62% 107.04%
MAT_CFR t+1 282 0 282 12.21% 10.52% 29.03% -6.82% 5.81% 16.67% 36.75% 137.79%
MAT_CFR t-1 282 0 282 16.40% 12.85% 115.01% -9.54% 8.88% 18.33% 45.50% 570.70%
MAT_CFR t-2 282 22 260 20.24% 13.32% 73.33% -10.90% 8.56% 19.15% 76.97% 505.31%
MAT_CFR t-3 282 88 194 59.68% 14.21% 948.62% -63.20% 8.90% 20.44% 96.37% 365.92%
ACFR t+3 282 3 279 -10.34% 0.17% 136.84% -43.99% -7.77% 7.29% 28.41% 90.68%
ACFR t+2 282 2 280 0.04% 0.33% 41.26% -28.46% -7.03% 7.06% 26.34% 72.10%
ACFR t+1 282 0 282 0.54% 0.49% 31.44% -26.71% -6.86% 6.68% 31.67% 123.47%
ACFR t-1 282 0 282 -3.90% -0.57% 117.79% -33.83% -7.74% 4.79% 34.96% 156.08%
ACFR t-2 282 22 260 -5.91% -0.85% 99.77% -91.40% -9.02% 4.67% 47.08% 420.41%
ACFR t-3 282 88 194 -27.55% -0.80% 769.01% -90.51% -9.85% 5.54% 149.39% 657.64%
ACFRpost 282 0 282 -0.80% 0.53% 19.44% -22.38% -6.95% 7.18% 19.79% 55.58%
ACFRpre 282 0 282 -4.94% -0.70% 78.04% -48.84% -6.71% 5.66% 49.87% 216.88%






















































































Figure 8.1 Box Plots for the Data Set of Operating Cash Flow of Merging (MEG_CFRi) and 
Matched (MAT_CFRi) Firms 
 225
According to the empirical rules for a normal distribution, if the data are normally 
distributed, then about 95.44 percent of the values are within 2 standard deviations (see 
figure 8.2). Therefore, testing starts with the traditional method of winsorizing the data at 
µ±2σ level. Huber’s M-estimator with K=1.28 winsorized is applied in the main analysis. If 
the data set is under the normal distribution, this approach should be similar to winsorized 
data at µ±1.28σ or using a 10 percent-winsorized mean estimator that keeps about 80 percent 
of the values within 1.28 standard deviations. 20 percent- winsorized is another alternative 
that is broadly accepted as an efficient robust estimator and that is usually used to compare 
the Huber’s M-estimator (Yuen 1974/ 1975, Singh 1998, Thomas 2000, Wilcox 2003). 
Therefore, the 20 percent- winsorized mean is also tested as a comparison. In addition, 
further tests are conducted (using trimming approach) on all of the above robust estimators, 
including the M-estimator with K=1.28. Importantly, trimming from the data set of operating 
cash flows for both merging (MEGi) and matched (MATi) firms will lose too many samples. 
Therefore, in this part trimming is done directly from the data set of ACFRpost, ACFRpre 
and ACFR△ . The statistics results are presented in table 8.2a and 8.2b. 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Probability of Standard Normal Distribution (0.84 standard deviation from the 
mean accounts for 60% of the set; 1.28 standard deviations from the mean account for 80%; 
and 2 standard deviations account for 95.44%) 
 
Statistical results for three breakdown levels of winsorizing are presented in table 8.2a: 
µ±2σ (≈2.5%), M-estimator with K=1.28 (≈10%) and 20 percent-winsorized mean (20%). 
The distribution of all operating performance measures is clearly improved. However, Panel 
A shows that the robust standard deviation of data set MEG_CFRt+3 (34.79%), 
MEG_CFRt-2 (25.21%), MEG_CFRt-3 (50.2%), MAT_CFRt-1 (41.76%), MAT_CFRt-2 
(34.43%) and MAT_CFRt-3 (207.38%) is still substantial, that the masking problems are still 
there, and that the breakdown point is too low when using a µ±2σ approach.  
 
By comparison, panel B shows that winsorizing using Huber’s M-estimator with 
K=1.28 is fairly appropriate. The robust estimators of mean and standard deviation are rather 
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reliable in all data sets and the masking problems are markedly improved. Besides, the level 
of winsorizing in each tail is flexible. Here the average level of right tail and left tail is 17.51 
and 10.43 percent, respectively. In panel C, using a 20 percent winsorized-mean to detect 
outliers provides similar results as an M-estimator approach does, but it arbitrarily replaces 
data at a given and higher level in both tails. A similar comparison is made on the trimming 
approach for the same three breakdown levels. To keep more data and simplify the 
computing procedure, the outliers are tackled from the data set ACFRpost, ACFRpre and 
∆ACFR. Table 8.2b reveals a consistent conclusion as made for the winsorizing  
 
Table 8.2 a Outlier Robustness Test: Winsorizing at different estimators 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Operating cash flow return (OCFR) is calculated as operating cash flow divided by market 
value of asset. Operating cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation. Post acquisition performance for each 
deal is measured by the operating cash flow return of the surviving acquirer after transaction. Pre acquisition performance is 
calculated as a weighted-average of the operating cash flow return for the bidder and the target included (MEGi pre and post). 
The weights are based on the market values of assets of both companies in the year before acquisition. Post and pre acquisition 
performances of the matched firms are measured as weighted-average of the operating cash flow rates (MATi pre and post). 
ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the 
change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
right tail left tail
MEG_CFR t+3 282 3 279 11.08% 12.47% 34.79% -6.15% 8.67% 17.62% 29.37% 77.84% 0.00% 0.72%
MEG_CFR t+2 282 2 280 12.12% 11.72% 11.41% -3.49% 7.35% 16.19% 29.39% 41.58% 0.36% 0.71%
MEG_CFR t+1 282 0 282 12.10% 11.05% 10.18% -3.20% 6.47% 16.53% 29.77% 41.06% 2.84% 1.42%
MEG_CFR t-1 282 0 282 12.76% 11.22% 11.72% 0.00% 7.14% 15.34% 34.41% 55.66% 1.05% 1.05%
MEG_CFR t-2 282 22 260 13.23% 11.91% 25.21% -1.32% 8.33% 16.78% 34.52% 153.48% 1.13% 1.13%
MEG_CFR t-3 282 88 194 20.54% 12.56% 50.23% 1.61% 8.44% 17.50% 38.53% 406.03% 0.51% 0.00%
MAT_CFR t+3 282 3 279 13.58% 12.15% 14.66% -6.62% 7.22% 18.98% 37.76% 62.17% 2.15% 1.79%
MAT_CFR t+2 282 2 280 12.70% 11.12% 15.89% -2.73% 6.24% 17.49% 42.62% 69.60% 2.50% 1.43%
MAT_CFR t+1 282 0 282 12.06% 10.52% 15.21% -6.82% 5.81% 16.67% 36.75% 70.26% 1.77% 1.06%
MAT_CFR t-1 282 0 282 15.78% 12.85% 41.76% -9.54% 8.88% 18.33% 45.50% 244.65% 1.05% 0.70%
MAT_CFR t-2 282 22 260 17.45% 13.32% 34.43% -10.90% 8.56% 19.15% 76.97% 166.01% 2.26% 1.13%
MAT_CFR t-3 282 88 194 12.09% 14.30% 207.38% -63.20% 8.90% 20.44% 96.37% 365.92% 0.51% 0.51%
1.34% 0.97%
ACFR t+3 282 3 279 -2.50% 0.17% 37.28% -40.62% -7.77% 7.29% 28.03% 78.77%
ACFR t+2 282 2 280 -0.58% 0.33% 18.04% -28.46% -7.03% 7.06% 26.34% 55.15%
ACFR t+1 282 0 282 0.04% 0.49% 16.55% -23.32% -6.86% 6.68% 24.77% 41.73%
ACFR t-1 282 0 282 -3.03% -0.57% 41.92% -33.83% -7.74% 4.79% 32.37% 156.08%
ACFR t-2 282 22 260 -4.22% -0.85% 41.73% -91.40% -9.02% 4.67% 47.08% 143.23%
ACFR t-3 282 88 194 8.53% -0.80% 194.20% -90.51% -9.85% 5.54% 149.39% 657.64%
ACFRpost 282 0 282 -0.27% 0.53% 14.74% -22.38% -6.95% 7.18% 19.79% 41.73%
ACFRpre 282 0 282 -2.33% -0.70% 36.72% -40.27% -6.71% 5.66% 39.10% 131.11%

















Table 8.2 a (Continued) 
right tail left tail
MEG_CFR t+3 282 3 279 12.87% 12.47% 5.77% 3.74% 8.67% 17.62% 21.20% 21.20% 15.77% 11.11%
MEG_CFR t+2 282 2 280 11.81% 11.72% 5.60% 3.33% 7.35% 16.19% 20.21% 20.21% 15.71% 12.86%
MEG_CFR t+1 282 0 282 11.41% 11.05% 5.99% 2.00% 6.47% 16.53% 20.22% 20.22% 14.89% 9.57%
MEG_CFR t-1 282 0 282 11.35% 11.22% 5.17% 3.44% 7.14% 15.34% 19.00% 19.00% 15.33% 9.76%
MEG_CFR t-2 282 22 260 12.27% 11.91% 5.32% 3.86% 8.33% 16.78% 20.09% 20.09% 16.60% 7.55%
MEG_CFR t-3 282 88 194 13.09% 12.56% 5.75% 3.63% 8.54% 17.50% 21.93% 21.93% 19.19% 10.61%
MAT_CFR t+3 282 3 279 12.71% 12.15% 7.34% 0.95% 7.22% 18.98% 23.35% 23.35% 17.20% 8.96%
MAT_CFR t+2 282 2 280 11.61% 11.12% 7.00% 0.32% 6.24% 17.49% 21.92% 21.92% 15.00% 7.50%
MAT_CFR t+1 282 0 282 10.88% 10.52% 6.43% 0.91% 5.81% 16.67% 20.13% 20.13% 17.38% 11.35%
MAT_CFR t-1 282 0 282 13.46% 12.85% 6.10% 3.65% 8.88% 18.33% 22.14% 22.14% 17.77% 9.41%
MAT_CFR t-2 282 22 260 13.84% 13.32% 6.82% 3.64% 8.56% 19.15% 24.10% 24.10% 20.00% 12.83%
MAT_CFR t-3 282 88 194 14.38% 14.21% 6.85% 3.73% 8.90% 20.44% 24.11% 24.11% 25.25% 13.64%
17.51% 10.43%
ACFR t+3 282 3 279 0.16% 0.17% 8.31% -13.09% -4.93% 5.57% 14.61% 20.25%
ACFR t+2 282 2 280 0.20% 0.54% 8.09% -13.29% -5.15% 4.80% 14.36% 19.89%
ACFR t+1 282 0 282 0.53% 0.23% 7.70% -12.54% -4.83% 5.17% 14.21% 19.31%
ACFR t-1 282 0 282 -2.11% -1.37% 7.24% -13.82% -6.91% 2.24% 9.94% 15.35%
ACFR t-2 282 22 260 -1.57% -0.70% 8.21% -16.24% -6.94% 3.94% 11.62% 16.45%
ACFR t-3 282 88 194 -1.29% -0.90% 8.47% -15.47% -6.74% 3.88% 12.64% 18.20%
ACFRpost 282 0 282 0.31% 0.59% 7.28% -11.94% -4.83% 5.23% 12.24% 19.31%
ACFRpre 282 0 282 -1.51% -0.70% 7.00% -13.74% -5.72% 3.18% 9.80% 13.99%
△ACFR 282 0 282 1.82% 1.73% 7.02% -9.97% -2.71% 6.49% 12.99% 18.31%
right tail left tail
MEG_CFR t+3 282 3 279 13.12% 12.47% 4.66% 7.32% 8.67% 17.62% 19.72% 19.72% 20.00% 20.00%
MEG_CFR t+2 282 2 280 11.83% 11.72% 4.54% 5.79% 7.35% 16.19% 18.09% 18.09% 20.00% 20.00%
MEG_CFR t+1 282 0 282 11.59% 11.05% 4.82% 5.61% 6.47% 16.53% 18.29% 18.29% 20.00% 20.00%
MEG_CFR t-1 282 0 282 11.52% 11.22% 4.24% 6.22% 7.14% 15.34% 17.61% 17.61% 20.00% 20.00%
MEG_CFR t-2 282 22 260 12.50% 11.91% 4.29% 7.09% 8.33% 16.78% 18.72% 18.72% 20.00% 20.00%
MEG_CFR t-3 282 88 194 13.17% 12.56% 4.47% 7.68% 8.54% 17.50% 19.55% 19.55% 20.00% 20.00%
MAT_CFR t+3 282 3 279 12.94% 12.15% 5.75% 5.92% 7.22% 18.98% 20.91% 20.91% 20.00% 20.00%
MAT_CFR t+2 282 2 280 11.77% 11.12% 5.64% 4.70% 6.24% 17.49% 19.67% 19.67% 20.00% 20.00%
MAT_CFR t+1 282 0 282 11.32% 10.52% 5.41% 4.88% 5.81% 16.67% 19.32% 19.32% 20.00% 20.00%
MAT_CFR t-1 282 0 282 13.80% 12.85% 5.02% 7.77% 8.88% 18.33% 20.97% 20.97% 20.00% 20.00%
MAT_CFR t-2 282 22 260 14.02% 13.32% 5.71% 6.97% 8.56% 19.15% 22.41% 22.41% 20.00% 20.00%
MAT_CFR t-3 282 88 194 15.15% 14.21% 6.24% 8.11% 8.90% 20.44% 24.85% 24.85% 20.00% 20.00%
20.00% 20.00%
ACFR t+3 282 3 279 0.19% 0.47% 6.64% -11.24% -3.53% 4.36% 12.22% 13.80%
ACFR t+2 282 2 280 0.05% 0.53% 6.59% -11.38% -4.85% 4.11% 12.04% 13.39%
ACFR t+1 282 0 282 0.27% 0.52% 6.47% -11.64% -3.43% 4.70% 11.95% 13.41%
ACFR t-1 282 0 282 -2.29% -1.55% 6.14% -13.17% -6.16% 1.86% 8.42% 9.84%
ACFR t-2 282 22 260 -1.52% -0.56% 6.86% -14.51% -6.23% 3.38% 9.96% 11.75%
ACFR t-3 282 88 194 -1.98% -0.90% 7.30% -15.41% -6.43% 2.79% 10.54% 11.43%
ACFRpost 282 0 282 0.10% 0.72% 6.05% -10.79% -3.63% 3.85% 10.16% 13.41%
ACFRpre 282 0 282 -1.70% -1.37% 5.88% -11.98% -5.51% 2.43% 7.60% 10.26%
△ACFR 282 0 282 1.80% 1.79% 5.79% -7.60% -1.76% 5.42% 10.76% 15.75%
Percentile
99
level of winsorizingCount Missing Valid Mean Median StandardDeviation
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Table 8.2 b Outlier Robustness Test: Trimming at different estimators 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Operating cash flow return (OCFR) is calculated as operating cash flow divided by market 
value of asset. Operating cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation. Post acquisition performance for each 
deal is measured by the operating cash flow return of the surviving acquirer after transaction. Pre acquisition performance is 
calculated as a weighted-average of the operating cash flow return for the bidder and the target included (MEGi pre and post). 
The weights are based on the market values of assets of both companies in the year before acquisition. Post and pre acquisition 
performances of the matched firms are measured as weighted-average of the operating cash flow rates (MATi pre and post). 
ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the 
change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
right tail left tail
ACFRpost 258 0 258 -0.08% 0.53% 10.53% -16.37% -6.71% 6.22% 16.56% 21.70% 2.48% 2.13%
ACFRpre 258 0 258 -0.82% -0.68% 26.45% -31.51% -5.85% 4.90% 26.37% 98.68% 2.09% 2.44%
△ACFR 270 0 270 -0.31% 0.94% 29.61% -31.65% -4.95% 7.54% 31.77% 94.87% 2.48% 1.77%
right tail left tail
ACFRpost 169 0 169 0.62% 0.80% 6.30% -10.35% -3.82% 5.31% 11.47% 13.65% 10.64% 12.06%
ACFRpre 169 0 169 -0.26% -0.65% 5.21% -9.75% -3.92% 3.36% 8.23% 10.75% 13.24% 17.42%
△ACFR 241 0 241 1.08% 0.78% 5.62% -8.61% -2.41% 5.19% 10.65% 13.00% 6.74% 7.80%
right tail left tail
ACFRpost 119 0 119 0.34% 0.68% 4.65% -7.02% -3.18% 3.64% 7.47% 8.34% 20%% 20.0%
ACFRpre 119 0 119 -0.88% -1.21% 4.00% -6.89% -3.96% 2.48% 6.24% 7.06% 20.0% 20.0%
△ACFR 170 0 170 1.17% 0.98% 4.79% -6.51% -2.39% 5.39% 9.10% 9.85% 20.0% 20.0%
Percentile
75
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Subsequently, the whole set of regression models (model 1 to model 9.1) is re-run in 
order to test the effects of these various estimators and methods. To make the comparison 
easier, table 8.3 summarizes the variables according to the significance in regression results; 
table 8.4 to table 8.8 displays the details. First of all, it is clear that no matter whether 
applying the measures of µ±2σ, M-estimator with K=1.28 or 20 percent to deal with the 
outliers, the regression results of most empirical models are relatively stable through the 
winsorizing method. That is, all models stay with significance in table 8.4 for µ±2σ 
winsorized, in table 8.5 for 20-percent winsorized (except model 1,5 and 6 for ∆ACFR), and 
in table 6.4-6.7 as main analysis. But the explanatory power of models lose significance by 
using µ±2σ trimmed for ∆ACFR (all models in table 8.6, panel B), M-estimator with K=1.28 
trimmed for ∆ACFR (model 2, 5, 6 in table 8.7, panel B) and 20-percent trimmed for 
∆ACFR (all models except model 7, 8, 8,1 in table 8.8, panel B).  
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 Secondly, setting the breakdown point at µ±2σ, as the statistics results show, is simply 
not enough to eliminate the contaminating data. Therefore, even though there are some 
signals for the ownership variables (CONCEN20, CONCEN1020 in table 8.4), the 
non-linear relationship (model 5-8) between ownership and both performance measures is 
hard to realize until using M-estimator with K=1.28 or 20 percent- winsorized /trimmed 
mean estimator. Third, unlike the stable cube relationship between ownership and both 
performance measures by using the winsorizing method (model 7 in table 6.4-6.6 and table 
8.5 for 20 percent-winsorized), a particular square relationship is observed between 
ownership and only post operating performance (ACFRpost) by using the trimming approach 
(model 6 in panel A for ACFRpost in table 8.6 M-estimator with K=1.28 trimmed and 8.7 20 
percent-trimmed).  
 
 Fourth, for governance mechanisms, separation (-), controlling CEO (+) and board 
size (-) are still the three major governance variables having an impact on acquisition 
performance as the basic results. For deal characteristics, trimming data may further release 
information regarding the positive effect of stock payment. Trimming at the 20 percent level 
can even see that merging with targets from English original countries leads to a better 
operating performance. Finally, for institutional variables, the initial and revised anti-director 
right indexes (ANTIDIR, NANTIDIR) generally hold the significantly positive effects on 
performance measures.  
 
In sum, inferring or declaring a best robust estimator or approach is not the major 
purpose of this sensitivity test. These experiments are primarily conducted so as to examine 
the reliability of the basic results. While some differentiation is evident when using a 
different approach (winsorizing or trimming) to chuck out the different proportion of outliers 
there are still robust findings in the results. 
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Table 8.3 Summary Results of Variables in Regressions with Significance for Outliers 
Robustness Tests 
ACFR post  △ACFR ACFR post  △ACFR ACFR post  △ACFR
Winsoried
OWN CONCEN1020 CONCEN20 CONCEN1020 CONCEN1020 CONCEN1020 CONCEN1020
CONCEN20 CONCEN2050 CONCEN20 CONCEN20 CONCEN20 CONCEN20
CUBE CUBE CUBE CUBE
GOV SEP CEOdual SEP SEP SEP SEP
CEOLSH OTHLSH CEOLSH CEOdual CEOLSH CEOdual
BSIZE BSIZE BSIZE BSIZE BSIZE
DEAL PAY_stock IND_rel COMPETE COMPETE COMPETE COMPETE
SIZE_rel LEV SIZE_rel LEV SIZE_rel
INSTI ANTIDIR NANTIDIR ANTIDIR ANTIDIR ANTIDIR ANTIDIR





OWN - - SQ CONCEN10 CONCEN2050 CUBE
CONCEN1020 SQ
CUBE
GOV SEP - BSIZE SEP CEOLSH CEOdual
CEOLSH CEOLSH CEOdual BSIZE
BSIZE CEOdual BSIZE
BSIZE
DEAL PAY_stock - PAY_stock TGORI TGORI
- SIZE_rel COMPETE SIZE_rel
LEV SIZE_rel
INSTI ANTIDIR - NANTIDIR ANTIDIR ANTIDIR ANTIDIR




 See table 5.5 for variable definitions.
µ±2σ M-est 20%
Table 8.4 Basic (Table 6.4-6.6) Table 8.5




Table 8.4 Ownership Structure, Institutional Mechanisms and Acquiring Firm Performance: Outlier Robustness Test on µ±2σ- Winsorized  
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return. Outliers have been winsorized using µ±2σ approach. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Panel A   Regressions on Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 
Intercept 0.149 *** 0.157 *** 0.189 *** 0.184 *** 0.140 *** 0.145 *** 0.159 *** -0.562 0.136 * -0.190 0.093
CONCEN10 -0.014
CONCEN1020 -0.039 * -0.039 *
CONCEN20 0.050 ** 0.030
CONCEN2050 0.021
CONCEN50 0.044
LSH1P 0.079 -0.035 -0.286 -0.160 -0.209 -0.272 -0.207
LSH1PSQ 0.166 1.197 0.382 0.768 0.745 0.599
LSH1PCUBE -0.934 -0.206 -0.578 -0.487 -0.401
SEP -0.050 * -0.066 ** -0.064 ** -0.067 ** -0.068 ** -0.070 ** -0.074 *** -0.064 ** -0.077 ** -0.075 ** -0.073 **
CEOLSH 0.056 * 0.033 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.042 0.050 0.046 0.053 * 0.051
CEOdual -0.033 -0.030 -0.031 -0.033 -0.033 -0.036 -0.034 -0.028 -0.033 -0.025 -0.037
BSIZE -0.003 -0.005 * -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 * -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.005
INDDIR -0.080 -0.064 -0.078 -0.072 -0.057 -0.059 -0.059 -0.092 -0.088 -0.112 -0.102
OTHLSH 0.020 0.001 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.015 0.018 0.009 0.011 0.007 0.018
TGORI_English -0.029 -0.041 -0.040 -0.038 -0.037 -0.035 -0.035 -0.047 -0.037 -0.037 -0.039
ATTI_Hostile -0.034 -0.037 -0.039 -0.035 -0.033 -0.030 -0.032 0.034 -0.008 -0.028 -0.009
PAY_stock -0.040 * -0.046 * -0.046 * -0.045 * -0.042 * -0.040 * -0.041 * -0.042 * -0.044 * -0.042 * -0.046 *
COMPETE -0.025 -0.021 -0.025 -0.025 -0.023 -0.025 -0.026 -0.031 -0.030 -0.035 -0.030
IND_rel 0.010 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.007
TOEHOLD -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.030 -0.024 -0.026 -0.030
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.010 * -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.009 * -0.011 ** -0.010 ** -0.012 **
LEV 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.000




ANTISDI 0.383 * -0.003
PUBENFORCE_high -0.223 ***
NANTIDIR_high 0.183 *** 0.134 ***
UK -0.048 -0.023 -0.169 *** -0.062
CAN 0.098 -0.025 0.397 *** 0.122 **
AUS 0.117 ** 0.095 0.093 * 0.090 *
ACFRpre 0.054 ** 0.062 ** 0.062 ** 0.061 ** 0.057 ** 0.055 ** 0.057 ** 0.051 ** 0.051 ** 0.052 ** 0.052 **













Model 5 Model 6
2.113*** 2.368*** 2.427***
Model 7Model 4(N=282)
µ±2σ- Winsorized (probability around 95.44%)
Model 9.1Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Table 8.4 (Continued) 
Panel B   Regressions on Dependent Variable: △ACFR
Intercept -0.170 -0.079 -0.053 -0.036 -0.146 -0.160 -0.125 -1.382 -0.196 -0.897 * -0.648
CONCEN10 0.039
CONCEN1020 -0.032 -0.032
CONCEN20 0.176 *** 0.160 **
CONCEN2050 0.192 **
CONCEN50 0.114
LSH1P 0.167 0.518 -0.082 0.001 -0.034 -0.116 -0.059
LSH1PSQ -0.511 1.946 0.766 1.147 1.197 1.069
LSH1PCUBE -2.224 -0.921 -1.310 -1.280 -1.204
SEP -0.060 -0.100 -0.099 -0.087 -0.085 -0.078 -0.086 -0.015 -0.027 -0.021 -0.019
CEOLSH -0.029 -0.081 -0.076 -0.079 -0.040 -0.059 -0.069 -0.009 -0.021 -0.019 -0.021
CEOdual -0.114 ** -0.105 * -0.106 * -0.101 * -0.117 ** -0.108 * -0.103 * -0.105 * -0.112 * -0.101 * -0.111 *
BSIZE 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
INDDIR 0.028 0.042 0.031 0.012 0.044 0.050 0.050 0.124 0.138 0.099 0.108
OTHLSH 0.133 ** 0.092 0.097 0.083 0.130 ** 0.109 0.114 * 0.098 0.106 0.102 0.111 *
TGORI_English 0.013 -0.020 -0.019 -0.025 0.006 0.000 -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 -0.007
ATTI_Hostile 0.113 0.097 0.096 0.080 0.115 0.107 0.102 0.128 0.093 0.085 0.102
PAY_stock -0.078 -0.091 -0.091 -0.094 -0.079 -0.085 -0.087 -0.077 -0.086 -0.080 -0.084
COMPETE -0.075 -0.071 -0.075 -0.076 -0.079 -0.072 -0.075 -0.069 -0.066 -0.070 -0.066
IND_rel 0.105 ** 0.108 ** 0.105 ** 0.108 ** 0.103 ** 0.112 ** 0.113 ** 0.116 ** 0.115 ** 0.114 ** 0.119 **
TOEHOLD -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 -0.016 -0.013 -0.023 -0.027
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.000







NANTIDIR_high 0.242 * 0.198
UK -0.459 -0.318 -0.355 ** -0.261 **
CAN -0.284 -0.251 ** 0.287 0.046
AUS -0.171 -0.187 -0.053 -0.056


















Model 6 Model 7
3.3 3.5
Model 3
µ±2σ- Winsorized (probability around 95.44%)(N=282)
Model 8 Model 9 Model 9.1Model 8.1
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Table 8.5 Ownership Structure, Institutional Mechanisms, and Acquiring Firm Performance: Outlier Robustness Test on 20%- Winsorized Mean 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return. Outliers have been trimmed using µ±2σ approach. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. See 
table 5.5 for variable definitions.  
Panel A   Regressions on Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 
Intercept 0.039 ** 0.040 ** 0.056 *** 0.056 *** 0.033 * 0.033 * 0.045 ** -0.091 0.055 ** 0.044 0.107 *
CONCEN10 -0.009
CONCEN1020 -0.020 ** -0.020 **
CONCEN20 0.019 ** 0.009
CONCEN2050 0.009
CONCEN50 0.009
LSH1P 0.016 0.016 -0.197 ** -0.170 ** -0.171 ** -0.189 ** -0.174 **
LSH1PSQ 0.001 0.875 *** 0.619 ** 0.647 ** 0.690 ** 0.658 **
LSH1PCUBE -0.791 *** -0.533 ** -0.563 ** -0.593 ** -0.574 **
SEP -0.017 * -0.024 ** -0.023 ** -0.023 ** -0.022 ** -0.022 ** -0.025 ** -0.029 *** -0.029 *** -0.030 *** -0.029 ***
CEOLSH 0.025 ** 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.019 * 0.019 * 0.016 0.023 ** 0.021 * 0.021 * 0.020 *
CEOdual -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 * -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 *
INDDIR -0.019 -0.012 -0.019 -0.019 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.026 -0.023 -0.029 -0.027
OTHLSH 0.008 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007
TGORI_English 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
ATTI_Hostile 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.007 0.011
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
COMPETE -0.030 ** -0.028 ** -0.030 ** -0.030 ** -0.029 ** -0.029 ** -0.030 ** -0.032 *** -0.032 ** -0.032 ** -0.031 **
IND_rel -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
TOEHOLD 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 -0.003 * -0.003 -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 *
LEV 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001






NANTIDIR_high 0.038 ** 0.027 *
UK -0.043 -0.019 -0.044 ** -0.020
CAN -0.052 -0.030 ** 0.064 0.002
AUS 0.048 ** 0.047 ** 0.025 0.024
ACFRpre 0.524 *** 0.529 *** 0.531 *** 0.531 *** 0.525 *** 0.525 *** 0.527 *** 0.518 *** 0.524 *** 0.526 *** 0.529 ***




Model 2 Model 3
32.1
6.763***8.039*** 7.564*** 7.913***




20%- Winsorized mean (Probability around 60%)
Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9.1Model 1 Model 9
33.8
6.740***




Table 8.5 (Continued) 
Panel B   Regressions on Dependent Variable: △ACFR
Intercept 0.022 0.024 0.041 * 0.043 * 0.016 0.016 0.029 -0.116 0.027 0.043 0.095 *
CONCEN10 -0.009
CONCEN1020 -0.021 ** -0.021 **
CONCEN20 0.021 ** 0.011
CONCEN2050 0.014
CONCEN50 0.006
LSH1P 0.018 0.019 -0.202 ** -0.194 ** -0.184 ** -0.194 ** -0.182 *
LSH1PSQ -0.001 0.905 *** 0.700 ** 0.662 ** 0.711 ** 0.684 **
LSH1PCUBE -0.820 *** -0.583 * -0.555 * -0.601 ** -0.585 *
SEP -0.014 -0.021 ** -0.020 * -0.019 * -0.019 * -0.019 * -0.022 ** -0.027 ** -0.025 ** -0.025 ** -0.025 **
CEOLSH 0.015 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.018 0.015 0.014 0.013
CEOdual -0.021 ** -0.019 ** -0.019 ** -0.019 ** -0.020 ** -0.020 ** -0.018 ** -0.017 * -0.017 * -0.017 * -0.019 **
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.013 -0.005 -0.013 -0.015 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.014 -0.010 -0.013 -0.011
OTHLSH 0.016 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.015
TGORI_English 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
ATTI_Hostile 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.010 0.017 0.015 0.019
PAY_stock -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
COMPETE -0.041 *** -0.039 *** -0.041 *** -0.041 *** -0.040 *** -0.040 *** -0.041 *** -0.044 *** -0.043 *** -0.043 *** -0.042 ***
IND_rel 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005
TOEHOLD 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.016 * 0.014 0.013 0.013
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LEV -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005






NANTIDIR_high 0.039 * 0.030 *
UK -0.096 ** -0.049 -0.043 * -0.024
CAN -0.123 ** -0.045 *** 0.041 -0.009
AUS 0.027 0.032 0.023 0.022


















Model 6 Model 7
2.0 4.6
Model 3
20%- Winsorized mean (Probability around 60%)(N=282)
Model 8 Model 9 Model 9.1Model 8.1
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Table 8.6 Ownership Structure, Institutional Mechanisms and Acquiring Firm Performance: Outlier Robustness Test on µ±2σ- Trimmed 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return. Outliers have been trimmed using µ±2σ approach. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. See 
table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Panel A   Regressions on Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 






LSH1P 0.045 -0.031 -0.194 -0.036 -0.124 -0.136 -0.124
LSH1PSQ 0.110 0.777 0.010 0.486 0.332 0.333
LSH1PCUBE -0.602 0.083 -0.348 -0.165 -0.183
SEP -0.011 -0.020 -0.020 -0.024 -0.021 -0.023 -0.026 -0.028 -0.040 * -0.037 * -0.036
CEOLSH 0.034 0.022 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.029 0.027 0.034 0.030 0.039 * 0.035
CEOdual -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011
BSIZE -0.004 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.005 ** -0.005 **
INDDIR -0.035 -0.027 -0.038 -0.031 -0.022 -0.024 -0.025 -0.016 -0.022 -0.039 -0.037
OTHLSH -0.012 -0.022 -0.019 -0.014 -0.018 -0.014 -0.012 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.009
TGORI_English -0.016 -0.023 -0.022 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.020 -0.035 -0.026 -0.027 -0.028
ATTI_Hostile -0.036 -0.038 -0.040 -0.034 -0.035 -0.034 -0.035 0.016 -0.022 -0.039 -0.029
PAY_stock -0.035 * -0.036 ** -0.037 ** -0.035 * -0.035 ** -0.034 * -0.034 * -0.036 ** -0.036 ** -0.034 * -0.038 **
COMPETE -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011
IND_rel -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012
TOEHOLD -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 -0.020 -0.013 -0.017 -0.019
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
LEV 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.004






NANTIDIR_high 0.143 *** 0.089 **
UK 0.009 0.030 -0.113 * -0.031
CAN 0.083 -0.044 0.248 ** 0.057
AUS 0.159 *** 0.136 *** 0.106 *** 0.093 **
ACFRpre 0.083 *** 0.083 *** 0.082 *** 0.081 *** 0.083 *** 0.082 *** 0.083 *** 0.062 *** 0.068 *** 0.077 *** 0.075 ***
 Adjust R2 (%)
F 




2.235*** 2.214*** 2.161*** 2.212*** 2.122*** 2.079***
6.9
Model 5 Model 6
2.057***
µ±2σ- Trimmed (probability around 95.44%)
16.5





Table 8.6 (Continued) 
Panel B   Regressions on Dependent Variable: △ACFR






LSH1P -0.039 -0.114 -0.462 -0.534 -0.506 -0.493 -0.526
LSH1PSQ 0.108 1.533 1.856 1.749 1.718 1.793
LSH1PCUBE -1.287 -1.607 -1.524 -1.502 -1.546
SEP -0.038 -0.047 -0.044 -0.039 -0.037 -0.038 -0.042 -0.027 -0.023 -0.021 -0.021
CEOLSH 0.024 0.010 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.023 0.017 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.006
CEOdual -0.052 -0.049 -0.051 -0.048 -0.049 -0.051 -0.049 -0.059 -0.058 -0.057 -0.051
BSIZE -0.010 * -0.011 * -0.012 * -0.012 * -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 * -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011
INDDIR -0.108 -0.090 -0.107 -0.115 -0.099 -0.101 -0.102 -0.138 -0.128 -0.128 -0.133
OTHLSH 0.023 0.010 0.017 0.010 0.016 0.020 0.024 0.023 0.028 0.025 0.019
TGORI_English -0.028 -0.033 -0.032 -0.036 -0.029 -0.028 -0.028 -0.012 -0.017 -0.019 -0.017
ATTI_Hostile 0.103 0.102 0.100 0.092 0.102 0.104 0.101 0.075 0.090 0.102 0.092
PAY_stock 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.028 0.023 0.025 0.027
COMPETE -0.032 -0.027 -0.032 -0.033 -0.028 -0.030 -0.032 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 -0.024
IND_rel 0.033 0.037 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.034 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.034
TOEHOLD -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.026 -0.030 -0.032 -0.030
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001








UK -0.130 -0.040 0.021 -0.042
CAN -0.073 0.086 -0.092 0.053
AUS -0.194 -0.183 -0.086 -0.085

















Model 4Model 1 Model 2
-1.4
0.7290.732
µ±2σ- Trimmed (probability around 95.44%)(After trimming,
N=270) Model 8 Model 9 Model 9.1Model 8.1Model 6
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Table 8.7 Ownership Structure, Institutional Mechanisms and Acquiring Firm Performance: Outlier Robustness Test on M-estimator K=1.28 Trimmed 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return. Outliers have been trimmed using Huber's M-estimator K=1.28 approach. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant 
at the 10% level. See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Panel A   Regressions on Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 






LSH1P 0.026 -0.203 *** -0.185 -0.191 -0.185 -0.174 -0.180
LSH1PSQ 0.361 *** 0.283 0.167 0.168 0.101 0.166
LSH1PCUBE 0.074 0.215 0.206 0.265 0.199
SEP 0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.010 -0.001 -0.010 -0.009 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.014
CEOLSH 0.011 0.002 0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.014
CEOdual 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
BSIZE -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR 0.038 0.045 0.036 0.047 * 0.049 * 0.041 0.041 0.028 0.033 0.028 0.031
OTHLSH 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011
TGORI_English -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ATTI_Hostile 0.029 0.032 0.029 0.040 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.029
PAY_stock -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009
COMPETE 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008
IND_rel -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
TOEHOLD -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005







NANTIDIR_high 0.081 * 0.037
UK -0.162 -0.070 -0.097 -0.017
CAN -0.130 -0.029 0.168 0.022
AUS 0.008 0.008 0.036 0.035
ACFRpre 0.303 *** 0.291 *** 0.313 *** 0.301 *** 0.290 *** 0.321 *** 0.320 *** 0.358 *** 0.359 *** 0.347 *** 0.347 ***











 M-estimator K=1.28-  Trimmed (Probability around 80%)
Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9.1Model 1
2.188*** 2.771*** 2.609***
11.1
Model 5 Model 6
2.237*** 2.143*** 2.180***






Table 8.7 (Continued) 
Panel B   Regressions on Dependent Variable: △ACFR
Intercept 0.024 0.017 0.042 * 0.039 * 0.012 0.016 0.033 0.031 -0.006 0.023 0.042
CONCEN10 -0.022 **




LSH1P 0.006 -0.092 -0.366 *** -0.372 *** -0.373 *** -0.345 *** -0.340 ***
LSH1PSQ 0.145 * 1.268 *** 1.169 *** 1.167 *** 1.099 *** 1.084 ***
LSH1PCUBE -1.024 *** -0.906 *** -0.903 *** -0.859 *** -0.848 ***
SEP -0.005 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.015 -0.024 * -0.024 * -0.022 * -0.022 *
CEOLSH 0.026 ** 0.014 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.022 * 0.018 0.026 * 0.026 ** 0.023 * 0.023 *
CEOdual -0.024 ** -0.021 ** -0.023 ** -0.023 ** -0.021 ** -0.024 ** -0.023 ** -0.020 ** -0.019 ** -0.021 ** -0.021 **
BSIZE -0.002 -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.002 **
INDDIR 0.018 0.030 0.018 0.021 0.029 0.028 0.024 0.012 0.011 0.017 0.018
OTHLSH 0.007 -0.002 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.011
TGORI_English 0.014 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009
ATTI_Hostile 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.007 0.007 0.018 0.020
PAY_stock -0.020 ** -0.022 ** -0.021 ** -0.021 ** -0.021 ** -0.019 * -0.019 * -0.020 ** -0.019 ** -0.021 ** -0.021 **
COMPETE -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.013
IND_rel -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008
TOEHOLD -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 *
LEV -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 **
ANTIDIR_high 0.056 0.064 ***
ENFORCE -0.001
ACCTSTD 0.000
XLEG_high 0.053 0.050 *
ANTISDI -0.023 -0.050
PUBENFORCE_high -0.017
NANTIDIR_high 0.051 ** 0.047 **
UK -0.067 -0.075 ** -0.020 -0.012
CAN -0.003 -0.015 0.051 0.031
AUS 0.014 0.014 0.049 ** 0.049 **
 Adjust R2 (%)
F 
 M-estimator K=1.28-  Trimmed (Probability around 80%)(After trimming,
N=241) Model 8 Model 9 Model 9.1Model 8.1
2.0


















Table 8.8 Ownership Structure, Institutional Mechanisms and Acquiring Firm Performance: Outlier Robustness Test on 20%- Trimmed Mean 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return. Outliers have been trimmed using 20%-mean approach. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Panel A   Regressions on Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 






LSH1P 0.023 -0.162 *** -0.108 -0.091 -0.092 -0.091 -0.095
LSH1PSQ 0.297 *** 0.037 -0.069 -0.057 -0.069 -0.036
LSH1PCUBE 0.256 0.383 0.370 0.383 0.351
SEP -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012
CEOLSH 0.035 ** 0.034 ** 0.034 ** 0.038 ** 0.027 * 0.038 *** 0.041 *** 0.053 *** 0.053 *** 0.053 *** 0.053 ***
CEOdual -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.016 -0.018 * -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.021 *
BSIZE -0.002 * -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.002 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.002 *
INDDIR 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
OTHLSH -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
TGORI_English 0.024 * 0.023 * 0.024 * 0.024 * 0.021 0.026 * 0.026 * 0.030 ** 0.030 ** 0.030 ** 0.030 **
ATTI_Hostile 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.028 * 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023
PAY_stock -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.006 -0.012 -0.007 -0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
COMPETE 0.031 * 0.033 ** 0.031 * 0.032 ** 0.032 * 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
IND_rel -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012
TOEHOLD -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 ** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 ***
LEV -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007






NANTIDIR_high 0.052 0.045 *
UK -0.031 -0.074 * -0.047 -0.031
CAN - -0.064 ** 0.014 -0.018
AUS -0.024 -0.041 -0.006 -0.006
ACFRpre 0.453 *** 0.451 *** 0.455 *** 0.412 *** 0.469 *** 0.480 *** 0.483 *** 0.486 *** 0.487 *** 0.486 *** 0.489 ***




20%- Trimmed mean (Probability around 60%)
36.7
Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9.1Model 1 Model 2 Model 9
3.788*** 3.726*** 3.545** 4.039*** 3.808*** 4.560*** 4.321***





32.9 37.328.2 28.0 28.8 35.2 34.8 36.7
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Table 8.8 (Continued) 
Panel B   Regressions on Dependent Variable: △ACFR






LSH1P 0.021 -0.032 -0.227 ** -0.238 ** -0.205 * -0.209 ** -0.206 *
LSH1PSQ 0.076 0.887 ** 0.869 ** 0.739 * 0.750 ** 0.763 **
LSH1PCUBE -0.736 ** -0.711 ** -0.609 * -0.615 * -0.635 *
SEP -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.014 -0.020 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013
CEOLSH 0.015 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008
CEOdual -0.017 * -0.016 * -0.017 * -0.018 * -0.017 * -0.018 * -0.017 * -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016 *
BSIZE -0.002 -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 **
INDDIR 0.020 0.030 0.024 0.027 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.020 0.024 0.022 0.025
OTHLSH -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004
TGORI_English 0.029 ** 0.025 * 0.028 ** 0.028 * 0.025 * 0.026 * 0.027 * 0.031 ** 0.027 * 0.028 * 0.026 *
ATTI_Hostile 0.024 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024
PAY_stock -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
COMPETE 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005
IND_rel -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
TOEHOLD 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 -0.004 * -0.004 -0.004 *
LEV 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000






NANTIDIR_high 0.062 * 0.027
UK -0.151 -0.033 -0.054 0.002
CAN -0.170 * -0.022 0.123 0.015
AUS 0.005 0.025 0.027 0.023

















Model 4Model 1 Model 2
3.0
1.560*1.292
20%- Trimmed mean (Probability around 60%)(After trimming,
N=170) Model 8 Model 9 Model 9.1Model 8.1Model 6
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8.3 Robustness Analysis on Clustering 
 
8.3.1 Background Introduction 
 Traditional statistical methods for fitting regression models generally assume each 
observation in the data set is independent. In a sense, this assumption may give substantial 
bias in parameter and variance estimates when sampling model populations with clustering 
characteristics. More specifically, when a number of objects are drawn closer to each other 
than to the rest of the objects, each observation may contain less unique information and the 
effective sample size can be diminished. If the standard errors are still normally reported, 
then the unequal probability of selection may distress the size of standard errors because the 
intra-class correlation (correlation between observations) is different from a Pearson 
correlation, which exists between two variables. Formally, Rand (1971: p846) defined 
clustering as of follows. 
 […]X represents the set of N objects (or points) to be clustered, { }1 2, , NX X X X= , and Y, a 
specific partitioning of these objects into K disjoint sets. This portioning will be called a clustering 
and written as a set of clusters, { }1 2, , KY Y Y Y= , where each cluster is a set of the given 
points, { }1 2, , , nkk k k kY X X X=  , with Σnk=N and nk 1 for ≧ 1, 2 ,k K= . The set of all such 
partitions, for all 1, 2,k N= , of a given set of N points will be denoted by Y.  
 
 Wooldridge (2003) gives a more detailed description for the goal of clustering 
analysis as follows. The goal is to estimate the parameters in the following linear model:  
 (1)                gm g gm gmy x z v= α + β+ γ +   
       1, , gm M= , 1, ,g G=  
where g indexes the “group” or “cluster,” m indexes observations within the group, Mg is the 
group size, and G is the number of groups. […] The approach to estimation and inference in 
equation (1) depends on several factors, including whether one is interested in the effects of 
aggregate variables (β) or individual specific (γ). Plus, it is necessary to make assumptions 
about the error terms. An important issue is whether vgm contains a common group effect, as in  
(2)                  gm g gmv c u= +  
 where cg is an unobserved cluster effect and ugm is the idiosyncratic error.  
 
 In previous studies, statistics research has attempted to correct standard errors and to 
develope robust standard error estimators (Quenouille 1949, Huber 1967, White 1980, Efron 
and Tibshirani 1986, Wu 1986, Greene 1998, Shao and Tu 1995). In general, investigators 
face two basic questions: how to set up a natural criterion for assigning each clustering a 
numerical value to indicate its relative appropriateness? And what is the best clustering 
approach for selecting a suitable subset and for providing estimators with better performance? 
(Rand 1971) Considering that the mathematical exposition, theoretical estimation or 
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performance evaluation has been rigorously discussed and the results made available in 
many statistical works, the main purpose of doing clustering analysis in this thesis is to 
examine whether the basic regression results based on an original population with the 
existence of multiple bidders are still efficient by using the default ordinary least square 
(OLS) standard errors.   
 
 OLS estimators are so called naive estimates that minimize the sum of squared errors 
and give efficient estimators in ideal conditions under the assumption of homoskedastic 
errors. However, clustered or correlated data frequently happen in empirical social science 
research. The population can be separated into several groups (clusters) according to sample 
characteristics. The clusters are individually independent, but observations within a cluster 
are internally more homogenous. A typical method used to account for the within-group 
dependence is to compute Weighted Least Squares (WLS) that may correct the problem of 
bias in the standard errors and thereby provide reasonably accurate confidence intervals and 
p values. However, WLS requires more assumptions and is more difficult to implement 
(Pfeffermann, Skinner, Holmes and Goldstein 1997, Goldstein 1995). Huber (1967) and 
White (1980) originally introduced the Huber-White standard error, a more general 
preferred estimate for corrections of the standard errors. The Huber-White standard error is 
also called sandwich (Zeger and Liang 1986) or the robust or empirical standard error in the 
SAS documentation. The clustered robust standard errors are standard errors that are 
adjusted for the correlation of error terms across observations. The formulas are  





V X X X Xµ µ− −
=
= ∑  
where nc is the total number of clusters, 
i*
jcluster
=  e xijµ ∑ and ei is the residual for the ith 
observation and xi is a row vector of predictors including the constant.  
 
 Since this type of standard error can be applied to estimate the variance of the MLE 
even when the error structure is non-constant or has more than two levels, they are more 
popular, once obtained, than other traditional standard error estimates for inferences and 
hypothesis testing of the econometric mode (Zeger and Liang 1986, Mancl and Leroux 1996, 
Wooldridge 2003). Fortunately, it is getting easier and faster to compute these standard error 
estimators with the enhancement of computing power in the last decades. This is true, for 
example, when using the clustered robust option of standard errors/ robust for linear 
regression in Stata 9.0, as available in commercial statistical software package.  
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 The clustered robust standard errors are preferred because they allow general 
heteroskedasticity and within-cluster error correlation, but at the same time are limited by the 
cluster size (Wooldridge 2003). In some applications with a small number of clusters (5-30, 
even 40 or 50 in Angrist and Lavy 2002 study), the clustered robust standard errors are 
proven to be downwards biased and hypothesis testing based on theses estimators is likely to 
be over-rejected (Kauermann and Carroll 2001, Bell and McCaffrey 2002). In addition, 
Freedman (2005) criticizes the use of clustered robust estimators because of 
underspecification. More clearly, the inferences of clustered robust standard errors are based 
on an OLS model that is admittedly incorrect. If the model were correct, or nearly correct, 
there would be no need for sandwiches. This is bias due to specification error. Therefore, 
when using the robust cluster variance estimator, it’s still important for the specification of 
the model to be reasonable so that the model has a reasonable interpretation and yields good 
predictions.  
 
 Benefiting from the development of high-speed computer technology, several 
different methods - that are computer-intensive and more reliable - have been introduced for 
estimating standard errors. The jackknife and the bootstrap are two of the methods that are 
nowadays widely used in clustering analysis. Again, a large number of theoretical articles 
have provided statistical inferences built upon these two techniques. Here, this thesis simply 
reviews some fundamental concepts on the basis of application. The jackknife 
(Quenouille-Tukey jackknife) was initially proposed by Quenouille (1949) and Tukey 
(1958). This statistical method is less dependent on model assumptions and does not need the 
theoretical formula to construct robust standard errors estimators and confidence intervals. 
Jackknifed statistics are created by systematically dropping out a subset of original data (one 
at a time) and by assessing the resulting variation in the studied parameter. Rodgers (1999) 
emphasizes the jackknife procedure that requires randomly re-sampling from the population 
without any replacement so as to fill the groups with a smaller number of observations in the 
subset than in the original sample. Sampling n-1 of the original observations generates a 
basic jackknife estimator called delete-one jackknife. The delete-one jackknife is well known 
and provides consistent variance estimation for the case of smooth estimators; it does not 
provide consistent variance estimation for estimators such as the sample quantiles that are 
generated in functionals which are not smooth enough (Miller 1974, Wu 1986, Shao and Tu 
1995). The bootstrap clearly holds a major advantage over the jackknife.  
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 The Bootstrap is the most recent computer-based method originally referenced by 
Efron (1979). Like the jackknife, the bootstrap obtains robust standard errors through 
resampling from the original data. However, instead of recomputing the estimators by 
deleting observations each time, the bootstrap procedure requires resampling with 
replacement so as to create samples of the original size (Efron and Tibshirani 1986, Rodgers 
1999). While more computation and expensive than the jackknife, the bootstrap can be 
conveniently applied to nonsmooth functions under general designs (Shao and Tu 1995). In 
some cases, the jackknife can be used to estimate the accuracy of bootstrap estimates (Efron 
1992). The bootstrap is useful, particularly in small size populations, to estimate the entire 
distribution of an estimator, to correct the bias in a clustering problem, to construct 
confidence intervals and to test hypotheses (Shao and Tu 1995, Basford and McLachlan 
1985). While some critics do not agree that larger sampling frames might improve 
performance, it is still generally accepted that discontinuities in the distributions around the 
critical points or the ends of confidence intervals may lead to uncertainty and imprecision 
(Rodgers 1999). But note that bootstrapping is, like other methods, not a “cure” for small 
sample sizes. If the sample is too small or un-preventative, resampling with replacement may 
actually enlarge the problems (Rodgers 1999). 
 
 It is not a straightforward process to assess different approaches that are developed at 
different times with different purposes. Also, there is no absolute scheme with which to 
measure clustering. The common solution to date is to calculate the clustered robust standard 
errors, but this method requires a premise that is the number of clusters should be large 
enough. With the help of a new generation of statistics software, the jackknife and bootstrap 
techniques have become more appealing and more computationally intensive than the robust 
option used to approximate standard errors. Since these two methods estimate the variability 
of a statistic from the variability of that statistic between subsamples, the performance of the 
jackknife and bootstrap estimators are less susceptible to the violation of model assumptions 
than the other traditional approach. The jackknife with its flexible sampling weights is easier 
to apply to complex sampling schemes, such as multi-stage sampling, than the bootstrap. But 
the bootstrap is a more preferred tool because it gives more accurate distribution estimators 
than the jackknife histogram, especially for more complicated problems such as estimating 
sampling distributions and constructing confidence sets. Previous studies have done 
numerous theoretical and empirical comparisons among different types of standard errors 
estimators. Much of that work has recommended the bootstrap rather than the others (Beran 
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1988, Efron and Gong 1983, Rasmussen 1989, Good 1994). The sensitivity analysis of 
clustering in this thesis is aimed not at the winner but at whoever has more of an interest in 
how the results under the different schemes support or challenge the basic conclusions.  
 
8.3.2 Application to Data 
 As mentioned in section 5.2.1 of chapter five, the sample is comprised of 282 deals by 
222 acquirers. This means that in the sample there are several transactions created by the 
same acquiring firms that are called multiple acquirers. In order to control for this, regression 
models are rerun through estimating cluster robust standard errors. This is a more common 
correction and can be easily realized by the wide audience. For the convenience of 
computing facilities, investigation then turns towards whether or not bootstrapping 43 
improves the OLS estimation with cluster standard errors - even when there aren't enough 
clusters. Both approaches can now be implemented in Stata. Table 8.9 displays the regression 
results with the default OLS standard errors and these serve as the preliminary regression 
results as well. Table 8.10 and table 8.11 present the simulations under the clustered-robust 
and the bootstrap respectively. 
 
 In Stata, the regress command includes a robust option for estimating the standard 
errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimators. With the clustered-robust option, the 
standard errors account for the intraclass correlation while the estimates of the coefficients 
are exactly the same as in ordinary OLS. This is because Stata uses a constant similar to a 
finite population correction (fpc) called a finite sample correction when calculating robust 
standard errors, while SAS does not. Therefore, when comparing the results of regression 
with clustered-robust standard errors as it appears in table 8.10 with OLS regression in table 
8.9, it seems that slight changes are evident in the standard errors but no changes at all in the 
coefficients44. For example, the coefficient of CONEN20 is 0.024 in OLS regression (panel 
A of table 8.9) is exactly same as that in regression with clustered-robust standard errors 
(panel A of table 8.10), but the standard error has a minor increase from 0.0102 in OLS 
regression to 0.0115 in regression with clustered-robust standard errors.  
 
 Considering the assumption of the sample with heteroskedasticity, the robust standard 
errors may be preferred but with little difference. While the F statistic has also mildly 
                                                 
43 Considering the features of jackknife and the numbers of subset sample, this thesis did simulation 
using the jackknife. The results are not reported but presented in appendix F for reference. 
44 The t values and p values are also similar as well but not reported in the table. 
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changed (e.g. 7.76 of model 1 in panel A table 8.9 to 6.59 in panel A table 8.10), it is not 
appropriate to make a comparison because it is no longer based on the sum of squares. It 
becomes a Wald test based on the robustly estimated variance matrix. At the same time, 
adjust R square is hold (e.g. 29.01 of model 1 in panel of both tables) and still function as a 
goodness-of-fit statistic but can’t use it to obtain F statistics. The root MSE (mean squared 
error) is also valid but is no longer an estimate of σ because there is no single σ. The signs of 
control variables in each specification in table 8.9 are all consistent with those in table 8.10. 
In sum, using robust standard errors in the example does not change any of the conclusions 
from the original OLS regression; clustering problems caused by dependent acquirers are 
therefore negligible in the sample. 
 
 It is getting relatively simple to run bootstrapping regression using the bootstrap 
built-in command in new Stata 9.0. All that needed is to identify the cluster variable (set 
“acquirer” as cluster variable) and then the sample drawn during each replication is a 
bootstrap sample of clusters. The default number of bootstrap replications to be performed is 
50. While 50-200 replications are generally adequate to give a good estimate of standard 
error, it is necessary to specify the size of clusters in the sample (222) (as in the jackknife 
regressions report) according to the number of bootstrap replications. Notice that the Stata 
program here treats bootstrapping regression as random. Simply to say, the program selects 
bootstrap samples directly from the observations, calculates the statistics for each bootstrap 
sample, saves the results and do repeats the sequence a large number of times. Finally there 
are results from each individual replication. This allows bootstrapping regression to be run 
again and again, and allows standard errors to be recalculated. However, there are slightly 
different results when bootstrapping runs again; this is because that there is no reason to 
select the same random samples. Regression here is tested twice and the outcomes are 
basically similar with little difference. Table 8.11 presents the bootstrapping results obtained 
on the second run.  
 
 Similar to the regressions with clustered-robust standard errors, bootstrapping 
regression models in Stata are tested by a Wald style test that is based on the chi squared 
distribution instead of the t-distribution. The program is designed to prevent researchers from 
running F-tests, which in any event would be incorrect due to the asymptotic nature of the 
bootstrapping technique. Thus, from table 8.11 it is clear that Wald chi square value for 
ACFRpost measure ranges between 102.73 of model 7 to 173.24 of model 8.1 and for 
∆ACFR measure ranges between 25.93 of model 5 to 56.85 of model 8.1. All the statistics 
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are significant at the 5 percent level, but the values are not compatible with F statistics in 
OLS regressions or with regressions with clustered robust standard errors. The bootstrapping 
regression analysis yields rather similar results to indicate that the basic conclusions are still 
held even after standard errors are corrected using the bootstrap standard error estimators.  
 
 There is a major difference in that the cube relationship between continuous 
ownership variables and the change operating performance (∆ACFR) is losing its importance 
after controlling institutional variables (i.e. model 8, 9, 8.1 and 9.1 in panel B). This means 
that controlling shareholders having over a certain amount of voting shares are finding it 
difficult to expropriate minority shareholders through M&A transactions when in countries 
with good legal protection. Indeed, this result is not a surprising find but does more strongly 
support the trend spotted in the preliminary analyses (see section 6.5.2 for full model results). 
In statistics technique, a possible reason may because that the bootstrap approach is trying to 
estimate a population distribution from the sample data; the performance may be not 
accurate when simulations depend crucially on particular observations.  
  
In table 8.11 the ownership dummy variables still have an effect on both measures. 
The significance of the cube relationship fade-off may be due to the essential extreme data in 
both tails as they are generally comprised in continuous variables. Overall, these standard 
error robustness tests provide results that are equivalent to the basic analysis. Clustering 
problems caused by multiple acquirers in the sample might be not necessary for 
consideration because standard linear regression already provides a very good approximation 
concerning the joint distribution of the regression coefficients.  
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Table 8.9 Standard Errors Robustness Test on Default OLS estimators 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. With the default OLS standard errors below (Italics). Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, 
* significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Panel A   Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 
Intercept 0.048 ** 0.050 ** 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.041 * 0.042 * 0.056 ** -0.158 0.055 * 0.020 0.108
0.0230 0.0225 0.0235 0.0238 0.0224 0.0225 0.0227 0.1660 0.0303 0.0797 0.0681
CONCEN10 -0.012
0.0087
CONCEN1020 -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
0.0095 0.0095






LSH1P 0.023 0.006 -0.234 ** -0.197 ** -0.201 ** -0.222 ** -0.202 **
0.0209 0.0583 0.1011 0.0999 0.0996 0.1011 0.1013
LSH1PSQ 0.025 1.012 *** 0.673 * 0.726 ** 0.768 ** 0.723 **
0.0794 0.3494 0.3568 0.3538 0.3603 0.3620
LSH1PCUBE -0.893 *** -0.553 * -0.609 * -0.635 ** -0.608 *
0.3081 0.3175 0.3147 0.3203 0.3221
SEP -0.019 * -0.028 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.026 ** -0.030 ** -0.032 ** -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 **
0.0110 0.0112 0.0110 0.0113 0.0117 0.0117 0.0116 0.0127 0.0126 0.0128 0.0129
CEOLSH 0.025 ** 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.025 * 0.022 * 0.022 0.021
0.0128 0.0130 0.0129 0.0129 0.0128 0.0132 0.0131 0.0135 0.0133 0.0134 0.0134
CEOdual -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.015
0.0094 0.0093 0.0092 0.0093 0.0094 0.0095 0.0094 0.0094 0.0094 0.0096 0.0095
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 *
0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012
INDDIR -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.027 -0.023 -0.031 -0.028
0.0215 0.0211 0.0211 0.0214 0.0216 0.0216 0.0213 0.0254 0.0252 0.0255 0.0257
OTHLSH 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.011
0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0112 0.0107 0.0112 0.0111 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0110
(N=282) Model 7Model 4Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 8 Model 9Model 5 Model 6 Model 8.1




TGORI_English 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
0.0145 0.0145 0.0143 0.0144 0.0145 0.0146 0.0144 0.0143 0.0142 0.0143 0.0144
ATTI_Hostile 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.016 0.012 0.005 0.011
0.0211 0.0210 0.0208 0.0210 0.0212 0.0212 0.0210 0.0222 0.0213 0.0215 0.0215
PAY_stock -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013
0.0101 0.0101 0.0099 0.0100 0.0101 0.0102 0.0100 0.0100 0.0098 0.0099 0.0100
COMPETE -0.035 ** -0.032 ** -0.035 ** -0.035 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.035 ** -0.038 ** -0.037 ** -0.037 ** -0.036 **
0.0153 0.0151 0.0150 0.0150 0.0152 0.0153 0.0151 0.0149 0.0149 0.0150 0.0151
IND_rel 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
0.0079 0.0077 0.0077 0.0078 0.0078 0.0079 0.0078 0.0077 0.0077 0.0078 0.0078
TOEHOLD 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.009
0.0104 0.0104 0.0102 0.0103 0.0104 0.0105 0.0103 0.0104 0.0103 0.0103 0.0104
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
SIZE_rel -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 **
0.0024 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0024
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 0.0033 0.0032 0.0033 0.0032 0.0033 0.0033












NANTIDIR_high 0.061 *** 0.045 **
0.0225 0.0214
UK -0.064 -0.033 -0.062 ** -0.029
0.0518 0.0338 0.0250 0.0193
CAN -0.061 -0.041 ** 0.099 ** 0.013
0.0625 0.0176 0.0467 0.0225
AUS 0.055 * 0.054 ** 0.035 * 0.034
0.0256 0.0251 0.0216 0.0218
ACFRpre 0.516 *** 0.518 *** 0.521 *** 0.521 *** 0.514 *** 0.514 *** 0.516 *** 0.503 *** 0.512 *** 0.512 *** 0.517 ***
0.0566 0.0563 0.0556 0.0559 0.0567 0.0568 0.0560 0.0565 0.0556 0.0557 0.0560
 Adjust R2 (%)
F 
Root MSE















Table 8.9 (Continued) 
Panel B   Dependent Variable: △ACFR
Intercept 0.021 0.023 0.045 * 0.048 * 0.013 0.014 0.028 -0.182 0.015 0.011 0.083
0.0257 0.0252 0.0264 0.0267 0.0250 0.0252 0.0255 0.1891 0.0341 0.0907 0.0771
CONCEN10 -0.013
0.0099
CONCEN1020 -0.027 ** -0.027 **
0.0108 0.0108






LSH1P 0.021 0.005 -0.243 ** -0.228 ** -0.219 * -0.230 ** -0.214 *
0.0236 0.0658 0.1143 0.1138 0.1132 0.1150 0.1148
LSH1PSQ 0.023 1.041 *** 0.762 * 0.737 * 0.784 * 0.749 *
0.0896 0.3953 0.4064 0.4025 0.4100 0.4103
LSH1PCUBE -0.921 *** -0.608 * -0.594 * -0.635 * -0.615 *
0.3486 0.3618 0.3580 0.3645 0.3651
SEP -0.016 -0.026 ** -0.024 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.026 ** -0.029 ** -0.027 * -0.027 * -0.027 *
0.0124 0.0126 0.0125 0.0127 0.0131 0.0132 0.0131 0.0145 0.0144 0.0145 0.0145
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.012
0.0144 0.0145 0.0145 0.0145 0.0144 0.0148 0.0147 0.0153 0.0150 0.0151 0.0152
CEOdual -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.022 ** -0.024 ** -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.023 **
0.0105 0.0104 0.0103 0.0104 0.0105 0.0106 0.0105 0.0107 0.0106 0.0109 0.0107
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014
INDDIR -0.013 -0.003 -0.013 -0.015 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007
0.0242 0.0237 0.0238 0.0241 0.0243 0.0244 0.0241 0.0288 0.0286 0.0289 0.0289
OTHLSH 0.023 * 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.022 *
0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0126 0.0120 0.0126 0.0125 0.0125 0.0124 0.0125 0.0124
Default Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimators(N=282)
Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9.1Model 9Model 6 Model 7Model 3 Model 4Model 1 Model 2 Model 5
 
 251
TGORI_English 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.0163 0.0163 0.0162 0.0163 0.0164 0.0164 0.0163 0.0163 0.0162 0.0163 0.0163
ATTI_Hostile 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.017
0.0238 0.0237 0.0235 0.0237 0.0239 0.0240 0.0237 0.0253 0.0243 0.0245 0.0243
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
0.0114 0.0113 0.0112 0.0113 0.0114 0.0115 0.0114 0.0114 0.0112 0.0113 0.0113
COMPETE -0.050 *** -0.046 *** -0.049 *** -0.050 *** -0.048 *** -0.048 *** -0.049 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.052 *** -0.051 ***
0.0171 0.0170 0.0168 0.0168 0.0171 0.0172 0.0170 0.0169 0.0168 0.0170 0.0170
IND_rel 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009
0.0088 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087 0.0088 0.0089 0.0088 0.0088 0.0087 0.0088 0.0088
TOEHOLD 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.021 * 0.019 * 0.018 0.017
0.0117 0.0116 0.0115 0.0115 0.0117 0.0117 0.0116 0.0117 0.0116 0.0117 0.0117
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
SIZE_rel -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0027 0.0027 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
LEV -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 * -0.006 * -0.007 ** -0.007 * -0.008 **
0.0036 0.0036 0.0035 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0037 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036












NANTIDIR_high 0.062 ** 0.049 **
0.0256 0.0243
UK -0.125 ** -0.070 * -0.061 ** -0.034
0.0584 0.0381 0.0284 0.0218
CAN -0.141 ** -0.058 *** 0.070 0.000
0.0704 0.0200 0.0530 0.0254
AUS 0.027 0.032 0.030 0.029
0.0289 0.0285 0.0246 0.0247





















Table8.10 Standard Errors Robustness Test on Clustered-Robust Standard Errors Estimators 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. With clustered (Robust) standard errors below (Italics). Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% 
level, * significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Panel A   Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 
Intercept 0.048 ** 0.050 ** 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.041 ** 0.042 ** 0.056 *** -0.158 0.055 ** 0.020 0.108
0.0222 0.0210 0.0232 0.0231 0.0206 0.0209 0.0216 0.1488 0.0250 0.0966 0.0795
CONCEN10 -0.012
0.0087
CONCEN1020 -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
0.0093 0.0093






LSH1P 0.023 0.006 -0.234 ** -0.197 * -0.200 ** -0.222 ** -0.202 **
0.0238 0.0607 0.1016 0.1021 0.1002 0.1012 0.1014
LSH1PSQ 0.025 1.011 *** 0.673 * 0.725 * 0.768 ** 0.723 *
0.0851 0.3744 0.3895 0.3800 0.3871 0.3844
LSH1PCUBE -0.892 *** -0.553 * -0.608 * -0.635 * -0.608 *
0.338 0.355 0.346 0.353 0.350
SEP -0.019 -0.028 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.026 ** -0.030 ** -0.032 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 **
0.0122 0.0125 0.0122 0.0121 0.0128 0.0126 0.0127 0.0135 0.0132 0.0134 0.0133
CEOLSH 0.025 * 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.021
0.0145 0.0152 0.0150 0.0150 0.0150 0.0151 0.0151 0.0162 0.0156 0.0158 0.0157
CEOdual -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.015
0.0098 0.0098 0.0098 0.0097 0.0099 0.0098 0.0097 0.0095 0.0096 0.0098 0.0100
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 *
0.0012 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014
INDDIR -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.027 -0.023 -0.031 -0.028
0.0239 0.0235 0.0234 0.0236 0.0238 0.0239 0.0236 0.0260 0.0262 0.0267 0.0271
OTHLSH 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.011
0.0121 0.0113 0.0115 0.0115 0.0118 0.0118 0.0121 0.0121 0.0119 0.0120 0.0118
Clustered-Robust Standard Errors Estimators
Model 8Model 5 Model 6 Model 7Model 4 Model 8.1 Model 9 Model 9.1Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(N=282)
 253
TGORI_English 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
0.0127 0.0121 0.0124 0.0123 0.0122 0.0122 0.0115 0.0118 0.0115 0.0115 0.0115
ATTI_Hostile 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.016 0.012 0.005 0.011
0.0141 0.0175 0.0170 0.0170 0.0158 0.0155 0.0150 0.0115 0.0125 0.0133 0.0124
PAY_stock -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013
0.0101 0.0091 0.0093 0.0093 0.0094 0.0097 0.0094 0.0097 0.0094 0.0095 0.0099
COMPETE -0.035 ** -0.032 ** -0.035 ** -0.035 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.035 ** -0.038 ** -0.037 ** -0.037 ** -0.036 **
0.0148 0.0142 0.0143 0.0144 0.0143 0.0143 0.0149 0.0149 0.0147 0.0147 0.0147
IND_rel 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
0.0078 0.0076 0.0075 0.0076 0.0077 0.0080 0.0078 0.0075 0.0075 0.0076 0.0077
TOEHOLD 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.009
0.0081 0.0082 0.0081 0.0081 0.0082 0.0083 0.0079 0.0081 0.0078 0.0079 0.0080
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
SIZE_rel -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 **
0.0023 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022 0.0023 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022 0.0021 0.0022 0.0022
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
0.0034 0.0032 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 0.0034 0.0034 0.0031 0.0033 0.0032












NANTIDIR_high 0.061 ** 0.045 **
0.0237 0.0207
UK -0.064 -0.033 -0.062 ** -0.029
0.0429 0.0309 0.0288 0.0229
CAN -0.061 -0.041 ** 0.099 * 0.013
0.0468 0.0194 0.0600 0.0210
AUS 0.055 ** 0.054 ** 0.035 * 0.034 *
0.0240 0.0243 0.0201 0.0190
ACFRpre 0.516 *** 0.518 *** 0.521 *** 0.521 *** 0.514 *** 0.514 *** 0.516 *** 0.503 *** 0.512 *** 0.512 *** 0.517 ***
0.061 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.059



















Panel B   Dependent Variable: △ACFR
Intercept 0.021 0.023 0.045 0.048 0.013 0.014 0.028 -0.182 0.015 0.011 0.083
0.0295 0.0278 0.0305 0.0304 0.0278 0.0282 0.0286 0.1711 0.0326 0.1105 0.0844
CONCEN10 -0.013
0.0099
CONCEN1020 -0.027 ** -0.027 **
0.0106 0.0106






LSH1P 0.021 0.005 -0.243 ** -0.228 * -0.218 * -0.230 * -0.214 *
0.0253 0.0669 0.1170 0.1172 0.1164 0.1178 0.1183
LSH1PSQ 0.023 1.041 ** 0.760 * 0.735 * 0.784 * 0.747 *
0.0915 0.4166 0.4277 0.4201 0.4299 0.4292
LSH1PCUBE -0.921 ** -0.606 -0.593 -0.635 * -0.613
0.3673 0.3787 0.3704 0.3800 0.3786
SEP -0.016 -0.026 * -0.024 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.026 ** -0.029 * -0.027 * -0.027 * -0.027 *
0.0131 0.0131 0.0130 0.0127 0.0132 0.0130 0.0133 0.0146 0.0144 0.0147 0.0147
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.012
0.0148 0.0158 0.0156 0.0156 0.0153 0.0157 0.0157 0.0165 0.0158 0.0161 0.0162
CEOdual -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.022 ** -0.024 ** -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.023 **
0.0104 0.0105 0.0105 0.0103 0.0105 0.0105 0.0106 0.0107 0.0107 0.0110 0.0110
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.0014 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
INDDIR -0.013 -0.003 -0.013 -0.015 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007
0.0267 0.0260 0.0262 0.0266 0.0268 0.0269 0.0265 0.0312 0.0308 0.0309 0.0314
OTHLSH 0.023 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.022
0.0141 0.0136 0.0136 0.0137 0.0139 0.0137 0.0138 0.0136 0.0133 0.0135 0.0135
Model 5Model 3 Model 4Model 1 Model 2 Model 6 Model 7
Clustered-Robust Standard Errors Estimators(N=282)
Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9.1Model 9
 255
TGORI_English 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.0156 0.0149 0.0152 0.0153 0.0152 0.0152 0.0148 0.0150 0.0149 0.0149 0.0150
ATTI_Hostile 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.017
0.0165 0.0184 0.0189 0.0190 0.0170 0.0169 0.0167 0.0180 0.0181 0.0173 0.0176
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
0.0120 0.0113 0.0114 0.0114 0.0116 0.0118 0.0117 0.0121 0.0117 0.0118 0.0121
COMPETE -0.050 *** -0.046 *** -0.049 *** -0.050 *** -0.048 *** -0.048 *** -0.049 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.052 *** -0.051 ***
0.0174 0.0162 0.0161 0.0161 0.0168 0.0168 0.0171 0.0169 0.0169 0.0170 0.0171
IND_rel 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009
0.0088 0.0086 0.0085 0.0086 0.0087 0.0090 0.0088 0.0088 0.0087 0.0088 0.0088
TOEHOLD 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.021 ** 0.019 * 0.018 * 0.017 *
0.0100 0.0103 0.0101 0.0101 0.0102 0.0103 0.0100 0.0101 0.0099 0.0100 0.0101
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
SIZE_rel -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.0025 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024 0.0026 0.0026 0.0025 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024
LEV -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.008 *
0.0042 0.0040 0.0042 0.0041 0.0040 0.0040 0.0041 0.0041 0.0038 0.0040 0.0040












NANTIDIR_high 0.062 ** 0.049 **
0.0295 0.0245
UK -0.125 ** -0.070 * -0.061 * -0.034
0.0510 0.0386 0.0356 0.0274
CAN -0.141 ** -0.058 *** 0.070 0.000
0.0535 0.0212 0.0745 0.0225
AUS 0.027 0.032 0.030 0.029
0.0297 0.0317 0.0239 0.0229
 Adjust R2 (%)
F 








2.22***1.81** 1.75** 2.24*** 2.12***
6.23 6.01
1.65*
2.763.06 4.30 2.41 4.58
1.77**1.66*
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Table 8.11 Standard Error Robustness Test on Bootstrap Standard Errors Estimators 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. 
Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. With clustered (Bootstrap) standard errors below (Italics). Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% 
level, * significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Panel A   Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 
Intercept 0.048 ** 0.050 ** 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.041 ** 0.042 * 0.056 ** -0.158 0.055 ** 0.020 0.108
0.0199 0.0204 0.0242 0.0244 0.0199 0.0216 0.0222 0.1896 0.0249 0.1131 0.0910
CONCEN10 -0.012
0.0077
CONCEN1020 -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
0.0095 0.0096






LSH1P 0.023 0.006 -0.234 ** -0.197 * -0.200 ** -0.222 ** -0.202 **
0.0253 0.0632 0.1140 0.1129 0.1001 0.1029 0.0920
LSH1PSQ 0.025 1.011 ** 0.673 * 0.725 * 0.768 * 0.723 *
0.0942 0.4326 0.4501 0.3787 0.4438 0.3706
LSH1PCUBE -0.892 ** -0.553 * -0.608 * -0.635 * -0.608 *
0.399 0.417 0.354 0.417 0.362
SEP -0.019 -0.028 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 * -0.026 ** -0.030 ** -0.032 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 **
0.0133 0.0127 0.0112 0.0123 0.0141 0.0121 0.0129 0.0148 0.0149 0.0141 0.0149
CEOLSH 0.025 * 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.021
0.0150 0.0154 0.0151 0.0145 0.0150 0.0149 0.0155 0.0165 0.0170 0.0166 0.0163
CEOdual -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.015
0.0099 0.0095 0.0101 0.0089 0.0099 0.0098 0.0093 0.0094 0.0103 0.0101 0.0090
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 * -0.002 *
0.0012 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014 0.0015 0.0013
INDDIR -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.027 -0.023 -0.031 -0.028
0.0231 0.0243 0.0244 0.0210 0.0218 0.0261 0.0233 0.0299 0.0281 0.0276 0.0293
OTHLSH 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.011
0.0120 0.0113 0.0123 0.0117 0.0120 0.0126 0.0125 0.0117 0.0117 0.0129 0.0121
Bootstrap Standard Errors Estimators





TGORI_English 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
0.0120 0.0136 0.0125 0.0126 0.0134 0.0126 0.0118 0.0117 0.0111 0.0120 0.0119
ATTI_Hostile 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.016 0.012 0.005 0.011
0.0152 0.0171 0.0181 0.0186 0.0178 0.0158 0.0185 0.0134 0.0135 0.0178 0.0131
PAY_stock -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013
0.0107 0.0095 0.0096 0.0097 0.0097 0.0092 0.0104 0.0109 0.0106 0.0102 0.0104
COMPETE -0.035 ** -0.032 ** -0.035 ** -0.035 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.035 ** -0.038 ** -0.037 ** -0.037 ** -0.036 **
0.0151 0.0144 0.0163 0.0142 0.0143 0.0153 0.0138 0.0149 0.0144 0.0174 0.0153
IND_rel 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
0.0078 0.0074 0.0080 0.0070 0.0076 0.0083 0.0080 0.0070 0.0082 0.0072 0.0079
TOEHOLD 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.009
0.0084 0.0081 0.0078 0.0084 0.0086 0.0082 0.0081 0.0082 0.0085 0.0079 0.0096
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
SIZE_rel -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 *** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 **
0.0023 0.0025 0.0022 0.0024 0.0024 0.0025 0.0024 0.0023 0.0021 0.0022 0.0023
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
0.0032 0.0033 0.0032 0.0033 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0036 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033












NANTIDIR_high 0.061 ** 0.045 **
0.0296 0.0218
UK -0.064 -0.033 -0.062 * -0.029
0.0617 0.0338 0.0349 0.0245
CAN -0.061 -0.041 * 0.099 0.013
0.0708 0.0214 0.0731 0.0249
AUS 0.055 ** 0.054 ** 0.035 0.034 *
0.0261 0.0250 0.0224 0.0202
ACFRpre 0.516 *** 0.518 *** 0.521 *** 0.521 *** 0.514 *** 0.514 *** 0.516 *** 0.503 *** 0.512 *** 0.512 *** 0.517 ***
0.059 0.058 0.060 0.061 0.066 0.063 0.067 0.058 0.065 0.063 0.060















125.57*** 126.33*** 147.95*** 115.14***
33.85 31.9430.00 31.59
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Table 8.11 (Continued) 
Panel B   Dependent Variable: △ACFR
Intercept 0.021 0.023 0.045 0.048 0.013 0.014 0.028 -0.182 0.015 0.011 0.083
0.0303 0.0283 0.0311 0.0301 0.0284 0.0247 0.0293 0.2479 0.0330 0.1295 0.0983
CONCEN10 -0.013
0.0101
CONCEN1020 -0.027 *** -0.027 ***
0.0100 0.0101






LSH1P 0.021 0.005 -0.243 * -0.228 * -0.218 * -0.230 * -0.214 *
0.0287 0.0726 0.1301 0.1251 0.1149 0.1198 0.1355
LSH1PSQ 0.023 1.041 ** 0.760 0.735 0.784 * 0.747
0.1023 0.4800 0.4830 0.4523 0.4242 0.4873
LSH1PCUBE -0.921 ** -0.606 -0.593 -0.635 * -0.613
0.4433 0.4481 0.4332 0.3801 0.4340
SEP -0.016 -0.026 ** -0.024 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.023 * -0.026 * -0.029 ** -0.027 * -0.027 * -0.027 *
0.0139 0.0127 0.0138 0.0127 0.0132 0.0135 0.0145 0.0145 0.0154 0.0159 0.0162
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.012
0.0156 0.0144 0.0167 0.0158 0.0156 0.0162 0.0166 0.0188 0.0166 0.0172 0.0168
CEOdual -0.024 ** -0.022 * -0.023 ** -0.022 ** -0.024 ** -0.024 ** -0.022 * -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.023 **
0.0099 0.0114 0.0107 0.0112 0.0103 0.0099 0.0114 0.0111 0.0119 0.0111 0.0110
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.0014 0.0015 0.0016 0.0017 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016
INDDIR -0.013 -0.003 -0.013 -0.015 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007
0.0268 0.0277 0.0272 0.0256 0.0271 0.0247 0.0258 0.0289 0.0334 0.0309 0.0347
OTHLSH 0.023 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.022 *
0.0141 0.0139 0.0136 0.0138 0.0135 0.0135 0.0147 0.0136 0.0136 0.0129 0.0132
Bootstrap Standard Errors EstimatorsN=282, Clusters=222
Replications=222 Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9.1Model 9Model 6 Model 7Model 1 Model 2 Model 5Model 3 Model 4
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TGORI_English 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.0176 0.0158 0.0149 0.0147 0.0151 0.0144 0.0146 0.0147 0.0151 0.0158 0.0165
ATTI_Hostile 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.017
0.0164 0.0216 0.0210 0.0225 0.0181 0.0160 0.0181 0.0219 0.0192 0.0203 0.0221
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
0.0126 0.0114 0.0116 0.0131 0.0117 0.0120 0.0112 0.0126 0.0131 0.0127 0.0120
COMPETE -0.050 *** -0.046 *** -0.049 *** -0.050 *** -0.048 *** -0.048 *** -0.049 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.052 *** -0.051 ***
0.0181 0.0176 0.0167 0.0174 0.0177 0.0171 0.0176 0.0186 0.0181 0.0179 0.0166
IND_rel 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009
0.0084 0.0086 0.0084 0.0088 0.0080 0.0094 0.0092 0.0090 0.0084 0.0090 0.0082
TOEHOLD 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.021 * 0.019 * 0.018 * 0.017
0.0102 0.0101 0.0111 0.0108 0.0096 0.0116 0.0103 0.0112 0.0114 0.0104 0.0111
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
SIZE_rel -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.0027 0.0026 0.0025 0.0023 0.0027 0.0025 0.0025 0.0026 0.0027 0.0027 0.0024
LEV -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.008 *
0.0041 0.0039 0.0040 0.0040 0.0040 0.0042 0.0040 0.0041 0.0040 0.0040 0.0041












NANTIDIR_high 0.062 * 0.049 **
0.0331 0.0240
UK -0.125 ** -0.070 * -0.061 -0.034
0.0817 0.0390 0.0413 0.0285
CAN -0.141 -0.058 ** 0.070 0.000
0.1108 0.0242 0.0896 0.0252
AUS 0.027 0.032 0.030 0.029
0.0343 0.0327 0.0245 0.0249


















8.4 Robustness Analysis on Windows of Measuring 
Performance 
 
The basic regressions attempt to explain the change in pre and post median 
performance over years t-3 to t-1 and t+1 to t+3 (∆ACFR) and the level of post median 
performance over t+1 to t+3 (ACFRpost). They also attempt to control for pre median 
performance over t-3 to t-1 operating performance (ACFRpre) (HPR 1992/ 1997, Linn and 
Switzer 2001, Ghosh 2001). However, one stream of academic literature argues that the 
changes in performance (∆ACFR) surrounding corporate events should be examined based 
on a set year (commonly the last year prior to the event) before the event and each of the 
years after the transaction (Denis and Denis 1995). Ghosh (2001) and Powell and Stark 
(2005) partially examine the change between year t-1 and the median post performance over 
t+1 to t+3 year. The operating performance in the year surrounding the transactions is 
examined in a further robustness test and then the benchmark regression model (model 7) is 
rerun along with the modified regression models (model 8.1 and 9.1) as representatives over 
these different measuring windows. The robustness results are reported in tables 8.12 and 
8.13.   
 
Table 8.12 is set just like table 6.1 but the part of change in operating cash flow return 
(∆ACFR) is presented in panel B with a different set of measuring windows instead. The 
results in panel A of table 8.12 are exactly same as those in panel A of table 6.1. It is clear 
that firms with acquisitions significantly underperform as compared with their matched peers 
in the level of adjusted operating performance (ACFRi) among the prior years of transactions 
(median measure -0.91, -0.70 and -1.37 percent at year t-3, t-2 and t-1, respectively) but the 
ratio of the change in adjusted operating performance (∆ACFR) declines from year t-3 to 
year t-1 by an median (mean) measure -0.22 (-0.86) percent which is not a statistically 
decrease. Following the acquisitions, merging firms exhibit a comparable performance with 
their benchmark firms in the level of adjusted operating cash flow returns (ACFRi) (median 
measure +0.23, +0.54 and +0.17 percent at year t+1, t+2 and t+3, respectively). However, 
there is a statistically significant increase in the ratio of the change in adjusted performance 
(∆ACFR3) by a median (mean) measure 2.25 (2.27) percent from year t-1 through year t+3. 
This evidence remains in ∆ACFR1 and ∆ACFR2 by median measure 2.03 and 2.28 through 
year t+1 and year t+2, respectively, and also stands in the median post performance 
(ACFRpost, median measure is 2.15) as applied in Ghosh (2001). All the mean and median 
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measures of the change performance are significantly distinguishable from zero at the 1% 
level.   
 
In the same way, improvements in post acquisition performance are tested using the 
regression approach. Panel C presents the regression results of adjusted returns at each post- 
acquisition year (ACFRt+i, i=1,2,3) and the adjusted returns at the last year prior to the 
transaction (ACFRt-1). The intercept α is positive and significant at least at the 5 percent level 
in all regression models (0.016, 0.013, 0.012 and 0.014 at t+1, t+2, t+3 and median over 3- 
year, respectively) which indicates that adjusted operating performance has a significant 
improvement in each post-acquisition year after controlling for the effects of 
pre-performance at year t-1. The slope coefficient β is also positive and statistically different 
from zero (0.494, 0.527, 0.483 and 0.504 at t+1, t+2, t+3 and median over 3- year, 
respectively) which specifies that the correlation in operating cash flow between the pre and 
post acquisition years is positive effect per year and that the adjusted cash flow returns tend 
to persist over time. These results certainly confirm the basic conclusions in table 6.1. There 
is no difference seen by using different windows to measure the change in operating cash 
flow returns. 
 
Major regression models are rerun in the following step. The metrics over these 
windows are displayed in table 8.13. Panel A reflects the level of operating performance at 
each post acquisition year (ACFRpost = ACFRt+i) by controlling the pre-performance at the 
last year prior to the event (ACFRpre=ACFRt-1). Panel B reflects the change in operating 
performance based on the last year prior to the event as well. 
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Table 8.12 Operating Cash Flows Returns: Robustness Test on Year Window of Measuring 
Performance 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Operating cash flow return (OCFR) is calculated as operating cash flow divided by market 
value of asset. Operating cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation. Post acquisition performance for each 
deal is measured by the operating cash flow return of the surviving acquirer after transaction. Pre acquisition performance is 
calculated as a weighted-average of the operating cash flow return for the bidder and the target included (MEGi pre and post). 
The weights are based on the market values of assets of both companies in the year before acquisition. Post and pre acquisition 
performances of the matched firms are measured as weighted-average of the operating cash flow rates (MATi pre and post). 
Industry, Size, and Pre performance Adjusted Operating Cash Flow Rates (ACFRt+i) is operating cash flow rates of merged 
firms minus those of matched firms at the year i (i=-1,-2,-3,1,2,3). The change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted 
cash flow rate (△ACFRpre) is defined as ACFR at the third year before transaction minus ACFR at the last year prior to 
transaction. The change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow rate (△ACFRt+i) is defined as ACFRi at each 
post year (i=1,2,3) minus the last year prior to transaction (i=-1). The change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted 
cash flow rate (△ACFRmd) is defined as  3-year median ACFR (ACFRpost) minus the last year prior to transaction 
(ACFRt-1). Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Significance of mean and median are measured 
using a standard two-tailed t- test and a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test, respectively. *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level, ** significance at the 5% level, * significance at the 10% level. 
Panel A   Operating Cash Flows
N Mean% Median% N Mean% Median % N Positive
-3 194 13.09 12.57 194 14.38 14.21 194 -1.29 ** -0.91 ** 43.81%
-2 260 12.27 11.91 260 13.84 13.32 260 -1.57 *** -0.70 *** 47.31%
-1 282 11.35 11.22 282 13.46 12.85 282 -2.11 *** -1.37 *** 39.01%
1 282 11.41 11.06 282 10.88 10.52 282 0.53 0.23 54.61%
2 280 11.81 11.72 280 11.61 11.12 280 0.20 0.54 52.14%
3 279 12.87 12.47 279 12.71 12.15 279 0.16 0.17 50.18%
ACFRpre: Median for years (-3 to -1) 282 -1.51 *** -0.70 *** 43.26%
ACFRpost: Median for years (+1 to +3) 282 0.31 0.59 53.19%
Panel B  Change in Operating Cash Flow Rate
N Positive
194 -0.86 -0.22 42.27%
282 2.64 *** 2.03 *** 63.48%
280 2.36 *** 2.28 *** 58.57%
279 2.27 *** 2.25 *** 58.06%
282 2.42 *** 2.15 *** 62.06%







ACFRmedian(t+1~t+3)= 0.014*** + 0.504***ACFRt-1
△ACFRmd: (ACFRpost - ACFRt-1)
Year
△ACFR1: (ACFRt+1 - ACFRt-1)
△ACFR2: (ACFRt+2 - ACFRt-1)
△ACFR3: (ACFRt+3 - ACFRt-1)
ACFRt+1= 0.016*** + 0.494***ACFRt-1
Industry, Size, and Pre-performance Adjusted
(MEGi-MATi=ACFRt+i)
Mean% Median%
Industry, Size, and Pre-performance Adjusted
(MEGi-MATi=ACFRt+i)Matched Firms (MATi )
Mean% Median%
ACFRt+2 = 0.013*** + 0.527***ACFRt-1




Mergering Firms (MEGi )
△ACFRpre: (ACFRt-1 - ACFRt-3)
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Interestingly, the ownership variables have no effect on the first two years (ACFRt+1 
and ACFRt+2 in panel A of Table 8.13), but the institutional variables are significantly 
positive when related to the post performance at the first year (ACFRt+1) alone. This result 
is rather consistent with intuition. Since this thesis is examining a specific corporate event, it 
is reasonable to conclude that good legal protection plays an important role in creating better 
corporate performance for acquiring firms at the beginning. By contrast, the strong influence 
(good or bad) of controlling shareholders takes time to come into play. Besides, when merely 
comparing to the pre performance at the single last year prior to the event, it is clear that a 
significant non-linear relationship still exists between the median post operating performance 
(ACFRpost) and the voting shares of controlling shareholders without controlling the 
institutional variables (model 7). Once the legal protection is put into consideration (model 
8.1 and 9.1), controlling shareholders seem to lose their influence over the median of post 
performance (ACFRpost) through acquisitions. This result was also found in the main 
analyses as basic conclusion and in the robustness test by bootstrap standard error estimators.  
 
For governance variables, separation has the strongest effect on the first year adjusted 
post performance (ACFRt+1); this indicates that controlling shareholders in acquisition firms 
are still likely to expropriate minority shareholders through acquisitions by separating their 
voting rights from cash flow rights, even in the countries with strong shareholder protection. 
In the tradition of years past, other governance variables like controlling CEO, CEO duality 
and board size, play a much more important role.  
 
For deal variables, if those factors are further classified into variables with transaction 
characteristics (deal- specific variables) and variables with company characteristics (firm- 
specific variables), deal- specific variables emerge such as payment type (PAY_stock) and 
multiple bidders (COMPETE); their significance becomes clear at the first two years and 
when the firm- specific variables like size relatedness (SIZE_rel) and acquirers leverage 
(LEV) stay to the end. Moreover, when this study regressed on the smooth median post 
performance (ACFRpost) instead of ACFRt+i, the results are similar to the basic conclusions 
in table 6.4 to table 6.6 those are controlled by the median pre performance over a three-year 
window (ACFRpre).  
 
In terms of the change performance measure (∆ACFRi) in table 8.13 panel B, it seems 
that model 7 loses its explanatory power on ∆ACFRt+1, ∆ACFRt+2 and ∆ACFRmd. This means 
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that those independent variables are not strong enough to explain the abnormal adjusted 
returns. While the explanatory power of model 8.1 and model 9.1 improves after putting 
institutional variables into consideration, it is still weakly significant at a 10 percent level. 
Until year t+3, the consistent patterns for post operating performance (as stated above) are 
observed. These results verify Ghosh’s (2001: p167) concern regarding the use of the mean 
or the median post year performance in comparison with data from year t-1. As he suggested, 
a possible alternative is “to take the mean of year 2 and 3, ignoring year t+1 information 
because of possible integration costs.”  In this thesis, it becomes clear that even when using 
the median performance of post three years, the results are still influenced at the first 
beginning years once the year t-1 is adopted as the benchmark of pre-performance. This 
thesis postulates the benchmark on a set of year t-1; the results are easily prejudiced due to 
the presence of extreme observations, and this influence takes a much longer time to offset. 
This problem is even worse when the abnormal returns are measured by the change in 
adjusted cash flow returns. In summary, this thesis finds that some valuable information may 
be specifically released and the change performance measures may be biased at the first 
beginning years by using the different year window to examine operating performance. 
Fortunately, the basic conclusions for ownership structure, governance mechanisms, 
institutional functions and legal characteristics are still qualitatively similar.  
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Table 8.13 Ownership Structure, Institutional Mechanisms and Acquiring Firm Performance: Robustness Test on Year Window of Measuring 
Performance 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million are obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. Industry, Size, and Pre performance Adjusted Operating Cash Flow Rates (ACFRt+i) is operating cash flow rates of merged firms minus those of matched firms at the year i (i=-1,-2,-3,1,2,3). 
ACFRpost is the 3- year median post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. The change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow rate ( ACFRt+i) is defined as △
ACFRi at each post year (i=1,2,3) minus the last year prior to transaction (i=-1). The change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow rate ( ACFRmd) is defined as  3△ -year median posst 
ACFR (ACFRpost) minus the last year prior to transaction (ACFRt-1). Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Panel A: Regression on Adjusted Post Operating Performance (ACFRt+i, i=1,2,3)
Intercept 0.056 ** 0.046 -0.030 0.064 ** 0.091 ** 0.174 ** 0.026 0.043 0.016 0.055 ** 0.070 ** 0.110
LSH1P -0.057 -0.035 -0.032 -0.125 -0.085 -0.080 -0.316 ** -0.310 ** -0.319 ** -0.181 * -0.145 -0.146
LSH1PSQ 0.445 0.115 0.054 0.563 0.296 0.266 1.042 ** 0.932 ** 0.916 ** 0.794 ** 0.504 0.484
LSH1PCUBE -0.497 -0.149 -0.088 -0.474 -0.245 -0.219 -0.791 ** -0.657 * -0.631 * -0.697 ** -0.419 -0.398
SEP -0.039 *** -0.040 *** -0.037 *** -0.034 ** -0.039 *** -0.039 ** -0.016 -0.025 -0.024 -0.023 * -0.027 ** -0.026 **
CEOLSH 0.013 0.024 * 0.025 * 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.032 ** 0.037 ** 0.038 ** 0.017 0.022 0.022
CEOdual 0.014 0.013 0.013 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.025 ** -0.023 ** -0.024 ** -0.005 -0.006 -0.008
BSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 *
INDDIR -0.020 -0.037 -0.042 -0.027 -0.060 ** -0.061 ** 0.007 0.002 -0.005 -0.018 -0.037 -0.042
OTHLSH -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.021 0.022 0.024 *- 0.005 0.003 0.007
TGORI_English 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.024 0.018 0.018 0.007 0.001 0.002
ATTI_Hostile -0.014 -0.020 -0.015 0.003 0.012 0.011 0.029 0.026 0.021 0.006 0.011 0.009
PAY_stock -0.019 * -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.015 -0.017 -0.018 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.021 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 **
COMPETE -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 -0.036 ** -0.036 ** -0.036 ** -0.025 -0.028 -0.028 -0.033 ** -0.034 ** -0.034 **
IND_rel -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
TOEHOLD -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.014 0.020 * 0.019 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.011 0.009
PREM_1day 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 ** -0.007 ** -0.007 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 **
LEV 0.008 ** 0.007 * 0.007 * 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.009 ** -0.008 ** -0.009 * -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
ANTIDIR_high 0.071 *** 0.029 0.014 0.046 *
XLEG_high 0.032 -0.038 -0.031 -0.031
ANTISDI 0.094 -0.122 0.018 -0.063
NANTIDIR_high 0.071 *** 0.027 0.019 0.039 *
UK -0.094 ** -0.072 *** -0.005 -0.015 0.002 -0.026 -0.024 -0.032
CAN -0.044 ** 0.044 * -0.006 0.016 -0.025 0.004 -0.031 * 0.015
AUS 0.005 0.042 * 0.049 0.021 0.054 * 0.036 0.049 * 0.027
ACFRt-1 0.412 *** 0.420 *** 0.419     *** 0.481 *** 0.465 *** 0.476 *** 0.452 *** 0.448 *** 0.457 *** 0.472 *** 0.463 *** 0.474 ***
adjusted R2
F 6.910*** 6.355*** 6.027***






























Table 8.13 (Continued) 
Panel B: Regression on the Change Operating Performance (△ACFR)
Intercept 0.020 0.011 -0.062 0.034 0.058 0.143 * -0.007 0.009 0.020 0.023 0.038 0.081
LSH1P -0.002 0.011 0.021 -0.078 -0.040 -0.031 -0.278 ** -0.272 ** -0.279 ** -0.131 -0.102 -0.098
LSH1PSQ 0.215 -0.148 -0.207 0.425 0.085 0.065 0.886 * 0.718 0.737 0.588 0.260 0.248
LSH1PCUBE -0.293 0.108 0.161 -0.368 -0.048 -0.038 -0.653 -0.444 -0.460 -0.513 -0.180 -0.173
SEP -0.026 * -0.024 -0.022 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 -0.004 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
CEOLSH 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.019 0.028 0.027 0.004 0.012 0.011
CEOdual 0.011 0.009 0.009 -0.011 -0.014 -0.016 -0.028 ** -0.026 ** -0.027 ** -0.008 -0.010 -0.012
BSIZE 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
INDDIR -0.015 -0.032 -0.033 -0.022 -0.054 -0.052 0.011 0.012 0.007 -0.013 -0.032 -0.033
OTHLSH 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.029 * 0.030 ** 0.032 ** 0.013 0.012 0.015
TGORI_English 0.029 0.023 0.021 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.038 * 0.031 0.031 0.021 0.016 0.016
ATTI_Hostile -0.006 -0.019 -0.009 0.009 0.013 0.016 0.037 0.031 0.028 0.013 0.012 0.015
PAY_stock -0.027 ** -0.028 ** -0.028 ** -0.023 * -0.025 * -0.026 ** -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.028 ** -0.029 ** -0.029 **
COMPETE -0.033 * -0.034 * -0.034 * -0.052 *** -0.051 *** -0.050 *** -0.042 ** -0.044 ** -0.043 ** -0.048 *** -0.049 *** -0.048 ***
IND_rel 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.005
TOEHOLD 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.023 * 0.028 ** 0.028 ** 0.016 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.019 0.017
PREM_1day 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
LEV 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.008 * -0.008 ** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.016 *** -0.008 ** -0.009 ** -0.009 **
ANTIDIR_high 0.074 ** 0.040 0.026 0.049 *
XLEG_high 0.064 * -0.010 -0.020 -0.002
ANTISDI 0.102 -0.114 -0.016 -0.056
NANTIDIR_high 0.070 ** 0.031 0.016 0.038 *
UK -0.132 *** -0.084 *** -0.046 * -0.031 -0.023 -0.030 -0.059 -0.043 *
CAN -0.054 ** 0.029 -0.023 0.003 -0.044 * -0.018 -0.040 * 0.001
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This thesis provides empirical evidence concerning the relationship between 
concentrated ownership structures and the long-term operating performance of acquiring 
firms in English origin countries other than the US. The primary agency problems in 
concentrated ownership structures are not between owners and managers, but between large 
shareholders and minority shareholders. Large shareholders are generally viewed as 
beneficial monitors of corporate performance. High levels of concentration, however, can 
lead to potential expropriation from minority shareholders via managerial entrenchment, 
tunneling, or sub-optimal investment decisions. This problem is potentially greater in firms 
with a separation of voting and cash flow rights. Corporate governance research mostly 
relies on the effectiveness of internal and external monitoring mechanisms to mitigate 
agency costs; recent studies focus more heavily on legal institutions. 
 
According to the classification and investigation of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1998), countries in English origin families are generally lumped 
together and viewed as possessing the strongest legal protections for minority shareholders. 
Companies in these countries are also shown to have higher firm performance. However, the 
levels of shareholders protection, either proxied by anti-director right indexes in LLSV 
(1998), extra-legal institutions in Dyck and Zinglaes (2003), or the new anti-self dealing 
measure in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (DLLV, 2006) vary among the 
countries in English common law families. One line of M&A studies provides evidence to 
suggest that controlling shareholders in countries with poor legal systems generally 
expropriate minority shareholders through acquisition transactions. Another line of study, 
however, shows that in countries with higher levels of investor protection the tunneling costs 
may be too high for controlling shareholders to entertain expropriation via M&As deals. 
 
Compared to most governance literature that tests general corporate performance, this 
thesis investigates the impact of ownership structures on firm performance around specific 
mergers and acquisitions because these transactions are large and significant investments in a 
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firm’s life. Whereas most M&A research adopts an event study methodology to evaluate the 
short-term market performance, this thesis examines the improvement of acquisition 
performance by measuring long-term accounting based performance to better captures the 
economic consequences and the underlying drivers. This thesis presents Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback (HPR, 1992) regression-based results and the results of a change model (Ghosh 
2001). Furthermore, it matches benchmark firms based on industry, size and 
pre-performance, similar to the technique of Barber and Lyon (1996).  
 
The existing international governance literature generally compares corporate 
performance among different legal origins under the assumption that companies in countries 
with same legal origins are homogeneous: this is not true. Hence, this thesis proves that the 
levels of legal/ extra- legal investor protection are different even in countries with the same 
legal origins and that they have a significant impact on firm performance. This thesis also 
evaluates the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms in corporate governance and 
completes the debate about deal characteristics.  
 
 
9.2 Main Findings 
 
First of all, for the improvement of acquisition performance this thesis finds that the 
changes in adjusted operating cash flow rates are significantly improved after M&A events. 
It also finds that after controlling the effects of pre-acquisition performance, the operating 
performance of merging firms is significantly improved in post-merger periods. These 
evidence confirms the synergy hypothesis which states that M&A transactions should 
improve the long-term financial and operating performance of merging firms to reflect that 
accounting performance can capture real economic creations (HPR 1992). In addition, this 
thesis finds that improvement in the operating performance of sample firms is primarily 
achieved by an increase in cash flow margins rather than by asset turnover. Also, higher sales 
growth after acquisitions is also noted in this sample. This finding agrees with Ghosh’s (2001) 
observations. 
 
Second, for the potential consequences of concentrated ownership, this thesis 
produces results showing that after controlling for well-documented governance mechanisms 
and deal characteristics, there exists a non-linear relationship between concentrated 
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ownership and the level and change in operating cash flow returns after acquisitions. Value 
creating deals are associated with higher levels of concentration consistent with decreasing 
agency costs as the controlling shareholder’s wealth invested in the acquiring firm increases. 
The companies with large shareholders but with a lower holding of voting shares 
significantly underperform when compared to their peers. The curvilinear relationship 
expressed in this thesis is similar to that described by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988b) 
and Anderson and Reeb (2003). Furthermore, this thesis confirms Ben-Amar and André 
(2006) who finds that the separation of ownership and voting rights leads to greater value 
destruction. Since these findings prove that ownership effects still exist even in acquiring 
firms with a so-called better legal system, this thesis concludes that legal origin itself is not 
enough to speak for a good corporate governance system which might mitigate agency costs.  
 
Furthermore, before controlling institutional variables this thesis does not find any 
significant evidence to prove that family controlled firms use M&As to obtain private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. However, once institution mechanisms are 
controlled, it does find that family firms underperform when compared to non-family firms 
after M&A transactions. This result contradicts the view that family firms tend to make 
value-persisting investment projects to maximize the firm value (Anderson and Reeb 2003). 
It is also clear that acquiring firms controlled by financial institutions have significantly poor 
acquisition performance. That financial institutional large shareholders do not act as effective 
monitors on M&A decisions may be owing to their short-term vision and conservative 
natures. These results further support the findings in Weinstein and Yafeh (1998).  
 
Third, for a broad set of corporate governance mechanisms, this thesis shows that 
acquiring firms with controlling CEO make significant improvements in post acquisition 
performance after controlling pre-performance. The presence of CEO-Chairman duality and 
board size are both significantly negatively associated with acquisition operating 
performance. When the cross effects between the type I agency problem (separation between 
ownership and voting rights) and the type II agency problem (separation between ownership 
and management) are compared, this thesis finds that controlling CEO has positive and 
dominant effects in the sample of this thesis. Once the type II agency cost is curbed, there 
exists no significant difference between companies with and without type I agency costs. The 
average performance in companies without type II but with type I agency costs is still 
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significantly superior to that in companies without type I but with type II agency costs. These 
results are supported when compared with those discovered by Villalonga and Amit (2006). 
 
Fourth, for the second generation governance mechanisms, this thesis concludes that 
the different level of legal mechanisms has a significant effect on acquisition operating 
performance among countries with the same legal origins. The greater investor protection, as 
measured by the initial anti-director right index in LLSV (1998) and revised anti-director 
rights index in DLLS (2006) has a positive impact on operating cash flow returns from 
acquisitions. However, this thesis does not document any differential performance with 
respect to the extra- legal systems of Dyck and Zingales (2004) and the anti-self-dealing 
index of DLLS (2006).  
 
Thus, the empirical results of the broad set of corporate governance mechanisms again 
prove that individual governance mechanisms and characteristics of the legal system are 
important determinants of acquisition performance in English origin countries. Research 
focusing on the difference between legal families needs to exert some care when lumping all 
English origin firms together as having the same well-developed corporate governance and 
investor protections; firm and country-level protections can vary substantially even in the 
same legal system and thereby remain important for explaining differences in firm 
performance.  
 
Finally, for deal characteristics, this thesis provides stable evidence concerning the 
significantly negative relationship between the acquiring performance and M&A transactions 
with more than one bidder. The higher deviation in the size ratio of bidders and targets brings 
on a poorer post operating performance but not on the change performance. After controlling 
for institutional variables, a significant but negative relationship exists between the degree of 
the acquirer’s leverage and the change performance. Except for the above deal variables, this 
thesis finds no significant relationship with other transaction characteristics such as target 




9.3 Limitations  
 
As with all empirical work, a number of limitations need to be considered regarding 
this thesis. First, the reason this thesis uses operating cash flow as the measure of long-term 
performance is to avoid most accounting ratios (such as ROA) which can be easily 
manipulated (Erickson and Wang 1999) or biased due to the accounting for mergers or the 
method of payment. However, it agrees with Powell and Stark (2005) that the HPR 
methodology using EBITDA as a denominator is still accrual based and that it is likely to be 
distorted by particular accounting policies. Data with respect to cash flow from operations 
varies from country to country as the cash flow statement is the least standardized of the 
statements in use. Powell and Stark (2005) suggest a ‘pure’ cash flow measure that is defined 
as pre-depreciation profit adjusted for changes in working capital. They compare both 
measures (EBITDA and pure cash flow) and conclude that results can be sensitive to 
particular methodological definitions but that inferences drawn are relatively robust to 
methodological concerns raised. While EBITDA may lead to some biased conclusions, this 
thesis still employs EBITDA as the operating cash flow measure in order to make results 
compatible with most papers that look at operational performance improvements following a 
significant corporate event (HPR 1992, Linn and Switzer 2001, Ghosh 2001).  
 
Second, this thesis uses the market value of assets to deflate the measure of operating 
cash flow as based on the assumptions in HPR (1992) that the market is efficient to adjust 
price swiftly in relation to the news announcement, and that market values better represent 
the opportunity cost of the assets. However, this thesis also agrees with Powell and Stark 
(2005) that market values are a forward-looking measure and that investors tend to 
overestimate the expected gains arising from takeover. HPR (1992) also recognize that their 
market-based measure is potentially limited and thus test its sensitivity. They conclude that 
asset values based on either market or book do not affect the results; a conclusion reinforced 
by Powell and Stark (2005).  
 
Third, the reason this thesis uses ROA as the proxy to develop performance-matching 
benchmark groups is simply because this measure is adopted by Barber and Lyon (1996) and 
is quite commonly used in prior studies. Also, this measure is available in Thomson 
Financial database that could easily be used as a filter. However, this thesis agrees with 
Ghosh (2001) and Powell and Stark (2005) that it might be helpful to do the matching on 
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pre-deal operating cash flows. The exact pre-performance metric does vary from one study to 
the other and there exists no formal means of testing the impact of this choice on results. 
Ghosh (2001) and Powell and Stark, (2005) have no examination for their pre-performance 
matching criteria either. Given the fact that performance metrics are highly correlated and 
that matching on pre-performance is generally the last matching criteria, i.e., leaving a 
relatively small number of potential matches anyway, this thesis expects that the difference is 
likely minimal. Although this difference still remains an empirical question, the operation of 
a different matching scheme is a non-trivial extension that has not been performed for this 
investigation.  
 
Fourth, this thesis does not include the acquisition of private targets. It agrees with 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) that looking at the impact of private acquisitions is of 
genuine interest. Market-based performance studies do point to a differential response. 
Nevertheless, the accounting-based performance literature, like this thesis, generally focuses 
on public acquisitions because private targets are usually much smaller than the acquirer,. 
making it more difficult to pick up the operational impact. Also, the pre-performance metric 
is generally the combined performance of both the acquirer and the target; but data with 
respect to private targets is unavailable.  
 
Finally, this thesis acknowledges that CEO ownership and compensation are 
important drivers behind M&A decisions and performance. However, executive 
compensation has become increasingly complex as firms have formed various executive 
compensation packages. Moreover, the measures and reports of compensation data on 
executive bonuses and stock options are not consistent across firms, countries, and periods. 
Thus, this thesis is constrained by the CEO compensation information and fails to provide 
evidence in this field. Similarly, as evidenced in the sample, each county has different type of 
separation. This thesis is limited by a lack of more detailed measurements relative to the 
degree of separation between control rights and cash flow rights.     
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9.4 Avenues for Future Research  
 
This thesis provides the following insight for future research. First of all, English 
origin firms are beginning to see the effects of ownership concentration and governance 
mechanisms on M&A performance in a single legal family. It concludes that firm-specific 
corporate governance and country-specific legal protections, rather than legal origins, have 
more influence on M&A value creations. Future research might usefully extend this 
cross-country (one legal origin) research to cross-legal origins research by investigating the 
global village. There are many other dimensions to analyze due to the broad range of 
information. More interesting results might emerge concerning the relationship/mutual 
influence among ownership structures, governance characteristics, institutional mechanisms, 
and corporate performance.  
   
Second, the results in this thesis show that most legal measures (except for the initial 
and revised anti-director right indexes) are sensitive to the particular methodology, operating 
performance measures and regression models used. One possible consideration that accounts 
for the sensitivity is the representativeness of these legal indexes. A better development of 
legal metrics for measuring cross-country differences is needed. For example, Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2005) constructed the entrenchment index based on “constitutional” and 
“takeover readiness”. They provide evidence suggesting that entrenchment provisions appear 
to cause lower firm value. Developing this corporate governance index could be of great help 
in empirical research.  
 
Beyond the representativeness concern, the other question is whether or not it is 
indeed counter-intuitive when legal measures are negative as related to the firm’s 
performance? Could it be possible that overly strong legal enforcements are costly to the 
concentrated firm because they exacerbate the agency problem? Further investigation into 
the optimal legal system is strongly recommended. 
 
Third, like the other empirical literature in the field of performance valuation, the 
choice of benchmark groups is always the core concern behind the research methodology in 
this thesis. This thesis basically selects matched firms by similar size, same industry, closest 
pre-performance and same origin (in the same way as in Barber and Lyon (1996)). However, 
how and why should certain individual multiples or certain comparable firms be selected?  
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Bhojraj and Lee (2002) generate a particular valuation multiple called “warranted multiple” 
as based on profitability, growth, and risk characteristics. Matched firms whose warranted 
multiple is closest to that of matching firms are selected. Bhojraj, Lee and Oler (2003) 
further suggest that using GICS (The Global Industry Classification Standard system) instead 
of SIC codes as an industry classification scheme could provide a better explanation 
concerning stock return comovements, cross-sectional variations and various key financial 
ratios realization. More information on benchmark construction would be helpful in 
establishing a greater degree of accuracy on this matter.  
 
Beyond benchmark construction, it also seems valuable to consider using a longer 
window of time for analysis. This thesis observes financial and accounting data for three 
years (36 months) before and after transactions. But some literature suggest that corporate 
events continue under- or over- performance beyond 36 months (Loughran and Ritter 2000). 
Changes over longer periods can be more informative because they might better specify the 
identity and relationships between observed variables and performance measures. 
 
Fourth, this thesis shows that controlling shareholders who hold company shares at 
middle levels (around 20%-60%) are more likely to make value-enhancing deals because of 
the incentive effects. Acquiring firms with low level controlled (10-20 percent) and high 
level controlled (over 60 percent) large shareholders may have higher agency costs which 
will lead to M&A performance decreases even in countries with so-called better legal origins. 
But what is the nature of these agency costs? Are they caused by bad investment choices, by 
poor management or by potential wealth transfers?  This thesis does not attempt to measure 
this aspect and offers it as a challenge for further studies.  
 
Finally, this thesis concludes by raising a question: why do minority shareholders 
remain for the ride if tunneling is possible and if investors are assumed to be rational? The 
concept of propping (negative tunneling) in recent work such as Friedman, Johnson and 
Mitton (2003) and Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) explains that underperformance might be 
compensated by the private funds of entrepreneurs, thus inducing small investors to stay on 
the investment. Propping is an interesting and innovative idea. More information and 
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Appendix A: Company List 
Panel A   Acquirers and Targets
Entity Name Sedol Country Entity Name Sedol Country
a001 Aristocrat Leisure Limited 6253983 AUS Casino Data Systems 2200466 USA
a002 Australian Gas Light Company 6064969 AUS NGC Holdings Limited B00MSQ7 NZL
a003 BHP Billiton Limited 6144690 AUS Dia Met Minerals Ltd. 2264053 CAN
a004 BHP Billiton Limited 6144690 AUS BHP Billiton PLC 0056650 GBR
a005 Baycorp Advantage Limited 6128661 AUS Baycorp Holdings Ltd. 6111100 NZL
a006 Downer EDI 6465573 AUS Evans Deakin Industries Ltd. 6323552 AUS
a007 Fosters Group Limited 6349268 AUS Beringer Wine Estates Holdings, Inc. 2120423 USA
a008 Henry Walker Eltin Group 6420884 AUS Eltin Limited 6550639 AUS
a009 Lion Nathan Limited 6538215 AUS Petaluma Limited 6080653 AUS
a010 Lion Nathan Limited 6538215 AUS Montana Group (NZ) Limited 6225443 NZL
a011 Symbion Health Limited 6574606 AUS F.H. Faulding & Co Limited 6332600 AUS
a012 Symbion Health Limited 6574606 AUS Australian Hospital Care Limited 6054517 AUS
a013 Paperlinx Limited 6222206 AUS Spicers Paper Limited 6834355 AUS
a014 Publishing And Broadcasting Limited 6637082 AUS Crown Limited 6237932 AUS
a015 Rio Tinto 6220103 AUS Ashton Minign Limited 6056999 AUS
a016 Rio Tinto 6220103 AUS North Limited 6644037 AUS
a017 Sons Of Gwalia Limited 6821324 AUS Pacmin Mining Corporation Limited 6120292 AUS
a018 Sons Of Gwalia Limited 6821324 AUS Gwalia Consolidated Limited 6415567 AUS
a019 Southern Cross Broadcasting 6904344 AUS Telecasters Australia Limited 6883766 AUS
a020 Tabcorp Holdings Limited 6873262 AUS Star City Holdings Limited 6868718 AUS
a021 Wesfarmers Limited 6948836 AUS Howard Smith Limited 6816308 AUS
a022 Iluka Resources Limited 6957575 AUS RGC Limited 6732330 AUS
a023 Alesco Corp. Limited 6063557 AUS Parbury Limited 6670504 AUS
a024 Harvey Norman Holdings 6173508 AUS Rebel Sport Limited 6727013 AUS
c001 Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. 2056807 CAN Donohue Inc. 2272379 CAN
c002 Alcan (Aluminum) Ltd 2013200 CAN Aluminium of Korea 6021975 KOR
c003 Alcan (Aluminum) Ltd 2013200 CAN Alusuisse Group AG 4780524 CHE
c004 Alcan (Aluminum) Ltd 2013200 CAN Indian Aluminium Company, Limited 6142230 IND
c005 Alimentation Couche Tard Inc. 2528102 CAN Silcorp Limited 2809272 CAN
c006 Astral Media Inc. 2060273 CAN Radiomutuel Inc. 2214434 CAN
c007 Barrick Gold Corp. 2024644 CAN Homestake Minign Co. 2435008 USA
c008 Barrick Gold Corp. 2024644 CAN Sutton Resources Ltd 2861012 CAN
c009 Baytex Energy Trust Limited 2552736 CAN Bellator Exploration Inc. 2091488 CAN
c010 Baytex Energy Trust Limited 2552736 CAN Dorset Exploration Ltd 2277200 CAN
c011 Baytex Energy Trust Limited 2552736 CAN Triumph Energy Corporation 2567837 CAN
c012 BCE Inc. 2089933 CAN CTV Inc. 2084488 CAN
c013 BCT.Telus Communications Inc. 2381093 CAN Quebectel Group Inc.orporated (THE) 2716800 CAN
c014 Bell Canada International Inc. 2969596 CAN Teleglobe Inc. 2577825 CAN
c015 Biovail Corp International 2098199 CAN Fuisz Technologies Ltd. 2357964 USA
c016 Canadian National Railways Company 2180632 CAN Illinois Central Corporation 2457273 USA
c017 Canadian National Railways Company 2180632 CAN Wisconsin Central Transporation 2973638 USA
c018 Canadian Natural Resources Limited 2171573 CAN Ranger Oil Limited 2723004 CAN
c019 Celestica Inc. 2263362 CAN Omni Industries Limited 6654865 SGP
c020 Celestica Inc. 2263362 CAN Primetech Electronics Inc. 2272454 CAN
c021 CGI Group Inc. 2159740 CAN Imrglobal Corp. 2448125 USA
c022 CHC Helicopter Corp. 2160281 CAN Helicopter Services Group ASA 4419947 NOR
c023 Co-Steel (Gerdau Ameristeel) Corp. 2205018 CAN New Jersey Steel Corporation 2630535 USA
c024 Dorel Industries Inc. 2262369 CAN Safety 1st, Inc. 2766968 USA
c025 Enbridge Inc. 2466149 CAN Midcoast Energy Resources Inc.orporated 2577342 USA
c026 Finning International Inc. 2339177 CAN Hewden Stuart PLC 0424053 GBR
c027 Glamis Gold Limited 2371113 CAN Rayrock Rexources Inc. 2726661 CAN
c028 Hummingbird Limited 2427812 CAN PC Docs Group International Inc. 2717427 CAN
c029 International Forest Products Limited 2963963 CAN Primex Forest Products Ltd 2703512 CAN
c030 Kinross Gold Corp. B03Z841 CAN AMAX Gold Inc. 2023298 USA
c031 Leitch Technology Corp. 2511414 CAN Digital Processing Systems Inc. 2269100 CAN
c032 Loblaw Companies Limited 2521800 CAN Provigo Inc. 2706328 CAN
c033 Magna International Inc. 2554475 CAN Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG 4846608 AUT
c034 MDS Inc. 2559696 CAN Phoenix International Life Sciences Inc. 2711281 CAN
c035 Catalyst Paper Corp. 2342733 CAN Pacifica Papers Inc. 2402530 CAN
c036 Onex Corp. 2659518 CAN American Buildings Company 2034546 USA
c037 PanCanadian Petroleum (Encana) Corp. 2793193 CAN CS Resources Limited 2160872 CAN
c038 Petrobank Energy & Resources Limited 2683670 CAN Barrington Petroleum Ltd. 2078083 CAN
c039 Placer Dome Inc. 2691714 CAN Getchell Gold Corporation 2341934 USA
c040 Precision Drilling B0P0ZR6 CAN Computalog Ltd. 2214791 CAN
c041 Precision Drilling B0P0ZR6 CAN Plains Energy Services Limited 2692438 CAN
c042 Primewest Energy Trust 2977588 CAN Cypress Energy 2206066 CAN
c043 Primewest Energy Trust 2977588 CAN Reserve Royalty Corporation 2796363 CAN
c044 Quebecor Printing (World) Inc. 2716231 CAN World Color Press, Inc. 2977522 USA




Appendix A (Continued)  
c046 Shaw Communications Inc. 2801836 CAN WIC Western International Communications 2964171 CAN
c047 Talisman Energy Inc. 2068299 CAN Lundin Oil AB 4449159 SWE
c048 Talisman Energy Inc. 2068299 CAN Petromet Resources Limited 2684598 CAN
c049 Talisman Energy Inc. 2068299 CAN Rigel Energy Corporation 2898054 CAN
c050 Teck Cominco Limited 2879327 CAN Cominco Limited 2213066 CAN
c051 Tembec Inc. 2883050 CAN Crestbrook Forest Industries Ltd. 2233008 CAN
c052 Thomson Corp. C000006385 CAN Primark Corporation 2702809 USA
c053 Transcanada Corp. 2665184 CAN Nova Corporation (OLD) 2642110 CAN
c054 Air Canada Inc. 2011323 CAN Canadian Airlines Corporation 2210454 CAN
c055 Armbro Enterprises Inc. (AECON Group Corp) 2699547 CAN BFC Construction Corp. 2075170 CAN
c056 Cangene Corp. 2173397 CAN Chesapeake Biological Laboratories, Inc. 2194785 USA
c057 Cinar Corp 2192994 CAN Edusoft Ltd. 2305662 ISR
c058 Coolbrands International Inc. 2228844 CAN Eskimo Pie Corporation 2321743 USA
c059 Corus Entertainment Inc. 2484516 CAN Nelvana Limited 2629748 CAN
c060 Crew Development (Gold) Corp 2171636 CAN Mindex ASA 5139868 NOR
c061 Dorel Industries Inc. 2262369 CAN Ameriwood Industries International Corp. 2752246 USA
c062 Exco Technologies Limited 2325392 CAN Tecsyn International Inc. 2148210 CAN
c063 Heroux-Devtek Inc. 2422947 CAN Devtek Corporation 2267665 CAN
c064 Laidlaw Inc. 2039381 CAN Greyhound Canada Transporation Corp. 2389600 CAN
c065 Laidlaw Inc. 2039381 CAN Greyhound Lines, Inc. 2388522 USA
c066 Laidlaw Inc. 2039381 CAN Emcare Holdings Inc. 2305543 USA
c067 Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. 2312684 CAN Trimark Holdings, Inc. 2929385 USA
c068 Nortel Networks Corp. 2583877 CAN Architel Systems Corporation 2049238 CAN
c069 Nortel Networks Corp. 2583877 CAN Clarify Inc. 2194213 USA
c070 Nortel Networks Corp. 2583877 CAN Alteon Websytems, Inc. 2492575 USA
c071 Nortel Networks Corp. 2583877 CAN Periphonics Corporation 2686862 USA
c072 Nortel Networks Corp. 2583877 CAN Bay Networks, Inc. 2947495 USA
c073  NS Power Hldg (EMERA) Inc. 2650050 CAN Bangor Hydro-Electric Company 2470236 USA
c074 Southernera Diamonds Inc. 2831305 CAN Messina Limited 6582706 ZAF
c075 Thomson Corp. C000006385 CAN Wave Technologies International, Inc. 2943976 USA
in01 Indian Rayon & Industries Ltd 6100421 IND PSI Data Systems Ltd 6143073 IND
in02 BPCL 6099723 IND KRL 6211839 IND
in03 Pentamedia Graphics Ltd 6124959 IND Film Roman Inc. 2361307 USA
in04 Hindalco Industries Ltd B0GWF48 IND Indian Aluminum Co Ltd C000008991 IND
in05 Dr Reddys Laboratories Ltd 6410959 IND Cheminor Drugs Ltd 6099961 IND
in06 Hindustan Lever Ltd 6261674 IND Pond's India Ltd 6693727 IND
ir01 CRH PLC 4182249 IRL Ibstock PLC 0455406 GBR
ir02 Elan Corporation PLC 4305507 IRL Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 2288570 USA
ir03 Elan Corporation PLC 4305507 IRL Liposome Company, Inc. (THE) 2518976 USA
ir04 Elan Corporation PLC 4305507 IRL Neurex Corporation 2041869 USA
ir05 Grafton Group PLC B00NKF3 IRL British Dredging PLC 0132505 GBR
ir06 Greencore Group PLC 5013832 IRL Paramount Foods PLC 0170862 GBR
ir07 Greencore Group PLC 5013832 IRL Hazlewood Foods PLC 0416685 GBR
ir08 IWP International PLC 5112609 IRL Jeyes Group PLC 0474315 GBR
ir09 Kerry Group PLC 4519579 IRL Golden Vale PLC 4376569 IRL
ir10 Kingspan Group PLC 4491235 IRL Hewetson PLC 0422659 GBR
ir11 Waterford Wedgwood PLC 4942636 IRL Rosenthal AG 4751401 DEU
is01 Gilat Satellite Networks Ltd 7582170 ISR ZapMe! (RSTAR) Corp C000066760 USA
m001 IOI Corp Bhd 6464514 MYS Palmco Holdings Bhd (Ioi Oleochemical) 6668446 MYS
n001 Fernz Corp  (NUFARM) Ltd (AUS) 6335331 NZL CIE Francaise Des Produits Indst'l-CFPI 4160278 FRA
n002 Nuplex Industries Limited 6651372 NZL Australian Chemical Holdings Limited 6064152 AUS
n003 Telecom Corp. Of New Zealand Limited 6881436 NZL AAPT Limited 6086468 AUS
s001 Flextronics International Limited 2353058 SGP JIT Holdings Limited 6085409 SGP
s002 Fraser And Neave Limited 6689458 SGP Times Publishing Limited 6891855 SGP
s003 GES International Limited 6141903 SGP Eltech Electronics Limited 6308214 SGP
s004 Keppel Corp. Limited 6490263 SGP Keppel Telecommunications Transportation 6842444 SGP
s005 Smrt Corp. Limited 6274456 SGP TIBS Holdings Ltd. 6900933 SGP
sa01 Amalgamated Beverage Industry Ltd 6023573 ZAF Suncrush Limited 6806536 ZAF
sa02 Anglogold Ashanti Limited 6565655 ZAF Anglogold Australasia Limited 6005582 AUS
sa03 Aveng Limited 6153339 ZAF LTA Limited 6500805 ZAF
sa04 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 6410562 ZAF Evander Gold Mines Limited 6301901 ZAF
sa05 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 6410562 ZAF Randfontein Estates Limited 6723420 ZAF
sa06 Impala Platinum Holdings Limited 6457804 ZAF Platexco Inc. 2692502 CAN
sa07 Invicta Holdings Limited 6650443 ZAF Bearing Man Limited 6088657 ZAF
sa08 Johnnic Holdings Limited 6475141 ZAF Millenium Entertainment Group Africa Ltd. 6160265 ZAF
sa09 Johnnic Holdings Limited 6475141 ZAF Times Media Ltd. 6891866 ZAF
sa10 Metrofile Holdings Limited 6588016 ZAF Computer Configurations Holdings Limited 6043708 ZAF
sa11 Steinhoff International Holdings Limited 6127936 ZAF Relyon Group P.L.C. 0731708 GBR
sa12 Tiger Brands Limited B0J4PP2 ZAF ICS Holdings Limited 6458506 ZAF
sa13 Tiger Brands Limited B0J4PP2 ZAF Adcock-Ingram Limited 6016625 ZAF
sa14 Trans Hex Group Limited 6164267 ZAF Gem Diamond Mining Corporation Limited 6127691 ZAF
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t001 Thai Union Frozen Products PCL 6422705 THA Songkla Canning 6821487 THA
u001 Acal PLC 0005588 GBR Sedgemoor PLC 0555373 GBR
u002 Aegis Group PLC 0965756 GBR Market Facts Inc. 2566403 USA
u003 Airtours PLC B06BLB4 GBR Travel Services International 2083140 USA
u004 AMEC PLC 0028262 GBR AGRA Inc. (AMEC Inc.) 2058621 CAN
u005 Ashtead Group PLC 0053673 GBR Sheriff Holdings PLC 0803908 GBR
u006 BAA PLC 0067340 GBR Duty Free International Inc. 2289421 USA
u007 Berisford PLC(ENODIS) 0093152 GBR Scotsman Industries Inc. 2779911 USA
u008 Billiton PLC (BHP Billiton) 0056650 GBR Rio Algom Ltd 2740100 CAN
u009 Bodycote International PLC 0689562 GBR Lindberg Corp 2516602 USA
u010 British Airways PLC 0129057 GBR British Regional Airlines Grp 0289575 GBR
u011 British American Tobacco PLC 0287580 GBR Imasco Ltd 2457767 CAN
u012 British American Tobacco PLC 0287580 GBR Rothmans Industries Ltd 6752253 SGP
u013 British Sky Broadcasting Group 0141192 GBR Sports Internet Group PLC 0540465 GBR
u014 BSS Group PLC B09BY45 GBR PTS Group PLC 0666145 GBR
u015 Cable & Wireless PLC 0162557 GBR Digital Island Inc. 2432924 USA
u016 Capital Radio PLC 0174239 GBR Border Television PLC 0112314 GBR
u017 Daily Mail & General Trust PLC 0945736 GBR Bristol United Press PLC 0125787 GBR
u018 Dixons Group PLC 0047245 GBR Elkjop ASA 5682027 NOR
u019 Ennstone PLC 0178725 GBR Breedon PLC 0121310 GBR
u020 First Technology PLC 0339135 GBR City Technology Holdings PLC 0199221 GBR
u021 First Technology PLC 0339135 GBR Control Devices Inc. C000030846 USA
u022 Gallaher Group PLC 0383369 GBR Austria Tabakwerke AG 5355921 AUT
u023 GKN PLC 3064650 GBR Interlake Corp 2463667 USA
u024 Great Universal Stores (GUS) PLC B0NH007 GBR Argos PLC 0048679 GBR
u025 Great Universal Stores (GUS) PLC B0NH007 GBR Metromail Corp 2601940 USA
u026 Greene King PLC 0387242 GBR Morland PLC 0603313 GBR
u027 Greene King PLC 0387242 GBR Old English Inns PLC 0659480 GBR
u028 Gyrus Group PLC 0170152 GBR Everest Medical Corp 299806109 USA
u029 Gyrus Group PLC 0170152 GBR Somnus Medical Technologies 2124072 USA
u030 Hanson PLC 3351608 GBR Pioneer International Ltd 6688701 AUS
u031 Headlam Group PLC 0417008 GBR Eclipse Blinds PLC 0303884 GBR
u032 Hill & Smith Holdings PLC 0427030 GBR Ash & Lacy PLC 0052841 GBR
u033 Homestyle Group PLC 0750134 GBR Harveys Furnishing PLC 0172501 GBR
u034 Imperial Metal Industries(IMI) PLC 0457963 GBR Polypipe PLC 0693808 GBR
u035 Invensys PLC 0807041 GBR BAAN Co NV 5380202 NLD
u036 Invensys PLC 0807041 GBR Marcam Solutions Inc. 56614A107 USA
u037 Jarvis PLC B0DLKZ4 GBR Streamline Holdings PLC 0842990 GBR
u038 Johnson Matthey PLC 0476407 GBR Meconic PLC 0575166 GBR
u039 Johnson Service Group PLC 0476281 GBR Semara Holdings PLC 0813004 GBR
u040 Johnston Press PLC 0476968 GBR Portsmouth & Sunderland News 0696205 GBR
u041 Kingfisher PLC 3319521 GBR But SA 4233998 FRA
u042 Kingfisher PLC 3319521 GBR VCI PLC 0930389 GBR
u043 Mayflower Corp PLC 0800222 GBR Dennis Group PLC 0892489 GBR
u044 Meggitt PLC 0575809 GBR Whittaker Corp 2963907 USA
u045 Misys PLC 0385785 GBR C-ATS Software Inc. 2182683 USA
u046 Misys PLC 0385785 GBR Medic Computer Systems Inc. 2575982 USA
u047 Misys PLC 0385785 GBR Sunquest Information Systems 2809421 USA
u048 National Express Group PLC 0621520 GBR Prism Rail PLC 0701240 GBR
u049 National Grid Group PLC B08SNH3 GBR New England Electric System 2629726 USA
u050 NSB Retail Systems PLC 0157069 GBR Real Time Control PLC 0727321 GBR
u051 Pearson PLC 0677608 GBR Dorling Kindersley Holdings 0277570 GBR
u052 Pearson PLC 0677608 GBR National Computer Systems Inc. 2625337 USA
u053 Pendragon PLC 0679529 GBR Evans Halshaw Holdings PLC 0323785 GBR
u054 Psion PLC B0D5VH5 GBR Teklogix International Inc. 2879145 CAN
u055 QXL.com (Ricardo) PLC 3270338 GBR Ricardo.de AG 5731178 DEU
u056 Reckitt & Colman PLC (Reckitt Benckiser PLC) 0727871 GBR Benckiser NV C000032852 NLD
u057 Retail Stores PLC (Liberty International ltd) 0774208 GBR Liberty PLC 0515979 GBR
u058 Rexam PLC 0425045 GBR American National Can Group 2441942 USA
u059 Rolls-Royce (Group) PLC 3283648 GBR Vickers PLC 0287052 GBR
u060 Sage Group PLC 0802165 GBR Best Software Inc. 086579109 USA
u061 Sage Group PLC 0802165 GBR Interact Commerce Corp 2423832 USA
u062 Sage Group PLC 0802165 GBR State of the Art Inc. 2842318 USA
u063 Sage Group PLC 0802165 GBR Tetra PLC 0184250 GBR
u064 Scottish (& Southern Energy) Hydro-Electric PLC 0790873 GBR Southern Electric PLC 0828677 GBR
u065 Scottish Power PLC 0690070 GBR PacifiCorp 2715669 USA
u066 Seton Healthcare Group PLC (SSL International) 0798112 GBR Scholl PLC 0323718 GBR
u067 Seton Scholl Healthcare PLC (SSL International) 0798112 GBR London International Group PLC 0499802 GBR
u068 Shanks (& McEwan) Group PLC 0799524 GBR Caird Group PLC 0442293 GBR
u069 Shield Diagnostics Group (Axis-Shield) PLC 0803997 GBR Axis Biochemicals AS 4055653 NOR
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u071 Shire Pharmaceuticals Grp PLC B0KQX86 GBR Roberts Pharmaceutical Corp 2743563 USA
u072 SkyePharma PLC 0812357 GBR DepoTech Corp 2264826 USA
u073 Smiths Group PLC 0818270 GBR Barringer Technologies Inc. 2081702 USA
u074 Smiths Industries PLC (Smiths Group PLC) 0818270 GBR TI Group PLC 0868673 GBR
u075 Somerfield PLC 0821869 GBR Kwik Save Group PLC 0499084 GBR
u076 Stagecoach Holdings PLC B01NL71 GBR Coach USA Inc. 2210346 USA
u077 Taylor Woodrow PLC 0878230 GBR Bryant Group PLC 0149408 GBR
u078 Trinity Mirror PLC 0903994 GBR Southnews PLC 0831567 GBR
u079 Unilever PLC B10RZP7 GBR Bestfoods 2230775 USA
u080 United News & Media (United Business Media) PLC B0B2LQ7 GBR CMP Media LLC 125891101 USA
u081 Vodafone AirTouch PLC 0719210 GBR Mannesmann AG 5060322 DEU
u082 Vodafone Group PLC 0719210 GBR AirTouch Communications Inc. 2674588 USA
u083 Vodafone Group PLC 0719210 GBR Japan Telecom Co Ltd 6475497 JPN
u084 Westbury PLC 0953687 GBR John Maunders Group PLC 0572327 GBR
u085 WH Smith (Group) PLC B02Q4M5 GBR Hodder Headline PLC 0417149 GBR
u086 Whitbread PLC B07FNF3 GBR Swallow Group PLC 0927228 GBR
u087 Wolseley PLC 0976402 GBR British Fittings Group PLC 0060242 GBR
u088 Wolverhampton & Dudley 3122945 GBR Mansfield Brewery PLC 0563332 GBR
u089 Wolverhampton & Dudley 3122945 GBR Marston Thompson & Evershed 0568702 GBR
u090 WPP Group PLC B0J6N10 GBR Intelliquest Information Group 2476966 USA
u091 WPP Group PLC B0J6N10 GBR Tempus Group PLC 0160409 GBR
u092 WPP Group PLC B0J6N10 GBR Young & Rubicam Inc. 2238638 USA
u093 WS Atkins PLC 0060800 GBR Lambert Smith Hampton PLC 0501763 GBR
u094 WSP Group PLC 0932374 GBR AB Jacobson & Widmark 4474731 SWE
u095 Wyevale Garden Centres PLC 0984568 GBR Country Gardens PLC 0228813 GBR
u096 Xenova Group PLC 2780214 GBR Cantab Pharmaceuticals PLC 0276889 GBR
u097 ZENECA Group  (Astrazeneca) PLC 0989529 GBR Astra AB 5241503 SWE
u098 Alexon Group PLC 0844402 GBR Style Holdings PLC 0854519 GBR
u099 Allied Domecq PLC B012L67 GBR Montana Group (NZ) Limited 6225443 NZL
u100 Allied Domecq PLC B012L67 GBR Bodegas Y Bebidas, S.A. 5513440 ESP
u101 Amdocs Limited 2256908 USA International Telecommn Data Systems Inc. C000030910 USA
u102 Applied Optical Technologies PLC 0046219 GBR Optical Security Group, Inc. 683848204 USA
u103 Austin Reed Group PLC 0729684 GBR Country Casuals Holdings PLC 0227393 GBR
u104 Bloomsbury Publishing PLC 3314775 GBR A. & C. Black PLC 0101709 GBR
u105 BP PLC 0798059 GBR Burmah Castrol PLC 0566944 GBR
u106 BP PLC 0798059 GBR Atlantic Richfield Company 2061618 USA
u107 Bunzl PLC B0744B3 GBR Provend Group PLC 0698115 GBR
u108 Cenes Pharmaceuticals PLC 0207050 GBR Cambridge Neuroscience, Inc. 2165736 USA
u109 Compass Group PLC 0533153 GBR Selecta Group 5236253 CHE
u110 Compass Group PLC 0533153 GBR Morrison Management Specialists, Inc. 2590747 USA
u111 De La Rue PLC B09JC23 GBR ATS Money Systems, Inc. 2002264 USA
u112 Delta PLC 0261506 GBR Delta Electrical Industries Limited 6260778 ZAF
u113 Game Group PLC 0736015 GBR Game PLC 0285186 GBR
u114 Ennstone PLC 0178725 GBR Blockleys PLC 0105411 GBR
u115 Ennstone PLC 0178725 GBR Natural Building Materials PLC 0438872 GBR
u116 Holidaybreak PLC 0316495 GBR Baldwin PLC 0072504 GBR
u117 Spectris PLC 0330860 GBR Servomex PLC 0797885 GBR
u118 Xansa PLC 0330417 GBR Druid Group PLC 0282079 GBR
u119 Filtronic PLC 0336299 GBR Sage Laboratories, Inc. 786650101 USA
u120 Findel PLC 0337407 GBR Novara PLC 0650041 GBR
u121 Galliford TRY PLC 0359906 GBR Try Group PLC 0895240 GBR
u122 Gaskell PLC 0432045 GBR Tomkinsons PLC 0896306 GBR
u123 Canterbury Foods Group PLC 3339820 GBR Sims Food Group PLC 0809155 GBR
u124 AGA Foodservice PLC 0374288 GBR Friatec AG 4423960 DEU
u125 BIG Food Group PLC (THE) 0455871 GBR Booker PLC 0110523 GBR
u126 Communisis PLC 0668323 GBR John Waddington PLC 0932006 GBR
u127 Kier Group PLC 0491563 GBR Bellwinch PLC 0090595 GBR
u128 Hilton Group PLC 0500254 GBR Stakis PLC 0838427 GBR
u129 Luminar PLC 0538244 GBR Northern Leisure PLC 0654612 GBR
u130 Mayflower Corp. PLC 0800222 GBR Metrotrans Corporation 2565143 USA
u131 Mentmore PLC 0576590 GBR Birkby PLC 0098362 GBR
u132 Acambis PLC 0694179 GBR Oravax, Inc. 2654933 USA
u133 Peterhouse Group PLC 0805410 GBR EVE Group PLC 0324034 GBR
u134 Photobition Group PLC 0687351 GBR Katz Digital Technologies, Inc. 2482167 USA
u135 Protherics PLC 0702920 GBR Therapeutic Antibodies Inc. 88337M100 USA
u136 Invensys PLC 0807041 GBR Eurotherm PLC 0323116 GBR
u137 SIG PLC 0802541 GBR Roskel PLC 0751007 GBR
u138 Telewest Communications PLC 0654452 GBR Flextech PLC 0343233 GBR
u139 Interserve PLC 0152815 GBR Band PLC 0146807 GBR
u140 Interserve PLC 0152815 GBR How Group PLC 0440383 GBR
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Panel B   Matched Acquirers and Matched Targets
Entity Name Sedol Country Entity Name Sedol Country
a001 Yankee Candles Company Inc. 2433671 USA Official Information Company (THE) C900021331 USA
a002 Gaz Metro Limited Partnership 2362418 CAN United Networks Limited 6695916 NZL
a003 Peabody Energy Corp. 2753454 USA Mesa Air Group Inc. 2582090 USA
a004 Peabody Energy Corp. 2753454 USA Corning Inc. 2224701 USA
a005 Forgent Networks Inc. 2932037 USA Myob Limited 6242862 AUS
a006 Serco Group PLC 0797379 GBR Featherlite Inc. 2331504 USA
a007 Sysco Corp. 2868165 USA Agribrands International, Inc. c000033225 USA
a008 Portman Limited 6695154 AUS Anglogold Australasia Limited 6005582 AUS
a009 UNIFIED WESTERN GROCERS, Inc. C900013941 USA Cranswick Premium Wines Limited 6087621 AUS
a010 UNIFIED WESTERN GROCERS, Inc. C900013941 USA Gerber Childrenswear, Inc. c000044653 USA
a011 WR Grace & Company 2232685 USA Nufarm 6335331 AUS
a012 WR Grace & Company 2232685 USA Interdent, Inc. c000031123 USA
a013 Intertape Polymer Group 2459901 CAN Printpack, Inc. c000065952 USA
a014 Six Flags Inc. 2891945 USA Alliance Gaming Corp. 2380818 USA
a015 Alumina Limited 6954985 AUS Aber Diamond Corp. 2033178 CAN
a016 Alumina Limited 6954985 AUS Minara Resources 6031855 AUS
a017 Ticor Limited 6890573 AUS Ranger Minerals Limited 6723077 AUS
a018 Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited 2009823 CAN Rayrock Resources Inc. 2726661 CAN
a019 Saga Communications Inc. 2767013 USA CTN Media Group Inc. 2952314 USA
a020 Four Seasons Hotels Inc. 2348935 CAN Vail Resorts Inc. 2954194 USA
a021 United Stationers Inc. 2923815 USA Email Limited c000005345 AUS
a022 Henry Walker Eltin Group 6420884 AUS Ashton Mining Limited c000005124 AUS
a023 Patrick Industries 2673154 USA DMI Furniture, Inc. 2250933 USA
a024 Investa Property Group 6954145 AUS Games Workshop Group PLC 0371847 GBR
c001 United Business Media PLC B0B2LQ7 GBR Sonoco Products Company 2821395 USA
c002 Electronic Data Systems Corp. 2312736 USA Nippon Kinzoku Company Limited 6640444 JPN
c003 Electronic Data Systems Corp. 2312736 USA FPB Holding Aktiengesellschaft 4333962 DEU
c004 Electronic Data Systems Corp. 2312736 USA Finolex Cables Limited 6139856 IND
c005 Arden Group Inc. 2047425 USA Arden Group Inc. 2047425 USA
c006 Chum Limited 2195766 CAN Canadian Satellite Communications Inc. 2172071 CAN
c007 Cameco Corp. 2166160 CAN AUR Resources Inc. 2002178 CAN
c008 Phelps Dodge Corp. 2685007 USA Glamis Gold Limited 2371113 CAN
c009 Penn Virginia 2680228 USA Paladin Resources PLC 0692032 GBR
c010 Patterson UTI Energy Inc. 2672537 USA Summit Resources Limited 2859084 CAN
c011 Paramount Resources Limited B073FP1 CAN Gulfstream Resources Canada Limited 2396729 CAN
c012 BT Group PLC 2816539 USA Keppel Telecommunications Transportation 6842444 SGP
c013 Cincinnati Bell Inc. 2196877 USA Focal Communications Corp. 2828824 USA
c014 McLeodusa Inc. 2876339 USA Cable & Wireless Optus Limited 6133160 AUS
c015 Chattem Inc. 2188982 USA Transkaryotic Therapies Inc. c000004578 USA
c016 Kansas City Southern 2607647 USA Guangshen Railway Company Limited 2394615 USA
c017 Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp 2154927 USA Guangshen Railway Company Limited 2394615 USA
c018 Nexen Inc. 2172219 CAN Weatherford International Limited 2962421 USA
c019 Whirlpool Corp. 2960384 USA Devro PLC 0267043 GBR
c020 Whirlpool Corp. 2960384 USA Universal Electronics Inc. 2911683 USA
c021 GEAC Computer Limited 2362690 CAN Transaction Systems Architects 2889155 USA
c022 Skywest Inc. 2814210 USA SAS Norge ASA 5066472 NOR
c023 Algoma Steel Inc. 2850054 CAN EASCO, Inc. c000029927 USA
c024 La-Z-Boy Chair Inc. 2508405 USA Federal Screw Works 2338969 USA
c025 Transalta Corp. 2901628 CAN MGE Energy Inc. 2554163 USA
c026 Canfor Corp. 2173416 CAN Korn Ferry International 2386849 USA
c027 Tenke Mining Corp. 2430702 CAN Aberfoyle Limited 6003100 AUS
c028 Acxiom Corp. 2159773 USA Medicalogic/Medscape Incorporated c000069418 USA
c029 Skyline Corp. 2814005 USA Calloways Nursery Inc. 2165231 USA
c030 Inmet Mining Corp. 2583026 CAN Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp. 2208136 USA
c031 Inter-Tel Inc. 2466462 USA Minacs Worldwide Inc. 2761963 CAN
c032 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc. 2972602 USA Foodland Associated Limited 6347875 AUS
c033 Jacuzzi Brands Inc. 2937054 USA Riken Corporation 6740203 JPN
c034 Parkway Holdings Limited 6811143 SGP NFO Worldwide, Inc. 2619169 USA
c035 Cascades Inc. 2179254 CAN Glatfelter 2372008 USA
c036 Brunswick Corp. 2149309 USA Hawk Corp. 2154886 USA
c037 Shell Canada Limited 2802806 CAN Beau Canada Exploration Ltd.. 2086622 CAN
c038 Akita Drilling Limited 2010728 CAN Tullow Oil PLC 0150080 GBR
c039 Cameco Corp. 2166160 CAN AvgoldLimited 2054102 USA
c040 Rowan Companies Income 2753197 USA Petromet Resources Limited 2684598 CAN
c041 XTO Energy Inc. 2236911 USA Niko Resources Limited 2639554 CAN
c042 Ensign Energy Services Inc. 2317623 CAN Denbury Resources Incorporated 2167442 CAN
c043 Horizon Offshore Inc. 2231637 USA Warren Resources Inc. 2981761 USA
c044 Hollinger Inc. 2253868 CAN Scripps EW Inc. 2862532 USA
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c046 United States Cellular Corp. 2918996 USA CTV Inc. 2084488 CAN
c047 Shell Canada Limited 2802806 CAN DNO ASA B0BV818 NOR
c048 Shell Canada Limited 2802806 CAN Startech Energy Inc. 2768782 CAN
c049 Apache Corp. 2043962 USA Plains Resources Inc. 2691617 USA
c050 Freeport-McMoran Copper & Gold 2352118 USA Antofagasta PLC 2528395 USA
c051 Cascades Inc. 2179254 CAN Gaylord Container Corporation 2362184 USA
c052 Quebecor Inc. 2716695 CAN Advanstar, Inc. c000065534 USA
c053 FPL Group Inc. 2328915 USA Newell Rubbermaid Inc. 2635701 USA
c054 China Eastern Airlines Corporation Limited 2191979 USA Dia Met Minerals Ltd. C000006061 CAN
c055 Atkins (WS) PLC 0060800 GBR Gleeson (MJ) Group PLC B01BNK2 GBR
c056 Theratechnologies Inc. 2889906 CAN Lannett Inc. 2447694 USA
c057 Laureate Education Inc. 2867689 USA Intervoice Inc. 2462244 USA
c058 Global Natural Energy PLC 3179189 GBR Professional Veterinary Products, Ltd. C900043063 USA
c059 Telemig Celular Participacoes SA 2297996 USA Kushner-Locke Company 2103684 USA
c060 Continental Minerals Corp. 2216775 CAN North Atlantic Natural Resources AB 5261824 SWE
c061 Virco Manufacturing Corp. 2929705 USA HMG Worldwide Corp. 2566425 USA
c062 MET-Pro Corp. 2582852 USA Osborne & Little PLC 0663050 GBR
c063 Tinsley (Eliza) Group PLC 0893040 GBR Intrenet Inc. 2470076 USA
c064 Arriva PLC 0230346 GBR TIBS Holdings Ltd. 6900933 SGP
c065 Arriva PLC 0230346 GBR TIBS Holdings Ltd. 6900933 SGP
c066 Arriva PLC 0230346 GBR Response Oncology Inc. 2098650 USA
c067 Playboy Enterprises Inc. 2691811 USA VTR PLC 0929354 GBR
c068 Matsushita Elect. Industrial Company LIM 2572121 USA NMS Communications Corp. 2622866 USA
c069 Matsushita Elect. Industrial Company LIM 2572121 USA Globe Business Resources, Inc. C000030360 USA
c070 Matsushita Elect. Industrial Company LIM 2572121 USA SCO Group Inc. 2855907 USA
c071 Motorola Inc. 2606600 USA Detection Systems, Inc. 2266059 USA
c072 Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson 2031730 USA Platinum Technology International, Inc. 2691781 USA
c073 Saskatchewan Power Corp. c900014406 CAN SJW Corp. 2811932 USA
c074 Sterlite Gold Limited 2352679 CAN Witwatersrand Gold Mining Co Ltd. 6975317 ZAF
c075 Quebecor Inc. 2716695 CAN Printware, Inc. C000030756 USA
in01 Gainsco Inc. B0QH402 USA Technology One Limited 6302410 AUS
in02 Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Limited 6100476 IND Helmerich Payne Inc. 2420101 USA
in03 HCL Technologies Limited 6294896 IND Valcom Inc. 2801784 USA
in04 Bodycote International PLC 0689562 GBR Finolex Cables Limited 6139856 IND
in05 Ghcl Limited 6397579 IND Goodlass Nerolac Paints Limited 6291778 IND
in06 Tata Chemicals Limited 6101167 IND Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries Limited 6582483 IND
ir01 Hanson PLC 2020125 USA Marshalls PLC B012BV2 GBR
ir02 Clorox Company 2204026 USA Sinopec Beijing Yanhua Petroch.,Co.- ADR 2022712 USA
ir03 Clorox Company 2204026 USA Bridgford Foods Corp. 2123013 USA
ir04 Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc. 2943545 USA Geltex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. C000001980 USA
ir05 Travis Perkins PLC 0773960 GBR Hampden Group PLC 0407582 GBR
ir06 Flowers Foods Inc. 2744243 USA NFF PLC 0648693 GBR
ir07 Arla Foods PLC 0257765 GBR Vlasic Foods International, Inc. C000033843 USA
ir08 Elizabeth Arden Inc. 2856524 USA Innovata PLC 0555470 GBR
ir09 Glanbia PLC 4058629 IRL Lance Inc. 2503314 USA
ir10 RTI International Metals Commerce 2296993 USA Baltek Corporation C000000550 USA
ir11 Marshalls PLC B012BV2 GBR Janis Limited 6469081 JPN
is01 Spherion Corp. 2473989 USA LQ Corporation Inc. B020TV1 USA
m001 Golden Hope Plantation Berhad 6411929 MYS Carlsberg Brewery Malaysia Berhad B09FGC9 MYS
n001 OM Group Inc. 2653684 USA Explosifs Et Products Chimiques N 4326401 FRA
n002 Stephan Company 2844961 USA Orbus Pharma Inc. 2965969 CAN
n003 Telesp Celular Participacoes 2297974 USA Tivo Inc. 2492724 USA
s001 IMI PLC 0457963 GBR Lindeteves-Jacoberg Limited 6537290 SGP
s002 Asia Food & Properties Limited 6018450 SGP Vantage Corp. Limited 6468668 SGP
s003 MSC Software Corp. 2553096 USA Jurong Technologies Industrial Corp. 6231150 SGP
s004 Delphi Corporation 2385998 USA Impsat Fiber Networks 2598967 USA
s005 Arriva PLC 0230346 GBR Prism Rail PLC 0701240 GBR
sa01 Cadbury Schweppes (S.A.) Limited 6002602 ZAF Omega Protein Corp. 2232652 USA
sa02 Palabora Mining Company Limited 6667904 ZAF Western Metals 6949721 AUS
sa03 Beazer Homes USA Inc. 2086172 USA Dorbyl Limited 6277057 ZAF
sa04 Breakwater Resources Limited 2122021 CAN Auriongold Limited 6370008 AUS
sa05 JCI Limited 6531515 ZAF Breakwater Resources Limited 2122021 CAN
sa06 Brascade Resources Inc. B02YLJ5 CAN Eurasia Mining PLC 0323042 GBR
sa07 Ballantyne Omaha Inc. 2070540 USA Boundless Corp. 2224789 USA
sa08 Tele Centro Oeste Celular Participacoes 2298018 USA JJB Sports PLC 0468523 GBR
sa09 Tele Centro Oeste Celular Participacoes 2298018 USA Wyndeham Press Group PLC 0978505 GBR
sa10 Harvey Nash Group PLC 0657354 GBR Synplicity Inc. 2652982 USA
sa11 Miller (Herman) Inc. 2594222 USA DMI Furniture, Inc. 2250933 USA
sa12 Alliance One International Inc. 2269865 USA South African Druggists Limited 6764775 ZAF
sa13 Universal Corp. 2923804 USA TL Administration Corp. 2891451 USA
sa14 Matodzi Resources Limited 6975403 ZAF Matodzi Resources Limited 6975403 ZAF
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t001 Guinness Anchor Berhad 6397803 MYS Tropical Canning 6902188 THA
u001 Northamber PLC 0645638 GBR Sanderson Group PLC 0774350 GBR
u002 The Laird Group PLC 0500522 GBR FTI Consulting Inc. 2351449 USA
u003 BBA Group PLC 0067748 GBR Bidcorp PLC c000016345 GBR
u004 Interserve PLC 0152815 GBR Guthrie GTS Limited 6399070 SGP
u005 Keane Inc. 2485371 USA Xansa PLC 0330417 GBR
u006 Singapore Airlines Limited 6811734 SGP Cash American International 2179425 USA
u007 Idex Corp. 2456612 USA Nordson Corp. 2641838 USA
u008 Companhia Siderurgica Nacional 2220936 USA Truserv Corporation c000018871 USA
u009 Mueller Industries Inc. 2609717 USA Insteel Industries Inc. 2325875 USA
u010 UAL Corp. 2901178 USA Alpha Airports Group PLC 0028132 GBR
u011 Reynolds American Inc. 2429090 USA CIT Group Inc. 2965549 USA
u012 Reynolds American Inc. 2429090 USA British American Tobacco Holdings Ltd. 6919207 ZAF
u013 Nextel Partners Inc. 2551874 USA Gearhouse Group PLC 0363402 GBR
u014 European Motor Holdings PLC 0315113 GBR Adam & Harvey Group PLC 0007830 GBR
u015 Time Warner Inc. 2712165 USA Choice One Communications Inc. C000070176 USA
u016 Stratos Global Corp. 2732754 CAN Vodavi Technology Inc. 2537722 USA
u017 Readers Digest Association Inc. 2726951 USA Liberfabrica PLC 0271680 GBR
u018 Best Buy Company Inc. 2094670 USA Schouw & Co A/S 5690859 DNK
u019 Baggeridge Brick PLC 0070360 GBR Calton Inc. 2594040 USA
u020 Renishaw PLC 0732358 GBR Spire Corp. 2834597 USA
u021 Macrovision Corp. 2546085 USA AZZ Inc. 2067672 USA
u022 Imperial Tobacco Group PLC 0454492 GBR Kobayashi Pharmaceutical 6149457 JPN
u023 Tomkins PLC 0896265 GBR Dorel Industries Inc. 2262369 CAN
u024 Rite Aid Corp. 2740809 USA Brown (N) Group PLC 0147297 GBR
u025 Rite Aid Corp. 2740809 USA Rollins Inc. 2747305 USA
u026 Starbucks Corp. 2842255 USA Luby Inc. 2162920 USA
u027 Enterprise Inns PLC 3387227 GBR Eldridge, Pope & Co., PLC 0257817 GBR
u028 Orbit/FR Inc. 2020017 USA APS Technologies Limited 6152369 ZAF
u029 Staar Surgical Company 2836292 USA Trimedyne Inc. 2904092 USA
u030 CRH PLC 2160816 USA The Morgan Crucible Company PLC 0602729 GBR
u031 Brammer PLC 0119508 GBR European Telecom PLC 0323495 GBR
u032 Synalloy Corp. 2867805 USA WYKO Group PLC 0983952 GBR
u033 Strategic Distribution Inc. 2759139 USA Ultimate Electronics Inc. 2907637 USA
u034 Charter PLC 0188263 GBR Devro PLC 0267043 GBR
u035 Olympus Corporation 2658719 USA Trader Classified Media 5934386 NLD
u036 Danaher Corp. 2250870 USA Modem Media, Incorporated c000062704 USA
u037 L & M Group Investments Limited 6388755 SGP Cerbco Inc. 2185176 USA
u038 Worthington Industries Inc. 2981932 USA Meridian Bioscience Commerce 2580265 USA
u039 Weightwatchers International Inc.o 2813585 USA MAC-Gray Corp. 2116950 USA
u040 Saint Ives PLC 0768900 GBR Bristol United Press PLC 0125787 GBR
u041 Costco Wholesale Corp. 2701271 USA Macintosh Confectie NV B13Y641 NLD
u042 Costco Wholesale Corp. 2701271 USA Ascent Media Group, Inc. c000020990 USA
u043 Meggitt PLC 0575809 GBR Adwest Automotive PLC 0008112 GBR
u044 VT Group PLC 3172973 GBR Summit Autonomous, Inc. 2859103 USA
u045 Logicacmg PLC 0522708 GBR Effective Management Systems Inc. B02ZMY0 USA
u046 Halma PLC 0405207 GBR Dialogic Corporation c000001457 USA
u047 RH Donnelley Corp. 2288752 USA Morrison Management Specialists, Inc. 2590747 USA
u048 Arriva PLC 0230346 GBR Atlantic Express Transportation Corp. c000065784 USA
u049 Scottish & Southern Energy PLC 0790873 GBR Pinnacle West Capital Corp. 2048804 USA
u050 Radstone Technology PLC 0720483 GBR Linx Printing Technologies PLC 0518558 GBR
u051 Quebecor World Inc. 2716231 CAN Taylor & Francis Group PLC 0274258 GBR
u052 Quebecor World Inc. 2716231 CAN CDI Corp. 2181129 USA
u053 Lookers PLC 0534446 GBR C.D. Bramall PLC 0774349 GBR
u054 Strongco Inc. B08KZ62 CAN Harvey Nash Group PLC 0657354 GBR
u055 Hollywood Media Corp. 2095941 USA Day Software Holding 5932432 CHE
u056 Boots Group PLC 3231078 GBR UCB SA 5596991 BEL
u057 Gander Mountain Company 2373216 USA Programmers Paradise Inc. 2690476 USA
u058 Domtar Inc. 2276304 CAN SPX Corp. 2787185 USA
u059 Bombardier Inc. 2109723 CAN IMI PLC 0457963 GBR
u060 Amdocs Limited 2256908 USA American Dental Partners 2236546 USA
u061 Logicacmg PLC 0522708 GBR Extensity, Inc. c000069925 USA
u062 Mitcham Industries Inc. 2597135 USA Warrantech Corp. 2941044 USA
u063 CSG Systems International 2210885 USA K3 Business Technology Group PLC B00P606 GBR
u064 Canadian Utilities Limited 2172639 CAN Wessex Water PLC 0949277 GBR
u065 International Power PLC 0632016 GBR Niagara Mohawk Holdings Inc. 2638722 USA
u066 Moss Brothers Group PLC 0605610 GBR Farmacias Benavides SA DE CV 2328528 USA
u067 Matalan PLC 0259426 GBR British Polythene Industries PLC 0779742 GBR
u068 Bristol Water Group PLC B0978K7 GBR York Waterworks PLC (THE) 0988894 GBR
u069 Regen Biologics Inc. 2010762 USA Natural ASA 5322011 NOR
u070 Valspar Corp. 2926739 USA Cell Genesys Inc. 2209775 USA
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u071 Nature Sunshine Products Inc. 2627816 USA Stepan Company 2845005 USA
u072 Cephalon Inc. 2185143 USA Viropharma Inc. 2945660 USA
u073 Harley-Davidson Inc. 2411053 USA Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. c000023114 USA
u074 American Axle & Manufacturing Holdings 2382416 USA NCR Corp. 2632650 USA
u075 Morrison (WM) Supermarkets PLC 0604316 GBR Empire Company Limited 2314000 CAN
u076 Arriva PLC 0230346 GBR CH Robinson Worldwide Inc. 2116228 USA
u077 Berkeley Group Holdings PLC B02L3W3 GBR Bellway PLC 0090498 GBR
u078 New York Times Company 2632003 USA Sanctuary Group PLC B0Y6NC6 GBR
u079 Astrazeneca PLC 0989529 GBR Campbell Soup Company 2162845 USA
u080 VNU NV 2650953 USA Dorling Kindersley Holdings PLC 0277570 GBR
u081 Time Warner Inc. 2712165 USA Nagahori Corporation 6619916 JPN
u082 United States Cellular Corp. 2918996 USA Sprint Nextel Corp. 2922447 USA
u083 Verizon Communications Inc. 2090571 USA Tokyo Broadcasting Systems Inc. 6894166 JPN
u084 M/I Homes Inc. 2549385 USA CALA PLC 0198518 GBR
u085 Signet Group PLC 0040374 GBR Bristol United Press PLC 0125787 GBR
u086 Darden Restaurants Inc. 2289874 USA Legacy Hotels Real Estate Investment Tru 2125633 CAN
u087 Genuine Parts Company 2367480 USA Saltire PLC 0803102 GBR
u088 Landrys Restaurants Inc. 2504254 USA Bush Boake Allen Inc. c000000781 USA
u089 Triarc Companies Inc. 2289744 USA Greene King PLC 0387242 GBR
u090 Computer Sciences Corp. 2215200 USA Frontstep Incorporated c0000027490 USA
u091 Electronic Data Systems Corp. 2312736 USA Guardian IT PLC 0247807 GBR
u092 Computer Sciences Corp. 2215200 USA Equifax Inc. 2319146 USA
u093 Insituform Technologies 2462039 USA Gremlin Group PLC 0042477 GBR
u094 Applied Optical Technologies PLC 0046219 GBR Scandiaconsult AB 5973947 SWE
u095 Building Materials Holdings Corp. 2069203 USA Wyevale Garden Centres PLC 0984568 GBR
u096 Macrochem Corp. C901921319 USA Torch Offshore Inc. 2763442 USA
u097 Lyondell Chemical Company 2540270 USA Novo Nordisk A/S 7077524 DNK
u098 Tarrant Apparel Group 2876362 USA Wensum Company PLC 0948531 GBR
u099 Constellation Brands Inc. 2170473 USA K-Swiss Inc. 2479824 USA
u100 Constellation Brands Inc. 2170473 USA SOS Cuetara SA B091DR1 ESP
u101 Misys PLC 0385785 GBR Macromedia Inc. 2549512 USA
u102 Christie Group PLC 0195315 GBR Conductus, Inc. C000028851 USA
u103 DEB Shops Inc. 2260493 USA QS Group PLC 0714851 GBR
u104 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited 2551421 CAN Charterhouse Communications PLC 0189200 GBR
u105 Royal Dutch Shell PLC B03MM40 GBR Murphy Oil Corp. 2611206 USA
u106 Royal Dutch Shell PLC B03MM40 GBR Amerada Hess Corp. 2023748 USA
u107 Intertape Polymer Group 2459901 CAN Ottakar's PLC 0265188 GBR
u108 Dyax Corp. 2621487 USA Commonwealth Biotechnologies Inc. 2593638 USA
u109 Whitbread PLC B07FNF3 GBR Fielmann AG 4409205 DEU
u110 Whitbread PLC B07FNF3 GBR Odyssey Healthcare Inc. 2813574 USA
u111 Johnston Press PLC 0476968 GBR Aqua Care System Inc. 2148317 USA
u112 Bucyrus International Inc. B018TZ0 USA Mallett PLC 0558350 GBR
u113 Character Group PLC 0897611 GBR Hamleys PLC 0262640 GBR
u114 Baggeridge Brick PLC 0070360 GBR Darby Group PLC 0264378 GBR
u115 Baggeridge Brick PLC 0070360 GBR Longmead Group PLC 0224907 GBR
u116 Monarch Casino & Resort Inc. 2599197 USA Providence & Worcester Railroad Company 2671084 USA
u117 Cooper Companies Inc. 2222631 USA Celsis International PLC B0CD5F6 GBR
u118 Kewill Systems PLC 0738334 GBR Penna Consulting PLC 0679466 GBR
u119 Stadium Group PLC 0837509 GBR Fiberstars Inc. 2352390 USA
u120 Sports Authority Inc. 2483030 USA Mid-States PLC 0268303 GBR
u121 Orleans Homebuilders Inc. 2331311 USA Montpellier Group PLC 0535900 GBR
u122 Hallwood Group Inc. 2405744 USA PEX PLC 0684738 GBR
u123 Rea Holdings PLC 0234906 GBR Zagro Asia Limited 6991993 SGP
u124 Amkor Technology Inc. 2242929 USA Weru AG 4948827 DEU
u125 Maple Leaf Foods Inc. 2555865 CAN US Office Products Company 2253880 USA
u126 Tadpole Technology PLC 0870593 GBR Rural Press Limited 6759470 AUS
u127 Gleeson (MJ) Group PLC B01BNK2 GBR Ben Bailey PLC 0070605 GBR
u128 Harrahs Entertainment Inc. 2705648 USA Queens Moat Houses PLC 0719890 GBR
u129 Roadhouse Grill Inc. 2735719 USA Clubhaus PLC 0204512 GBR
u130 Meggitt PLC 0575809 GBR Pacific Aerospace & Electronics Inc. B00PS77 USA
u131 Smithway Motor Xpress 2856104 USA Compco Holdings PLC 0214801 GBR
u132 Datatrak International Inc. 2181538 USA Proteome PLC 0310419 GBR
u133 4Imprint Group PLC 0664097 GBR Wescol Group PLC 0949051 GBR
u134 Dicom Group PLC B0L2K15 GBR Baltimore Technologies PLC 2504793 USA
u135 Titan Pharmaceuticals Inc. 2111557 USA Supergen Inc. 2861313 USA
u136 General Dynamics 2365161 USA Oxford Instruments PLC 0665045 GBR
u137 Systemax Inc. 2394712 USA Adam & Harvey Group PLC 0007830 GBR
u138 CSC Holdings, Inc. c000065724 USA Allied Technologies Limited 6116406 ZAF
u139 Serco Group PLC 0797379 GBR Sharpe & Fisher PLC 0800329 GBR
u140 Sembcorp Logistics Limited B07W0X1 SGP Bracknell Corp. 2728162 CAN
u141 Air Methods Corp. 2049777 USA Newmarket Investments PLC 0128850 GBR
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Appendix B: Results by using Enforcement measures with the average of three LLSV 
enforcement indexes 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
transactions over US$ 10 million obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers 
& Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return.  ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. Outliers have been 
winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. With OLS standard errors. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% 
level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.  ENFOCE_AVG is calculated by the average score of 
judicial efficiency, rule of law, and corruption in La Porta et al (1998). See table 5.5 for the definitions of other variable. 
 
Full Sample (N=282) Count Mean Median SD ACFRpostPearson
 △ACFR
Pearson
ENFORCE_AVG 282 9.11 9.22 0.93 -0.127** -0.170***
Intercept -0.158 -0.182
LSH1P -0.197 ** -0.228 **
LSH1PSQ 0.674 * 0.762 *
LSH1PCUBE -0.554 * -0.608 *
SEP -0.032 ** -0.029 **
CEOLSH 0.025 * 0.018
CEOdual -0.011 -0.021 *






COMPETE -0.038 ** -0.053 ***
IND_rel 0.001 0.007
TOEHOLD 0.012 0.021 *
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000
SIZE_rel -0.005 * -0.001
LEV -0.001 -0.006




UK -0.064 -0.125 **
CAN -0.061 -0.141 **
AUS 0.055 ** 0.027
ACFRpre 0.503 *** -










Panel A   Univariate Analysis
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Appendix C: Non-Parametric Mann-Whitney Tests for Dummy Variables 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed 
transactions over US$ 10 million obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers 
& Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return.  ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. Outliers have been 
winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Non-Parametric Mann-Whitney Tests are presented for dummy variables. *** 
denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 for variable 
definitions. 
 
Mean Rank Mean Rank
CONCEN10 Y 168 60% 140.35           138.68         
N 114 40% 143.19           145.66         
CONCEN1020 Y 81 29% 136.84         125.27         **
N 201 71% 143.38         148.04         
CONCEN20 Y 87 31% 143.63       151.17         
N 195 69% 140.55       137.19         
CONCEN2050 Y 56 20% 134.53         153.63         
N 226 80% 143.23         138.50         
CONCEN50 Y 31 11% 160.06         146.73         
N 251 89% 139.21         140.85         
SEP Y 47 17% 128.16         131.16         
N 235 83% 144.17         143.57         
CEOLSH Y 39 14% 168.53         ** 142.65         
N 243 86% 137.16         141.31         
CEOdual Y 73 26% 148.27         131.28         
N 209 74% 139.13         145.07         
OTHLSH Y 54 19% 145.94         152.24         
N 228 81% 140.45         138.96         
TGORI_English Y 260 92% 141.61         141.64         
N 22 8% 140.25         139.82         
ATTI_Hostile Y 9 3% 155.44         160.61         
N 273 97% 141.04         140.87         
PAY_Stock Y 48 17% 125.06         138.20         
N 234 83% 144.87         142.18         
COMPETE Y 19 7% 125.68         94.45           ***
N 263 93% 142.64         144.90         
IND_rel Y 101 36% 136.15         142.28         
N 181 64% 144.48         141.07         
TOEHOLD Y 46 16% 141.84         151.46         
N 236 84% 141.43         139.56         
ANTIDIR_high Y 236 84% 143.60         142.01         
N 46 16% 130.73         138.87         
XLEG_high Y 174 62% 135.93         140.10         
N 108 38% 150.48         143.75         
PUBENFORCE_high Y 82 29% 144.53         133.91         
N 200 71% 140.26         144.61         
NANTIDIR_high Y 167 59% 141.74         145.29         











































Appendix D: Regressions Results in Table 6.5 & 6.6 with Beta Coefficients and R Square Changed 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return. ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 
for variable definitions. The following statistics in table are presented in Beta Coefficients. 
LSH1P -0.706 ** -0.593 ** -0.604 ** -0.670 ** -0.609 ** -0.759 ** -0.713 ** -0.682 * -0.720 ** -0.668 *
LSH1PSQ 2.098 *** 1.397 * 1.505 ** 1.595 ** 1.501 ** 2.240 *** 1.637 * 1.584 * 1.689 * 1.609 *
LSH1PCUBE -1.383 *** -0.858 * -0.943 * -0.984 ** -0.943 * -1.480 *** -0.976 * -0.953 * -1.022 * -0.987 *
SEP -0.152 ** -0.165 ** -0.171 *** -0.172 *** -0.168 ** -0.139 ** -0.154 ** -0.146 * -0.146 * -0.144 *
CEOLSH 0.069 0.118 * 0.105 * 0.104 0.100 0.010 0.087 0.070 0.061 0.058
CEOdual -0.077 -0.064 -0.072 -0.066 -0.087 -0.138 ** -0.129 * -0.131 * -0.129 * -0.147 **
BSIZE -0.122 ** -0.143 ** -0.137 ** -0.128 ** -0.113 * -0.095 -0.105 -0.098 -0.099 -0.087
INDDIR -0.033 -0.068 -0.060 -0.080 -0.071 -0.010 -0.030 -0.017 -0.026 -0.020
OTHLSH 0.051 0.029 0.039 0.041 0.061 0.114 0.090 0.104 0.108 0.124 *
TGORI_English 0.003 -0.019 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 0.030 0.014 0.008 0.008 0.007
ATTI_Hostile 0.018 0.039 0.030 0.012 0.027 0.038 0.020 0.034 0.031 0.043
PAY_stock -0.059 -0.056 -0.065 -0.063 -0.070 -0.044 -0.033 -0.049 -0.049 -0.054
COMPETE -0.119 ** -0.130 ** -0.128 ** -0.129 ** -0.125 ** -0.176 *** -0.190 *** -0.187 *** -0.185 *** -0.181 ***
IND_rel 0.016 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.014 0.060 0.047 0.053 0.053 0.064
TOEHOLD 0.029 0.059 0.060 0.052 0.046 0.078 0.111 * 0.102 * 0.094 0.089
PREM_1day 0.033 0.065 0.061 0.064 0.060 0.041 0.081 0.077 0.075 0.071
SIZE_rel -0.128 ** -0.108 * -0.117 ** -0.116 ** -0.127 ** -0.055 -0.034 -0.041 -0.042 -0.052
LEV -0.014 -0.009 -0.027 -0.030 -0.043 -0.106 * -0.107 * -0.125 ** -0.124 * -0.135 **
ANTIDIR_high 0.422 ** 0.306 ** 0.663 *** 0.401 ***
ENFORCE -0.023 0.313
ACCTSTD 0.164 -0.014
XLEG_high -0.190 -0.163 -0.092 0.037
ANTISDI 0.080 -0.131 0.033 -0.144
PUBENFORCE_high -0.435 * -0.366
NANTIDIR_high 0.409 *** 0.305 ** 0.431 ** 0.343 **
UK -0.439 -0.226 -0.427 ** -0.197 -0.893 ** -0.499 * -0.436 ** -0.242
CAN -0.374 -0.248 ** 0.603 ** 0.081 -0.889 ** -0.363 *** 0.440 0.001
AUS 0.212 * 0.206 ** 0.133 * 0.129 0.108 0.128 0.119 0.116
ACFRpre 0.496 *** 0.483 *** 0.493 *** 0.492 *** 0.497 ***






































Appendix E: Regressions Results in Table 6.5 & 6.6 with VIF Value 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return.  ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 
for variable definitions. 
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
Intercept -0.158 0.055 * 0.020 0.108 -0.182 0.015 0.011 0.083
LSH1P -0.197 ** 38.471 -0.201 ** 38.142 -0.222 ** 38.774 -0.202 ** 38.421 -0.228 ** 38.421 -0.219 * 38.126 -0.231 ** 38.771 -0.214 * 38.413
LSH1PSQ 0.674 * 232.709 0.726 ** 228.426 0.769 ** 233.657 0.724 ** 232.813 0.762 * 232.523 0.737 * 228.423 0.786 * 233.650 0.749 * 232.798
LSH1PCUBE -0.554 * 102.859 -0.609 * 100.849 -0.635 ** 103.041 -0.608 * 102.874 -0.608 * 102.820 -0.594 * 100.846 -0.637 * 103.041 -0.615 * 102.874
SEP -0.032 ** 1.815 -0.033 *** 1.782 -0.033 *** 1.797 -0.033 ** 1.795 -0.029 ** 1.814 -0.027 * 1.776 -0.028 * 1.791 -0.027 * 1.791
CEOLSH 0.025 * 1.740 0.022 * 1.682 0.022 1.684 0.021 1.682 0.018 1.734 0.014 1.674 0.012 1.673 0.012 1.672
CEOdual -0.011 1.370 -0.012 1.360 -0.011 1.407 -0.015 1.362 -0.021 * 1.350 -0.021 * 1.343 -0.021 * 1.389 -0.023 ** 1.345
BSIZE -0.003 ** 1.441 -0.003 ** 1.430 -0.003 ** 1.411 -0.002 * 1.390 -0.002 1.431 -0.002 1.421 -0.002 1.405 -0.002 1.385
INDDIR -0.027 1.789 -0.023 1.761 -0.031 1.786 -0.028 1.779 -0.011 1.781 -0.007 1.750 -0.010 1.770 -0.007 1.764
OTHLSH 0.005 1.526 0.007 1.487 0.008 1.506 0.011 1.472 0.016 1.507 0.019 1.467 0.019 1.485 0.022 * 1.452
TGORI_English -0.005 1.185 -0.004 1.169 -0.004 1.171 -0.004 1.170 0.004 1.179 0.002 1.166 0.002 1.168 0.002 1.168
ATTI_Hostile 0.016 1.229 0.012 1.131 0.005 1.136 0.011 1.117 0.008 1.227 0.014 1.131 0.012 1.135 0.017 1.115
PAY_stock -0.011 1.147 -0.013 1.095 -0.012 1.105 -0.013 1.101 -0.006 1.144 -0.009 1.093 -0.009 1.103 -0.010 1.099
COMPETE -0.038 ** 1.125 -0.037 ** 1.123 -0.037 ** 1.121 -0.036 ** 1.120 -0.053 *** 1.110 -0.052 *** 1.108 -0.052 *** 1.108 -0.051 *** 1.106
IND_rel 0.001 1.101 0.001 1.094 0.000 1.107 0.002 1.091 0.007 1.092 0.008 1.083 0.008 1.093 0.009 1.078
TOEHOLD 0.012 1.180 0.012 1.154 0.010 1.154 0.009 1.150 0.021 * 1.167 0.019 * 1.146 0.018 1.146 0.017 1.142
PREM_1day 0.000 1.211 0.000 1.205 0.000 1.205 0.000 1.204 0.000 1.210 0.000 1.204 0.000 1.204 0.000 1.203
SIZE_rel -0.005 * 1.306 -0.005 ** 1.284 -0.005 ** 1.297 -0.005 ** 1.286 -0.001 1.275 -0.002 1.251 -0.002 1.266 -0.002 1.253
LEV -0.001 1.338 -0.002 1.256 -0.002 1.287 -0.003 1.270 -0.006 * 1.289 -0.007 ** 1.208 -0.007 * 1.243 -0.008 ** 1.228
ANTIDIR_high 0.083 ** 19.452 0.060 ** 5.969 0.126 *** 19.191 0.076 *** 5.932
ENFORCE -0.001 24.554 0.012 23.974
ACCTSTD 0.003 6.187 0.000 6.015
XLEG_high -0.028 18.124 -0.024 14.894 -0.013 18.068 0.005 14.677
ANTISDI 0.046 11.929 -0.075 7.665 0.018 11.916 -0.079 7.664
PUBENFORCE_high -0.070 * 18.054 -0.056 18.018
NANTIDIR_high 0.060 *** 9.712 0.045 ** 8.668 0.062 ** 9.711 0.049 ** 8.664
UK -0.064 53.913 -0.033 22.916 -0.062 ** 12.349 -0.029 7.275 -0.125 ** 52.932 -0.070 * 22.555 -0.061 ** 12.349 -0.034 7.267
CAN -0.061 61.308 -0.041 ** 4.883 0.099 ** 33.740 0.013 7.724 -0.141 ** 60.022 -0.058 *** 4.825 0.070 33.567 0.000 7.689
AUS 0.055 * 4.095 0.054 ** 3.954 0.035 * 2.888 0.034 2.886 0.027 4.031 0.032 3.917 0.030 2.886 0.029 2.885
ACFRpre 0.503 *** 1.255 0.512 *** 1.213 0.512 *** 1.198 0.517 *** 1.196
 Adjust R2 (%)
F 
Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9 Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9Model 9.1 Model 9.1
B B B B B B B
Panel B: △ACFRPanel A: ACFRpost
(N=282)
B
33.90 33.70 32.80 31.90 7.80 7.90 6.60 6.10
6.531** 6.963*** 6.492*** 6.495*** 1.950*** 2.054*** 1.826** 1.799**  
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Appendix F: Regressions Results on Robustness Test of Standard Error using Jackknife Approach 
Sample of 282 mergers and acquisitions by 222 acquiring firms in 11 English Origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre and post industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow return.  ∆ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre performance adjusted cash flow 
return. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber's M estimator approach. With Jackknife standard errors below (Italics). Two tail tests *** denotes significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% 
level, * significant at the 10% level. See table 5.5 for variable definitions. 
Panel A   Dependent Variable: ACFRpost 
Intercept 0.048 ** 0.050 ** 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.041 * 0.042 * 0.056 ** -0.158 0.055 ** 0.020 0.108
0.0240 0.0222 0.0248 0.0247 0.0219 0.0223 0.0231 0.1860 0.0274 0.1375 0.0924
CONCEN10 -0.012
0.0092
CONCEN1020 -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
0.0097 0.0097






LSH1P 0.023 0.006 -0.234 ** -0.197 * -0.200 * -0.222 ** -0.202 *
0.0259 0.0662 0.1095 0.1123 0.1093 0.1104 0.1105
LSH1PSQ 0.025 1.011 ** 0.673 0.725 * 0.768 * 0.723 *
0.0965 0.4158 0.4445 0.4293 0.4379 0.4317
LSH1PCUBE -0.892 ** -0.553 -0.608 -0.635 -0.608
0.3851 0.4174 0.4015 0.4116 0.4036
SEP -0.019 -0.028 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 * -0.026 * -0.030 ** -0.032 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 **
0.0130 0.0133 0.0130 0.0131 0.0136 0.0136 0.0138 0.0150 0.0146 0.0149 0.0148
CEOLSH 0.025 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.021
0.0152 0.0160 0.0158 0.0158 0.0158 0.0159 0.0159 0.0173 0.0166 0.0169 0.0168
CEOdual -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.015
0.0102 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0104 0.0104 0.0103 0.0103 0.0102 0.0105 0.0107
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 * -0.002
0.0013 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
INDDIR -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.027 -0.023 -0.031 -0.028
0.0256 0.0250 0.0251 0.0254 0.0254 0.0256 0.0254 0.0284 0.0286 0.0294 0.0298
OTHLSH 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.011




Clustered Jackknife Standard Errors
Model 9.1Model 6 Model 7Model 2 Model 3 Model 5 Model 8 Model 9Model 8.1
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TGORI_English 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
0.0138 0.0131 0.0135 0.0134 0.0133 0.0133 0.0125 0.0130 0.0125 0.0126 0.0126
ATTI_Hostile 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.016 0.012 0.005 0.011
0.0164 0.0205 0.0200 0.0199 0.0183 0.0180 0.0174 0.0140 0.0148 0.0161 0.0148
PAY_stock -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013
0.0108 0.0095 0.0098 0.0099 0.0100 0.0103 0.0100 0.0107 0.0103 0.0106 0.0109
COMPETE -0.035 ** -0.032 ** -0.035 ** -0.035 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.035 ** -0.038 ** -0.037 ** -0.037 ** -0.036 **
0.0159 0.0152 0.0154 0.0154 0.0154 0.0153 0.0162 0.0161 0.0159 0.0160 0.0158
IND_rel 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
0.0082 0.0080 0.0079 0.0080 0.0081 0.0084 0.0082 0.0080 0.0080 0.0081 0.0082
TOEHOLD 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.009
0.0085 0.0086 0.0085 0.0086 0.0087 0.0088 0.0084 0.0088 0.0084 0.0086 0.0086
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
SIZE_rel -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 **
0.0025 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0023 0.0024 0.0024
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
0.0036 0.0033 0.0035 0.0035 0.0034 0.0034 0.0036 0.0036 0.0033 0.0036 0.0034












NANTIDIR_high 0.061 * 0.045 *
0.0323 0.0236
UK -0.064 -0.033 -0.062 -0.029
0.0548 0.0346 0.0392 0.0258
CAN -0.061 -0.041 * 0.099 0.013
0.0635 0.0214 0.0912 0.0237
AUS 0.055 * 0.054 * 0.035 0.034 *
0.0287 0.0280 0.0244 0.0213
ACFRpre 0.516 *** 0.518 *** 0.521 *** 0.521 *** 0.514 *** 0.514 *** 0.516 *** 0.503 *** 0.512 *** 0.512 *** 0.517 ***
0.064 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063






29.01 30.00 31.3331.59 28.86 28.62 30.57






0.0613 0.05965 0.060040.06089 0.06019 0.06031 0.06139  
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Appendix F (Continued)  
Panel B   Dependent Variable: △ACFR
Intercept 0.021 0.023 0.045 0.048 0.013 0.014 0.028 -0.182 0.015 0.011 0.083
0.0317 0.0296 0.0327 0.0325 0.0296 0.0302 0.0307 0.2072 0.0359 0.1651 0.0973
CONCEN10 -0.013
0.0103
CONCEN1020 -0.027 ** -0.027 **
0.0110 0.0110






LSH1P 0.021 0.005 -0.243 * -0.228 * -0.218 * -0.230 * -0.214 *
0.0270 0.0713 0.1241 0.1264 0.1251 0.1266 0.1271
LSH1PSQ 0.023 1.041 ** 0.760 0.735 0.784 * 0.747
0.1000 0.4514 0.4721 0.4616 0.4740 0.4705
LSH1PCUBE -0.921 ** -0.606 -0.593 -0.635 -0.613
0.4056 0.4257 0.4144 0.4273 0.4223
SEP -0.016 -0.026 * -0.024 * -0.023 * -0.023 -0.023 -0.026 * -0.029 * -0.027 * -0.027 * -0.027 *
0.0138 0.0139 0.0138 0.0136 0.0140 0.0139 0.0143 0.0160 0.0158 0.0161 0.0161
CEOLSH 0.012 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.012
0.0155 0.0166 0.0164 0.0165 0.0161 0.0166 0.0166 0.0176 0.0169 0.0175 0.0173
CEOdual -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.022 ** -0.024 ** -0.024 ** -0.022 ** -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.021 * -0.023 **
0.0110 0.0110 0.0110 0.0109 0.0111 0.0111 0.0112 0.0115 0.0114 0.0118 0.0119
BSIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.0015 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
INDDIR -0.013 -0.003 -0.013 -0.015 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007
0.0283 0.0275 0.0279 0.0283 0.0283 0.0285 0.0283 0.0342 0.0337 0.0339 0.0344
OTHLSH 0.023 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.022
0.0147 0.0142 0.0143 0.0145 0.0146 0.0144 0.0146 0.0146 0.0142 0.0147 0.0144
Clustered Jackknife Standard Errors(N=282)
Model 8 Model 8.1 Model 9.1Model 9Model 6 Model 7Model 3 Model 4Model 1 Model 2 Model 5
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TGORI_English 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.0170 0.0161 0.0166 0.0167 0.0165 0.0166 0.0161 0.0164 0.0163 0.0163 0.0165
ATTI_Hostile 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.017
0.0191 0.0215 0.0220 0.0221 0.0197 0.0197 0.0194 0.0218 0.0214 0.0207 0.0208
PAY_stock -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
0.0125 0.0119 0.0120 0.0120 0.0121 0.0124 0.0123 0.0129 0.0125 0.0128 0.0130
COMPETE -0.050 *** -0.046 *** -0.049 *** -0.050 *** -0.048 *** -0.048 *** -0.049 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.052 *** -0.051 ***
0.0187 0.0174 0.0173 0.0173 0.0181 0.0181 0.0187 0.0184 0.0185 0.0186 0.0187
IND_rel 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009
0.0092 0.0089 0.0089 0.0090 0.0090 0.0094 0.0092 0.0093 0.0092 0.0093 0.0093
TOEHOLD 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.021 * 0.019 * 0.018 0.017
0.0105 0.0108 0.0106 0.0107 0.0108 0.0109 0.0106 0.0110 0.0107 0.0109 0.0109
PREM_1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
SIZE_rel -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.0026 0.0026 0.0025 0.0025 0.0027 0.0027 0.0026 0.0026 0.0025 0.0026 0.0026
LEV -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 * -0.007 -0.008 *
0.0044 0.0042 0.0044 0.0044 0.0043 0.0043 0.0044 0.0045 0.0041 0.0045 0.0043












NANTIDIR_high 0.062 0.049 *
0.0412 0.0278
UK -0.125 ** -0.070 -0.061 -0.034
0.0620 0.0434 0.0497 0.0309
CAN -0.141 ** -0.058 ** 0.070 0.000
0.0695 0.0236 0.1168 0.0253
AUS 0.027 0.032 0.030 0.029
0.0350 0.0361 0.0292 0.0255
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Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence on the relation between concentrated ownership and the long
term operating performance of acquiring firms. We investigate the performance around 287 takeovers in
English-origin countries other than the US by following the classification of La Porta et al. [La Porta,
R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. The Journal of Political
Economy, 106(6), 1113–1155]. Our principal finding is that the relationship between concentrated ownership
and the level and change in operating cash flow returns after takeovers is non-linear. Value creating deals
are associated with higher levels of concentration consistent with decreasing agency costs as the dominant
shareholder’s wealth invested in the acquiring firm increases. We also find, although all acquiring firms
are from English-origin countries, that greater investor protection, as measured by the updated anti-director
rights index in Djankov et al. [Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2006). The
law and economics of self-dealing. Working Paper], has a positive impact on operating performance from
acquisitions. We do not find a link between performance and their new anti-self-dealing index.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G12; G14; G34
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions; Concentrated ownership; Operating performance; English-origin countries; Anti-
self-dealing index; Anti-director rights index
1. Introduction
Stemming mostly from the agency model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) but also from
much earlier work such as Berle and Means (1932), corporate governance research has generally
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 131 650 8351; fax: +44 131 650 8337.
E-mail address: paul.andre@ed.ac.uk (P. André).
0148-6195/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.04.003
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emphasized the role of control mechanisms in dispersed ownership structures as found in the US.
However, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), among others, show that dispersed
ownership is only common in larger firms and in countries with good shareholder protection.
Since concentrated ownership in a firm has its own specific costs and benefits, a growing body
of empirically work investigates the unique characteristics of such firms (Bebchuk, Kraakman,
& Triantis, 2000; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002). Following the
investor protection classification scheme of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998), subsequent cross-country research also focuses on comparing corporate performance
among countries with different legal characteristics (Gugler, Mueller, & Yurtoglu, 2004; Fauver,
Houston, & Naranjo, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). While English-origin countries1 are often lumped
together and viewed as examples of dispersed ownership and greater investor protection, concen-
trated ownership is quite prevalent in many of these countries and the level of investor protection
and the risks of self-dealing does vary among the group (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, &
Shleifer, 2006).
One of the most important drivers of corporate performance over the last decade is without a
doubt the level of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The most recent merger wave which begins in
the mid-1990 and reaches its peak in 2000 is not only confined to the US market but is truly global
(Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, & Zulehner, 2003). One additional feature of the recent M&A wave is
that takeovers are larger than ever. Companies invest billions of dollars in making acquisitions but
most empirical studies show that shareholders of acquiring firms experience wealth destruction
on average or at best break even (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Goergen & Renneboog,
2004; Franks & Harris, 1989; Jensen & Ruback, 1983).
A recent stream of research focuses on ownership structure, governance and the value creation
of specific corporate decisions such as M&A. Concentrated ownership introduces new dimen-
sions to the issue. In countries with low investor protection, some argue that M&A are a tool used
by controlling shareholders to facilitate tunneling that benefit them at the expense of minority
shareholders (Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Bigelli & Mengoli, 2004). In countries with better cor-
porate governance, dominant shareholders may not be in a position to benefit from tunneling but
they may choose to reduce risk by making sub-optimal investment decision (Ben-Amar & André,
2006; Faccio & Stolin, 2006; Holmen & Knopf, 2004).
To date, most research examines the relationship between acquisition performance and own-
ership structures by adopting traditional market based event study methodology since it assumes
that stock prices immediately reflect the benefits from the deal (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford,
2001; Franks & Harris, 1989; Goergen & Renneboog, 2004; Limmack, 1991; Sudarsanam, 1996).
However, Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, and Best (1998) argue that the nature of the short term market
performance methodology may not fully capture anticipated benefits from an acquisition. Fol-
lowing the work of Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), financial researchers take a longer term
perspective and examine the change in operating cash flow returns to better understand value
creation and its drivers.
Our study adds to the ongoing debate about the benefits and costs of concentrated ownership
and further examines the effects of governance, legal investor protection and anti-self-dealing
measures on value creation following M&A. We extend the research of Ben-Amar and André
1 La Porta et al. (1998) include the following countries in the English-origin category: Australia, Canada, Hong Kong,
India, Ireland, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
United Kingdom, United States and Zimbabwe.
382 T.-Y. Yen, P. André / Journal of Economics and Business 59 (2007) 380–405
(2006) by doing a cross-country analysis. Our study is based on a sample of 287 deals over
1997–2001 in 11 English-origin countries: Australia, Canada, India, Republic of Ireland, Israel,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.
We find, after controlling for well documented governance mechanisms and deal characteris-
tics, that the relationship between concentrated ownership and the level and change in operating
cash flow returns after acquisitions is non-linear. Value creating deals are associated with higher
levels of concentration consistent with decreasing agency costs as the dominant shareholder’s
wealth invested in the acquiring firm increases. Further, separation of ownership and voting rights
leads to greater value destruction. We also find, although all acquiring firms are from English-
origin countries, that greater investor protection, as measured by the updated anti-director-rights
index in Djankov et al. (2006) has a positive impact on abnormal cash flow returns from acquisi-
tions. We do not document any differential performance with respect to their new anti-self-dealing
index.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on the issues
surrounding concentrated ownership structures. Section 3 describes the sample and methodology.
Section 4 reports the major results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
A relatively large body of empirical research focuses on the agency problem between own-
ers and managers in widely held companies. This work suggests that large shareholders, block
holders, are a good internal mechanism to reduce agency costs since these shareholders have
greater incentives and resources to efficiently monitor and ensure value maximization (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976, Schleifer & Vishny, 1986).
However, an agency problem potentially exists between controlling shareholders and minor-
ity shareholders in concentrated ownership structures. Further, controlling shareholders often
have greater control rights than their cash flow rights because of pyramidal structures, cross-
holdings, dual class shares and various other control devices (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta
et al., 1999). This separation provides an opportunity for controlling shareholders to expropriate
minority shareholders. Tunneling is one of the common problems cited (Johnson, Lopez-de-
Silanes, La Porta, & Shleifer, 2000). When dominant shareholders do not bear the full costs
of their decisions, they may have incentives to act in their own interest at the expense of
firm performance. There are many ways to achieve tunneling such as by special dividends,
excessive perks, excess compensation, advantageous transfer prices, inter-company loans at non-
market rates, guaranties of other entities borrowing or by enhancing the value of other firms
in the group by sub-optimal investment decisions such as merger transactions. Further, Zhang
(1998) provides empirical evidence that controlling shareholders may make sub-optimal deci-
sions because they are more risk averse than other shareholders whose portfolios are better
diversified.
Managerial entrenchment is another cost of concentrated ownership. Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino,
& Buchholtz (2001) argue that concentrated ownership structures, especially family structures,
may limit top management positions to affiliated members instead of hiring more qualified out-
side professional managers. Further, high ownership stakes by those that are also top managers,
such as in family firms, can reduce the effectiveness of outside monitoring since it lowers
the probability of managerial turnover or of successful takeover bids when the firm is per-
forming poorly (Davies, Hillier, & McColgan, 2005; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Stulz,
1988).
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Based on the benefits and costs of concentrated ownership, our study investigates the following
accentuating or mitigating factors:
2.1. Separation
Ownership and control rights can differ because corporations issue different classes of shares
that provide different voting rights for given cash-flow rights (Faccio & Lang, 2002). Separation
of ownership and control rights means that controlling shareholders do not bear the full costs of
their decisions. Separation has generally been shown to have a significantly negative effect on
firm performance (Claessens et al., 2000; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La
Porta et al., 2002).
2.2. CEO position
Whether an individual related to or himself the dominant shareholder should occupy the seat
of CEO is still debatable. Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that with effective outside monitors,
family CEOs may provide essential firm-specific know-how and reduce agency problems. Many
researchers, however, offer a different view: dominant CEOs may more easily entrench themselves
and thus deviate from firm value maximization (Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schonea, 2005; Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Sharma & Ho, 2002).
2.3. Board structure
Board structure is central to the corporate governance system. Directors are assumed to pro-
vide professional advice, to hire and compensate the CEO and to replace the CEO if necessary
(Jensen, 1993). The board is generally composed of inside (related) and outside (unrelated)
directors. Academics, regulators, as well as shareholder activists suggest that outside direc-
tors should enhance firm value through effective monitoring. They further suggest that the
size of the board (not too large and not too small) and the separation of the CEO/COB
position lead to better governance. Empirical studies on board characteristics have obtained
mixed results. Several authors provide evidence that outside directors enhance board effec-
tiveness (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1988) while others find either a weak relation
(Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 2002) or even a negative relationship (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996).
Conyon and Peck (1998) investigate the effects of board size and find a negative association
between measures of corporate performance and board size. André, Ben-Amar, and Saadi (2006)
document a non-linear relationship. Similarly, the relationship between CEO-chairman dual-
ity and performance remains unclear (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Vefeas & Theodorou,
1998).
2.4. Other large shareholders
Other large shareholders, or block holders, are recognized as an effective mitigating factor
(André & Schiehll, 2004). Large block holders such as institutional investors have the means of
monitoring and influencing the controlling shareholder. Maury and Pajuste (2005) show that not
only the presence but also the equal distribution of voting shares among block holders has positive
effect on firm value.
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2.5. Legal institutions
Recent papers emphasize the importance of legal institutions in protecting investors and lim-
iting self-dealing by controlling shareholders (Denis & McConnell, 2003). La Porta et al. (1998)
initially classify 49 countries around the world into four major families of law. Common-law
has been adopted in the British colonies, including the United States, Canada, Australia, India,
Malaysia, Thailand, and many other countries. They further show that these English-origin coun-
tries have the strongest investor protection rules. They measure the level of shareholder rights by
an anti-director rights index. Recent papers provide evidence that companies in countries with
an English-origin legal system have higher corporate performance due to the better corporate
governance system and legal environment (Becht & Roell, 1999; Gugler et al., 2004; Johnson,
Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000; Mueller & Yurtoglu, 2000).
However, the anti-director rights index has been criticized for its ad-hoc nature and for
coding errors. Djankov et al. (2006) revise their original anti-director rights index using more
precise definitions of the proxies composing the index and correcting for coding errors. They
further present a new measure of legal protection: the anti-self-dealing index. They design a
questionnaire starting with a fixed self-dealing transaction and then attempt to measure the
hurdles that controlling shareholders need to tackle in order to extract private benefit from
this transaction. They then collect completed questionnaires from attorneys working in an
international law firm. In summary, they show that common law countries have a higher
average anti-self-dealing index since English-origin countries typically require extensive disclo-
sure and approval of the transaction by interested shareholders. However, as in the case of the
anti-director rights index, there remains a fair amount of variation across English-origin countries.
The impact of concentrated ownership on corporate performance is still an open question.
Some studies show that firm value increases with the cash flow ownership of the largest share-
holders (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 2002;
McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, & Mishra, 1998). In contrast, other studies suggest that without
effective monitoring, controlling shareholders are likely to exploit minority shareholders and make
sub-optimal decisions and even more so when control rights exceed the cash flow rights (Cronqvist
& Nilsson, 2003; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001). Also, many studies suggest that the relationship
may not be linear (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988).
Recent studies look at M&A to examine whether controlling shareholder create or destroy
value. Ben-Amar and André (2006) investigate Canadian deals and show that separation of own-
ership and control does not have the anticipated negative impact on value creation and that family
ownership has a positive impact. European studies by Faccio and Stolin (2006) and Holmen and
Knopf (2004) find no significant evidence to prove wealth transfer from minority shareholders
to controlling shareholders through takeovers. They conclude that legal or extralegal institutions
effectively mitigate the tunneling problem. However, Bigelli and Mengoli (2004) find a non-
monotonic relationship between the participation of the dominant shareholder and the abnormal
returns for bidder shareholders in Italy.
Bae et al. (2002) investigate mergers by Korean business groups also called chaebols. They
argue that the owner-managers of chaebols have substantial discretionary power and that legal
protection against expropriation of minority shareholders is weak in Korea. They find that when
chaebol affiliated firms make acquisitions, their share price drops so that the minority shareholders
of these firms lose out while controlling shareholders gain because of the increase in value of
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other firms in the group. They further argue that the implicit guarantee of a bailout for chaebols
members still make these investment interesting for minority shareholders.2
Our study proposes to re-examine the relationship between ownership structure and the per-
formance of bidding firms in the context of ownership concentration and separation between
cash-flow and control rights for a broad sample of English-origin countries while controlling for
varying level of investor protection as measured by the updated anti-director rights index and new
anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2006).
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample selection
Our data set is obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM World-
wide Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Our sample meets the following criteria: (1) observations
are for 1997–2001; (2) acquiring firms and targets are listed companies; (3) deals are completed
and are mergers, exchange offers, or acquisitions of a majority interest; (4) companies with sev-
eral M&A during the period are included; (5) only transactions greater than US$ 10 million are
included; (6) adopting the La Porta et al. (1998) classification, acquiring nation is an English-
origin country except for the US3; (7) companies have financial and accounting data for the 7-year
window available in Datastream; and (8) ownership data is available from proxies or annual reports
of each company from Mergent database, Canadian SEDAR filing system, EDGAR SEC fillings,
or company websites. Note that government, financial, and investment companies are excluded
because of their specific accounting and regulatory requirements. Our final sample comprises 287
deals (227 acquiring firms) in 11 countries.
Table 1, panel A, reports the annual numbers, aggregate values, and mean values of deals. Our
sample comprises 287 acquisitions with a total market value of over US$ 564 billion. Acquiring
firms paid, on average (median), US$ 1966.6 (239.3) million for the targets. Panel B presents
acquisitions by primary SIC code. The largest proportion of deals is in the manufacturing sector.
Panel C lists firms and deal values by country. Most deals are initiated in the UK (142 deals out
of the 287 or 49.5%) followed by Canada (77 deals or 26.8%), and Australia (25 deals or 8.7%).
The other 43 (15%) deals are spread across the following countries: South Africa (14), Ireland
(11), India (6), Singapore (6), New Zealand (3), Israel (1), Malaysia (1), and Thailand (1).
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Dependent variable
3.2.1.1. Performance measure. Based on Healy et al. (1992), this study uses pre-tax operating
cash flow (OCF) to measure the acquisition performance. We define operating cash flow as oper-
ating income after depreciation plus depreciation and goodwill amortization (in other words,
EBITDA). This definition ensures that the performance measure is unaffected by different merger
2 La Porta et al. (2000), Friedman et al. (2003) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) discuss this notion of negative
tunneling or propping.
3 The US market is excluded since it has been extensively studied and a greater proportion of large American firms are
widely held. Nevertheless, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and other suggest that around a third of US large publicly listed
firms can be characterized as family firms. Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2006) find family ownership in 48% of the 2000
largest industrial firms.











Panel A: Number and value of transactions
1997 11 373.9 198.0 4112.8
1998 45 684.0 173.5 30779.7
1999 74 1909.2 211.4 141283.1
2000 88 3852.7 297.5 339039.5
2001 69 713.1 205.5 49201.2
Total 287 1966.6 239.3 564416.3
By SIC code 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997–2001
Panel B: Sample by industry
Agriculture and natural resources: 0000–1999 3 7 8 14 12 44
Manufacturing: 2000–3999 2 24 35 45 29 135
Transportation: 4000–4999 3 5 10 12 12 42
Consumer: 5000–5999 1 6 7 6 5 25
Services: 7000–8999 2 3 14 11 11 41













Panel C: Sample by acquirer nation
Australia 25 20 177.6 177.6 22937.2 25
Canada 77 57 895.6 300.1 68962.1 71
India 6 6 155.1 155.1 930.6 6
Ireland-Rep 11 8 207.8 207.8 4629.7 10
Israel 1 1 53.4 53.4 53.4 1
Malaysia 1 1 49.5 49.5 49.5 1
New Zealand 3 3 295.4 6.2 886.2 2
Singapore 6 6 1601.8 229.5 9610.6 6
South Africa 14 11 164.5 164.5 2947.4 14
Thailand 1 1 124.1 124.1 124.1 1
United Kingdom 142 113 3192.2 285.5 453285.5 128
Total 287 227 1966.6 239.3 564416.3 265
Sample of 287 mergers and acquisitions by 227 acquiring firms in 11 English-origin countries (Australia, Canada, India,
Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001
for completed transactions over US$10 million obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM
Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database.
accounting methods, tax policy, or the type of financing used to fund the acquisition. Operat-
ing cash flow return (OCFR) is calculated as operating cash flow divided by market value of
asset.
Operating cash flow returns are computed for each company up to 3 years before and after the
acquisition event (MEG pre and post). Pre-acquisition performance is calculated as a weighted-
average of the operating cash flow rate for the bidder and the target. The weights are based on
the market values of assets of both companies at the year before acquisition. This measurement
is consistent with that of Healy et al. (1992), Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1997) and Ghosh
(2001).
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Following Ghosh’s (2001) critic of Healy et al. (1992), we set criteria to select a list of
matched firms based on size, industry, and pre-performance. After the list of matched firms
is set, the steps for calculating operating cash flows are repeated and we get operating cash
flow rates for the pair of matched firms (a match for the bidder and a match for the target).
Since the pair of matched firms forms the benchmark, both post- and pre-acquisition perfor-
mances is also measured as the weighted-average of the operating cash flow returns based on the
market values of assets of the bidder and the target the year before acquisition (MAT pre and
post).
The industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted operating cash flow return (ACFR) is the
operating cash flow return of the merging firm minus that of the matched pair of firm. Similar
to Healy et al. (1992), the median of ACFR 3 years before and after acquisition (ACFRpre
and ACFRpost) is used. Furthermore, while most studies focus on post-acquisition performance
only (Healy et al., 1992; Linn & Switzer, 2001; Loughran & Ritter, 1997; Powell & Stark, 2005;
Rahman & Limmack, 2004), some papers also calculate the change in cash flow returns (ACFR)
to examine the improvement in performance (Carline, Linn, & Yadav, 2002; Rahman & Limmack,
2004). ACFR is defined as ACFRpost minus ACFRpre. We examine both performance metrics
(ACFRpost and ACFR).
3.2.1.2. Performance benchmark. Following Barber and Lyon (1996), most researchers adopt
industry, size, and pre-performance based matching. For example, Loughran and Ritter (1997)
choose their matched firms by using the following criteria: (1) 2-digit SIC, assets within
25–200%, closest EBITDA/assets and (2) if there is no match, assets within 90–110%, clos-
est but higher EBITDA/assets. In Ghosh (2001), firms are matched by the same 2-digit SIC
code, total assets between 25% and 200%, and closest ratio of operating cash flow to mar-
ket value of assets (sales). Powell and Stark (2005) select their matched firms with an initial
size filter of between 25% and 200% within the bidders and targets industries. To make our
results comparable with previous studies, our matching procedure is consistent with the rec-
ommendations of Barber and Lyon (1996) and similar to the approaches employed by Ghosh
(2001) and Loughran and Ritter (1997). We construct our benchmarks with the following initial
criteria:
1. Same 2-digit primary SIC code.
2. Similar size, measured as book value of assets within 70% and 130% 1 year before takeover.
3. Similar pre-performance, measured as return on asset (ROA) within 90% and 110% 1 year
before takeover.
4. Same nation code as the bidder and the target.
From the list of potential matched firms, we select the firm with closest but highest ROA. If
there is no match, the pre-performance restriction is extended by choosing a matching firm with
ROA between 50% and 150%. If still no firm meets the criteria, the same country rule is replaced
by a same legal origin country rule and the pre-performance limit is reset to 90–110%. If the first
run criteria are too strict to give a matching firm, we do a second run with larger bands. That is,
same 2-digit primary SIC code, book value of assets within 25% and 200%, ROA between 90%
and 110%, and the same country. After the second run, we obtain 92% matching for acquiring
firms and 94% for target firms. For the few cases without a match at this point, we select the firm
with the closest ROA within size band and industry.
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Finally, statistical analysis shows that our original operating cash flow data of both merged
and matched firms have heavy tailed distributions. We use Huber’s M-estimator4 with k = 1.28 to
estimate the measure of location and detect the outliers and then winsorize the data.5
3.2.2. Independent variables
Independent variables are grouped into five categories: ownership variables; governance and
legal variables as discussed above; typical deal variables found in event studies (see André, Kooli,
& L’Her, 2004; Ben-Amar & André, 2006 for further discussions); and country control variables.
All variables are defined in Table 2. We discuss ownership variables below. Our coding approach
is similar to Faccio and Lang (2002).
Ownership variables include five dummy variables reflecting different thresholds of vot-
ing shares held by the largest shareholder. We also have a continuous variable for the actual
percentage of voting shares held. The information is obtained from the description of substan-
tial/principal shareholders in each company’s proxy circular or annual report the year prior to the
deal.
3.2.2.1. Concentrated ownership at 10% threshold (CONCEN10). This dummy variable is for
companies having a large shareholder holding more than 10% of the voting shares. The 10% level
has been broadly used as a cut point to test the difference between dispersed and concentrated
ownership structures because it provides a significant stake and most countries mandate disclosure
at this level or lower (Faccio et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 1998).6
3.2.2.2. Concentrated ownership at 20% threshold (CONCEN20). Some researchers argue that
20% might be a better cut-off point to define ownership concentration (Claessens et al., 2000;
Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Faccio et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, we set another
dummy variable for when companies have a large shareholder with more than 20% of voting
shares.
3.2.2.3. Concentrated ownership at 50% threshold (CONCEN50). When a large shareholder
holds more than 50% of the voting shares, it not only dominates but typically it legally controls
the firm (Becht & Roell, 1999; Faccio & Lang, 2002). Therefore, we also set a dummy variable
at the 50% threshold to examine this specific ownership structure.
4 M-estimators are highly recommended due to higher breakdown points than mean and more accurate variance than
median from a normal distribution or trimmed means from a heavy tailed probability curve. Also, M-estimators play
a more dominant role when dealing with regression analysis issues (Wilcox, 2001). For the M-estimators, the idea of
flexibility of trimming ratio is introduced by Eq. (1) where any observed value X is declared an outlier based on the sample




This study uses a well-known M-estimator called one-step M-estimator which has been broadly applied by using K = 1.28
(Huber, 1964).
5 The average level of winsorizing for right tails is 16.35%, 10.89% for left tails.
6 Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand require the disclosure of top 20 large and substantial shareholders.
Canada requires the disclosure of information with respect to the large shareholders who beneficially own 10% or more
of outstanding common shares whereas the UK and South African thresholds are 3% and 5%, respectively.




Independent variables: Ownership variables
CONCEN10 One if a shareholder owns more than 10% of voting shares of the acquiring firm
CONCEN20 One if a shareholder owns more than 20% of voting shares of the acquiring firm
CONCEN50 One if a shareholder owns more than 50% of voting shares of the acquiring firm
CONCEN1020 One if a shareholder owns between 10% and 20% of voting shares in the acquiring firm
CONCEN2050 One if a shareholder owns between 20% and 50% of voting shares in the acquiring firm
LSH1P The percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder
LSH1PSQ The square of the percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder
LSH1PCUBE The cube of the percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder
Other independent variables
Governance variables
SEP One if there exists separation of ownership and cash flow rights in the acquiring firm
CEOLSH One if CEO is related to the largest shareholder
CEOdual One if CEO and COB positions are held by the same individual
OTHLSH One if there is another shareholder with at least 10% of the voting shares of the acquiring
firms
BSIZE Numbers of directors on the board
Deal variables
TGORI English One if the legal origin of target firm is English
ATTI Hostile One if the management or board of target firm were initially opposed to the deal
PAY Stock One if the payment method of transaction was stock only
COMPETE One if the acquiring firm had to compete with other possible acquirers
IND rel One if the acquiring and target firms had equivalent 4-digit primary SIC code
TOEHOLD One if acquiring firm owns any target shares before transaction
PREM 1day Premium of offer price to target trading price 1 day prior to the announcement date
SIZE rel Natural logarithm of the acquiring firm’s market value of assets divided by target firm’s
market value of asset at the fiscal year end before the acquisition year
LEV Natural logarithm of the acquiring firm’s leverage (book value of debts divided by market
value of assets) at the fiscal year end before the acquisition year
Legal variables
NANTIDIR high One if the acquiring firm is in a country with highest score (5) of updated anti-director
rights index (Djankov et al., 2006)
ANTISDI level Anti-self-dealing index (Djankov et al., 2006)
Country variables
UK One if acquiring firm nation is the United Kingdom
CAN One if acquiring firm nation is Canada
AUS One if acquiring firm nation is Australia
Ownership and governance variables are obtained from proxies or annual reports of each company. Proxies are obtained
from Mergent database, Canadian SEDAR filing system, EDGAR SEC fillings, or company website. Deal variables are
collected from Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database.
Legal variables are scores from of Djankov et al. (2006).
3.2.2.4. Concentrated ownership between 10–20% and 20–50% (CONCEN1020 and CON-
CEN2050). These two dummy variables are created to allow three ownership categories: between
10% and 20%, between 20% and 50%, and more than 50% (CONCEN50).
3.2.2.5. Percentage of voting shares (LSH1P, LSH1PSQ, LSH1PCUBE). A continuous variable
measures the actual percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder (from 10% or
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more). The variable is squared and cubed to capture the potential non-linear relationship between
controlling ownership and acquiring performance. Authors having examined non-linear rela-
tionships include Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Anderson and Reeb
(2003).
4. Results
4.1. Operating cash flows returns
Table 3 presents the operating cash flow returns (pre, post, and change) for the merging and
matching firms and the adjusted operating cash flow return. The results in panel A report a median
operating cash flow return for merged firms (MEGi) in the 3 years before acquisition ranging from
11.32% to 12.20%. The median pre-acquisition operating cash flow return for matched firms
(MATi) is from 12.6% to 13.79%. The median measure of industry, size, and pre-performance
adjusted return (MEGi − MATi) for year −3, −2, and −1 is −0.17%, −0.88%, and −1.42%,
respectively (all statistically different from zero). The median adjusted return over the 3-year
pre-acquisition period is −1.24% and statistically different from zero. Similar conclusions are
drawn from the measure of mean operating performance.
In contrast, we see the mean and median measures of adjusted returns in each of the three post-
acquisition years are insignificant except for the mean adjusted return in year +1 (0.81%). The
median adjusted return over post-acquisition years (ACFRpost) is 0.79% and the mean is 0.57%.
Although these results are generally not distinguishable from zero, mean measures are positive
and concurrently decrease from t + 1 to t + 3. Furthermore, the mean and the median measure of
the change of operating cash flow rate (ACFR) are 2.43% and 2.20%, respectively. Both are
significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Summarily, the results demonstrate that merged firms in our sample under-perform the
benchmark firms before M&A. This finding contrasts with some prior studies (Ghosh, 2001;
Healy et al., 1992). We do find that operating performance of merged firms improves after
M&A events. This result is consistent with that reported by Healy et al. (1992). Powell
and Stark (2005) find modest improvements for UK deals. Although the post-adjusted return
is not statistically distinguishable from zero, the measures of change in adjusted returns
are significant when combining the significantly poor pre-performance and positive post-
performance.
In panel B, we present the regression results of the 3-year post-acquisition median adjusted
returns (ACFRpost) on the 3-year pre-acquisition median adjusted returns (ACFRpre). The inter-
cept α (0.015) is positive and significant at the 1% level which indicates adjusted operating
performance improvements of 1.5% in the post-acquisition period after controlling for the effects
of pre-performance. The slope coefficient (0.475) is also positive and different from zero. The
slope coefficient captures the persistence over time. Healy et al. (1992, 1997) and Ghosh (2001)
find similar results.In panels C and D, we test the sensitivity of results to various windows (year
−1 compared to year +1, +2, and +3) similar to Denis and Denis (1995). Results are qualitatively
similar to the change in pre- and post-3-year median adjusted performance. Further analysis is
based on these measures.7
7 We also ran the regressions in Table 6 using these alternative measures, not reported, and results where again
quantitatively similar.
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Table 3







Industry, size and pre-performance















Panel A: Operating cash flow return
−3 287 11.51 11.45 12.13 12.60 −1.15** -0.17* 48.43
−2 287 11.79 12.20 13.37 13.79 −1.59*** -0.88*** 46.34
−1 287 11.22 11.32 12.87 13.47 −2.15*** -1.42*** 38.68
1 287 11.11 11.42 10.12 10.61 0.81* 0.38 55.40
2 287 11.77 11.88 10.99 11.34 0.54 0.61 53.31
3 287 12.47 11.68 11.81 12.39 0.29 -0.09 49.83
ACFRpre: median for
years (−3 to −1)
−1.86*** −1.24*** 42.86
ACFRpost: median for






2.43 *** 2.20*** 63.07
Panel B: Regression of ACFRpost on ACFRpre ACFRpost = 0.015*** + 0.475***ACFRpre; F = 74.792***;
adjusted R2 = 0.205
Year Adjusted (MEGi − MATi)
Mean (%) Median (%)
Panel C: Robustness test on change in operating cash flow return
ACFR(+1): ACFR1 − ACFR−1 2.96*** 2.13***
ACFR(+2): ACFR2 − ACFR−1 2.69*** 2.45***
ACFR(+3): ACFR3 − ACFR−1 2.44*** 2.22***
Regression F Adjusted R2
Panel D: Robustness Test on Regression of ACFRt = 1,2,3 on ACFRt−1
ACFRt+1 = 0.018*** + 0.481***ACFRt−1 70.291*** 0.195
ACFRt+2 = 0.017*** + 0.526***ACFRt−1 74.371*** 0.204
ACFRt+3 = 0.013*** + 0.451***ACFRt−1 47.617*** 0.140
Sample of 287 mergers and acquisitions by 227 acquiring firms in 11 English-origin countries (Australia, Canada, India,
Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001
for completed transactions over US$ 10 million obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM
Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database. Operating cash flow return (OCFR) is calculated as operating cash flow
divided by market value of asset. Operating cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation. Post-acquisition
performance for each deal is measured by the operating cash flow return of the surviving acquirer after transaction. Pre-
acquisition performance is calculated as a weighted-average of the operating cash flow return for the bidder and the target
included (MEGi). The weights are based on the market values of assets of both companies in the year before acquisition.
Post- and pre-acquisition performances of the matched firms are measured as weighted-average of the operating cash flow
rates (MATi). Industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted operating cash flow rates (ACFR) is operating cash flow rates
of merged firms minus those of matched firms. The change in industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted cash flow rate
(ACFR) is defined as 3-year median ACFRpost minus 3-year-median ACFRpre. Outliers have been winsorized using
Huber’s M-estimator approach. ***Significance at the 1% level; **significance at the 5% level; *significance at the 10%
level.
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4.2. Descriptive statistics
In Table 4, we display summary statistics of all variables for the full sample and a breakdown
for the three major countries (Australia, Canada, and the UK). Comparing adjusted operating
cash flows returns across countries, we see that Canadian firms have the best pre-performance
and post-performance median measures (i.e., performance was not statistically different from
matching firms) whereas our sample of firms from other English-origin countries experience poor
pre-merger abnormal performance which improves in the post-merger period leading them to
experience greater improvements in ACFR (all statistically significantly different from zero).
For ownership variables, we see that concentrated ownership at the 10% threshold is dominant
in all countries (72% in Australia, 64% in Canada, 51% in the UK, and 74% for ‘others’). The
median voting shares of the largest shareholder is 12% in the UK (below the overall sample
median of 21%), 26% in Australia, 47% in Canada, and 38% in other English-origin countries.
While there are only 16 firms out 142 (11%) with a 20% or more large shareholder in the UK, this
is the case in 40% of the Australian sample and in 53% of cases in Canada and ‘others’. Canada
has the largest number of controlling large shareholders (27% of firms have a shareholder with
over 50% of voting shares) followed by the other English-origin countries (23%) but there is only
one case in the UK and none in Australia. La Porta et al. (1999), using a 10% cut off and looking
at medium-sized firms, find concentrated ownership in 90% of cases in Australia, 90% in the UK,
60% in Canada, and 82.5% on average for ‘others’. At a 20% cut off, they find 70% concentration
in Australia, 40% in the UK and Canada, and 57% for ‘others’.
For governance variables, separation of voting and cash flow rights is present in 15% of the
sample but mostly common in Australia and Canada but not in the UK or ‘others’. CEOs are
linked to the largest shareholder in 14% of cases but this is also most prevalent in Australia (20%)
and Canada (29%). CEO is also COB in 26% of cases; Australia and the UK are below average
whereas Canada and ‘others’ are above. There exists a second large shareholder in and around
20% of cases across all countries. Maury (2005), examining 1672 Western European non-financial
firms, reports that 36% of the sample firms have multiple block holders. Median board size ranges
between 7 and 10 members. Conyon and Peck (1998) show that UK board size is 8.56, on average.
Examining deal characteristics, we see that the quasi-totality of deals is with a target also from
an English-origin country and that most deals are friendly. Cernat (2004) points out that there are
relatively few hostile deals in Europe. Between 16% and 19% of deals are entirely paid with stock,
compared to 11.3% pure stock European deals in Faccio and Masulis (2005). Overall, 36% of
deals are classified as being in the same industry (both target and acquirer having same 4-digit SIC
code). Compared to the 13.29% level in Goergen and Renneboog (2004) for European takeovers,
we have relatively fewer deals (7%) involving a second bidder and only 16% of deals are initiated
by acquirers with a toehold. The median 1-day premium is 30.43% overall, highest in the UK
(37.14%) and lowest in Canada (19.72%). The average size of acquirers is about 5.7, exp (1.74)
times larger than that of targets and the average level of leverage is 16% (compared to 21.5% in
Maury, 2005 for Western European firms).
Looking at the updated anti-director rights index of Djankov et al. (2006), five sample countries
(59% of deals) including India, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, and the UK are classified as
countries with top scores. As for their new anti-self-dealing index, the median score is 0.81 for all
countries in our sample. We see that Canada and Australia have lower anti-director rights indexes
and lower than median anti-self-dealing indexes (0.65 in Canada and 0.79 in Australia) whereas















Descriptive statistics (by country)
Australia (n = 25) Canada (n = 77) United Kingdom
(n = 142)
Others (n = 43) All (n = 287)
Performance variables
ACFRpre Mean −2.24* −0.40 −2.16*** −3.29** −1.86***
Median −2.68 0.1 9 −1.57*** −2.04** −1.24***
ACFRpost Mean 0.55 1.25 −0.03 1.34 0.57
Median 1.24 1.32 0.55 0.29 0.79
ACFR Mean 2.79** 1.64* 2.13*** 4.63*** 2.43***
Median 3.05* 1.83** 2.00*** 3.83*** 2.20***
Ownership variables
CONCEN10 # (1,0) 18 (72%) 7 (28%) 49 (64%) 28 (36%) 72 (51%) 70 (49%) 32 (74%) 11 (26%) 171 (60%) 116 (40%)
CONCEN20 # (1,0) 10 (40%) 15 (60%) 41 (53%) 36 (47%) 16 (11%) 126 (89%) 23 (53%) 20 (47%) 90 (31%) 197 (69%)
CONCEN50 # (1,0) 0 (0%) 25 (100%) 21 (27%) 56 (73%) 1 (1%) 141 (99%) 10 (23%) 33 (77%) 32 (11%) 255 (89%)
CONCEN1020 # (1,0) 8 (32%) 17 (68%) 8 (10%) 69 (90%) 56 (39%) 86 (61%) 9 (21%) 34 (79) 81 (28%) 206 (72%)
CONCEN2050 # (1,0) 10 (40%) 15 (30%) 20 (26%) 57 (74%) 15 (11%) 127 (89%) 13 (30) 30 (70%) 98 (0%) 229 (80%)
LSH1P (%) # 18 (72%) 49 (64%) 72 (51%) 32 (74%) 171 (60%)
Mean 0.28 0.47 0.16 0.37 0.30
Median 0.26 0.47 0.12 0.38 0.21
Governance variables
SEP # (1,0) 16 (64%) 9 (36%) 24 (31%) 53 (69%) 3 (2%) 139 (98%) 1 (2%) 42 (98%) 44 (15%) 243 (85%)
CEOLSH # (1,0) 5 (20%) 20 (80%) 22 (29%) 55 (71%) 8 (6%) 134 (94%) 5 (12%) 3 8 (88%) 40 (14%) 247 (86%)
CEOdual # (1,0) 3 (12%) 22 (88%) 27 (35%) 50 (65%) 31 (22%) 111 (78%) 13 (74%) 30 (70%) 74 (26%) 213 (74%)
OTHLSH # (1,0) 5 (20%) 20 (80%) 16 (21%) 61 (79%) 24 (17%) 118 (83%) 9 (21%) 34 (79%) 54 (19%) 233 (81%)
BSIZE Mean 8.56 10.27 9.13 10.63 9.61
Median 7.00 10.00 9.00 10.00 9.00
Transaction variables
TGORI English # (1,0) 25 (100%) 0 (0%) 71 (92%) 6 (8%) 128 (90%) 14 (10%) 41 (95%) 2 (5%) 265 (92%) 22% (8%)
ATTI Hostile # a,CO 3 (12%) 22 (88%) 1 (1%) 76 (99%) 4 (3%) 138 (97%) 2 (5%) 41 (95%) 10 (3%) 277 (97%)
PAY Stock # (1,0) 4 (16%) 21 (84%) 14 (18%) 63 (82%) 22 (15%) 120 (85%) 8 (19%) 35% (81%) 48 (17%) 239 (83%)
COMPETE # (1,0) 3 (12%) 22 (88%) 6 (8%) 71 (92%) 9 (6%) 133 (94%) 1 (2%) 42 (98%) 19 (7%) 268 (93%)
IND rel # (1,0) 8 (32%) 17 (68%) 33 (43%) 44 (57%) 51 (36%) 91 (64%) 10 (23%) 33 (77%) 102 (36%) 185 (64%)
TOEHOLD # (1,0) 6 (24%) 19 (76%) 10 (13%) 67 (87%) 23 (16%) 119 (84%) 8 (19%) 35 (81%) 47 (16%) 240 (84%)
Prem 1day Mean 22.91 31.19 37.05 23.83 32.66













Table 4 (Continued )
Australia (n = 25) Canada (n = 77) United Kingdom
(n = 142)
Others (n = 43) All (n = 287)
LN(SIZE rel) Mean (LN, non-LN) 1.49 4.43 1.95 7.02 1.68 5.38 1.71 5.52 1.74 5.70
Median (LN, non-LN) 0.97 2.64 1.75 5.75 1.48 4.37 1.92 6.82 1.66 5.23
LN(LEV) Mean (LN, non-LN) −1.59 0.20 −1.56 0.21 −1.94 0.14 −1.93 0. 14 −1.81 0. 16
Median (LN, non-LN) −1.48 0.23 −1.28 0.28 −1.78 0.17 −2.07 0.13 −1.66 0.19
Legal variables
NANTIDIR high # (1,0) 0 (0%) 25 (100%) 0 (0%) 77 (100%) 142 (100%) 0 (0%) 27 (63%) 16 (37%) 169 (59%) 118 (41*)
ANTISDI level Mean 0.79 0.65 0.93 0.83 0.82
Median – – – 0.83 0.81
Sample of 287 mergers and acquisitions by 227 acquiring firms in 11 English-origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom)
between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost
is the pre- and post-industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted cash flow return. ACFR is for the change in industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted cash flow return. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber’s
M-estimator approach. *,**,***Indicate whether ACFR measures are statistically different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. See Table 2 for variable definitions.
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4.3. Univariate analysis
Table 5, panel A, examines the relationship between performance and the ownership, gov-
ernance, and deal variables on a univariate basis.8 Looking at the ownership variables, we see
that LSH1P, voting share percentage of the largest shareholder, is positively correlated with
performance, but not significantly. Turning to CONCEN10, we find that the mean (median) post-
adjusted cash flow return, ACFRpost, for the 171 firms with a large shareholder (over 10%) is
0.49% (0.79%) whereas it is 0.68% (0.84%) for the 116 widely held firms. The mean (median)
change in ACFR, ACFR, is 2.36% (1.72%) for firms with a large shareholder and 2.53% (2.87%)
for widely held firms, both differences not being significant. We also analyze the performance
for various sub-groups and find that the CONCEN1020 group has the poorest post-performance
whereas the CONCEN20 and CONCEN2050 groups do better than other groups. Table 5, panel B,
further investigates and confirms the above results and suggest a potential non-linear relationship
between performance and ownership. These univariate results suggest that firms with lower levels
of concentration make poorer M&A decisions.
Governance variables are weakly related to the change in adjusted cash flow returns (ACFR).
Firms with controlling CEOs outperform their peers on post-adjusted performance (ACFRpost)
at the 10% level of significance. This is consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003) who suggest
that family CEOs view themselves as the stewards of the firm. Further, board size has a sig-
nificantly negative correlation with ACFRpost. Jensen (1993) argues that keeping boards small
should improve firm performance. Yermack (1996) suggests that large boards are associated with
problems such as communication and effective decision-making. Conyon and Peck (1998) also
find empirical evidence of a negative relationship between board size and firm performance.
Among the deal variables, the COMPETE variable has a significantly negative relationship
with ACFR. This evidence is consistent with Duggal and Millar (1999) that show multiple
bidders benefiting targets but not bidders. The correlation between premium and both performance
measures (ACFRpost and ACFR) is not significant. The correlation between the relative size
and ACFR or ACFRpost is −0.109 and −0.217, both significant. Our results contrast with some
studies which suggest that deal size is not related to post-merger returns (Agrawal et al., 1992;
Healy et al., 1992; Franks & Harris, 1989) but support the view that larger deviations in firm
size leads to poorer acquisition performance (Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Moeller, Schlingemann, &
Stulz, 2004). Our findings support the debt-monitoring hypothesis by documenting a significant
relation between the leverage ratio, LEV, and post-adjusted performance at the 5% level.
For legal variables, the companies with high anti-director rights indexes (NANTIDIR high)
have a lower mean measure (0.49) but a higher median measure (0.95) of post-acquisition per-
formance (ACFRpost). Companies with better investor protection have better mean and median
measures (2.87 and 2.51) of the change in adjusted operating performance (ACFR). The corre-
lation between the level of the anti-self-dealing index (ANTISDI level) and ACFRpost is negative
(−0.08) while that with ACFR is positive (0.024). None of the relationships are significant.
4.4. Regression results
Table 6 reports regression results for our two operating performance measures on ownership
structure after controlling for governance mechanisms, transaction characteristics, and legal vari-
















Full sample (N = 287) Count ACFRpost ACFR
Mean (%) Median (%) S.D. (%) t-Test/Pearson Mean (%) Median (%) S.D. (%) t-Test/Pearson
Panel A: All variables
Ownership variables
CONCEN10
Y 171 (60%) 0.49 0.79 7.77 −0.212 2.36 1.72 7.51 −0.188
N 116 (40%) 0.68 0.84 6.97 2.53 2.87 7.80
CONCEN1020
Y 81 (28%) −0.20 0.53 7.24 −1.099 0.81 −0.36 7.33 −2.273**
N 206 (72%) 0.87 1.08 7.52 3.07 2.80 7.65
CONCEN20
Y 90 (31%) 1.12 1.67 8.21 0.840 3.76 2.77 7.45 2.019**
N 197 (69%) 0.32 0.56 7.08 1.83 1.88 7.64
CONCEN2050
Y 58 (20%) 0.80 −0.60 8.18 0.260 4.06 2.75 7.80 1.827*
N 229 (80%) 0.51 1.16 7.27 2.02 2.07 7.53
CONCEN50
Y 32 (11%) 1.70 3.35 8.38 0.907 3.21 2.77 6.85 0.612
N 255 (89%) 0.43 0.53 7.33 2.33 2.06 7.72
LSH1P (%) 171 (60%) – – – 0.055 – – – 0.110
Governance variables
SEP
Y 44 (15%) −0.70 −1.12 8.50 −1.104 1.09 1.80 6.34 −1.276
N 243 (85%) 0.80 1.11 7.24 2.68 2.36 7.81
CEOLSH
Y 40 (14%) 2.69 3.24 7.72 1.950* 1.74 2.41 6.50 −0.619
N 247 (86%) 0.23 0.34 7.36 2.54 2.09 7.79
CEOdual
Y 74 (26%) 0.89 1.67 7.64 0.430 1.53 1.76 8.18 −1.187














Y 54 (19%) 1.08 0.85 8.55 0.499 3.74 2.39 8.34 1.401
N 233 (81%) 0.45 0.79 7.18 2.13 2.07 7.43
BSIZE (#) 287 (100%) – – – −0.154*** – – – −0.097
Transaction variables
TGORI English
Y 265 (92%) 0.60 0.79 7.61 0.287 2.44 2.20 7.67 0.034
N 22 (8%) 0.24 0.65 5.31 2.38 2.45 7.15
ATTI Hostile
Y 10 (3%) 2.64 2.77 7.93 0.895 4.91 4.78 7.34 1.046
N 277 (97%) 0.50 0.68 7.43 2.34 2.09 7.63
PAY Stock
Y 48 (17%) −1.01 0.02 6.81 −1.613 2.58 1.18 8.59 0.146
N 239 (83%) 0.89 1.16 7.54 2.40 2.51 7.43
COMPETE
Y 19 (7%) −1.51 −1.83 7.36 −1.261 −2.31 −0.97 7.36 −2.839***
N 268 (93%) 0.72 1.00 7.45 2.77 2.55 7.54
IND rel
Y 102 (36%) 0.18 0.11 7.55 −0.66 2.66 1.85 8.02 0.375
N 185 (64%) 0.79 1.23 7.40 2.31 2.62 7.41
TOEHOLD
Y 47 (16%) 0.76 1.11 6.64 0.192 3.07 3.12 5.43 0.626
N 240 (84%) 0.53 0.76 7.61 2.31 1.91 7.98
PREM 1day (%) 287 (100%) – – – −0.028 – – – 0.033
SIZE rel (#) 287 (100%) – – – −0.217*** – – – −0.109*













Table 5 (Continued )
Full sample (N = 287) Count ACFRpost ACFR
Mean (%) Median (%) S.D. (%) t-Test/Pearson Mean (%) Median (%) S.D. (%) t-Test/Pearson
Legal variable
NANTIDIR high
Y 169 (59%) 0.95 0.95 7.08 −0.209 2.51 2.51 8.03 1.158
N 118 (41%) 0.61 0.61 1.81 1.85 6.98 6.98
ANTISDI level (#) 287 (100%) – – – −0.080 – – – 0.024
Full sample (N = 287) ACFRpost (% positive) ACFR (% positive)
Panel B: Further look at ownership
Widely held (N = 116) 0.68 (52.6%) 0.68 (52.6%) 0.68 (52.6%) 2.53 (66.4%) 2.53 (66.4%) 2.53 (66.4%)
CONCEN1020 (N = 81) 0.49 (55.0%) −0.20 (54.3%) −0.20 (54.3%) 2.36 (60.8%) 0.81 (49.4%) 0.81 (49.4%)
CONCEN2050 (N = 58) 1.12 (55.6%) 0.80 (48.3%) 3.76 (71.1%) 4.06 (72.4%)
CONCEN50 (N = 32) 1.70 (68.8%) 3.21 (68.8%)
Test of difference −0.212 0.688 0.557 −0.188 3.248** 2.246*
Sample of 287 mergers and acquisitions by 227 acquiring firms in 11 English-origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South
Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC
PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre- and post-industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted cash flow return. AACFR
is for the change in industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted cash flow return. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber’s M-estimator approach. t-Tests of differences are
presented for dummy variables and Pearson correlations for continuous variables: ***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. See














Ownership structure and acquiring firm performance
Panel A: ACFRpost
Variables (N = 287) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7






LSH1P 0.007 −0.020 −0.183*
LSH1PSQ 0.038 0.753*
LSH1PCUBE −0.026*
SEP −0.288** −0.036** −0.035*** −0.034** −0.032** −0.324** −0.035**
CEOLSH 0.228 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.014
CEOdual −0.113 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.011 −0.011 −0.009
OTHLSH 0.094 −0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.005
BSIZE −0.024** −0.003** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.002* −0.002* −0.003**
TGORI English −0.049 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.006 −0.006 −0.004
ATTI Hostile 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.028 0.028 0.026
PAY stock −0.134 −0.150 −0.015 −0.015 −0.014 −0.013 −0.014
COMPETE −0.037** −0.034** −0.037** −0.037** −0.035** −0.036** −0.036**
IND rel −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOEHOLD 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008
PREM 1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE rel −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.007***
LEV −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
NANTIDIR high 0.064*** 0.049** 0.050** 0.052** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.048**
ANTISDI level −0.032 −0.061 −0.052 −0.054 −0.046 −0.043 −0.041
UK −0.045** −0.264 −0.028 −0.030 −0.037* −0.038* −0.028
CAN 0.029 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.025 0.025 0.022
AUS 0.035* 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.033* 0.034* 0.033*
ACFRpre 0.459*** 0.466*** 0.472*** 0.473*** 0.459*** 0.460*** 0.460***
R2 32.1 32.3 34.0 34.1 31.5 31.6 32.6













Table 6 (Continued )
Panel B: ACFR
Variables (N = 287) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7






LSH1P 0.014 −0.030 −0.196
LSH1PSQ 0.064 0.791*
LSH1PCUBE −0.665*
SEP −0.020 −0.029** −0.028** −0.026* −0.025* −0.026* −0.028**
CEOLSH 0.007 −0.008 −0.003 −0.004 0.000 0.003 −0.002
CEOdual −0.017 −0.014 −0.014 −0.014 −0.017 −0.017 −0.015
OTHLSH 0.019 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.015 0.015
BSIZE −0.002 −0.003** −0.004** −0.004** −0.002 −0.002 −0.003*
TGORI English −0.003 −0.009 −0.009 −0.010 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004
ATTI Hostile 0.029 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.029 0.029 0.027
PAY stock −0.006 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.006 −0.005 −0.005
COMPETE −0.051*** −0.047*** −0.051*** −0.051*** −0.049*** −0.050*** −0.050***
IND rel 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007
TOEHOLD 0.016* 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015
PREM 1day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE rel −0.005* −0.005* −0.006** −0.006** −0.005* −0.005* −0.005**
LEV −0.007 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.006 −0.006
NANTIDIR high 0.069*** 0.049** 0.051** 0.054** 0.060** 0.061** 0.050**
ANTISDI level 0.008 −0.029 −0.019 −0.023 −0.008 −0.005 −0.002
UK −0.059** −0.035 −0.037 −0.040 −0.049* −0.051* −0.040
CAN 0.024 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.018 0.018 0.015
AUS 0.031 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.029 0.031 0.030
R2 12.5 13.3 15.5 15.7 11.9 12.1 13.1
F 2.03*** 1.92** 2.42*** 2.33*** 1.80** 1.86** 1.78**
Sample of 287 mergers and acquisitions by 227 acquiring firms in 11 English-origin countries (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South
Africa, Thailand and United Kingdom) between 1997 and 2001 for completed transactions over US$ 10 million obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s SDC PlatinumTM
Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database. ACFRpre and ACFRpost is the pre- and post-industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted cash flow return. ACFR is for the change
in industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted cash flow return. Outliers have been winsorized using Huber’s M-estimator approach. Clustered robust standard errors. Two tail tests:
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. See Table 2 for variable definitions.
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ables. Panel A presents results for the post performance measure, ACFRpost. We can see that all
models are significant and that R2 are between 31.5% and 34.1%. Panel B shows results for the
change in performance, ACFR. Again, all models are significant and have R2 between 11.9%
and 15.7%. Looking at ownership, results further confirm the non-linear relationship between
ownership of the largest shareholder and the two operating performance measures. The presence
of a large shareholder (more than 10%) does not suggest over or under-performance in either mea-
sures (Model 1 in panels A and B). However, the presence of a large shareholder (more than 20%)
improves the change in performance by 2.9% (panel B, Model 2). When we separate firms with
large shareholders between 10% and 20% ownership (CONCEN1020) and more (CONCEN20),
we clearly see that the CONCEN1020 group under-performs (−2.6% for ACFRpost and −3.0%
for ACFR, both significant) whereas the CONCEN20 group over-performs the widely held
group (but not significantly).
We further investigate the actual level of concentration with our continuous variable LSH1P
(Models 5–7). Given the indications of a non-linear relationship, we introduce a quadratic and
cubic relationship. Model 5, the linear model, suggests that post performance (change in perfor-
mance) increases by 0.7% (1.4%) for a one percent change in concentration. However, the cubic
model (Model 7) better fits the data and captures the relationship exposed in prior models and
in the univariate tests. For the post-performance (panel A, Model 7), we find a first inflection
point at 15.13% where performance starts to increase with the level of concentration and a second
inflection point at 61.62% where performance start to taper off. Further analysis shows that our
curve remains below the level of widely held firms (the intercept, 0.072) up to the 34.85% level
of ownership, but is always greater than zero (ACFRpost at the first inflexion point is around
0.059). Also, performance remains above the level of widely held firms up to the 80.3% level
of ownership, dipping below zero at 97% (but the maximum level of ownership in our sample
is 87%). We find similar results for the change in performance with inflection points at 15.5%
and 63.85%.9 Hence, similar to Ben-Amar and André (2006) and others, firms with concentrated
ownership structures make good M&A decisions, on average. However, at lower levels of con-
centration there is some evidence that these firms perform more poorly than widely held firms
or more concentrated ones. Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that US family firms outperform
non-family firms over the entire spectrum of ownership levels, peaking at around 30%.
When looking at governance variables, we confirm that the separation of cash flow rights and
control rights is negatively related to performance similar to a number of studies (e.g., Bennedsen
& Nielsen, 2005; Claessens et al., 2000; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta
et al., 2002). Perceived good governance or investor protection in these English-origin countries
does not appear sufficient to mitigate the agency costs of separation. We also find that firms with
smaller boards do better than those with larger boards, capturing the potential inefficiency of larger
boards as suggested in the prior literature (e.g., Conyon & Peck, 1998; Jensen, 1993; Yermack,
1996). Other variables such as related CEO, duality or other block holders are not significant in
explaining long-term M&A performance.
Among deal characteristics and consistent with our univariate results, the presence of mul-
tiple bidders and of larger relative acquirers has a significant negative impact on post-adjusted
performance or the change in adjusted performance. Other variables such as hostility, payment
9 For our change measure, the curve remains below the level of widely held firms (the intercept, 0.036) up to the 35.2%
level of ownership, but is also always greater than zero (change in ACFR at the first inflection point is around 0.022).
Performance remains above the level of widely held firms up to the 83.8% level of ownership, dipping below zero at
93.6% but again the maximum level of ownership in our sample is 87%.
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method, relatedness, initial toehold, premium paid or leverage do not have a significant impact in
explaining the change in performance.
For legal variables, we find that high anti-director rights based on the updated measures by
Djankov et al. (2006) are positively associated with good M&A decisions for all model speci-
fications. Investor protection, even in English-origin countries, has an impact on performance.
However, we do not find a link between long-term acquisition performance and the new Djankov
et al. (2006) anti-self-dealing index.
5. Conclusion
This study investigates the relationship between concentrated ownership structure and long
term operating performance of acquiring firms in English-origin countries other than the US,
following the classification of La Porta et al. (1998). Our results confirm that after controlling for
governance mechanisms, deal characteristics, and legal systems, a non-linear relationship exists
between concentrated ownership and post-acquisition operating performance over 3 years after
the transaction. The companies with large shareholders but with a lower holding (between 10%
and 20%) of voting shares significantly under perform their peers. Higher levels of ownership are
associated with positive post-acquisition performance. Value creating deals are associated with
higher level of concentration consistent with decreasing agency costs as large shareholder wealth
invested in the acquiring firm increases. Further, separation of ownership and voting rights leads
to greater value destruction.
We also find, although acquiring firms are all from English-origin countries, that investor
protection has a varying influence on corporate performance. Our empirical results show that
ownership structure, individual governance mechanisms and characteristics of the legal system
are important determinants of performance in English-origin countries. Researchers need to exert
some care when they lump all English-origin firms together as having high corporate gover-
nance and investor protection since firm and country differences remain important in explaining
differences in performance.
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